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ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED, 

TO  THE 

CONSTitUTiON  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 

BY  JOSEPH  BUTLER,  LL.D., 

LATE  BISHOP  Of  DURHAM. 


WITH  AN  » 

INTRODUCTORY  PREFACE, 

BY  BISHOP  HALIFAX. 


10  WHICH  ARE  ADDED, 

COPIOUS  ANALYTICAL  QUESTIONS 

\ 

ifOR  THE 

EXAMINATION  OF  STUDENTS. 

BY  REV.  JOSEPH  McKEE,  A.M. 

STEREOTYPE  ACADEMY  AND  SCHOOL  EDITION. 


NEW  YORK: 

PUBLISHED  BY  MARK  H.  NEWMAN  &  CO., 

No.  199  BROADWAY 


1847. 


^  s> 
* 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  m  the  year  1847 
BY  MAKK  H.  NEWMAN  &  CO., 

In  the  Clerk’s  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for 
the  Southern  District  of  New  York. 


4 


CONTENTS. 


Preface  to  the  School  Edition . vii 

Preface,  by  Bishop  Halifax, . 1 

Life  of  Dr.  Butler,  by  Dr.  Kippis, . 19 

Advertisement,  .  i  * . 27 

Introduction,  .  i  .  29 


PART  I. 

OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 

CHAP.  L 

Of  a  Future  Life,  .  . . 39 

CHAP.  11. 

Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Punishments ;  and  par¬ 
ticularly  of  the  latter,  i  .....  i  ^  .  54 

CHAP.  III. 

Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God,  v  ......  64 

CHAP.  IV. 


Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  implying  Trial,  Difficulties,  and  Danger,  84 

CHAP.  V. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  for  Moral  Discipline  and  im¬ 
provement,  i  9t 

CHAP.  VI. 

On  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  influencing  Practice,  .  110 

CHAP.  VII. 

Of  the  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a  scheme,  or  Constitu¬ 
tion,  imperfectly  comprehended, . 123 

Conclusion,  .  .  133 


CONTENTS. 


PART  II. 

OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 

CHAP.  I. 

Pag«. 

Of  the  importance  of  Christianity, . 139 

CHAP.  IL 

Of  the  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revelation  considered  as 
Miraculous, . l54 

CHAP.  III. 

Of  our  incapacity  of  judging  what  were  to  be  expected  in  a  Revela¬ 
tion;  and  the  Credibility,  from  Analogy,  that  it  must  contain 
Things  appearing  liable  to  Objections,  ......  169 

CHAP.  IV; 

Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme,  or  Constitution,  imperfectly  , ,  , 
Comprehended, . .  ^  .  173 

CHAP.  V. 

Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity ;  the  appointment  of  a  Me¬ 
diator,  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World  by  him,  ....  180 

CHAP.  VI. 

Of  the  Want  of  Universality  in  Revelation ;  and  of  the  supposed 
Deficiency  in  the  proof  of  it,  .......  196 

CHAP.  VII. 

Of  the  particular  evidence  for  Christianity,  .  .  ;  .  *  213 

CHAP.  VIII. 

Of  the  objections  which  maybe  made  against  arguing  from  the  Anal- 

-  ogy  of  Nature  to  Religion,  ........  241 

Conclusion, . 251 


TWO  DISSERTATIONS  ON  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 


•  •  •  • 


Dissert.  I. 
Dissert.  II. 


4 


258 

264 


INTRODUCTORY  PREFACE 


TO  THE 

SCHOOL  EDITION. 


The  fundamental  truths  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion 
must  underlay  every  correct  system  of  academic  instruction.  This 
is  an  acknowledged  axiom.  The  religious  sentiment  is  the  crown¬ 
ing  perfection  of  the  scholar  and  the  man.  To  deny  this  in  theory, 
or  even  practically  to  neglect  it  during  a  course  of  school-room 
studies,  is  regarded  by  every  just  and  enlightened  thinker  as  an 
unpardonable  offence.  The  wisest  and  best  men  of  the  age,  urge 
the  paramount  necessity  of  moral  and  spiritual  culture  in  all  our 
seminaries  and  schools  of  learning.  Centuries  of  experience  have 
demonstrated  that  “  The  tree  of  knowledge  is  not  the  tree  of  life,^^ 
though  they  grow  side  by  side,  and  are  fostered  by  the  same 
genial  influences.  Earnest  instructors  and  enlightened  parents 
are  alike  anxious,  and  ready,  to  discard  from  their  systems  of  edu¬ 
cation,  that  sordid  utilitarianism,  which,  by  plying  the  intellect 
only,  seeks  to  fit  the  student  to  make  a  figure  in  the  world :  which 
studies  outsides  and  appearances — the  regulation  of  youthful  char¬ 
acter  and  conduct  according  to  the  conventionalisms  of  refined  so¬ 
ciety,  rather  than  according  to  that  which,  in  itself  considered,  is 
Good,  and  Just,  and  Fair. 

After  all  the  progress  that  has  been  made  in  modes  of  acquiring 
and  communicating  intellectual  knowledge,  little,  it  must  be  con¬ 
fessed,  has  been  accomplished  in  modes  of  acquiring  and  commu¬ 
nicating  moral  and  spiritual  instruction;  in  awakening  in  the 
youthful  heart  an  abiding  sense  of  virtue  and  true  greatness,  or 
in  fashioning  its  Life  after  the  model  of  what  it  ought  to  be,  as 
manifested  in  the  life  and  character  of  the  Divine  Founder  of 
Christianity. 

Ricli  as  this  age  is,  jb.eyond  all  othejrs,  in  text-books  for  school?, 


INTRODUCTORY  PREFACE. 


•  •  ♦ 

Viu 

still  there  is  a  want,  an  expressed  need,  of  school-boohs  that  will 
teach  the  rnysteries  of  the  Inner  Life,  the  fundamental  laws  of 
true  happiness  ;  the  immortality  and  destiny  of  man.  The  study 
of  the  ancient  classics,  the  mathematics  and  the  natural  sciences, 
need  not,  ought  not,  to  be  divorced  from  such  themes,  as  it  is  to 
be  feared  they  not  unfrequently  are,  particularly  when  the  aim  is 
to  make  a  brilliant  character  rather  than  a  just  thinker  and  a  right 
doer.  What  are  the  facts  and  phenomena  which  natural  science 
investigates  but  glimpses  of  the  Infinite  Mind,  as  unfolded  in  the 
material  creation — the  hidings  and  revealings  of  a  Power  whose 
“greatness  is  unsearchable?”  It  is  surely  proper  and  becom¬ 
ing  that  all  endeavors  to  interpret  their  meaning,  should  be  ac¬ 
companied  with  a  reverent  and  discreet  reference  to  their  great 
Author. 

We  need,  we  say,  in  our  schools,  a  more  direct  exposition  of 
the  principles  of  religious  truth  and  duty,  than  is  to  be  found  in 
the  class-books  in  conimon  use.  It  is  not  a  work  on  theology  that 
Is  wanted ;  nor  is  it  a  work  that  will  teach  the  formula  of  a  sect ; 
but  a  comprehensive,  logical,  and  scientific  summary  of  the  first 
truths  of  natural  and  revealed  religion,  and  the  evidences  on  which 
they  are  predicated.  “The  Analogy  of  Religion,  Natural 
AND  Revealed,  to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Na-. 
TURE,”  BY  Bishop  Butler,  comes  the  nearest  to  this  of  any  work 
in  the  English  language.  Butler  teaches  religion  neither  as  a 
creed  nor  a  dogma :  but  a  philosophy,  profound  and  searching  j 
the  science  of  the  human  soul ;  its  immortality,  its  destiny ;  its 
subjection  to  law  stern  and  unescapable ;  the  analogies  between 
the  moral  and  m.aterial  laws  of  the  universe — teaching,  which  the 
pupil  who  has  had  the  right  kind  of  home  training,  reverences., 
To  say  that  it  is  a  masterly  and  unanswerable  defence  of  the  fun-f 
damental  facts  of  the  Christian  religion,  is  but  to  repeat  the  ex¬ 
pression  of  very  nearly  a  century  of  keen-eyed  criticism  and 
investigation.  Nor  has  it  been  overlooked  as  a  text-book  for 
school-room  instruction.  It  has  been  introduced  to  some  extent 
into  the  public  and  private  schools  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  Still,  valuable  as  it  confessedly  is,  and  profound  and  clear 
as  its  arguments  are,  the  costume,  the  metaphysical  air  of  the 
book,  scares  the  timid  young  student.  He  is  afraid  to  grapple 
with  thoughts  so  severely  logical,  and  uttered  in  a  style  not  only 
ungainly,  but  at  times  obscure.  Add  to  this,  it  wants  those  flash¬ 
ings  up  of  genius  and  imagination,  which  delight  him  so  much  in 


INTRODUCTORY  PREFACE. 


IX 


his  favorite  Ancient  and  English  classics.  He  needs  help — stimu¬ 
lus— every  facility  short  of  that  which  w^ould  encourage  intellec¬ 
tual  laziness.  This  we  have  endeavored,  however  imperfectly, 
to  give  him,  by  a  series  of  analytical  questions  constructed  as 
nearly  as  possible  in  the  language  of  the  work  itself,  so  that  his 
attention  may  be  directed,  with  keen  eyes,  to  the  most  important 
doctrines  and  illustrations  in  the  text. 

It  is  true,  some  of  the  most  accomplished  teachers  are  opposed 
to  this  mode  of  instruction.  They  sturdily  contend  for  recitations 
prepared  by  topics.  Still  we  prefer  the  Socratic  or  interrogatory 
form,  and  particularly  so,  when  the  questions  for  exercise  are 
added  to  the  work  as  an  appendix,  instead  of  in  the  margin,  or  at 
the  foot  of  the  page.  It  renders  the  study  of  the  work  less  toil¬ 
some  ;  it  generates  habits  of  thinking  and  inquiry  ;  it  exercises  the 
memory  without  overburdening  it ; — in  a  word,  it  enables  the 
scholar  to  come  to  the  class-room,  conscious  he  is  prepared  for  his 
recitation,  whether  it  be  conducted  by  extemporaneous  or  printed 
interrogatories.  Nor  is  this  all.  There  is  no  other  mode,  which, 
when  judiciously  managed,  brings  the  mind  of  the  instructor  so 
efficiently  in  contact  with  the  minds  of  his  class.  Questions  for 
exercise,  however— that  is,  printed  questions^ — are  for  the  scholar. 
The  teacher  may  use  them  or  not,  as  his  own  experience  and  the 
exigencies  of  his  class  may  determine.  But  such  questions  are, 
emphatically^  for  the  scholar. 

These  Questions,  which  we  offer  as  helps  for  the  study  of  the 
Analogy,  were  originally  written  out  for  a  class  of  Young  Ladies 
in  one  of  the  oldest  and  best  known  Female  Seminaries  in  this 
city.  They  were  prepared  hurriedly,  (and  without  the  most  dis¬ 
tant  intention  of  publication,)  so  that  they  might  be  in  the  hands 
of  the  class  before  the  commencement  of  the  study.  Imperfect  as 
they  are,  we  trust  they  will  save  other  teachers  and  classes  the 
manual  toil  of  writing  out  and  transcribing  similar  exercises  on 
this  work.  To  both  we  say,  “  Si  quid  melius  novisti  impertito  ; 
si  non  utere  his  mecum.''^ 

We  do  earnestly  desire  to  see  Butler’s  Analogy  a  popular 
school-book.  It  ought  not  to  be  consigned  to  the  dusty  shelves  of 
a  library.  It  is  questionable  whether  the  present  is  an  age  of 
higher  faith  in  the  facts  of  Christianity,  than  that  which  called  for 
the  work  originally.  But  be  this  as  it  may,  its  wide  circulation 
as  a  school-book  must  tell  on  the  belief  and  practice  of  the  rising 
youth.  Several  attempts  have  been  made  to  modernize  this 


X 


INTRODUCTORY  PREFACE. 


work:  no  such  liberties  have  been  taken  with  this  edition.  We 
would  not  dislodge  a  single  brick  from  the  setting  in  which  the 
hand  of  Butler  placed  it.  It  would  be  sacrilege. 

As  an  intellectual  gymnastic — a  work  well  fitted  to  give  tq  the 
young  mind  an  active  and  inquisitive  turn: — it  has  no  superior. 
Still,  this  is  not  its  highest  excellence.  The  study  of  other  works 
will  answer  the  same  purpose  equally  well.  Nor  is  academic 
drill  and  discipline  absolutely  necessary  for  this.  The  mind  will 
grow  sharp  soon  enough  by  the  friction  of  every-day  life,  to  fit  it 
for  the  ordinary  pursuits  of  business  and  the  world.  It  will  soon 
become  athletic  enough  by  its  wrestlings  with  time  and  circum-; 
stances  for  this.  We  have  distinguished  men  in  all  the  walks  of 
science,  art,  literature,  and  commerce,  who  owe  little  to  scholastic 
training.  But  the  chief  value  of  this  masterly  work  lies  in  the 
great  thoughts  and  doctrines  which  it  teaches :  in  its  vivifying  and 
healthful  influence  in  waking  up,  and  making  alive  the  religious 
sentiment ;  and  arming  the  young  student  with  logical  and  manly 
reasons  for  his  faith  in  the  profound  teachings  of  Christianity ; 
without  which,  the  education  of  youth  is  incomplete,  no  matter 
how  thoroughly  and  well  soever  the  perceptive  and  reflectin.g 
faculties  may  have  been  disciplined. 


New  York  May,  1847. 


PREFACE 


BY 

SAMUEL  HALIFAX,  D.D., 

LATE  LORD  BISHOP  OF  GLOUCESTER. 


[The  following  prefatory  analysis  of  Butler’s  Moral  and  Religious 
Systems,  and  of  his  method  of  applying  reasonings  drawn  from  Analogy 
to  the  Subject  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion,  deserves  the  marked 
attention  of  the  student.] 

In  some  editions,  this  preface  is  preceded  by  a  few  pages, 
designed  to  shield  Bishop  Butler’s  character  against  the 
charge  of  superstition  ;  placing  too  much  stress  on  rites  and 
ceremonies  in  religion :  a  tendency  to  substitute  penances 
and  forms  in  the  room  of  Christianity.  We  have  omitted 
these  pages  as  they  are  in  no  way  connected  with  this  work, 
and  add  nothing  to  its  interest  or  value.  There  seems,  how¬ 
ever,  to  have  been  no  just  grounds  for  such  a  calumny. 
Bishop  Butler,  like  many  good  men  of  the  present  age,  was 
deeply  affected  by  the  growing  indifference  of  the  mass  of  the 
people  to  religious  duties  and  observances  ;  and  in  his  pri¬ 
mary  charge  to  the  Clergy  of  his  Diocese  in  1751,  he  boldly 
asserted  the  usefulness  of  forms  and  rites  addressed  to  the 
senses  as  aids  to  devotion  and  'piety :  a  charge,  which,  at  the 
time,  gave  very  general  offence  to  the  Church,  and  which, 
taken  in  connection  with  some  other  facts  in  the  history  of 
this  good  man’s  life,  formed  the  stuff,  out  of  which  the  alle¬ 
gations,  we  have  referred  to,  were  manufactured  several 
years  after  his  death. 

It  is  painful  to  think  so  little  of  the  moral  and  religious 
workings  of  the  mind  of  this  great  man  is  known.  We 
would  gladly  know  something  definitely  of  his  intellectual 
and  spiritual  life,  during  the  twenty  years  of  study  and  pre¬ 
paration  devoted  to  the  composition  of  The  Analogy ;  from 
the  first  rude  conception  of  the  work,  until  it  came  forth  frorn 
his  hands,  like  the  statue  from  the  mallet  and  chisel  of  the 
sculptor  finished,  ad  ungem.  Every  sentence,  it  is  said,  has 


2 


PREFACE. 


been  fashioned  and  moulded  into  the  present  form  by  repeated 
re-writing  and  condensation.  And  we  can  easily  believe  it, 
for  the  words  are  laid  together  in  many  sentences  so  closely 
and  skilfully,  that  one  more,  or  one  less,  would  destroy  the 
unity  and  meaning  of  the  whole. 

The  literary  reputation  of  Bishop  Butler,  however,  is  in 
truth  the  least  of  his  excellencies.  He  was  more  than  a 
good  writer  :  he  was  a  good  man  ;  and  what  is  an  addition 
even  to  this  eulogy,  he  was  a  sincere  Christian.  His  whole 
study  was  directed  to  the  knowledge  and  practice  of  sound 
morality  and  true  religion  ;  these  he  adorned  by  his  life,  and 
has  recommended  to  future  ages  in  his  writings  ;  in  which, 
if  my  judgment  be  of  any  avail,  he  has  done  essential  service 
to  both,  as  much,  perhaps,  as  any  single  person,  since  the 
extraordinary  gifts  of  “  the  word  of  wisdom  and  the  word 
of  knowledge”*  have  been  withdrawn. 


In  what  follows  I  propose  to  give  a  snort  account  of  the 
Bishop’s  moral  and  religious  systems^  as  these  are  collected 
from  his  works. 

I.  His  way  of  treating  the  subject  of  morals  is  to  be 
gathered  from  the  volume  of  his  Sermons,  and  particularly 
from  the  three  first,  and  from  the  preface  to  that  volume. 

“  There  is,”  as  our  author  with  singular  sagacity  has  ob¬ 
served,  “  a  much  more  exact  correspondence  between  the 
natural  and  moral  world,  than  we  are  apt  to  take  notice  of.”'{' 
The  inward  frame  of  man  answers  to  his  outward  condition  ; 
the  several  propensities,  passions,  and  affections,  implanted 
in  our  hearts  by  the  Author  of  nature,  are  in  a  particular 
manner  adapted  to  the  circumstances  of  life  in  which  he 
hath  placed  us.  This  general  observation,  properly  pursued, 
leads  to  several  important  conclusions.  The  original  inter¬ 
nal  constitution  of  man,  compared  with  his  external  condi¬ 
tion,  enables  us  to  discern  what  course  of  action  and  be¬ 
havior  that  constitution  leads  to^  what  is  our  duty  respect¬ 
ing  that  condition,  and  furnishes  us  besides  with  the  most 
powerful  arguments  to  the  practice  of  it. 

What  the  inward  frame  and  constitution  of  man  is,  is  a 
question  of  fact ;  to  be  determined,  as  other  facts  are,  from 
experience,  from  our  internal  feelings  and  external  senses 


♦  1  Cor.  xii.  8. 


*{•  Serm,>  vi. 


BY  THE  EDITOK. 


3 


and  from  the  testimony  of  others.  Whether  human  nature, 
and  the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  placed,  might  not  have 
been  ordered  otherwise,  is  foreign  to  our  inquiry,  and  none 
of  our  concern.  Our  province  is,  taking  both  of  these  as 
they  are,  and  viewing  the  connexion  between  them,  from 
that  connexion  to  discover,  if  we  can,  what  course  of  action 
is  fitted  to  that  nature  and  those  circumstances.  From  con¬ 
templating  the  bodily  senses,  and  the  organs  or  instruments 
adapted  to  them,  we  learn  that  the  eye  was  given  to  see 
with,  the  ear  to  hear  with.  In  like  manner,  from  consider¬ 
ing  our  inward  perceptions  and  the  final  causes  of  them,  we 
collect  that  the  feeling  of  shame,  for  instance,  was  given  to 
prevent  the  doing  of  things  shameful ;  compassion,  to  carry 
us  to  relieve  others  in  distress  ;  anger,  to  resist  sudden  vio¬ 
lence  offered  to  ourselves.  If,  continuing  our  inquiries  in 
this  way,  it  should  at  length  appear,  that  the  nature,  the 
whole  nature  of  man  leads  him  to,  and  is  fitted  for,  that  par¬ 
ticular  course  of  behaviour  which  we  generally  distinguish¬ 
ed  by  the  name  of  virtue,  we  are  authorized  to  conclude, 
that  virtue  is  the  law  we  are  born  under,  that  it  was  so  in¬ 
tended  by  the  Author  of  our  being  ;  and  we  are  bound  by 
the  most  intimate  of  all  obligations,  a  regard  to  our  own 
high  interest  and  happiness,  to  conform  to  it  in  all  situations 
and  events. 

Human  nature  is  not  simple  and  uniform,  but  made  up 
of  several  parts  ;  and  we  can  have  no  just  idea  of  it  as  a 
system  or  constitution,  unless  we  take  into  our  view 
the  respects  and  relation  which  these  parts  have  to  each 
other.  As  the  body  is  not  one  member,  but  many  ;  so 
our  inward  structure  consists  of  various  instincts,  appetites, 
and  propensions.  Thus  far  there  is  no  difference  between 
human  creatures  and  brutes.  But  besides  these  common 
passions  and  affections,  there  is  another  principle  pecu¬ 
liar  to  mankind,  that  of  conscience,  moral  sense,  reflection, 
call  it  what  jmu  please,  by  wdiich  they  are  enabled  to  review 
their  whole  conduct,  to  approve  of  some  actions  in  them¬ 
selves,  and  to  disapprove  of  others.  That  this  principle  will 
of  course  have  some  influence  on  our  behaviour,  at  least  at 
times,  will  hardly  be  disputed  ;  but  the  particular  influence 
wnich  it  ought  to  have,  the  precise  degree  of  powxr  in  the 
regulating  of  our  internal  frame  that  is  assigned  it  by  Him 
who  placed  it  there,  is  a  point  of  the  utmost  consequence  in 
Itself,  and  on  the  determination  of  which,  the  very  hinge  of 
our  Author’s  iMoral  System  turns.  If  the  faculty  here  spo- 


4 


PREFACE 


ken  of  be,  indeed,  what  it  is  asserted  to  be,  in  nature  and 
kind,  superior  to  every  other  passion  and  affection  ;  if  it  be 
given,  not  merely  that  it  may  exert  its  force  occasionally,  oi 
as  our  present  humour  or  fancy  may  dispose  us,  but  that  k 
may  at  all  times  exercise  an  uncontrollable  authority  and 
government  over  all  the  rest ;  it  will  then  follow,  that,  in  or¬ 
der  to  complete  the  idea  of  human  nature  as  a  system,  we 
must  not  only  take  in  each  particular  bias,  propension,  in¬ 
stinct,  which  are  seen  to  belong  to  it,  but  we  must  add,  be¬ 
sides,  the  principle  of  conscience,  together  with  the  subjec¬ 
tion  that  is  due  to  it  from  all  the  other  appetites  and  passions  ; 
just  as  the  idea  of  a  civil  constitution  is  formed,  not  barely 
from  enumerating  the  several  members,  and  ranks  of  which 
it  is  composed,  but  from  these  considered  as  acting  in  vari¬ 
ous  degrees  of  subordination  to  each  other,  and  all  under 
the  direction  of  the  supreme  authority,  whether  that  authori¬ 
ty,  be  vested  in  one  person  or  more. 

The  view  here  given  of  the  internal  constitution  of  man, 
and  of  the  supremacy  of  conscience,  agreeable  to  the  con¬ 
ceptions  of  Bishop  Butler,  enables  us  to  comprehend  the 
force  of  that  expression,  common  to  him  and  the  ancient 
moralists,  that  virtue-  consists  in  following  nature.  The 
meaning  cannot  be,  that  it  consists  in  acting  agreeably  to 
that  propensity  of  our  nature  which  happens  to  be  the  stron¬ 
gest  ;  or  which  propels  us  towards  certain  objects  without  any 
regard  to  the  methods  by  which  they  are  to  be  obtained;  but 
the  meaning  must  be,  that  virtue  consists  in  the  due  regulation 
and  subjection  of  all  the  other  appetites  and  affections  to  the 
superior  facultj^  of  conscience  ;  from  a  conformity  to  which 
alone  our  actions  are  properly  natural^  or  coriespondent  to 
the  nature,  to  the  whole  nature,  of  such  an  agent  as  man. 
From  hence  too  it  appears,  that  the  Author  of  our  frame  is 
by  no  means  indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice,  or  has  left  us  at 
liberty  to  act  at  random,  as  humour  or  appetite  may  prompt 
us  ;  but  that  every  man  has  the  rule  of  right  within  him  ; 
a  rule  attended  in  the  very  notion  of  it  with  authority,  and 
such  as  has  the  force  of  a  direction  and  a  command  from 
Him  who  made  us  what  we  are,  what  course  of  behaviour 
is  suited  to  our  nature,  and  which  he  expects  that  wc.  should 
follow.  This  moral  faculty  implies  also  a  presentiment  and 
apprehension,  that  the  judgment  which  it  passes  on  our  ac¬ 
tions,  considered  as  of  good  or  ill  desert,  will  hereafter  be 
confirmed  by  the  unerring  judgment  of  God  ;  when  virtue 
and  happiness,  vipe  and  misery,  whose  ideas  are  now  so 


BY  THE  EDITOR. 


5 


closely  connected,  shall  be  indissolubly  united,  and  the  divine 
government  be  found  to  correspond  in  the  most  exact  propor¬ 
tion  to  the  nature  he  has  given  us.  Lastly,  this  just  preroga¬ 
tive  or  supremacy  of  conscience  it  is,  which  Mr  Pope  has 
described  in  his  Universal  Prayer ^  though  perhaps,  he  may 
have  expressed  it  rather  too  strongly  where  he  says, 

‘  What  conscience  dictates  to  be  done 
Or  warns  me  not  to  do, 

This  teach  me  more  than  hell  to  shun, 

That,  more  than  heaveri  pursue.’ 

The  reader  will  observe,  that  this  way  of  treating  the 
subject  of  morals,  by  an  appeal  to  facts ^  does  not  at  all  inter¬ 
fere  with  that  other  wa}’’,  adopted  by  Dr  Samuel  Clarke  and 
others,  which  begins  y/ith  inquiririg  into  the  relations  and 
fitness  of  things^  but  rather  illustrates  and  confirms  it.  That 
there  are  essential  differences  in  the  qualities  of  human  ac¬ 
tions,  established  by  nature,  and  that  this  natural  difference  of 
things,  prior,  to  and  independent  of  all  luill,  creates  a  natural 
fitness  in  the  agent  to  act  agreeably  to  it,  seems  as  little  to 
be  denied,  as  that  there  is  the  moral  difference  before  explain^ 
ed,  from  which  we  approve  and  feel  a  pleasure  in  what  is 
right,  and  conceive  a  distaste  to  what  is  wrong.  Still,  how¬ 
ever,  when  we  are  endeavoring  to  establish  either  this  mo¬ 
ral  or  that  natural  difference,  it  ought  never  to  be  forgotten, 
or  rather  it  will  require  to  be  distinctly  shown,  that  both  of 
these,  when  traced  up  to  their  source,  suppose  an  intelligent 
Author  of  nature,  and  moral  ruler  of  the  world ;  who  ori¬ 
ginally  appointed  these  differences,  and  by  such  an  appoint¬ 
ment  has  signified  his  will  that  we  should  conform  to  them, 
as  the  only  effectual  method  of  securing  our  happiness  on  the 
whole  under  his  government.*  And  of  this  consideration  oui 
prelate  himself  was  not  unmindful ;  as  may  be  collected 
from  many  expressions  in  different  parts  of  his  writings, 
and  particularly  from  the  following  passages  in  his  Xlth 
Sermion.  ‘  It  may  be  allowed,  without  any  prejudice  to  the 
cause  of  virtue  and  religion,  that  our  ideas  of  happiness  and 
misery  are,  of  all  our  ideas,  the  nearest  and  most  important 
to  us  ;  that  they  will,  nay,  if  you  please,  that  they  ought 
to  prevail  over  those  of  order,  and  beauty,  and  harmony,  and 
proportion,  if  there  should  ever  be,  as  it  is  impossible  there 
ever  should  be,  any  inconsistence  bctweep  them.’  And 


*  See  note  E,  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 


6 


PREFACE 


again,  ‘  Though  virtue  or  moral  rectitude  does  indeed,  con¬ 
sist  in  affection  to  and  pursuit  of  what  is  right  and  good,  as 
such  ;  yet,  when  we  sit  down  in  a  cool  hour,  we  can  neither 
justify  to  ou/selves  this  or  any  other  pursuit,  till  we  are  con¬ 
vinced  that  it  will  be  for  our  happiness,  or  at  least  not  con¬ 
trary  to  it.’* * * § 

Besides  the  general  system  of  morality  opened  above,  our 
Author,  in  his  volume  of  Sermons,  has  stated  with  accuracy 
the  difference  between  self  love  and  benevolence  j  in  oppo¬ 
sition  to  those  who,  on  the  one  hand,  make  the  whole  of 
virtue  to  consist  in  benevolence, 'j'  and  to  those  who,  on  the 
other,  assert  that  every  particular  affection  and  action  is're- 
solvable  into  self-love.  In  combating  these  opinions,  he  has 
shown,  I  think,  unanswerably,  that  there  are  the  same  kind 
of  indications  m  human  nature,  that  we  were  made  to  pro¬ 
mote  the  happiness  of  others,  as  that  we*  were  made  to  pro¬ 
mote  our  own  ;  that  it  is  no  just  objection  to  this,  that  we 
have  dispositions  to  do  evil  to  others  as  well  as  good ;  for  we 
have  also  dispositions  to  do  evil  as  well  as  good  to  ourselves^ 
to  our  own  most  important  interests  even  in  this  life,  for  the 
sake  of  gratifying  a  present  passion  ;  that  the  thing  to  be 
lamented  is,  not  that  men  have  too  great  a  regard  to  their 
own  real  good,  but  that  they  have  not  enough  ;  that  bene¬ 
volence  is  not  more  at  variance  with,  or  unfriendly  to,  self 
love,  than  any  other  particular  affection  is  ;  and  that  by  con¬ 
sulting  the  happiness  of  others  a  man  is  so  far  from  lessen¬ 
ing  his  own,  that  the  very  endeavour  to .  do  so  though  he 
should  fail  in  the  accomplishment,  is  a  source  of  the  high¬ 
est  satisfaction  and  peace  of  mind.J  He  has  also,  in  pas¬ 
sing,  animadverted  on  the  philosopher  of  Malmsbury,  who, 
in  his  book  ‘  Of  Human  Nature,’  has  advanced,  as  discove¬ 
ries  in  moral  science,  that  benevolence  is  only  the  love  of 
power,  and  compassion  the  fear  of  future  calamity  to  our¬ 
selves.  And  this  our  Author  has  done,  not  so  much  v/ith 
the  design  of  exposing  the  false  reasoning  of  Mr  Hobbes, 
but  because  on  so  perverse  an  account  of  human  nature  he 
has  raised  a  system,  subversive  of  all  justice  and  honesty. § 

II.  The  religious  system  of  Bishop  Butler  is  chiefly  to 
be  collected  from  the  treatise,  entitled,  ‘  The  Analogy 

*  Serm.  xi. 

t  See  the  2d  Dissertation  ‘  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue.’ 

t  See  Serm.  i.  and  xi.  and  the  Preface  to  the  Volume  of  Sermon*. 

§  See  the  notes  to  Serm.  i.  and  v. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  ^ 

Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed,  to  the  Constitution  and 
Course  of  nature.’ 

‘  All  things  are  double  one  against  another,  and  God  hath 
made  nothing  imperfect.’*  On  this  single  observation  of 
the  Son  of  Sirach,  the  whole  fabric  of  our  prelate’s  defence 
of  religion,  in  his  Analogy,  is  raised.  Instead  of  indulging 
in  idle  speculations,  how  the  world  might  possibly  have 
been  better  than  it  is  ;  or,  forgetful  of  the  dhference  between 
hypothesis  and  fact,  attempting  to  explain  the  divine  econo¬ 
my  with  respect  to  intelligent  creatures,  from  preconceived 
notions  of  his  own  ;  he  first  inquires  what  the  constitution 
of  nature,  as  made  known  to  us  in  the  way  of  experiment, 
actually  is  ;  and  from  this,  now  seen  and  acknowledged,  he 
endeavours  to  form  a  judgment  of  that  larger  constitution, 
which  religion  discovers  to  us.  If  the  dispensation  of  Pro¬ 
vidence  we  are  now  under,  considered  as  inhabitants  of  this 
world,  and  having  a  temporal  interest  to  secure  in  it,  be 
found,  on  examination,  to  be  analogous  to,  and  of  a  piece 
with  that  further  dispensation,  which  relates  to  us  as  design¬ 
ed  for  another  world,  in  which  we  have  an  eternal  interest, 
depending  on  our  behaviour  here  ;  if  both  may  be  traced  up 
to  the  same  general  laws,  and  appear  to  be  carried  on  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  same  plan  of  administration  ;  the  fair  pre¬ 
sumption  is,  that  both  proceed  from  one  and  the  same  Au¬ 
thor.  And  if  the  principal  parts  objected  to  in  this  latter 
dispensation  be  similar  to,  and  of  the  same  kijid  w'ith  what 
we  certainly  experience  under  the  former  ;  the  objections, 
being  clearly  inconclusive  in  one  case,  because  contradicted 
by  plain  fact,  must,  in  all  reason,  be  allowed  to  be  inconclu¬ 
sive  also  in  the  other. 

This  way  of  arguing  from  what  is  acknowledged  to  what 
is  disputed,  from  things  known  to  other  things  that  resemble 
them,  from  that  part  of  the  divine  establishment  Vv^hich  is 
exposed  to  our  view  to  that  more  important  one  which  lies 
beyond  it,  is  on  all  hands  confessed  to  be  just.  By  this  me¬ 
thod  Sir  Isaac  Newton  has  unfolded  the  system  of  nature  ; 
Dy  the  same  method  Bishop  Butler  has  explained  the  sys¬ 
tem  of  grace  ;  and  thus,  to  use  the  words  of  a  writer,  whom 
I  quote  with  pleasure,  ‘  has  formed  and  concluded  a  happy 
alliance  between  faith  and  philosophy.’! 

And  although  the  argument  from  analogy  be  allowed  to 
be  imperfect,  and  by  no  means  sufficient  to  solve  all  difficul- 

*  Eccles.  xlii.  24 

T  Mr  Mainvs^ring’s  Dissertation,  prefixed  to  his  Volume  of  Sermons, 


8 


PREFACE 


ties  respecting  the  government  of  God,  and  the  designs  of 
his  providence  with  regard  to  mankind  ;  (a  degree  of  knowl¬ 
edge,  which  we  are  not  furnished  with  faculties  for  attain¬ 
ing,  at  least  in  the  present  state  ;)  yet  surely  it  is  of  impor¬ 
tance  to  learn  from  it,  that  the  natural  and  moral  world  are 
intimately  connected,  and  parts  of  one  stupendous  whole,  or 
system ;  and  that  the  chief  objections  which  are  brought 
agaii:^t  religion,  may  be  urged  with  equal  force  against  the 
constitution  and  course  of  nature,  where  they  are  certainly 
false  in  fact.  And  this  information  we  may  derive  from  the 
work  before  us  ;  the  proper  design  of  which,  it  may  be  of 
use  to  observe,  is  not  to  prove  the  truth  of  religion,  either 
natural  or  revealed,  but  to  confirm  that  proof. already  known, 
by  considerations  from  aiialogy. 

After  this  account  of  the  method  of  reasoning  employed 
by  our  Author,  let  us  now  advert  to  his  manner  of  applying 
it,  first,  to  the  subject  of  Natural  Religion,  and,  secondly,  to 
that  of  Revealed. 

1.  The  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  fears  is  a  future 
life  ;  and  with  this  the  treatise  begins.  Neither  the  reason' 
of  the  thing,  nor  the  analogy  of  nature,  according  to  Bishop 
Butler,  give  ground  for  imagining,  that  the  unknown  event, 
death,  will  he  our  destruction.  The  states  in  which  we  have 
formerly  existed,  in  the  womb  and  in  infancy,  are  not  more 
different  from  each  other  than  from  that  of  mature  age  in 
which  we  now  exist  ■  therefore,  that  we  shall  continue  to 
exist  hereafter,  in  a  state  as  different  from  the  present  as  the 
present  is  from  those  through  which  we  have  passed  alrea¬ 
dy,  is  a  presuniption  favored  by  the  analogy  of  nature.  All 
that  we  know  from  reason  concerning  death,  is  the  effects  it 
has  upon  animal  bodies  ;  and  the  frequent  instances  among 
men,  of  the  intellectual  powers  continuing  in  high  health 
and  vigour,  at  the  very  time  when  a  mortal  disease  is  on  the 
point  of  putting  an  end  to  all  the  powers  of  sensation,  induce 
us  to  hope  that  it  may  have  no  effect  at  all  on  the  human  soul, 
not  even  so  much  as  to  suspend  the  exercise  of  its  faculties  ; 
though  if  it  have,  the  suspension  of  a  power  by  no  means  im¬ 
plies  its  extinction,  as  sleep  or  a  swoon  may  convince  us.* 

The  probability  of  a  future  state  once  granted,  an  impor¬ 
tant  question  arises,  How  best  to  secure  our  interest  in  that 
state  ?  We  find  from  what  passes  daily  before  us,  that  the 
constitution  of  nature  admits  of  misery  as  well  as  happiness  ; 


*  Part  i.  chap.  1. 


9 


BY  THE  EDITOR. 

that  both  of  these  are  the  consequences  of  our  qwn  actions, 
and  these  consequences  we  are  enabled  to  foresee.  There¬ 
fore,  that  our  happiness  or  misery  in  a  future  world  may  de¬ 
pend  on  our  own  actions  also,  and  that  rewards  or  punish¬ 
ments  hereafter  may  follow  our  good  or  ill  behaviour  here,  is 
but  an  appointment  of  the  same  sort  with  what  we  expe¬ 
rience  under  the  divine  government,  according  to  the  regular 
course  of  nature.* 

This  supposition  is  confirmed  from  another  circumstance, 
that  the  natural  government  of  God,  under  which  we  now 
live,  is  also  moral ;  in  which  rewards  and  punishments  are 
the  consequences  of  actions,  considered  as  virtuous  and 
vicious.  Not  that  every  man  is  rewarded  or  punished  here 
in  exact  proportion  to  his  desert ;  for  the  essential  tendencies 
of  virtue  ancf  vice,  to  produce  happiness  and  the  contrary, 
are  often  hindered  from  taking  effect  from  accidental  causes. 
However,  there  are  plainly  the  rudiments  and  beginnings  of 
a  righteous  administration  to  be  discerned  in  the  constitution 
of  nature  ;  from  whence  we  are  led  to  expect,  that  these  ac¬ 
cidental  hindrances  will  one  day  be  removed,  and  the  rule  of 
distributive  justice  obtain  completely  in  a  more  perfect  state. y 

The  moral  government  of  God,  thus  established,  implies  in 
the  notion  of  it  some  sort  of  trial,  or  a  moral  possibility  of  act¬ 
ing  wrong  as  well  as  right,  in  those  who  are  the  subjects  of 
it.  xlnd  the  doctrine  of  religion,  that  the  present  life  is  in 
fact  a  state  of  probation  for  a  future  one,  is  rendered  credible 
from  its  being  analogous  throughout  to  the  general  conduct 
of  Providence  towards  us  with  respect  to  this  world  ;  in 
which  prudence  is  necessary  to  secure  our  temporal  interest, 
just  as  ^ye  a?:o  taught  that  virtue  is  necessary  to  secure  our 
eternal  interest :  and  both  are  trusted  to  ourselves.  J 

But  the  present  life  is  not  merely  a  state  of  probation,  im¬ 
plying  in  it  difficulties  and  danger,  it  is  also  a  state  of  disci¬ 
pline  and  improvement :  and  that,  both  in  our  temporal  and 
religious  capacity.  Thus,  childhood  is  a  state  of  discipline 
for  youth ;  youth  for  manhood ;  and  that  for  old  age.  Strength 
of  body,  and  maturity  of  understanding,  are  acquired  by  de¬ 
grees  :  and  neither  of  them  without  continual  exercise  and 
attention  on  our  part,  not  only  ip  the  beginning  of  life,  but 
through  the  whole  course  of  it.  So,  again,  with  respect  to 
QUr  religious  concerns,  the  present  world  is  fitted  to  be,  and 

*  Chap.  2  t  Chap.  3.  |  Part  i.  chap.  4, 


10 


PREFACE 


to  good  men  is  an  event,  a  state  of  discipline  and  improve* 
ment  for  a  future  one.  The  several  passions  and  propensions 
implanted  in  our  hearts,  incline  us,  in  a  multitude  of  instan* 
ces,  to  forbidden  pleasures  ;  this  inward  infirmity  is  increa¬ 
sed  by  various  snares  and  temptations,  perpetually  occurring 
from  without ;  hence  arises  the  necessity  of  recollection  and 
self-government,  of  withstanding  the  calls  of  appetite,  and 
forming  our  minds  to  habits  of  piety  and  virtue  ;  habits  of 
which  we  are  capable,  and  which,  to  creatures  in  a  state  of 
moral  imperfection,  and  fallen  from  their  original  integrity, 
must  be  of  the  greatest  use,  as  an  additional  security,  over 
and  above  the  principle  of  conscience,  from  the  dangers  to 
which  we  are  exposed,* 

Nor  is  the  credibility  here  given,  by  the  analogy  of  nature, 
to  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  destroyed  or  weakened  by 
any  notions  concerning  necessity.  Of  itself  it  is  a  mere 
word,  the  sign  of  an  abstract  idea  ;  and  as  much  requires  an 
agent,  that  is,  a  necessary  agent  in  order  to  effect  any  thing, 
as  freedom  requires  a  free  agent.  A  dmitting  it  to  be  specu¬ 
latively  true,  if  considered  as  influencing  practice,  it  is  the 
same  as  false  :  for  it  is  matter  of  experience,  that,  with  re¬ 
gard  to  our  present  interest,  and  as  inhabitants  of  this  world, 
we  are  treated  as  if  we  were  free ;  and  therefore  the  analo¬ 
gy  of  nature  leads  us  to  conclude,  that,  with  regard  to  oui 
future  interest,  and  as  designed  for  another  world,  we  shall 
be  treated  as  free  also.  Nor  does  the  opinion  of  necessity, 
supposing  it  possible,  at  all  affect  either  the  general  proof  of 
religion,  or  its  external  evidence.']' 

Still  objections  may  be  made  against  the  wisdom  and  good¬ 
ness  of  the  divine  government,  to  which  analogy,  which  can 
only  show  the  truth  or  credibility  of  facts,  affords  no  answer. . 
Y et  even  here  analogy  is  of  use,  if  it  suggest  that  the  di¬ 
vine  government  is  a  scheme  or  system  and  not  a  number 
of  unconnected  acts,  and  that  this  system  is  also  above  oui 
comprehension.  Now,  the  government  of  the  natural  world 
appears  to  be  a  system  of  this  kind  ;  with  parts,  related  to 
each  other,  and  together  composing  a  whole  :  in  which  sys?- 
tem,  ends  are  brought  about  by  the  use  of  means,  many  of 
which  means,  before  experience,  would  have  been  suspected 
to  have  had  a  quite  contrary  tendency  ;  which  is  carried  on 
by  general  laws,  similar  causes  uniformly  producing  similar 
effects ;  the  utihty  of  which  general  laws,  and  the  inconve- 


^  Chap.  6, 


t  Fart  h  Chap.  6. 


BY  THE  EDITOB. 


n 


niences  which  would  probably  arise  from  the  occasional  or 
even  secret  suspension  of  them,  we  are  in  some  sort  enabled 
to  discern  but  of  the  whole  we  are  incompetent  judges, 
because  of  the  small  part  which  comes  within  our  view. 
Reasoning  then  from  what  we  know,  it  is  highly  credible, 
that  the  government  of  the  moral  world  is  a  system  also  car* 
ried  on  by  general  laws,  and  in  which  ends  are  accomplish¬ 
ed  by  the  intervention  of  means  ;  and  that  both  constitu 
tions,  the  natural  and  the  moral,  are  so  connected,  as  to  form 
together  but  one  scheme.  But  of  this  scheme,  as  that  of 
the  natural  world  taken  alone,  we  are  not  qualified  to  judge 
on  account  of  the  mutual  respect  of  the  several  parts  to  each 
other  and  to  the  whole,  and  our  own  incapacity  to  survey 
the  whole,  or,  with  accuracy,  any  single  part.  All  objec¬ 
tions,  therefore,  to  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  divine 
government  may  be  founded  merely  on  our  ignorance  ;  j*  and 
to  such  objections  our  ignorance  is  the  proper,  and  a  satis¬ 
factory  answer.  J 

2.  The  chief  difficulties  concerning  Natural  Religion  be¬ 
ing. now  removed,  our  Author  proceeds,  in  the  next  place,  to 
that  which  is  revealed ;  and  as  an  introduction  to  an  inquiry 
into  the  Credibility  of  Christianity,  begins  with  the  conside¬ 
ration  of  its  Importance. 

The  importance  of  Christianity  appears  in  two  respects. 
First,  In  its  being  a  republication  of  natural  Religion,  in  its 
native  simplicity,  with  authority,  and  with  circumstances  of 
advantage  ;  ascertaining  in  many  instances  of  moment, 
what  before  was  only  probable,  and  particularly  confirming 
the  doctrine  of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments. § 
Secondly,  As  revealing  a  new  dispensation  of  Providence, 
originating  from  the  pure  love  and  mercy  of  God,  and  con¬ 
ducted  by  the  mediation  of  his  Son,  and  the  guidance  of 
his  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  salvation  of  mankind,  re 
presented  in  a  state  of  apostacy  and  ruin.  This  account  of 
Christianity  being  admitted  to  be  just,  and  the  distinct  offi¬ 
ces  of  these  three  divine  persons  being  once  discovered  to 
us,  we  are  as  much  obliged,  in  point  of  duty,  to  acknowledge 
the  relations  we  stand  in  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  as  our 
Mediator  and  Sanctifier,  as  we  are  obliged  in  point  of  duty 

♦  See  a  Treatise  on  Divine  Benevolence,  by  Dr  Thomas  Balguy, 
Part  ii. 

t  See  Note  P,  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 

t  Part  i.  Chap.  7. 

§  See  note  at  the  end  of  this  Prefer 


12 


PREFACE 


to  acknowledge  the  relation  we  stand  in  to  God  the  Fa¬ 
ther  ;  although  the  two  former  of  these  relations  be  learnt 
from  revelation  only,  and  in  the  last  we  are  instructed  by  the 
light  of  nature  ;  the  obligation  in  either  case,  arising  from 
the  offices  themselves,  and  pot  at  all  depending  on  the  man¬ 
ner  in  which  they  are  made  known  to  us."^ 

The  presumptions  against  revelation  in  general  are,  that 
it  is  not  discoverable  by  reason,  that  it  is  unlike  to  what  is 
so  discovered,  and  that  it  was  introduced  and  supported  by 
miracles.  But  in  a  scheme  so  large  as  that  of  the  universe, 
unbounded  in  extent  and  everlasting  in  duration,  there  must 
of  necessity  be  numberless  circumstances  which  are  beyond 
the  reach  of  our  faculties  to  discern,  and  which  can  only  be 
known  by  divine  illumination.  And  both  in  the  natural  and 
moral  government  of  the  world,  under  which  we  live,  we 
find  many  things  unlike  one  to  another,  and  therefore  ought 
not  to  wonder  if  the  same  unlikeness  obtain  between  things 
visible  and  invisible  ;  although  it  be  far  from  true,  that  re¬ 
vealed  religion  is  entirely  unlike  the  constitution  of  nature, 
as  analogy  may  teach  us.  Nor  is  there  any  thing  incredible 
in  revelation,  considered  as  miraculous  ;  whether  miracles  be 
supposed  to  have  been  performed  at  the  beginning  of  the 
world,  or  after  a  course  of  nature  has  been  established.  Not 
at  the  heginning  of  the  xoorld;  for  then  there  was  either  no 
course  of  nature  at  all,  or  a  power  must  have  been  exerted 
totally  different  from  what  that  course  is  at  present.  All 
men  and  animals  cannot  have  been  born,  as  they  are  now  ; 
but  a  pair  of  each  sort  must  have  been  produced  at  first,  in 
a  way  altogether  unlike  to  that  ip  which  they  have  been 
since  produced ;  unless  we  affirm,  that  men  and  animals 
have  existed  froin  eternity  in  an  endless  succession.  One 
miracle,  therefore,  at  least,  there  must  have  been  at  the  be¬ 
ginning  of  the  world,  or  at  the  time  of  man’s  creation.  Not 
after  the  settlement  of  a  course  of  nature,  on  account  of  mira¬ 
cles  being  contrary  to  that  course,  or,  in  other  words,  contra¬ 
ry  to  experience ;  fpr,  in  order  to  know  whether  miracles, 
worked  in  attestation  of  a  divine  religion,  be  contrary  to  ex 
perience  or  not,  we  ought  to  be  acquainted  with  other  cases 
similar  or  parallel  to  those  in  which  miracles  are  alleged  to 
have  been  wrought.  But  where  shall  we  find  such  similar 
or  parallel  cases  %  The  world  which  we  inhabit  affords » 
none.  We  know  of  no  extraordinary  revelations  from  God 


♦  Part  ii.  Chapter  5 


BY  tllB  £1)IT0R, 


13 


td  man,  but  those  recorded  in  the  Old  and  New  Testament ; 
all  of  which  were  established  by  miracles.  It  cannot  there¬ 
fore  be  said,  that  miracles  are  incredible,  because  contrary  to 
experience,  when  all  the  experience  we  have  is  iii  favor  of 
miracles,  and  on  the  side  of  religion,*  Besides,  in  reason¬ 
ing  concerning  miracles,  they  ought  not  to  be  compared  with 
common  natural  events,  but  with  uncommon  appearances, 
such  as  cdmets,  magnetism,  electricity  ;  which,  to  one  ac¬ 
quainted  only  with  the  usual  phenomena  of  nature,  and  the 
common  powers  of  matter;  must  before  proof  of  their  actual 
existence,  be  thought  incredible. p 

The  presumptions  against  Beveiation  in  general  being 
despatched,  objections  against  the  Christian  Revelation  in 
particular,  against  the  scheme  of  it,  as  distinguished  from 
objections  against  its  evidence,  are  considered  next.  Now, 
supposing  a  revelation  to  be  really  given,  it  is  highly  proba¬ 
ble  beforehand,  that  it  must  contain  many  things  appearing 
to  us  liable  to  objections.  The  acknowledged  dispensation 
of  nature  is  very  different  from  what  we  should  have  expect¬ 
ed  ;  reasoning  then  from  analogy,  the  revealed  dispensation, 
it  is  credible,  would  be  also  different.  Nor  are  we  in  any 
sort  judges  at  what  time,  or  in  what  degree,  or  manner  it  is 
fit  or  expedient  for  God  to  instruct  us,  in  things  confessedly 
of  the  greatest  use,  either  by  natural  reason,  or  by  superna¬ 
tural  information.  Thus;  arguing  on  speculation  only,  and 
without  experience,  it  would  seem  very  unlikely  that  so  im¬ 
portant  a  remedy  as  that  provided  by  Christianity,  for  the  re¬ 
covery  of  mankind  from  a  state  of  ruin,  should  have  been 
for  so  many  ages  withheld  ;  and,  when  at  last  vouchsafed, 
should  be  imparted  to  so  few  ;  and,  after  it  has  been  impart* 
ed,  should  be  attended  with  obscurity  and  dOubt.  And  just 
so  we  might  have  argued,  before  experience,  concerning  the 
remedies  provided  in  nature  for  bodily  diseases,  to  which 
by  nature  \ve  are  exposed  :  for  many  of  these  were  unknown 
to  mankind  for  a  number  of  ages  ;  are  known  but  to  few 
now :  some  important  ones  probably  not  discovered  yet ;  and 
those  which  are,  neither  certain  in  their  application,  nor  uni- 
Yersal  in  their  use.'  And  the  same  mode  of  reasoning  that 
would  lead  us  to  expect  they  should  have  been  so,  would 
lead  us  to  expect  that  the  necessity  of  them  should  have 
been  superseded,  by  there  being  no  diseases  ;  as  the  neces- 
aity  of  the  Christian  scheme,  it  may  be  thought,  might  also 


♦  See  note  H,  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 


T  Chap.  8. 


PREFACE 


U 

have  been  superseded,  by  preventing  the  fall  of  man,  so  that 
he  should  not  have  stood  in  need  of  a  Redeemer  at  all.* 

As  to  the  objections  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of 
Christianity,  the  same  answer  may  be  applied  to  them  as 
was  to  the  like  objections  against  the  constitution  of  nature. 
For  here  also,  Christianity  is  a  scheme  or  economy,  compo¬ 
sed  of  various  parts,  forming  a  whole,  in  which  scheme  means 
are  used  for  the  accomplishing  of  ends  ;  and  which  is  con¬ 
ducted  by  general  laws,  of  all  of  which  we  know  as  little 
as  we  do  of  the  constitution  of  nature. .  And  the  seeming 
want  of  wisdom  or  goodness  in  this  system  is  to  be  ascribed 
to  the  same  cause,  as  the  like  appearances  of  defects  in  the 
natural  system  ;  our  inability  to  discern  the  whole  scheme, 
and  our  ignorance  of  the  relation  of  those  parts  which  are 
discernible  to  others  beyond  our  view. 

The  objections  against  Christianity,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
and  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  having  been  ob¬ 
viated  together,  the  chief  of  them  are  now  to  be  considered 
distinctly.  One  of  these,  which  is  levelled  against  the  en¬ 
tire  system  itself,  is  of  this  sort:  The  restoration  of  mankind, 
represented  in  Scripture  as  the  great  design  of  the  gospel,  is 
described  as  requiring  a  long  series  of  means,  and  persons, 
and  dispensations,  before  it  can  be  brought  to  its  completion ; 
whereas  the  whole  ought  to  have  been  effected  at  once. 
Now  every  thing  we  see  in  the  course  of  nature,  shows  the 
folly  of  this  objection.  For  in  the  natural  course  of  Provi¬ 
dence,  ends  are  brought  about  by  means,  not  operating  im¬ 
mediately  and  at  once,  but  deliberately  and  in  a  way  of  pro¬ 
gression  ;  one  thing  being  subservient  to  another,  this  to 
somewhat  further.  The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of 
fruits,  the  growth  of  vegetable  and  animal  bodies,  are  in¬ 
stances  of  this.  And  therefore,  that  the  same  progres¬ 
sive  method  should  be  followed  in  the  dispensation  of  Chris¬ 
tianity,  as  is  observed  in  the  common  dispensation  of  Provi¬ 
dence,  is  a  reasonable  expectation  justified  by  the  analogy 
of  nature.f 

Another  circumstance,  objected  to  in  the  Christian  scheme, 
is  the  appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and  the  saving  of  the 
world  through  him.  But  the  visible  government  of  God  be¬ 
ing  actually  administered  in  this  way,  or  by  the  mediation 
and  instrumentality  of  others,  there  can  be  no  general  pre¬ 
sumption  against  an  appointment  of  this  kind,  against  tlris 


♦  Chap.  3. 


t  Chap.  4 


6Y  THE  EDITOR. 


l5 


invisible  government  being  exercised  in  the  same  manner. 
We  have  seen  already,  that  with  regard  to  ourselves  this 
visible  government  is  earned  on  by  rewards  and  punish¬ 
ments  ;  for  happiness  and  misery  are  the  consequences  of 
our  own  actions,  considered  as  virtuous  and  vicious  ;  and 
these  consequences  we  are  enabled  to  foresee,.  It  might  have 
been  imagined,  before  consulting  experience,  that  after  we 
had  rendered  ourselves  liable  to  misery  by  our  own  ill  con¬ 
duct,  sorrow  for  what  was  past,  and  behaving  well  for  the 
future,  would,  alone,  and  of  themselves,  have  exempted  us 
from  deserved  punishment,  and  restored  us  to  the  divine  fa* 
vor.  But  the  fact  is  otherwise  ;  and  real  reformation  is  of¬ 
ten  found  to  be  of  no  avail,  so  as  to  secure  the  criminal  from 
poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  and  death,'  the  never  failing  at¬ 
tendants  on  vice  and  extravagance,  exceeding  a  certain  de¬ 
gree.  By  the  course  of  nature  then  it  appears,  God  does 
not  always  pardon  a  sinner  on  his  repentarice.  Yet  there  is 
provision  made,  even  in  nature,  that  the  miseries  which  men 
bring  on  themselves,  by  unlawful  indulgences,  may  in  many 
cases  be  mitigated,  and  in  some  removed  ;  partly  by  extra¬ 
ordinary  exertions  of  the  offender  himself,  but  more  espe¬ 
cially  and  frequently  by  the  intervention  of  others,  who  vo¬ 
luntarily,  and  from  motives  of  compassion,  submit  to  labor 
and  sorrow,  such  as  produce  long  and  lasting  inconveniences 
to  themselves,  as  the  means  of  rescuing  another  from  the 
wretched  effects  of  former  imprudences.  Vicarious  punish¬ 
ment,  therefore,  or  one  person’s  sufferings  contributing  to 
the  relief  of  another,  is  a  providential  disposition  in  the  econo¬ 
my  of  nature.*  And  it  ought  not  to  be  matter  of  surprise, 
if  by  a  method  analogous  to  this  we  be  redeemed  from  sin 
and  misery,  in  the  economy  of  grace.  That  mankind  at 
present  are  in  a  state  of  degradation,  different  from  that  in 
which  they  were  originally  created,  is  the  very  ground  of 
the  Christian  revelation,  as  contained  in  the  Scriptures. 
Whether  we  acquiesce  in  the  account,  that  our  being  placed 
in  such  a  state  is  owing  to  the  crime  of  our  first  parents,  or 
choose  to  ascribe  it  to  any  other  cause,  it  makes  no  differ¬ 
ence  as  to  our  condition  :  the  vice  and  unhappiness  of  the 
world  are  still  there,  notwithstanding  all  our  suppositions  ; 
nor  is  it  Christianity  that  hath  put  us  into  this  state.  Wo 
learn  also  from  the  same  Scriptures,  what  experience  and 
the  use  of  expiatory  sacrifices  from  the  most  early  times 


•  See  note  I,  at  the  end  of  this  Prefece. 


16 


PREFACE 


might  have  taught  us,  that  repentance  alone  is  not  sufficient 
to  prevent  the  fatal  consequences  of  past  transgressions  1 
But  that  still  there  is  room  for  mefcy,  and  that  repentance 
shall  he  available,  though  not  of  itsfelf,  yet  through  the  me¬ 
diation  of  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah  ;  who,  from  the  snb- 
limest  principles  of  compassion,  when  we  were  dead  in  tres¬ 
passes  and  sins,"^  suffered  and  died,  the  innocent  for  the  guil¬ 
ty,  the  just  for  the  unjust,y  that  we  might  have  redemption 
through  his  blood,  even  the  forgiveness  bl*  sins.J  Iti  what 
tvay  the  death  of  Christ  was  of  that  efficacy  it  is  said  to 
be,  in  procuring  the  reconciliation  of  sinners,  the  Scriptures 
have  not  explained.  It  is  enough  that  the  doctrine  is  re¬ 
vealed  ;  that  it  is  not  contrary  to  any  truth  which  reason 
and  experience  teach  us  ;  and  that  it  accords  in  perfect  har¬ 
mony  with  the  usual  method  of  the  divine  conduct  in  the 
government  of  the  world. § 

Again  it  hath  been  said,  that  if  the  Christian  revelation 
were  true,  it  must  have  been  universal,  and  could  not  have 
been  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.  But  God,  in  his  natural 
providence,  dispenses  his  gifts  in  great  variety,  not  only 
among  creatures  of  the  same  species,  but  to  the  same  indi¬ 
viduals  also  at  different  times.  Had  the  Christian  revela¬ 
tion  been  universal  at  first,  yet,  from  the  diversity  of  men’s 
abilities,  both  of  mind  and  body,  their  various  means  of  im¬ 
provement,  and  other  external  advantages,  some  persons 
must  soon  have  been  in  a  situation,  with  respect  to  religious 
knowledge,  much  superior  to  that  of  others,  as  much  per¬ 
haps  as  they  are  at  present.  And  all  men  will  be  equita¬ 
bly  dealt  with  at  last ;  and  to  whom  little  is  given,  of  him 
little  will  be  required.  Then,  as  to  the  evidence  of  religion 
being  left  doubtful,  difficulties  of  this  sort,  like  difficulties  in 
practice,  afford  scope  and  opportunity  for  a  virtuous  exercise 
-  of  the  understahding,  and  dispose  the  mind  to  acquiesce  and 
rest  satisfied  with  any  evidence  that  is  real.  In  the  daily 
commerce  of  life,  men  are  obliged  to  act  Upon  great  uncer¬ 
tainties,  with  regard  to  success  in  their  temporal  pursuits  ; 
and  the  case  with  regard  to  religion  is  parallel.  However, 
though  religion  be  not  intuitively  true;  the  proofs  of  it  which 
we  have  are  amply  sufficient  in  reasoh  to  induce  us  to  em¬ 
brace  it ;  and  dissatisfaction  with  those  proofs  may  possibly 
be  men’s  own  fault.  || 

Nothing  remains  but  to  attend  to  the  positive  evidence 

♦  Eph.  U.  1. 

S  Coap. 


r  1  Pet.  iii.  18. 
ii  Chap.  6. 


t  ColoB-  i,  14. 


BY  THE  EDITOR. 


17 


there  is  for  the  truth  of  Christianitj,  Now,  besides  its  di¬ 
rect  and  fundamental  proofs,  which  are  miracles  and  prophe¬ 
cies  ;  there  are  milny  collateral  circumstances,  which  may  be 
united  into  one  view,  and  altogether  may  be  considered  cts  ma¬ 
king  up  cne  argument.  In  this  way  of  treating  the  subject, 
the  revelation,  whether  real  or  otherwise,  may  be  supposed 
to  be  wholly  historical ;  the  general  design  of  which  appears 
to  be,  to  give  an  account  of  the  condition  of  religion,  and  its 
professors,  with  a  concise  narration  of  the  political  state  of 
things,  as  far  as  religion  is  affected  by  it,  during  a  great 
length  of  time,  near  six  thousand  years  of  which  are  already 
past.  More  particularly,  it  comprehends  an  account  of  God’s 
entering  into  covenant  with  one  nation,  the  Jews,  that  he 
would  be  their  God,  and  that  they  should  be  his  people  ;  of 
his  often  interposing  in  their  affairs  ;  giving  them  the  pro¬ 
mise;  and  afterwards  the  possession,  of  a  flourishing  coun¬ 
try ;  assuring  them  of  the  greatest  national  prosperity  in 
case  of  their  obedience,  and  threatening  the  severest  nation¬ 
al  punishment  in  case  they  forsook  him,  and  joined  in  the 
idolatry  of  their  pagan  neighbors.  It  contains  also  a  pre¬ 
diction  of  a  particular  person  to  appear  in  the  fulness  of  time, 
in  whom  all  the  promises  of  God  to  the  Jews  were  to  be  ful¬ 
filled.  And  it  relates,  that,  at  the  time  expected,  a  per¬ 
son  did  actually  appear,  assuming  to  be  the  Saviour  fore 
told  ;  that  he  worked  various  miracles  among  them,  in  con¬ 
firmation  of  his  divine  authority  ;  and  as  was  foretold  also, 
was  rejected  and  put  to  death  by  the  very  people  who  had 
long  desired  and  waited  for  his  coming :  But  that  his  reli¬ 
gion,  in  spite  of  all  opposition,  was  established  in  the  world 
by  his  disciples,  invested  with  supernatural  powers  for  that 
purpose  ;  of  the  fate  and  fortunes  of  which  religion  there  is 
a  prophetical  description,  carried  down  to  the  end  of  time. 
Let  any  one  now,  after  reading  the  above  history,  and  not 
knowing  whether  the  whole  were  not  a  fiction,  be  supposed 
to  ask.  Whether  all  that  is  here  related  be  true  ?  and  instead 
of  a  direct  answer,  let  him  be  informed  of  the  several  ac¬ 
knowledged  facts,  which  arc  found  to  correspond  to  it  in  real 
life ;  and  then,  let  him  compare  the  history  and  facts  toge¬ 
ther,  and  observe  the  astonishing  coincidence  of  both  :  Such 
a  joint  review  must  appear  to  him  of  very  great  weight,  and 
to  amount  to  evidence  somewhat  more  than  human.  And 
unless  the  whole  series,  and  every  particular  circumstance 


18 


PREFACE 


contained  in  it,  can  be  thought  to  have  arisen  from  accident, 
the  truth  of  Christianity  is  proved.* 

The  view  here  given  of  the  moral  and  religious  systems 
of  Bishop  Butler,  it  will  immediately  be  perceived,  is  chiefly 
intended  for  younger  students,  especially  for  students  in  di¬ 
vinity  ;  to  whom  it  is  hoped  it  may  be  of  use,  so  as  to  en¬ 
courage  them  to  peruse,  with  proper  diligence,  the  original 
works  of  the  Author  himself.  For  it  may  be  necessary  to 
observe,  that  neither  of  the  volumes  of  this  excellent  pre¬ 
late  are  addressed  to  those  who  read  for  amusement,  or  curio¬ 
sity,  or  to  get  rid  of  time.  All  subjects  are  not  to  be  com¬ 
prehended  with  the  same  ease ;  and  morality  and  religion, 
when  treated  as  sciences,  each  accompanied  with  difficulties 
of  its  own,  can  neither  of  them  be  understood  as  they  ought, 
without  a  very  peculiar  attention.  But  morality  and  reli¬ 
gion  are  not  merely  to  be  studied  as  sciences,  or  as  being 
speculatively  true  ;  they  are  to  be  regarded  in  another  and 
higher  light,  as  the  rule  of  life  and  manners,  as  containing 
authoritative  directions  by  which  to  regulate  our  faith  and 
practice.  And  in  this  view,  the  in  Anite  importance  of  them 
considered,  it  can  never  be  an  indifferent  matter  whether 
they  be  received  or  rejected.  For  both  claim  to  be  the  voice 
of  God ;  and  whether  they  be  so  or  not,  cannot  be  know, 
till  their  claims  be  impartially  examined.  If  they  indeed 
come  from  him,  we  are  bound  to  conform  to  them  at  our 
peril:  nor  is  it  left  to  our  choice,  whether  we  will  submit  to 
the  obligations  they  impose  upon  us  or  not ;  for  submit  to 
them  we  must,  in  such  a  sense,  as  to  incur  the  punishments 
denounced  by  both  against  wilful  disobedience  to  their  in¬ 
junctions. 

*  Chap.  7.  To  the  Analogy  are  subjoined  two  Dissertations,  both  on 
ginally  inserted  in  the  body  of  the  work.  One  on  Personal  Identity ^  in 
which  are  contained  some  strictures  on  Mr  Locke,  who  asserts  that  con¬ 
sciousness  makes  or  constitutes  personal  identity  j  whereas,  as  our  author 
observes,  consciousness  makes  only  personality,  or  is  necessary  to  the  idea  of 
a  person,  i.  e.  a  thinking,  intelligent  being,  but  presupposes,  and  therefore 
cannot  constitute,  personal  identity;  just  as  knowledge  presupposes  truth, 
but  does  not  constitute  it.  Consciousness  of  past  actions  does  indeed  show 
us  the  identity  of  ourselves,  or  gives  us  a  certain  assurance  that  we  are  the 
same  persons  or  livTng  agents  now,  which  we  were  at  the  time  to  which  our 
remembrance  can  look  back ;  but  still  we  should  be  the  same  persons  as  we 
were,  though  this  consciousness  of  what  is  past  were  wanting,  though  all 
that  had  b^n  done  by  us  formerly  were  forgotten ;  unless  it  be  true,  that 
no  person  has  existed  a  single  moment  beyond  what  he  can  remember. 
The  other  dissertation  is  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue^  which  properly  be¬ 
longs  to  the  moral  system  of  our  Author  already  explained 


THE  LIFE 


OP 

DR  BUTLER. 


-0 

Dr  Joseph  Butler,  a  prelate  of  the  most  distinguished 
character  and  abilities,  was  born  at  Wantage,  in  Berk¬ 
shire,  in  the  year  1692.  His  father  Mr.  Thomas  Butler, 
who  was  a  substantisil  and  reputable  shopkeeper  in  that 
town,  observing  in  his  son  Joseph*  an  excellent  genius  and  in¬ 
clination  for  learning,  determined  to  educate  him  for  the  min¬ 
istry,  among  the  Protestant  dissenters  oP  the  presbyterian 
denomination.  For  this  purpose,  after  he  had  gone  through 
a  proper  course  of  grammatical  literature,  at  the  free  gram¬ 
mar  school  of  his  native  place,  under  the  care  of  the  Rev. 
Mr  Philip  Barton,  a  clergyman  of  the  Church  of  England, 
he  was  sent  to  a  dissenting  academy,  then  kept  at  Glouces¬ 
ter,  but  which  was  soon  afterwards  removed  to  Tewksbury. 
The  principal  tutor  of  this  academy  was  Mr  Jones,  a  man 
of  uncommon  abilities  and  knowledge,  who  had  the  honor 
of  training  up  several  scholars,  who  became  of  great  emi¬ 
nence,  both  in  the  established  church  and  among  the  dissen¬ 
ters.  At  Tukesbury,  Mr  Butler  made  an  extraordinary 
progress  in  the  study  of  divinity  ;  of  which  he  gave  a  re¬ 
markable  proof,  in  the  letters  addressed  by  him  while  he 
resided  at  Tukesbury,  to  Dr  Samuel  Clarke,  laying  before 
him  the  doubts  that  had  arisen  in  his  mind,  concerning  the 
conclusiveness  of  some  arguments  in  the  Doctor’s  demon¬ 
stration  of  the  being  and  attributes  of  God.  The  first  of 
these  letters  was  dated  the  4th  November,  1713  ;  and  the 
sagacity  and  depth  of  thought  displayed  in  it,  immediately 
excited  Dr  Clark’s  particular  notice.  This  condescension 


*  He  was  the  youngest  of  eight  cliildreu. 


20 


THE  LIFE  OF 


encouraged  Mr  Butler  to  address  the  Doctor  again  upon 
the  same  subject,  which  likewise  was  answered  by  him ; 
and  the  corresnondence  being  carried  on  in  three  other  let- 
ters,  the  whole  was  annexed  to  the  celebrated  treatise  before 
mentioned,  and  the  collection  has  been  retained  in  all  the 
subsequent  editions  of  that  work.  The  management  of 
this  correspondence  was  intrusted  by  Mr  Butler  to  his  friend 
and  fellow  pupil,  Mr  Seeker,  who,  in  order  to  conceal  the 
affair,  undertook  to  convey  the  letters  to.  the  post-office  at 
Gloucester,  and  to  bring  back  Dr  Clark’s  answers.  When 
Mr  Butler’s  name  was  discovered  to  the  doctor,  the  candor, 
modesty^  and  good  sense,  with  which  he  had  written,  imme¬ 
diately  procured  him  the  friendship  of  that  eminent  and  ex¬ 
cellent  man.  Our  young  student  was  not,  however,  during 
his  continuance  at  Tukesbury,  solely  employed  in  metaphy’ 
sical  speculations  and  inquiries.  Another  subject  of  his 
serious  consideration  was,  the  propriety  of  his  becoming  a 
dissenting  minister.  Accordingly,  he  entered  into  an  ex¬ 
amination  of  the  principles  of  non-conformity  ;  the  result  of 
which  was,  sach  a  dissatisfaction  with  them,  as  determined 
him  to  conform  to  the  established  church.  '  This  intention 
was,  at  first,  disagreeable  to  his  father,  who  endeavored  to 
divert  him  from  his  purpose  ;  and,  with  that  view,  called  in 
the  assistance  of  some  eminent  presbyterian  divines ;  but 
finding  his  son’s  resolution  to  be  fixed,  he  at  length  suffered 
him  to  be  removed  to  Oxford,  where  he  was  admitted  a  com¬ 
moner  of  Oriel  college,  on  the  17th  March,  1714.  And 
what  time  he  took  orders  doth  not  appear,  nor  who  the  bishop 
was  by  whom  he  was  ordained ;  but  it  is  certain  that  he 
entered  into  the  church  soon  after  his  admission  at  Oxford,  if 
it  be  true,  as  is  asserted,  that  he  sometimes  assisted  Mr 
Edward  Talbot  in  the  divine  service,  at  his  living  of  Hen- 
dred,  near  Wantage  With  this  gentleman,  who  was  the 
second  son  of  Dr  William  Talbot,  successively  bishop  of 
Oxford,  Salisbury,  and  Durham,  Mr  Butler  formed  an  inti¬ 
mate  friendship  at  Oriel  college  ;  which  friendship  laid  the 
foundation  of  all  his  subsequent  preferments,  and  procured 
for  him  a  very  honorable  station,  when  he  was  only  twenty- 
six  years  of  age.  For  it  was  in  1718  that,  at  the  recom¬ 
mendation  of  Mr  Talbot,  in  conjunction  with  that  of  Dr 
Clarke,  he  was  appointed  by  Sir  Joseph  Jekyll  to  be  preach¬ 
er  at  the  Rolls.  This  was  three  years  before  he  had  taken 
any  degree  at  the  University,  where  he  did  not  go  outbache- 
for  of  law  till  the  10th  Juno,  1721,  which,  however,  was  as 


DR  BDILER. 


21 


Boon  as  that  degree  could  suitably  be  conferred  on  hlir.  Mr 
Butler  continued  at  the  Rolls  till  1726  ;  in  the  beginning  of 
which  year  he  published,  in  one  volume  octavo,  “  Fifteen 
Sermons  preached  at  that  Chapel.”  IiT  the  meanwhile,  by 
the  patronage  of  Dr  Talbot,  bishop  of  Durham,  to  whose 
notice  he  had  been  recommended  (together  with  Mr  Ben¬ 
son  and  Mr  Seeker)  by  Mr  Edward  Talbot,  on  his  death 
bed,  our  author  had  been  presented  first  to  the  rectory  of 
Haiighton,  near  Darlington,  and  afterwards  to  that  of  Stan¬ 
hope,  in  the  same  diocese.  The  benefice  of  Haughton, 
was  given  to  him  in  1722,  and  that  of  Stanhope  in  1725. 
At  Haughton  there  was  a  necessity  for  rebuilding  a  great 
part  of  the  parsonage  house,  and  Mr  Butler  had  neither 
money  nor  talents  for  that  work.  Mr  Seeker,  therefore, 
who  had  always  the  interest  of  his  friends  at  heart,  and  ac¬ 
quired  a  very  considerable  influence  with  Bishop  Talbot, 
persuaded  that  prelate  to  give  Mr  Butler,  in  exchange  for 
Haughton,  the  rectory  of  Stanhope,  which  was  not  only 
free  from  any  such  incumbrance,  but  was  likewise  of  much 
superior  value,  being  indeed  one  of  the  richest  parsonages 
in  England.  Whi/lst  our  author  continued  preacher  at  the 
Rolls-Chapel,  he  divided  his  time  between  his  duty  in  town 
and  country  ;  but  when  he  quiti  ed  the  Rolls,  he  resided, 
during  seven  years,  wholly  at  Stanhope,  in  the  conscious 
discharge  of  every  obligation  appertaining  to  a  good  parish 
priest.  This  retirement,  however,  was  too  solitary  for  his 
disposition,  which  had  in  it  a  natural  cast  of  gloominess. 
And  though  his  recluse  hours  were  by  no  means  lost,  either 
to  private  improvement  or  public  utility,  yet  he  felt  at  times, 
very  painfully,  the  want  of  that  select  society  of  friends  to 
which  he  had  been  accustomed,  and  which  could  inspire  hini 
with  the  greatest  cheerfulness.  Mr  Seeker,  therefore,  who 
knew  this,  was  extremely  anxious  to  draw  him  out  into  a 
more  active  and  conspicuous  scene,  and  omitted  no  opportu 
nity  of  expressing  this  desire  to  such  as  he  thought  capable 
of  promoting  it.  Having  himself  been  appointed  king's 
chaplain,  in  1732,  he  took  occasion,  in  a  conversation  which 
he  had  the  honor  of  holding  with  Glueen  Caroline,  to  men¬ 
tion  to  her  his  friend  Mr  Butler.  The  queen  said  she 
thought  he  had  been  dead.  Mr  Seeker  assured  her  he  was 
uot.  Y et  her  Majesty  afterwards  asked  Archbishop  Black¬ 
burn  if  he  was  not  dead  ;  his  answer  was,  “  No,  madam  ; 
but  he  is  buried.”  Mr  Seeker  continuing  his  purpose  of 
endeavouring  to  bring  his  friend  out  of  his  retirement,  found 


22 


THE  LIFE  OF 


means,  upon  Mr  Charles  Talbot's  being  made  lord  chansel- 
lor,  to  have  Mr  Butler  recommended  to  him  for  his  chaplain. 
His  lordship  accepted,  and  sent  for  him  ;  and  this  promotion 
calling  him  to  town,  he  took  Oxford  in  his  way,  and  was  ad¬ 
mitted  there  to  the  degree  of  doctor  of  law,  on  the  8th 
December,  1733.  The  lord  chancellor,  who  gave  him  also 
a  prebend  in  the  church  of  Rochester,  had  consented  that 
he  should  reside  at  his  parish  of  Stanhope  one  half  of  the 
year. 

Dr  Butler  being  thus  brought  back  into  the  world,  his 
merit  and  his  talents  soon  introduced  him  to  particular  no¬ 
tice,  and  paved  the  way  for  his  rising  to  those  high  dignities 
which  he  afterwards  enjoyed.  In  1736  he  was  appointed 
clerk  of  the  closet  to  queen  Caroline  ;  and  in  the  same  year, 
he  presented  to  her  majesty  a  copy  of  his  excellent  treatise, 
entitled,  “  The  Analogy  of  Rehgion,  Natural  and  Revealed, 
to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature.”  His  attendance 
upon  his  royal  mistress,  by  her  especial  command,  was  from 
seven  to  nine  in  the  evening  every  day  ;  and  though  this 
particular  relation  to  that  excellent  and  learned  queen  was 
soon  determined  by  her  death  in  1737,  yet  he  had  been  so 
effectually  recommended  b}^  her,  as  well  as  by  the  late  Lord 
Chancellor  Talbot,  to  his  Majesty’s  favor,  that  in  the  next 
year  he  was  raised  to  the  highest  order  of  the  church,  by  a 
nomination  to  the  bishopric  of  Bristol ;  to  which  see  he  was 
consecrated  on  the  Third  December,  1738.  King  George 
II.  not  being  satisfied  with  this  proof  of  his  regard  to  Dr 
Butler,  promoted  him,  in  1740,  to  the  deanery  of  St  Paul’s, 
London  ;  into  which  he  was  installed  on  the  24th  May  in 
that  year.  Finding  the  demands  of  this  dignity  to  be  in¬ 
compatible  with  his  parish  duty  at  Stanhope,  he  immediate¬ 
ly  resigned  that  rich  benefice.  Besides  our  prelate’s  unro- 
mitted  attention  to  his  pecuhar  obligations,  he  was  called 
upon  to  preach  several  discourses  on  public  occasions,  which 
were  afterwards  separately  prmted,  and  have  since  been  an¬ 
nexed  to  the  latter  editions  of  the  sermons  at  the  Rolls- 
Chapel.  In  1746,  upon  the  death  of  Dr  Egerton,  bishop 
of  Hereford,  Dr  Butler  was  made  clerk  of  the  closet  to  the 
King  ;  and  on  the  16th  October,  1750,  he  received  another 
distinguished  mark  of  his  Majesty’s  favor,  by  being  transla¬ 
ted  to  the  see  of  Durham.  This  was  on  the  16th  of  Octo¬ 
ber  in  that  year,  upon  the  decease  of  Dr  Edward  Chandler. 
Our  prelate  being  thus  appointed  to  preside  over  a  diocese 
with  which  he  had  long  been  connected,  delivered  his  first, 


DR  BUTLER. 


25 


and  indeed  his  last  charge  to  his  clergy,  at  his  primary  visi¬ 
tation  in  1751.  The  principal  object  of  it  was,  ‘  External 
Religion.’  The  bishop  having  observed,  with  deep  concern, 
the  great  and  growing  neglect  of  serious  piety  in  the  king¬ 
dom,  insisted  strongly  on  the  usefulness  of  outward  forms 
and  institutions,  in  fixing  and  preserving  a  sense  of  devotion 
and  duty  in  the  minds  of  men.  In  doing  this,  he  was 
thought  by  several  persons  to  speak  too  favourably  of  Pa¬ 
gan  and  Popish  ceremonies,  and  to  countenance  in  a  certain 
degree,  the  cause  of  superstition.  Under  that  apprehension 
an  able  and  spirited  writer,  who  was  understood  to  be  a 
clergyman  of  the  Church  of  England,  published  in  1752,  a 
pamphlet,  entitled,  ‘  A  Serious  Inquiry  into  the  Use  and 
Importance  of  External  Religion  ;  occasioned  by  some  pas¬ 
sages  in  the  Right  Rev.  the  Lord  Bishop  of  Durham’s 
Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  that  Diocese  ; — Humbly  addressed 
to  his  Lordship.’  Many  persons,  however,  and  we  believe  the 
greater  part  of  the  Clergy  of  the  diocese,  did  not  think  our 
prelate’s  Charge  so  exceptionable  as  it  appeared  to  this  au¬ 
thor.  The  Charge,  being  printed  at  Durham,  and  having 
never  been  annexed  to  any  of  Dr  Butler’s  other  works,  is 
now  become  extremely  scarce  ;  and  it  is  observable,  that  it 
is  the  only  one  of  his  publications  which  ever  produced  him 
a  direct  literary  antagonist.^' 

By  this  promotion,  our  worthy  bishop  was  furnished  with 
ample  means  of  exerting  the  virtue  of  charity ;  a  virtue 
which  eminentl}’’  abounded  in  him,  and  the  exercise  oi 
which  was  his  highest  delight.  But  this  gratification  he 
did  not  long  enjoy.  He  had  been  but  a  short  time  seated  in 
his  new  bishopric,  when  his  health  began  visibly  to  decline  ; 
and  having  been  complimented,  during  his  indisposition,  up¬ 
on  account  of  his  great  resignation  to  the  divine  will,  he  is 
said  to  have  expressed  some  regret  that  he  should  be  taken 
from  the  present  world  so  soon  after  he  had  been  rendered 
capable  of  becoming  much  more  useful  in  it.  In  his  last 
illness  he  was  carried  to  Bristol,  to  try  the  waters  of  that 
place  ;  but  these  proving  inefiectual,  he  removed  to  Bath, 
where,  being  past  recovery,  he  died  on  the  16th  of  June, 
1752.  His  corpse  was  conveyed  to  Bristol,  and  interred  in 
the  cathedral  there,  where  a  monument,  with  an  inscription, 
is  erected  to  his  memory. 

On  the  greatness  of  Bishop  Butler’s  character  we  need 

*  This  Charge,  with  all  the  rest  of  Bishop  Butler’s  writings,  is  included 
in  the  present  edition  of  his  works. 


24 


THE  LIFE  OF  DR.  BUTLER. 


not  enlarge  ;  for  his  profound  knowledge,  and  the  prodigious 
strength  of  his  mind,  are  amply  displayed  in  his  incompara¬ 
ble  writing.  His  piety  was  of  the  most  serious  and  fervent, 
and,  perhaps  somewhat  of  the  ascetic  kind.  His  benevo¬ 
lence  was  warm,  generous,  and  diffusive.  Whilst  he  was 
bishop  of  Bristol  he  expended,  in  repairing  and  improving  the 
episcopal  palace,  four  thousand  pounds,  which  is  said  to 
have  been  more  than  the  whole  revenues  of  bishopric 
amounted  to,  during  his  continuance  in  that  see.  Besides  his 
private  benefactions,  he  was  a  contributor  to  the  infirmary  at 
Bristol,  and  a  subscriber  to  three  of  the  hospitals  at  London. 
He  was  likewise  o,  principal  promoter,  though  not  the  first 
founder  of  the  infirmarv  at  Newcastle, in  Northu.mberland.  In 
supporting  the  hospitality  and  dignity^  of  the  rich  and  pow¬ 
erful  diocese  of  Durham,  he  was  desirous  of  imitating  the 
spirit  of  his  patron.  Bishop  Talbot.  In  this  spirit  he  set 
apart  three  days  every  week  for  the  reception  and  entertain¬ 
ment  of  the  principal  gentry  of  the  country.,  Nor  were 
even  the  clergy^  who  had  the  poorest  benifices  neglected  by 
him.  He  not  only  occasionally  invited  them  to  dine  with 
him,  but  condescended  to  visit  them  at  their  respective  par 
ishes.  By  his  will  he  left  five  hundred  pounds  to  the  Socie¬ 
ty  for  Propagating  the  Gospel  in  Foreign  Parts  and  some 
legacies  to  his  friends  and  domestics.  His  executor  and 
residuary  legatee  was  his  chaplain,  the  Rev.  Dr  Nathaniel 
Forster,  a  divine  of  distinguished  literature.  Bishop  Butler 
was  never  married.  Soon  after  his  decease,  the  following 
lines,  by  way  of  epitaph,  were  written  concerning  him  ;  and 
were  printed  first,  if  we  recollect  aright,  in  the  London  Ma¬ 
gazine. 


Beneath  this  marble,  Butler  lies  entombed, 

Who,  with  a  soul  enflamed  by  love  divine. 

His  life  in  presence  of  his  God  consumed. 

Like  the  bright  lamps  before  ihe  holy  shrine. 

His  aspect  pleasing,  mind  with  learning  fraught, 
His  eloquence  was  like  a  chain  of  gold. 

That  the  wild  passions  of  mankind  controlled; 
Merit,  wherever  to  be  found,  he  sought. 

Desire  of  transient  riches  he  had  none ; 

These  he,  with  bounteous  hand,  did  well  dispense 
Bent  to  fulfil  the  ends  of  Providence ; 

His  heart  still  fixed  on  an  immortal  crown ; 

His  heart  a  mirror  was,  of  purest  kind. 

Where  the  bright  image  of  his  Maker  shined ; 
Reflecting  faithful  to  the  throne  above. 

The  arrauiant  glories  of  the  Mystic  Dove. 


The  following  Epitaph,  said  to  be  written  by  Dr  Nathan* 
iel  Forster,  is  inscribed  on  a  flat  marble  stone,  in  the  ca¬ 
thedral  church  cf  Bristol,  placed  over  the  spot  where  the 
remains  of  Bishop  Butler  are  deposited  ;  and  which,  as 
it  is  now  almost  obliterated,  it  may  be  worth  while  here  to 
preserve. 

H.  IS. 

Reverendus  adraodum  in  Christo  Pater 
JOSEPHUS  BUTLER,  LL.  D. 

Hujusce  primo  Dioecescos 
Deinde  Dunelmensis  Episcopus. 

Hualis  quantusq ;  Vir  erat 
Sua  libentissime  agnovit  set  as : 

Et  si  quid  Prsesuli  aut  Scriptori  ad  famam  valent 
Mens  altissima, 

Ingenii  perspicacis  et  Bubacti  Vis, 

Animusq ;  pius,  simplex,  Candidas,  liberalis, 

,  Mortui  baud  facile  evanescet  memoria. 

Obiit  Bathonise  16  Kalend.  Julii, 

A.  D.  1752. 

Aiinos  natus  60. 


2 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


If  the  reader  should  meet  hero  with  any  thing  which  he 
had  not  before  attended  to,  it  will  not  be  in  the  observations 
upon  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  these  being  all 
obvious  ;  but  in  the  application  of  them  :  in  which,  though 
there  is  nothing  but  what  appears  to  me  of  some  real  weight, 
and  theri»tfore,  of  great  importance ;  yet  he  will  observe 
several  things  which  will  appear  to  him  of  very  little,  if  he 
can  think  things  to  be  of  little  importance,  which  are  of  any 
real  weight  at  all,  upon  such  a  subject  as  religion.  How¬ 
ever,  the  proper  force  of  the  following  treatise  lies  in  the 
whole  general  analogy  considered  together. 

It  is  come,  1  know  not  how,  to  be  taken  for  granted,  by 
many  persons,  that  Christianity  is  not  so  much  as  a  subject 
of  inquiry  ;  but  that  it  is.  now  at  length,  discovered  to  be 
fictitious.  And  accordingly  they  treat  it,  as  if,  in  the  pre¬ 
sent  age,  this  were  an  agreed  point  among  all  people  of  dis» 
cernment  ;  and  nothing  remained,  but  to  set  it  up  as  a  prin¬ 
cipal  subject  of  mirth  and  ridicule,  as  it  were  by  way  of  re¬ 
prisals,  for  its  having  so  long  interrupted  the  pleasures  of  the 
world.  On  the  contrary,  thus  much,  at  least,  will  be  here 
found,  not  taken  for  granted,  but  proved,  that  any  reasona¬ 
ble  man,  who  will  thoroughly  consider  the  matter,  may  be 
as  much  assured,  as  he  is  of  his  own  being,  that  it  is  not, 
liowcver,  so  clear  a  case,  that  there  is  nothing  in  it.  There 
is,  I  think,  strong  evidence  of  its  truth;  but  it  is  certain 


28. 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


no  one  can,  upon  principles  of  reason,  be  satisfied  of  the 
contrary.  And  the  practical  consequence  to  be  drawn 
from  this,  is  not  attended  to,  by  every  one  who  is  concerned 
in  it. 


May,  1736. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Probable  evidence  is  essentially  distinguished  from  de¬ 
monstrative ‘by  this,  that  it  admits  of  degrees,  and  of  all 
variety  of  them,  from  the  highest  moral  certainty,  to  the  ve¬ 
ry  lowest  presumption.  We  cannot,  indeed,  say  a  thing  is 
probably  true  upon  one  very  slight  presumption  for  it ;  be¬ 
cause,  as  there  "may  be  probabilities  on  both  sides  of  the 
question,  there  may  be  some  against  it ;  and  though  there 
be  not,  yet  a  slight  presumption  does  not  beget  that  degree 
of  conviction,  which  it  implied  in  saying  a  thing  is  probably 
true.  But  that  the  slightest  possible  presumption  is  of  the 
nature  of  a  probability,  appears  from  hence,  that  such  low 
presumption,  often  repeated,  will  amount  even  to  moral  cer¬ 
tainty.  Thus,  a  man’s  having  observed  the  ebb  and  flow  of 
the  tide  to-day,  affords  some  sort  of  presumption,  though  the 
lowest  imaginable,  that  it  may  happen  again  to-morrow  ; 
but  the  observation  of  this  event  for  so  man}”  days,  and 
months,  and  ages  together,  as  it  has  been  observed  by 
mankind,  gives  us  a  full  assurance  that  it  will. 

That  which  chiefly  constitutes  prohabiiUy^  is  expressed  in 
the  word  likely ;  i.  e.  like  some  truth,*  or  true  event ;  like  it, 
in  itself,  in  its  evidence,  in  some  more  or  fewer  of  its  circum¬ 
stances.  For  when  we  determine  a  thing  to  be  probably 
true,  suppose  that  an  event  has  or  will  come  to  pass,  ’i  is 
from  the  mind’s  remarking  in  it  a  likeness  to  some  other  events 


*  Verisemile. 


30 


INTRODUCTION. 


whicli  we  have  observed  has  come  to  pass,  And  this  ob¬ 
servation  forms,  in  numberless  daily  instances,  a  presump¬ 
tion,  opinion,  or  full  conviction,  that  such  event  has  or  will 
come  to  pass  ;  according  as  the  observation  is,  that  the  like 
event  has  sometimes,  most  commonly,  or  always,  so  far  as 
our  observation  reaches,  come  to  pass  at  like  distances  of 
time,  or  place,  or  upon  like  occasions.  Hence  arises  the  be¬ 
lief,  that  a  child,  if  it  lives  twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to  the 
stature  and  strength  of  a  man  ;  that  food  will  contribute  to 
the  preservation  of  its  life,  and  the  want  of  it  for  such  a 
number  of  days  be  its  certain  destruction.  So,  likewise,  the 
rule  and  measure  of  our  hopes  and  fears  concerning  the  suc¬ 
cess  of  our  pursuits  ;  our  expectations  that  others  will  act 
so  and  so  in  such  circumstances ;  and  our  judgment  that 
such  actions  proceed'  from  such  principles  ;  all  these  rely 
upon  our  having  observed  the  like  to  what  we  hope,  fear,  ex¬ 
pect.  judge  ;  1  say  upon  our  having  observed  the  like,  either 
with  respect  to  others  or  ourselves.  And  thus,  whereas  the 
prince,"'^  who  had  always  lived  in  a  warm  climate,  naturally 
concluded,  in  the  way  of  analogy,  that  there  was  no  such 
thing  as  water’s  becoming  hard,  because  he  had  always  ob¬ 
served  it  to  be  fluid  and  yielding  ;  'we,  on  the  contrary,  from 
analogy,  conclude,  that  there  is  no  presumption  at  all  against 
this  ;  that  it  is  supposable  there  may  be  frost  in  England 
any  given  day  in  January  next ;  probable,  that  there 
will  on  some  day  of  the  month  ;  and  that  there  is  a  moral 
certainty,  i.  e.  ground  for  an  expectation,  without  any  doubt 
of  it,  in  some  part  or  other  of  the  winter. 

Probable  evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but  an  im¬ 
perfect  kind  of  information,  and  is  to  be  considered  as  rela 
tive  only  to  beings  of  limited  capacities.  For  nothing  which 
is  the  possible  object  of  knowledge,  whether  past,  present,  or 
future,  can  be  probable  to  an  infinite  intelligence  ?  since  it 
cannot  but  be  discerned  absolutely  as  it  is  in  itself  certainly 
true,  or  certainly  false.  But  to  us,  probability  is  the  very 
guide  of  life. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  that  in  questions  of  difficul¬ 
ty,  or  such  as  are  thought  so,  where  more  satisfactory  evi¬ 
dence  cannot  be  had,  or  is  not  seen,  if  the  result  of  examina¬ 
tion  be,  that  there  appears,  upon  the  whole,  any  the  lowest 
presumption  on  one  side,  and  none  on  the  other,  or  a  greatci 
presumption  on  one  side,  though  in  the  lowest  degree  grea- 

•  The  Story  is  told  by  Mr  Locke,  in  the  chapter  of  Probability. 


INTRODUCTION. 


31 


ter,  this  determines  the  question,  even  in  matters  of  specu¬ 
lation  ;  and,  in  matters  of  practice,  will  lay  us  under  an  ab* 
solute  and  formal  obligation,  in  point  of  prudence  and  of  in* 
terest,  to  act  upon  that  presumption,  or  low  probability, 
though  it  be  so  low  as  to  leave  the  mind  in  a  very  great 
doubt  which  is  the  truth.  For  surely  a  man  is  as  really 
bound  in  prudence  to  do  what  upon  the  whole  appears,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  best  of  his.  judgment,  to  be  for  his  happiness, 
as  what  he  certainly  knows  to  be  so.  Nay,  further,  in  ques¬ 
tions  of  great  consequence,  a  reasonable  man  will  think  it 
concerns  him  to  remark  lower  probabilities  and  presumptions 
than  these  ;  suc4i  as  amount  to  no  more  than  showing  one 
side  of  a  question  to  be  as  supposable  and  credible  as  the 
other  ;  nay,  such  as  but  amount  to  much  less  even  than 
this.  For  numberless  instances  might  be  mentioned  res¬ 
pecting  the  corhmon  pursuits  of  life,  where  a  man  would  be 
thought,  in  a  literal  sense,  distracted,  who  would  not  act, 
and  with  great  application  too,  not  only  upon  an  even 
chance,  but  upon  much  less,  and  where  the  probability  or 
chance  was  greatly  against  his  succeeding.* 

It  is  not  my  design  to  inquire  further  into  the  nature,  the 
foundation,  and  measure  of  probability ;  or  whence  it  pro¬ 
ceeds,  that  likeness  should  beget  that  presumption,  opinion, 
and  full  conviction,  .which  the  human  mind  is  formed  to  re¬ 
ceive  from  it,  and  which  it  does  necessarily  produce  in  every 
one  ;  or  to  guard  against  the  errors  to  which  reasoning  from 
analogy  is  liable.  This  belongs  to  the  subject  of  logic,  and 
is  a  part  of  this  subject  which  has  not  yet  been  thoroughly 
considered.  Indeed  I  shall  not  take  upon  me  to  say,  how 
far  the  extent,  compass,  and  force,  of  analogical  reasoning 
can  be  reduced  to  general  heads  and  rules,  and  the  whole  be 
formed  into  a  system.  But  though  so  little  in  this  way  has 
been  attempted  by  those  who  have  treated  of  our  intellectu¬ 
al  powers,  and  the  exercise  of  them,  this  does  not  hinder 
but  that  we  may  be,  as  we  unquestionably  are,  assured,  that 
analogy  is  of  weight,  various  degrees,  towards  determining 
our  judgment,  and  our  practice.  Nor  does  it  in  any  wise 
cease  to  be  of  weight  in  those  cases,  because  persons,  either 
given  to  dispute,  or  who  require  things  to  be  stated  with 
greater  exactness  than  our  faculties  appear  to  admit  of  in 
practical  matters,  may  find  other  cases,  in  which  it  is  not 


*  See  Chap,  vi  Part  2, 


32 


INTRODUCTION. 


easy  to  say,  whether  it  be,  or  be  not,  of  any  weight ;  or  in¬ 
stances  of  seeming  analogies,  which  are  really  of  none.  It 
r is  enough  to  the  present  purpose  to  observe,  that  this  gene¬ 
ral  way  of  arguing  is  evidently  natural,  just  and  conclusive, 
For  there  is  no  man  can  make  a  question  but  that  the  sun 
will  rise  to-morrow,  and  be  seen,  where  it  is  seen  at  all,  in 
q  the  figure  of  a  circle,  and  not  in  that  of  a  square.  , 

Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reasoning,  Origen*  has 
with  singular  sagacity  observed,  that,  ‘  he^who  believes  the 
Scriptures  to  have  proceeded  fi'om  him  who  is  the  Author 
of  nature,  may  well  expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of  difficul¬ 
ties  in  it,  as  are  found  in  the  constitution  of  pature.’  And, 
in  a  like  way  of  reflection,  it  may  be  added,  that  he  who  de¬ 
nies  the  Scripture  to  have  been  from  God,  upon  account  of 
these  difficulties,  may  for  the  very  same  reason,  deny  the 
world  to  have  been  formed  by  him.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
there  be  an  analogy,  or  likeness,  between  that  system  of 
things  and  dispensation  of  Providence  which  revelation  in¬ 
forms  us  of,  and  that  system  of  ,thmgs  and  dispeiisation  of 
Providence  which  experience,  together  with  reason,  informs 
us  of,  i.  e.  the  known  course  of  nature  ;  this  is  a  presump¬ 
tion,  that  they  have  both  the  same  author  and  cause  ;  at 
least  so  far  as  to  answer  objections  against  the  former  being 
from  God,  drawn  from  any  thing  which  is  analogical  or  simi¬ 
lar  to  what  is  in  the  latter,  which  is  acknowledged  to  be 
from  him  ;  for  an  Author  of  nature  is  here  supposed. 

Forming  our  notions  of  the  constitution  and  government 
of  the  world  upon  reasoning,  without  foundation  for  the 
principles  which  we  assume,  whether  from  the  attributes  of 
God,  or  any  thing  else,  is  building  a  world  upon  hypothesis, 
like  Des  Cartes.  Forming  our  notions  upon  reasoning  from 
principles  which  are  certain,  but  applied  to  cases  to  which 
wc  have  no  ground  to  apply  them,  (like  those  who  explain 
the  structure  of  the  human  body,  and  the  nature  of  diseases 
and  medicines,  from  mere  madiernatics,  without  sufficient 
data)  is  an  error  much  akin  to  the  former  :  since  what  is  as¬ 
sumed,  in  order  to  make  the  reasoning  apiilicable,  is  hypothe¬ 
sis.  But  it  must  be  allowed  just,  to  join  abstract  reasoning 
with  the  observation  of  facts,  and  argue  from  such  facts  as 
are  known,  to  others  that  are  like  them  ;  from  that  part  of 
the  Divine  government  over  intelligent  creatures,  which 

*  Xpn  fi£v  Toi  yt  Tov  (ZTTal  'rapaSe^aixevov  ra  KTicavros  rov  Koapov  civai  -av 
ras  rng  ypa(bas  mircKrOai,  hri  baa  rrspi  rrjs  /crtccws  airavTU  roi^  ^rjTuai  tov  nept 
avrijs  Aoyov,  ravra.  Kai  mpi  tiov  ypa^poov.  Philocal.  p.  23.  Ed.  Cant. 


INTRODUCTION. 


33 


comes  under  our  view,  to  that  larger  and  more  general  go* 
rernment  over  them  which  is  beyond  it ;  and  from  what  is 
present,  to  collect  what  is  likely,  credible,  or  not  incredible, 
will  be  hereafter. 

This  method,  then,  of  concluding  and  determining,  being 
practical,  and  what,  if  we  will  act  at  all,  we  cannot  but  act 
upon  in  the  common  pursuits  of  life  ;  being  evidently  con¬ 
clusive,  in  various  degrees,  proportionable  to  the  degree 
and  exactness  of  the  whole  analogy  or  likeness  ;  and  hav¬ 
ing  so  great  authority  for  its  introduction  into  the  subject  of 
religion,  even  revealed  religion,  my  design  is  to  apply  it  to 
that  subject  in  general,  both  natural  and  revealed  ;  taking 
for  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  Na¬ 
ture,  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world.  For  as  there  is  no 
presumption  against  this,  prior  to  the  proof  of  it,  so  it  has 
been  often  proved  with  accumulated  evidence  ;  from  this  ar¬ 
gument  of  analogy  and  final  causes  ;  from  abstract  reason¬ 
ings  ;  from  the  most  ancient  tradition  and  testimony ;  and 
from  the  general  consent  of  mankind.  Nor  does  it  appear, 
so  far  as  I  can  find,  to  be  denied  by  the  generality  of  those 
who  profess  themselves  dissatisfied  with  the  evidence  of 
religion. 

As  there  are  some,  who,  instead  of  thus  attending  to  what 
is  in  fact  the  constitution  of  Nature,  form  their  notions  of 
God’s  government  upon  hypothesis  ;  iSO  there  are  others  who 
indulge  themselves  in  vain  and  idle  speculations,  how  the 
world  might  possibly  have  been  framed  otherwise  than  it  is : 
and  upon  supposition  that  things  might,  in  imagining  that 
they  should,  have  been  disposed  and  carried  on  after  a 
better  model,  than  what  appears  in  the  present  disposition 
and  conduct  of  them.  Suppose,  now,  a  person  of  such  a 
turn  of  mind  to  go  on  with  his  reveries,  till  he  had  at  length 
fixed  upon  some  particular  plan  of  Nature,  as  appearing  to 
him  the  best, — one  shall  scarce  be  thought  guilty  of  detrac¬ 
tion  against  human  understanding,  if  one  should  say,  even 
beforehand,  that  the  plan  which  this  speculative  person 
would  fix  upon,  though  he  were  the  wisest  of  the  sons  of 
men,  probably  would  not  be  the  very  best,  even  accor¬ 
ding  to  his  own  notion  of  lest ;  whether  he  thought 
that  to  be  so  which  afforded  occasions  and  motives  for  the 
exercise  of  the  greatest  virtue,  or  which  was  productive  of 
the  greatest  happiness,  or  that  these  two  were  necessarily 
connected,  and  run  up  into  one  and  the  same  plan.  How¬ 
ever  it  may  not  be  amiss,  once  for  all,  to  see  what  would  be 

2* 


34 


INTRODUCTION. 


the  amount  of  these  emendations  and  imaginary  improve¬ 
ments  upon  the  system  of  Nature,  or  how  far  they  would 
mislead  us.  And  it  seems  there  could  be  no  stopping,  till  we 
come  to  some  such  conclusions  as  these  : — That  all  crea¬ 
tures  should  at  first  be  made  as  perfect  and  as  happy, 
as  they  were  capable  of  ever  being  ;  that  nothing,  to  be 
sure,  of  hazard  or  danger  should  be  put  upon  them  to 
do  ;  some  indolent  persons  would  perhaps  think,  nothing  at 
all ;  or  certainly,  that  effectual  care  should  be  taken,  that 
they  should,  whether  necessary  or  not,  yet  eventually  and 
in  fact,  always  do  what  was  right  and  most  conducive  to 
happiness,  which  would  be  thought  easy  for  infinite  power 
to  effect,  either  by  not  giving  them  any  principles  which 
would  endanger  their  going  wrong,  or  by  laying  the  right 
motive  of  action  in  every  instance,  before  their  minds  con¬ 
tinually,  in  so  strong  a  manner,  as  would  never  fail  of  indu¬ 
cing  them  to  act  conformably  to  it ;  and  that  the  whole 
method  of  governmient  by  punishments  should  be  rejected 
as  absurd  ;  as  an  awkward  round-about  method  of  carrying 
things  on  ;  nay,  as  contrary  to  a  principal  purpose,  for  which 
it  would  be  supposed  creatures  were  made,  namely,  hap¬ 
piness. 

Now,  without  considering  what  is  to  be  said  in  particu¬ 
lar  to  the  several  parts  of  this  train  of  folly  and  extrava¬ 
gance,  what  has  been  above  intimated  is  a  full,  direct,  gene¬ 
ral  answer  to  it,  namely,  that  we  may  see  beforehand  that 
we  have  not  faculties  for  this  kind  of  speculation.  For 
though  it  be  admitted,  that,  from  the  first  principles  of 
our  nature,  we  unavoidably  judge  or  determine  some  ends 
to  be  absolutely  in  themselves  preferable  to  others,  and 
that  the  ends  now  mentioned,  or  if  they  run  up  into  one, 
that  this  one  is  absolutely  the  best,  and  consequently,  that 
we  must  conclude  the  ultimate  ends  designed  in  the  con¬ 
stitution  of  nature  and  conduct  of  Providence,  is  the  most 
virtue  and  happiness  possible  ;  yet  we  are  far  from  being 
able  to  judge  what  particular  disposition  of  things  would 
be  most  friendly  and  assistant  to  virtue,  or  what  means 
might  be  absolutely  necessary  to  produce  the  most  happi¬ 
ness  in  a  system  of  such  extent  as  our  own  world  may  be, 
taking  in  all  that  is  past  and  to  come,  though  we  should 
suppose  it  detached  from  the  whole  of  things.  Indeed,  wo 
are  so  far  from  being  able  to  judge  of  this,  that  we  are  not 
judges  what  may  be  the  necessary  means  of  raising  and 
conducting  one  person  to  the  highest  perfection  and  happiness 


INTRODUCTION. 


35 


of  his  nature.  Nay,  even  in  the  little  affairs  of  the  present 
life,  we  find  men  of  different  education  and  ranks  are  not 
competent  judges  of  the  conduct  of  each  other.  Our  whole 
nature  leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to  God,  and 
to  deny  all  imperfection  in  him.  And  this  will  forever  be  a 
practical  proof  of  his  moral  character,  to  such  as  will  con¬ 
sider  what  a  practical  proof  is,  because  it  is  the  voice  of 
God  speaking  in  us.  And  from  hence  we  conclude,  that 
virtue  must  be  the  happiness,  and  vice  the  misery,  of  every 
creature  ;  and  that  regularity,  and  order,  and  right,  cannot 
but  prevail,  finally,  in  a  universe  under  his  government. 
But  we  are  in  no  sort  judges  what  are  the  necessary  means 
of  accomplishing  this  end. 

Let  us,  then,  instead  of  that  idle  and  not  very  innocent 
employment  of  forming  imaginary  models  of  a  world,  and 
schemes  of  governing  it,  turn  our  thoughts  to  what  we  ex¬ 
perience  to  be  the  conduct  of  Nature  with  respect  to  intelli¬ 
gent  creatures  ;  which  may  be  resolved  into  general  laws 
or  rules  of  administration,  in  the  same  way  as  many  of  the 
laws  of  Nature,  respecting  inanimate  matter,  may  be  col¬ 
lected  from  experiments.  And  let  us  compare  the  known 
constitution  and  course  of  things  with  what  is  said  to  be  the 
moral  system  of  Nature,  the  acknowledged  dispensations  of 
Providence,  or  that  government  which  we  find  ourselves 
under,  with  what  religion  teaches  us  to 'believe  and  expect, 
and  see  whether  they  are  not  analogous,  and  of  a  piece. 
And  upon  such  a  comparison  it  will,  I  think,  be  found,  that 
they  are  very  much  so  ;  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the 
same  general  laws,  and  resolved  into  the  same  principles  of 
Divine  conduct. 

Phe  analogy  here  proposed  to  be  considered,  is  of  pretty 
large  extent,  and  consists  of  several  parts  ;  in  some  more, 
in .  others  less,  exact.  In  some  few  instances,  perhaps,  it 
may  amount  to  a  real  practical  proof,  in  others  not  so  ;  yet 
in  these  it  is  a  confirmation  of  what  is  proved  otherwise.  It 
will  undeniably  show,  what  too  many  want  to  have  shown 
them,  that  the  system  of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed, 
considered  only  as  a  system,  and  prior  to  the  proof  of  it,  is 
not  a  subject  of  ridicule,  unless  that  of  nature  be  so  too. 
Anl  it  will  afford  an  answer  to  almost  all  objections  against 
the  system  both  of  natural  and  of  revealed  religion,  though 
not  perhaps  an  answer  in  so  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very 
considerable  degree  an  answer,  to  the  objections  against  the 
evidence  of  it ;  for,  objections  against  a  proof,  and  objections 


36 


intropt;ction. 


against  what  is  said  to  be  proved,  the  reader  will  observe^ 
are  different  things. 

Now,  the  divine  government  of  the  world,  implied  in  the 
notion  of  religion  in  general,  and  of  Christianity,  contains 
in  it, — That  mankind  is  appointed  to  live  in  a  future  state 
that  there  every  one  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished  re¬ 
warded  or  punished  respectively  for  all  that  behaviour  here 
which  we  comprehend  under  the  words,  virtuous  or  vicious, 
morally  good  or  evil :  J  that  our  present  life  is  a  probation, 
a  state  of  trial, §  and  of  discipline,  j|  for  that  future  one; 
notwithstanding  the  objections  which  men  may  fancy  they 
have,  from  notions  of  necessity,  against  there  being  any 
such  moral  plan  as  this  at  all ;  IT  and  whatever  objectiojis 
may  appear  to  lie  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  as 
it  stands  so  imperfectly  made  known  to  us  at  present :  * 
that  this  world  being  in  a  state  of  apostacy  and  wickedness, 
and  consequently  of  ruin,  and  the  sense  both  of  their  condi¬ 
tion  and  duty  being  greatly  corrupted  amongst  men,  this 
gave  occasion  for  an  additional  dispensation  of  Providence, 
of  the  utmost  importance,  'j*  |  proved  by  miracles,  J  J  but 
containing  in  it  many  things  appearing  to  us  strange,  and 
not  to  have  been  expected  ;  §  §  a  dispensation  of  Providence, 
which  is  a  scheme  or  system  of  things  ||  ||  carried  on  by  the 
mediation  of  a  Divine  person,  the  Messiah,  in  order  to  the 
recovery  of  the  world :  IT  IT  yet  not  revealed  to  all  men,  nor 
proved  with  the  strongest  possible  evidence  to  all  those  to 
whom  it  is  revealed  ;  but  only  to  such  a  part  of  mankind, 
and  with  such  particular  evidence,  as  the  wisdom  of  God 
thought  fit.^^  *  The  design,  then,  of  the  following  Treatise 
will  be  to  show,  that  the  several  parts  principally  objected 
against  in  his  moral  and  Christian  dispensation,  including 
its  scheme,  its  publication,  and  the  proof  which  God  has  af¬ 
forded  us  of  its  truth  ;  that  the  particular  parts  principally 
objected  against  in  this  whole  dispensation,  are  analogous  to 
what  is  experienced  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature, 
or  Providence  ;  that  the  chief  objections  themselves,  which 
are  alleged  against  the  former,  are  no  other  than  what  may 
be  alleged  with  like  justness  against  the  latter,  where  they 
are  found  in  fact  to  be  inconclusive  ;  and  that  this  argument, 
from  analogy,  is  in  general  unanswerable,  and  undoubtedly 

♦Ch.  i.  .  '  TCh.ii.  tCh.iii. 

6Ch.  iv.  .  II  Ch.  V.  IT  Ch  vL 

♦*Ch.  vii  f  r  Part  II.  ch.  i.  *tCh.  iL 

§§Ch.iii.  IlllCh.  iv.  TTirCh.v.  *  *  *  Ch.  vi.  vii. 


INTRODUCTION. 


of  weight  on  the  side  of  religion,*  notwithstanding  the  ob¬ 
jections  which  may  seem  to  lie  against  it,  and  the  real 
ground  which  there  may  be  for  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
the  particular  degree  of  weight  which  is  to  be  laid  upon  it. 
This  is  a  general  account  of  what  may  be  looked  for  in  the 
following  Treatise.  And  I  shall  begin  it  with  that  which  is 
the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes,  and  of  all  our  fears — all  our 
hopes  and  fears,  which  are  of  any  consideration — I  mean, 
a  future  life. 

*  Ch.  viiL 


ij 


yf'  ‘  ‘ 


■*  .-. 


»v|^  V*>  ’-■f  '  ':i'^^  •■‘ 


:  :•»;>)  *r  • 

/  ^ »  ■ 


.'I 


■  r^ii 


-,:;  I  '/7  '  ■-'  ’ 

V  *  .*  V.Jiff’  «l<i  4  . 


N*  V  N> 

.<  ■  ■  \ 


* 


■^I  • 

.  ‘■I1» 
Hj'  ,'. 


■f,  I  ■  •,  .  >» 

k  -  .  .^  «• 


^  C .  »  >  .  Vi  ,  *  i.  %  *  '  ■  i 


'•'lW-  •  ^ 


V  - 


'.3  k,'*-’ 
l  .  », 


-  -.  - 


.  ..  ■  i-s*: 

V  .  ‘---.Hf  >:>  •';i“r.:..v  -';■  - 

.- ,U- '■  '  ■'  " 

<»:  •  -i 

J  •  V*  i; 


THE 


ANALOGY 

OF 

RELIGION 

TO  THE 

CX)NSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 


PART  I. 

OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 


CHAP.  I. 

Of  a  Future  Life. 

Strange  difficulties  have  been  raised  by  some  concern* 
ing  personal  identity,  or  the  sameness  of  living  agents,  im¬ 
plied  in  the  notion  of  our  existing  now  and  hereafter,  or  in 
any  two  successive  moments  ;  which  whoever  thinks  it 
worth  while,  may  see  considered  in  the  first  Dissertation  at 
the  end  of  this  Treatise.  But,  without  regard  to  any  of 
them  here,  let  us  consider  what  the  analogyof  Nature,  and 
the  several  changes  which  we  have  undergone,  and  those 
which  we  know  we  may  undergo  without  being  destroyed, 
suggest,  as  to  the  effect  which  death  may,  or  may  not, 
have  upon  us  ;  and  whether  it  be  not  from  thence  probable, 
that  we  may  survive  this  change,  and  exist  in  a  future  state 
of  life  and  perception. 

I.  From  our  being  born  into  the  present  world  in  the  help¬ 
less  imperfect  state  of  infancy,  and  having  arrived  from 
thence  to  mature  age,  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature 
}n  our  own  species,  that  the  same  'creatures,  the  same 


40 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


[part  I. 


individuals,  should  exist  in  degrees  of  life  and  perception, 
with  capacities  of  action,  of  enjoyment,  and  suffering,  in 
one  period  of  their  being,  greatly  different  from  those  ap¬ 
pointed  them  in  another  period  of  it.  And  in  other  creatures 
the  same  law  holds.  For  the  difference  of  their  capacities 
and  states  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go ’no  higher)  and  in  ma¬ 
turity  ;  the  change  of  worms  into  flies,  and  the  vast  enlarge¬ 
ment  of  their  locomotive  powers  by  such  change  ;  and  birds 
and  insects  bursting  the  shell,  then  habitation,  and  by  this 
means  entering  into  a  new  world,  furnished  with  new  ac¬ 
commodations  for  them  ;  and  finding  a  new  sphere  of  action 
assigned  them  ; — these  are  instances  of  this  general  law  of 
nature.  Thus,  all  the  various  and  wonderful  transforma¬ 
tions  of  animals  are' to  be  taken  into  consideration'  here. 
But  the  states  of  life  in  which  we  ourselves  existed  for¬ 
merly,  in  the  womb  and  in  our  infancy,  are  almost  as  differ¬ 
ent  from  our  present,  in  mature  age,  as  it  is  possible  to 
conceive  any  two  states  or  degrees  of  life  can  be.  There¬ 
fore,  that  we  are  to  exist  hereafter  in  a  state  as  different 
(suppose)  from  our  present,  as  this  is  from  our  former,  is  but 
according  to  the  analogy  of  nature  ;  according  to  a  natural 
order  or  appointment,  of  the  very  same  kind  with  what  we 
have  already  experienced. 

II.  We  know  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  action,  of 
happiness,  and  misery ;  for  we  are  conscious  of  acting,  of 
enjoying  pleasure,  and  suffering  pain.  Now,  that  we  have 
these  powers  and  capacities  before  death,  is  a  presumption 
that  we  shall  retain  them  through  and  after  death  ;  indeed, 
a  probability  of  it  abundantly  sufficient  to  act  upon,  unless 
there  be  some  positive  reason  to  think  that  death  is  the  de 
struction  of  those  living  powers  ;  because  there  is  in  every 
case  a  probability,  that  all  things  will  continue  as  we  expe¬ 
rience  they  are,'  in  all  respects,  except  those  in  which  we 
have  some  reason  to  think  they  will  be  altered.  This  is 
that  kind^  of  presumption,  or  probability,  from  analogy, 
expressed  in  the  very  word  continuance^  which  seems  our 
only  natural  reason  for  believing  the  course  of  the  world  will 
continue  to-morrow,  as  it  has  done  so  far  as  our  experience 
or  knowledge  of  history  can  carry  us  back.  Nay,  it  seems 
our  only  reason  for  believing,  that  any  one  substance,  now 

*  I  say  kind  of  presumption  or  probability  ;  for  1  do  not  mean  to  affirm, 
that  there  is  the  same  degree  of  conviction  that  our  living  powers  will  con¬ 
tinue  after  death,  as  there  is,  that  our  will 


CHAT.  I.] 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


41 


existing,  will  continue  to  exist  a  moment  longer  ;  the  self- 
existent  substance  only  excepted.  Thus,  if  men  were  as¬ 
sured  that  the  unknown  event,  death,  was  not  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  our  faculties  of  perception  and  of  action,  there  wmuld 
be  no  apprehension  that  any  other  power  or  event,  uncon¬ 
nected  with  this  of  death,  would  destroy  these  faculties  just 
at  the  instant  of  each  creature’s  death  ;  and  therefore  no 
doubt  but  that  they  w'ould  remain  after  it :  which  shows 
the  high  probability  that  our  living  powers  will  continue 
after  death,  unless  there  be  some  ground  to  think  that  death 
is  their  destruction.  ^  For,  if  it  would  be  in  a  manner  certain 
that  WQ  should  surwve  duath,  provided  it  Were  certain  that 
death  would  not  be  our  destruction,  it  must  be  highly  proba¬ 
ble  we  shall  survive  it,  if  there  be  no  ground  to^huk  death 
will  be  our  destruction. 

Now,  though  I  think  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  prior 
to  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future  life  commonly 
insisted  upon,  there  would  arise  a  general  confused  suspi¬ 
cion,  that,  in  the  great  shock  and  alteration  which  we  shall 
undergo  by  death,  we,  i.  e.  our  livmg  powers,  might  be 
wholly  destrojmd  ;  yet  even  prior  to  those  proofs,  there  is 
really  no  particular  distinct  ground,  or  reason,  for  this  appre¬ 
hension  at  all,  so  far  as  I  can  find.  If  there  be,  it  must 
arise  either  from  Ihe  reason  of  the  things  or  from  the  analogy 
of  JVature. 

But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reason  of  the  things  that 
death  is  the  destruction  of  living  agents,  because  we  know 
not  at  all  what  death  is  in  itself ;  but  only  some  of  its  eiTects, 
such  as  the  dissolution  of  flesh,  skin,  and  bones  :  and  these 
effects  do  in  no  wise  appear  to  imply  the  destruction  of  a 
living  agent.  And,  besides,  as  we  are  greatly  in  the  dark 
upon  what  the  exercise  of  our  living  powders  depends,  so  we 
are  wholl}^  ignorant  what  the  powers  themselves  depend 
upon ;  the  powers  themselves,  as  distinguished,  not  only 

*  DestructiGU  of  living  powers,  is  a  manner  of  expression  unavoidably 
ambiguous  ;  and  may  signify  either  tlic  destruction  of  a  living  being,  so 
as  that  the  same  living  being  shall  be  incapable  of  ever  perceiving  or 
acting  again  at  all;  or  the  destruction  qf  those  means  and  mstrufnents 
by  xchich  it  is  capable  of  its  present  life,  of  its  present  state  of  perception 
and  of  action.  It  is  here  used  in  the  former  sense.  When  it  is  used  in  the 
latter,  the  epithet  present  is  added.  The  loss  of  a  mail’s  eye  is  a  destruction 
of  living  powers  in  the  latter  sense.  But  we  have  no  reason  to  think  the  de¬ 
struction  of  living  powers,  in  the  former  sense,  to  be  possible.  We  have  no 
more  reason  to  think  a  being,  endued  with  living  powers,  ever  loses  them 
durincr  its  whole  existence,  than  to  believe  that  a  stone  ever  aconites  thern> 


42  OF  A  FUTURi;  LIFE.  [CHAF.  I. 

from  their  actual  exercise,  but  also  from  the  present  capaci¬ 
ty  of  exercising  them  ;  and  opposed  to  their  destruction  ; 
for  sleep,  or,  however,  a  swoon,  shows  us,  not  only  that 
these  powers  exist  when  they  are  not  exercised,  as  the 
passive  power  of  motion  does  in  inanimate  matter  ;  but 
shows  also  that  they  exist,  when  there  is  no  present  capa¬ 
city  of  exercising  them  ;  or  that  the  capacities  of  exercising 
them  for  the  present,  as  well  as  the  actual  exercise  of  them, 
may  be  suspended,  and  yet  the  powers  themselves  remain 
undestroyed.  Since,  then,  we  know  n^-^at  all  upon  what 
the  existence  of  our  living  powers  depends,  this  show’s  fur¬ 
ther,  there  can  no  probability  be  collected  horn  the  reason 
of  the  thing,  that  death  wdll  be  their  destruction  :  because 
their  existence  may  depend  upon  somewhat  in  no  degree 
affected  by  death  ;  upon  somewhat  quite  out  of  the  reach  of 
this  king  of  terrors.  So  that  there  is  nothing  more  certain, 
than  that  the  reason  of  the  thing  shows  us  no  connexion 
between  death  and  the  destruction  of  living  agents.  Nor 
can  we  find  any  thing  throughout  the  whole  analogy  of 
JVaturCj  to  afford  us  even  the  slightest  presumption,  that 
animals  ever  lose  their  living  powers  ;  much  less,  if  it  were 
possible,  that  they  lose  them  by  death  ;  for  we  have  no 
faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any  beyond  or  through  it,  so  as 
to  see  what  becomes  of  them.  This  event  removes  them 
from  our  view.  It  destroys  the  sensible  proof,  which  we  had 
before  their  death,  of  their  being  possessed  of  living  powers, 
but  does  not  appear  to  afford  the  least  reason  to  believe, 
that  they  are  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived,  of  them. 

And  our  knowing,  that  they  were  possessed  of  these 
powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to  which  we  have  faculties 
capable  of  tracing  them,  is  itself  a  probability  of  their  retain¬ 
ing  them  beyond  it.  And  this  is  confirmed,  and  a  sensible 
credibility  is  given  to  it,  by  observing  the  very  great  and 
astonishing  changes  which  we  have  experienced  ;  so  great, 
that  our  existence  in  another  state  of  life,  of  perception  and 
of  action,  will  be  but  according  to  a  method  of  providential 
conduct,  the  like  to  which  has  been  already  exercised,  even 
with  regard  to  ourselves  ;  according  to  a  course  of  nature, 
the  like  to  which  we  have  already  gone  through. 

However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  sensible,  how 
difficult  it  is  to  silence  imagination  enough  to  make,  the 
voice  of  reason  even  distinctly  heard  in  this  case  ;  as  we  are 
accustomed,  from  our  youth  up,  to  indulge  that  forward 
delusive  faculty,  ever  obtruding  beyond  its  sphere  j  of  some 


PART  I.] 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


43 


assistance,  indeed,  to  apprehension,  but  the  author  of  ail 
error ;  as  we  plainly  lose  ourselves  in  gross  and  crude  con¬ 
ceptions  of  things,  taking  for  granted  that  we  are  acquaint* 
ed  with  what  indeed  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of ;  it  may  be 
proper  to  consider  the  imaginary  presumptions,  that  death 
will  be  our  destruction,  arising  from  these  kinds  of  early  and 
lasting  prejudices ;  and  to  show  how  little  they  can  really 
amount  to,  even  though  we  cannot  wholly  divest  ourselves 
of  them.  And 

I.  All  presumption  of  death’s  being  the  destruction  of  liv¬ 
ing  beings,  must  go  upon  supposition  that  they  are  com¬ 
pounded,  and  so  discerptible.  But,  since  consciousness  is  a 
single  and  individual  power,  it  should  seem  that  the  subject 
in  which  it  resides,  m_ust  be  so  too.  For,  were  the  motion 
of  any  particle  of  matter  absolutely  one  and  indivisible,  so  as 
that  it  should  imply  a  contradiction  to  suppose  part  of  this 
motion  to  exist,  and  part  not  to  exist  i.  e.  part  of  this  matter 
to  move,  and  part  to  be  at  rest ;  then  its  power  of  motion 
would  be  indivisible  ;  and  so  also  would  the  subject  in  which 
the  power  inheres,  namely,  the  particle  of  matter  :  for,  if 
this  could  be  divided  into  two,  one  part  might  be  moved  and 
the  other  at  rest,  which  is  contrary  to  the  supposition.  In 
like  manner,  it  has  been  argued,  *  and,  for  any  thing  ap¬ 
pearing  to  the  contrary,  justly,  that  since  the  perception,  or 
consciousness,  which  we  have  of  our  own  existence  is  indi¬ 
visible,  so  as  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  suppose  one  part  of 
it  should  be  here  and  the  other  there  ;  the  perceptive  power, 
or  the  power  of  consciousness,  is  indivisible  too  :  and,  conse¬ 
quently,  the  subject  in  which  it  resides,  i.  e.  the  conscious 
being.  Now,  upon  supposition  that  living  agent  each  man 
calls  himself,  is  thus  a  single  being,  which  there  is  at  least 
no  more  difficulty  in  conceiving  than  in  conceiving  it  to  be  a 
compound,  and  of  which  there  is  the  proof  now  mentioned ; 
it  follows,  that  our  organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourselves, 
or  part  of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter  around  us.  And 
it  is  as  easy  to  conceive  how  matter,  which  is  no  part  of 
ourselves,  may  be  appropriated  to  us  in  the  manner  which 
our  present  bodies  are,  as  how  we  can  receive  impressions 
from,  and  have  power  over  any  matter.  It  is  as  easy  to 
conceive,  that  we  may  exist  out  of  bodies,  as  in  them  ;  that 
we  might  have  animated  bodies  of  any  other  organs  and 
senses  wholly  different  from  these  now  given  us,  and  that 


*  See  Dr  Clarke’s  I^etter  to  Mr  Dodwell,  and  the  Defences  of  it. 


44  or*  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  [cHAP.  ! 

\\’'e  may  nereafter  animate  these  same  or  new  bodies  vari¬ 
ously  modified  and  organized,  as  to  conceive  how  we  can 
animate  such  bodies  as  our  present.  And,  lastly,  the  disso¬ 
lution  of  all  these  several  organized  bodies,  supposing  our¬ 
selves  to  have  successively  animated  them,  would  have  no 
more  conceivable  tendency  to  destroy  the  living  beings,  our¬ 
selves,  or  deprive  us  of  hving  faculties,  the  faculties  of  per¬ 
ception  and  of  action,  than  the  dissolution  of  any  foreign 
matter,  which  we  are  capable  of  receiving  impressions  from, 
and  making  use  of  for  the  common  occasions  of  life. 

II.  The  simplicity  and  absolute  oneness  of  a  living  agent 
cannot,  indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  properly 
proved  by  experimental  observations.  But  as  these  fall 
in  with  the  supposition  of  its  unit}^  so  they  plainly  lead  us 
to  conclude  certain!}^,  that  our  gross  organized  bodies,  with 
which  we  perceive  the  objects  of  sense,  and  with  which  we 
act,  are  no  part  of  ourselves,  and  therefore  show  us,  that 
wm  have  no  reason  to  believe  their  destruction  to  be  ours  ; 
even  wfilhout  determining  whether  our  living  substances  ba 
material  or  immaterial.  For  wm  see  by  experience,  that 
men  may  lose  their  limbs,  their  organs  of  sense,  and  even 
the  greatest  part  of  these  bodies,  and  yet  remain  the  same 
living  agents  ;  And  persons  can  trace  up  the  existence  of 
themselves  to  a  time  when  the  bulk  of  their  bodies  was  ex¬ 
tremely  small,  in  comparison  of  what  it  is  in  mature  age ; 
and  we  cannot  but  think,  that  they  might  then  have  lost  a 
considerable  part  of  that  small  body,  and  yet  have  remained 
the  same  living  agents,  as  they  may  now  lose  great  part  of 
their  present  body^  and  remain  so.  And  it  is  certain,  that 
the  bodies  of  all  animals  are  in  a  constant  flux,  from  that 
never  ceasing  attrition  which  there  is  in  every  part  of  them. 
Now,  things  of  this  kind  unavoidably  teach  us  to  distinguish 
between  these  living  agents,  ourselves,  and  large  quantities 
of  matter,  in  which  we  are  very  nearly  interested :  since 
these  may  be  alienated,  and  actually  are  in  a  daily  course 
of  succession,  and  changing  their  owners ;  whilst  we  are 
assured,  that  each  living  agent  remains  one  and  the  same 
permanent  being.'*  And  this  general  observation  leads  us 
on  to  the  following  ones. 

Firsts  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  expe¬ 
rience,  what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  being  each 
man  calls  himself ;  and  yet,  till  it  be  determined  that  it  is 


*  See  Dissertation  T. 


CHAP.  I.] 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


45 


larger  in  bulk  than  the  solid  elementaiy  particles  of  matter, 
which  there  is  no  ground  to  think  any  natural  power  can 
dissolve,  there  is  no  sort  of  reason  to  think  death  to  be  the 
dissolution  of  it,  of  the  living  being,  even  though  it  should 
not  be  absolutel}''  indiscerptible. 

Secondly^  From  our  being  so  nearly  related  to,  and  inter¬ 
ested  in  certain  systems  of  matter,  suppose  our  flesh  and 
bones,  afterwards  ceasing  to  be  at  all  related  to  them,  the 
living  agents,  ourselves,  remaining  all  this  while  undesiioy- 
ed,  notwithstanding  such  alienations  :  and  consequently 
these  systems  of  matter  not  being  ourselves  ;  it  follows  fur¬ 
ther,  that  we  have  no  ground  to  conclude  any  other,  suppose 
internal  systems  of  matter,  to  be  the  living  agents  ourselves  : 
because  we  can  have  no  ground  to  conclude  this,  but  from 
our  relation  to,  and  interest  in  such  other  systems  of  matter  ; 
and,  therefore,  we  can  have  no  reason  to  conclude,  what 
befalls  those  systems  of  matter  at  death,  to  be  the  destruction 
of  the  living  agents.  We  have  already,  several  times  over, 
lost  a  great  part,  or  perhaps  the  v.?holti  of  our  bodjq  accord¬ 
ing  to  certain  common  established  laws  of  nature  ;  yet  we 
remain  the  same  living  agents  :  when  we  shall  lose  as  great 
a  part,  or  the  whole,  by  another  common  established  law  of 
nature,  death,  why  may  we  not  also  remain  the  same  % 
That  the  alienation  has  been  gradual  in  one  case,  and  in  the 
other  will  be  more  at  once,  does  not  prove  any  thing  to  the 
contrary.  We  have  passed  undestroyed  through  those 
many  and  great  revolutions  of  matter,  so  peculiarly  appro¬ 
priated  to  ourselves  ;  why  should  we  imagine  death  would 
be  so  fatal  to  us  '1  Nor  can  it  be  objected,  that  what  is  thus 
alienated,  or  lost,  is  no  part  of  our  original  solid  body,  but 
only  adventitious  matter  ;  because  we'  may  lose  entire  limbs, 
which  must  have  contained  many  solid  parts  and  vessels  of 
the  original  body :  or  if  this  be  not  admitted,  we  have  no 
proof  that  any  of  these  solid  parts  are  dissolved  or  alienated 
by  dee.th  ;  though,  by  the  way,  we  are  very  nearly  related 
to  that  extraneous  or  adventitious  matter,  wlrilst  it  continues 
united  to  and  distending  the  several  parts  of  our  solid  body. 
But,  after  all,  the  relation  a  person  bears  to  those  parts  of 
his  body  to  which  he  is  the  most  nearly  related,  what  does 
it  appear  to  amount  to  but  this,  that  the  living  agent  and 
those  parts  of  the  body  mutually  affect  each  other  %  And 
the  same  thing,  the  same  thing  in  kind,  though  not  in  de¬ 
gree,  may  be  said  of  all  foreign  matter,  which  gives  us 
ideas,  and  which  we  have  any  power  over.  From  these 


40 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


[part  I 


observations  the  whole  ground  of  the  imagination  is  remov¬ 
ed,  that  the  dissolution  of  any  matter  is  the  destruction  of 
a  living  agent,  from  the  interest  he  once  had  in  such  matter. 

Tnirdly,  If  we  consider  our  body  somewhat  more  distinct¬ 
ly,  as  made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of  perception  and 
of  motion,  it  will  bring  us  to  the  same  conclusion.  Thus, 
the  common  optical  experiments  show,  and  even  the  obser¬ 
vation  how  sight  is  assisted  by  glasses  shows,  that  we  see 
with  our  eyes  in  the  same  sense  as  we  see  with  glasses. 
Nor  is  there  any  reason  to  believe,  that  we  see  with  them  in 
any  other  sense  ;  any  other,  I  mean,  which  would  lead  us 
to  think  the  eye  itself  a  percipient.  The  like  is  to  be  said 
of  hearing :  and  our  feeling  distant  solid  matter  by  means 
of  somewhat  in  our  hand,  seems  an  instance  of  the  like  kind, 
as  to  the  subject  we  are  considering.  All  these  are  instances 
of  foreign  matter,  or  such  as  is  no  part  of  our  body,  being 
instrumental  in  preparing  objects  for,  and  conveying  them  to 
the  perceiving  power,  in  a  manner  similar,  or  like  to  the 
manner  in  which  our  organs  of  sense  prepare  and  convey 
them.  Both  are,  in  a  like  way,  instruments  of  our  receiv¬ 
ing  such  ideas  from  external  objects,  as  the  Author  of  na¬ 
ture  appointed  those  external  objects  to  be  the  occasions  of 
exciting  in  us.  However,  glasses  are  evidently  instances 
of  this  ;  namely,  of  matter,  which  is  no  part  of  our  body,  pre¬ 
paring  objects  for,  and  conveying  them  towards  the  perceiv¬ 
ing  power,  in  like  manner  as  our  bodily  organs  do.  And  if 
we  see  with  our  eyes  only  in  the  same  manner  as  we  do  with 
glasses,  the  like  may  justly  be  concluded  from  analogy,  of 
all  our  other  senses.  It  is  not  intended,  by  any  thing  here 
said,  to  affirm,  that  the  whole  apparatus  of  vision,  cr  of  per 
ception  by  any  other  of  our  senses,  can  be  traced,  through 
all  its  steps,  quite  up  to  the  living  power  of  seeing,  or  per¬ 
ceiving  ;  but  that,  so  far  as  it  can  be  traced  by  experimental 
observations,  so  far  it  appears,  that  our  organs  of  sense  pre¬ 
pare  and  convey  on  objects,  in  order  to  their  being  perceived, 
in  like  manner  as  foreign  matter  does,  without  affording  any 
shadow  of  appearance,  that  they  themselves  perceive.  And 
that  we  have  no  reason  to  think  our  organs  of  sense  perci¬ 
pients,  is  confirmed  by  instances  of  persons  losing  some  of 
them,  the  living  beings  themselves,  their  former  occupiers, 
remaining  unimpaired.  It  is  confirmed  also  by  the  experi¬ 
ence  of  dreams ;  by  which  we  find  we  are  at  present  pos¬ 
sessed  of  a  latent,  and  what  would  otherwise  be  an  unima- 
gined  unknown  power  of  perceiving  sensible  objects,  in  as 


CHAP.  I.] 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


41 


strong  and  lively  a  manner  without  our  external  organs  of 
sense,  as  with  them. 

So  also  with  regard  to  our  power,  of  moving,  or  directing 
motion  by  will  and  choice  ;  upon  the  destruction  of  a  limb, 
this  active  power  remains,  as  it  evidently  seems,  unlessened ; 
so  as  that  the  living  being,  who  has  suffered  this  loss,  would 
be  capable  of  moving  as  before,  if  it  had  another  limb  to 
move  with.  It  can  walk  by  the  help  of  an  artificial  leg, 
just  as  it  can  make  use  of  a  pole  or  a  lever,  to  reach  towards 
itself  and  to  move  things  beyond  the  length  and  the  power 
of  its  natural  arm  :  and  this  last  it  does  in  the  same  manner 
as  it  reaches  and  moves,  with  its  natural  arm,  things  nearer 
and  of  less  weight.  Nor  is  there  so  much  as  any  appear¬ 
ance  of  our  limbs  being  endued  with  a  power  of  moving  or 
directing  themselves  ;  though  they  are  adapted,  like  the  se¬ 
veral  parts  of  a  machine,  to  be  the  instruments  of  motion  to 
each  other  ;  and  some  parts  of  the  same  limb,  to  be  instru¬ 
ments  of  motion  to  the  other  parts  of  it. 

Thus,  a  man  determines  that,  he  will  look  at  such  an  ob¬ 
ject  through  a  microscope  ;  or,  being  lame  suppose,  that  he 
will  walk  to  such  a  place  with  a  staff  a  week  hence.  His 
eyes  and  his  feet  no  more  determine  in  these  cases,  than  the 
microscope  and  the  staff.  Nor  is  there  any  ground  to  think 
they  any  more  put  the  determination  in  the  practice,  or  that 
his  ej^es  are  the  seers,  or  his  feet  the  movers,  in  any  other 
sense  than  as  the  microscope  and  the  staff  are.  Upon  the 
whole,  then,  our  organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are  certainly 
instruments,  which  the  living  persons,  ourselves,  make  use 
of  to  perceive  and  move  with.  There  is  not  any  probability, 
that  they  are  any  more  ;  nor,  consequently,  that  we  have 
any  other  kind  of  relation  to  them,  than  what  we  may  have 
to  any  other  foreign  matter  formed  into  instruments  of  per¬ 
ception  and  motion,  suppose  into  a  microscope  or  a  staff'  (1 
say,  any  other  kind  of  relation,  for  I  am  not  speaking  of  the 
degree  of  it ;  nor,  consequently,  is  there  any  probability, 
that  the  alienation  or  dissolution  of  these  instruments  is  the 
destruction  of  the  perceiving  and  moving  agent. 

And  thus  our  finding,  that  the  dissolution  of  matter  in 
which  living  beings  were  most  nearly  interested,  is  not  their 
dissolution ;  and  that  the  destruction  of  several  of  the  or¬ 
gans  and  instruments  of  perception  and  of  motion  belong¬ 
ing  to  them,  is  not  their  destruction  ;  shows,  demonstrative¬ 
ly,  that  there  is  no  ground  to  think,  that  the  dissolution 
of  any  other  matter  or  destruction  of  any  other  organs 


48 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


[part  1. 


and  instruments,  will  be  the  dissolution  or  destruction 
of  living  agents,  horn  the  like  kind  of  relation.  A'nd  we 
have  no  reason  to  think  we  stand  in  any  other  kind  of 
relation  to  any  thing  which  we  find  dissolved  by  death. 

But  it  is  said,  these  observations  are  equally  applicable  tc 
brutes  ;  and  it  is  thought  an  insuperable  difficulty,  that 
they  should  be  immortal,  and,  by  consequence,  capable  of 
everlasting  happiness.  Now,  this  manner  of  expression  is 
both  invidious  and  weak  :  but  the  thing  intended  by  it,  is 
really  no  difficulty  at  all,  either  in  the  way  of  natural  or 
moral  consideration.  For,  1st,  Suppose  the  invidious  thing, 
designed  in  such  a  manner  of  expression,  wmre  really  im¬ 
plied,  as  it  is  not  in  the  least,  in  the  natural  immortality  of 
brutes  ;  namely,  that  they  must  arrive  at  great  attainments, 
and  become  rational  and  moral  agents  ;  even  this  would  be 
no  difficulty,  since  we  know  not  what  latent  powers  and 
capacities  they  may  be  endued  with.  There  was  once,  pri¬ 
or  to  experience,  as  great  presumption  against  human  crea¬ 
tures,  as  there  is  against  the  brute  creatures,  arriving  at 
that  degree  of  understanding  which  we  have  in  mature  age ; 
for  we  can  trace  up  our  own  existance  to  the  same  original 
with  theirs.  And  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature, 
that  creatures  endued,  with  capacities  of  virtue  and  religion, 
should  be  placed  in  a  condition  of  being,  in  which  they  are 
altogether  without  tire  use  of  them  for  a  considerable  length 
of  their  duration,  as  in  infancy  and  childhood.  And  great 
part  of  the  human  species  go  out  of  the  present  world,  be^- 
fore  they  come  to  the  exercise  of  these  capacities  in  any  de¬ 
gree  at  all.  But  then,  2dly,  The  natural  immortality  of 
brutes  does  not  in  the  least  imply,  that  they  are  endued  with 
any  latent  capacities  of  a  rational  or  moral  nature.  And 
the  economy  of  the  universe  might  require,  that  there  should 
be  living  creatures  without  any  capacities  of  this  kind. 
And  all  difficulties,  as  to  the  manner  how  they  are  to  be  dis¬ 
posed  of,  are  so  apparently  and  wholly  founded  on  our  igno¬ 
rance,  that  it  is  wonderful  they  should  be  insisted  upon  by  any, 
but  such  as  are  weak  enough  to  think  they  are  acquainted 
with  the  whole  system  of  things.  There  is,  then,  absolute¬ 
ly  nothing  at  all  in  this  objection,  which  is  so  rhetorically 
urged  against  the  greatest  part  of  the  natural  proofs  or  pre¬ 
sumptions  of  the  immortality  of  human  minds  ;  I  say  the 
greatest  part  ;  for  it  is  less  applicable  to  the  following  ob¬ 
servation,  which  is  more  peculiar  to  mankind  : — 

III.  That  as  it  is  evident  our  present  powers  and  capaci- 


CHAP.  I.] 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


49 


tics  of  reason,  memory,  and  aiFection,  do  not  depend  upon 
our  gross  body,  in  the  manner  in  which  perception  by  our 
organs  of  sense  does  ;  so  they  do  not  appear  to  depend  upon 
it  at  all  in  any  such  manner,  as  to  give  ground  to  think,  that 
the  dissolution  of  this  body  will  be  the  destruction  of  these 
our  present  powers  of  reflection,  as  it  will  of  our  powers  of 
sensation  ;  or  to  give  ground  to  conclude,  even  that  it  will 
be  so  much  as  a  suspension  of  the  former. 

Human  creatures  exist  at  present  in  two  states  of  life 
and  perception,  greatly  different  horn  each  other  ;  each  of 
which  has  its  own  peculiar  laws,  and  its  o  .vn  peculiar  en¬ 
joyments  and  sufferings.  When  any  of  our  senses  are 
affected,  or  appetites  gratified  with  the  objects  of  them,  we 
may  be  said  to  exist,  or  live,  in  a  state  of  sensation.  When 
none  of  our  senses  are  affected,  or  appetites  gratified,  and 
yet  we  perceive,  and  reason,  and  act,  we  may  be  said  to  ex¬ 
ist,, or  live,  in  a  state  of  .reflection.  Now  it  is  by  no  means 
certain,  that  any  thing  which  is  dissolved  by  death  is  any 
way  necessary  to  the  living  being,  in  this  Us  state  of  reflec¬ 
tion,  after  ideas  are  gained.  For  though,  from  our  present 
constitution  and  condition  of  being,  our  external  organs  of 
sense  are  necessary  for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflecting 
powers,  as  carriages,  and  levers,  and  scaffolds  are  in  archi¬ 
tecture  ;  yet,  when  these  ideas  are  brought  in,  we  are  capa¬ 
ble  of  reflecting  in  the  most  intense  degree,  and  of  enjoying 
the  greatest  pleasure,  and  feeling  the  greatest  pain,  by 
means  of  that  reflection,  without  any  assistance  from  our 
senses ;  and  without  anj?  at  all,  which  we  know  of,  from 
that  body,  which  will  be  dissolved  by  death.  It  does  not 
appear,  then,  that  the  relation  of  this  gross  body  to  the  re¬ 
flecting  being,  is  in  any  degree,  necessary  to  thinking  ;  to 
our  intellectual  enjoyments  or  sufferings  :  nor,  consequently, 
that  the  dissolution,  or  alienation  of  the  former  by  death,  will 
be  the  destruction  of  those  present  powers,  which  render  us 
capable  of  this  state  of  reflection.  Further,  there  are  in¬ 
stances  of  moral  diseases,  which  do  not  at  ah  affect  our 
present  intellectual  powers  ;  and  this  affords  a  presumption, 
that  those  diseases  will  not  destroy  these  present  powers, 
[ndeed,  from  the  observations  made  above,  it  appears,  that 
.here  is  no  presumption,  from  their  mutually  affecting  each 
other,  that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of 


3 


50 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


[part  I. 


the  living  agent.  And  by  the  same  reasoning  it  must  ap¬ 
pear,  too,  that  there  is  no  presumption,  from  their  mutually 
affecting  each  other,  that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  is  the 
destruction  of  our  present  reflecting  powers  ;  but  instances 
of  their  not  affecting  each  other,  afford  a  presumption  of  the 
contrary.  Instances  of  mortal  disease  not  impairing  our 
present  reflecting  powers,  evidently  turn  our  thoughts  even 
from  imagining  such  diseases  to  be  the  destruction  of  them, 
Several  things,  indeed,  greatly  affect  all  our  living  powers, 
and  at  length,  suspend  the  exercise  of  them  ;  as,  for  in¬ 
stance,  drowsiness,  increasing  till  it  ends  in  sound  sleep  : 
and  from  hence  we  might  have  imagined  it  would  destroy 
them,  till  we  found,  by  experience,  the  weakness  of  this  way 
of  judging.  But,  in  the  diseases  now  mentioned,  there  is  not 
60  much  as  the  shadow  of  probability,  to  lead  us  to  any 
such  conclusion,  as  to  the  reflecting  powers  which  we  have 
at  present ;  for,  in  those  diseases,  persons  the  moment  before 
death  appear  to  be  in  the  highest  vigor  of  life.  They  dis¬ 
cover  apprehension,  memory,  reason,  all  entire ;  with  the 
utmost  force  of  affection  ;  sense  of  a  character,  of  shame 
and  honor  ;  and  the  highest  mental  enjoyments  and  suffer¬ 
ings,  even  to  the  last  gasp  :  and  these  surely  prove  even 
greater  vigor  of  life  than  bodily  strength  does.  Now,  what 
pretence  is  there  for  thinking,  that  a  progressive  disease, 
when  arrived  to  such  a  degree,  I  mean  that  degree  which 
is  mortal,  will  destroy  those  powers,  which  were  not  impair¬ 
ed,  which  were  not  affected  by  it,  during  its  whole  progress, 
quite  up  to  that  degree  1  And  if  death,  by  diseases  of  this 
kind,  is  not  the  destruction  of  our  present  reflecting  powers, 
it  will  scarce  be  thought  that  death  by  any  other  means  is. 

It  is  obvious  that  this  general  observation  may  be  carried 
on  further  ;  and  there  appears  so  little  connexion  between 
our  bodily  powers  of  sensation,  and  our  present  powers  of 
reflection,  that  there  is  no  reason  to  conclude  that  death, 
which  destroys  the  former,  does  so  much  as  suspend  the 
exercise  of  the  latter,  or  interrupt  our  continuing  to  exist  in 
the  like  state  of  reflection  which  we  do  now.  For,  suspen¬ 
sion  of  reason,  memory,  and  the  affections  which  they  ex¬ 
cite,  is  no  part  of  the  idea  of  death,  nor  is  implied  in  our 
notion  of  it.  And  our  dail}^  experiencing  these  powers  to  be 
exercised,  without  any  assistance,  that  we  know  of,  from 
those  bodies  which  will  be  dissolved  by  death  ;  and  our  find¬ 
ing  often,  that  the  exercise  of  them  is  so  lively  to  the  last ; — 
these  things  afford  a  sensible  apprehension,  that  death  mav 


CHAP.  I,] 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


61 


not  perhaps  be  so  much  as  a  discontinuance  of  the  exeicisr 
of  these  powers,  nor  of  the  enjoyments  and  sufferings  which 
it  implies;^  so  that  our  posthumous  life,  whatever  there  may 
be  in  it  additional  to  our  present,  yet  may  not  be  entirely  be¬ 
ginning  anew,  but  going  on.  Death  may,  in  some  sort,  and 
in  some  respects,  answer  to  our  birth,  which  is  not  a  sus¬ 
pension  of  the  faculties  which  we  had  before  it,  or  a  total 
change  of  the  state  of  life  in  which  we  existed  when  in  the 
womb,  but  a  continuation  of  both,  with  such  and  such  great 
alterations. 

Nay,  for  ought  we  know  of  ourselves,  of  our  present  life, 
and  of  death,  death  may  immediately,  in  the  natural  course 
of  things,  put  us  into  a  higher  and  more  enlarged  state  of 
life,  as  our  birth  does  a  state  in  which  our  capacities  and 
sphere  of  perception,  and  of  action,  may  be  much  greater 
than  at  present.  For,  as  our  relation  to  our  external  organs 
of  sense  renders  us  capable  of  existing  in  our  present  state 
of  sensation,  so  it  may  be  the  only  natural  hindrance  to  our 
existing,  immediately  and  of  course,  in  a  higher  state  of  re¬ 
flection.  The  truth  is,  reason  does  not  at  all  show  us  in 
what  state  death  naturally  leaves  us.  But  were  we  sure 
that  it  would  suspend  all  our  perceptive  and  active  powers, 
yet  the  suspension  of  a  power,  and  the  destruction  of  it,  are 
effects  so  totally  different  in  kind,  as  we  experience  from 
sleep  and  a  swoon,  that  we  cannot  in  any  wise  argue  from 
one  to  the  other  ;  or  conclude,  even  to  the  lowest  degree  of 
probability,  that  the  same  kind  of  force  which  is  sufficient  to 
suspend  our  faculties,  though  it  be  increased  ever  so  much, 
will  be  sufficient  to  destroy  them. 

These  observations  together  may  be  sufficient  to  show, 
how  little  presumption  there  is  that  death  is  the  destruction 

*  There  are  three  distinct  questions,  relating  to  a  future  life,  here  con¬ 
sidered  :  Whether  death  be  the  destruction  of  living  agents  1  If  not, 
Whether  it  be  the  destruction  of  their  'present  powers  of  reflection,  as  it 
certainly  is  the  destruction  of  their  present  powers  of  sensation  1  And  if 
not.  Whether  it  ke  the  suspension,  or  discontinuance  of  the  exercise,  of 
these  present  reflecting  powers  1  Now,  if  there  be  no  reason  to  believe 
the  last,  there  will  be,  if  tliat  were  possible,  less  for  the  next,  and  less  still 
for  the  first. 

t  This,  according  to  Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brahmans:  vojii- 
^Eiv  jxsv  yap  Sr]  tov  psv  evdaSs  /?£OJ/,a)s  av  aKpriv  Kvoyevuiv  eivai'  top  6e  OavaTOP, 
yEPEijiS  Eig  TOP  opTCog  l3iop,  Kai  top  EvSaipopa  Toig  (pt^^oaotprjaaai.  JLib.  XV^.  p. 

1039.  Ed.  Amst.  1707.  To  which  opinion  perhaps  Antoninus  rnay 
allude  in  these  words,  d)  g  pvp  TEpipspstg,  ttote  EpPpvop  ek  nns  yaaTpog  Trjg 
yvpatKog  as  e^eXOt],  sToog  EKSc^saOai  Tr]p  cjpap  bp  t]  to  xpv^apiov  as  ts  sXvTpg 

rsTS  Si  tTEaciTai.  Lib.  IX.  C.  3. 


52 


OF  A  FUTUHE  LIFE. 


[part  L 


of  human  creatures.  However,  there  is  the  shadow  of  an 
analogy,  which  may  lead  us  to  imagine  it  is  ;  the  supposed 
likeness  which  is  observed  between  the  decay  of  vegetables 
and  of  living  creatures.  And  this  likeness  is  indeed  suffi¬ 
cient  to  afford  the  poets  very  apt  allusions  to  the  flowers  of 
the  field,  in  their  pictures  of  the  frailty  of  our  present  life. 
But,  in  reason,  the  analogy  is  so  far  from  holding,  that  there 
appears  no  ground  even  for  the  comparison,  as  to  the  present 
question  ;  because  one  of  the  two  subjects  compared  is 
wholly  void  of  that,  which  is  the  principle  and  chief  thing  in 
the  other,  the  power  of  perception  and  action  ;  and  which  is 
the  only  thing  we  are  inquiring  about  the  continuance  of. 
So  th^t  the  destruction  of  a  vegetable  is  an  event  not  simi¬ 
lar,  or  analogous,  to  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent. 

But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off  the  delusive 
custom  of  substituting  imagination  in  the  room  of  experi¬ 
ence,  we  would  confine  ourselves  to  what  we  do  know  and 
understand ;  if  we  would  argue  only  from  that,  and  from 
that  form  our  expectations,  it  would  appear,  at  first  sight, 
that  as  no  probability  of  living  beings  ever  ceasing  to  be  so, 
can  be  concluded  from  the  reason  of  the  thing  ;  so  none 
can  be  collected  from  the  analogy  of  nature  ;  because  we 
cannot  trace  any  living  beings  beyond  death.  But  as  we 
are  conscious  that  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  percep¬ 
tion  and  of  action,  and  are  living  persons,  what  we  are  to 
go  upon  is,  that  we  shall  continue  so  till  we  foresee  some 
accident,  or  event,  which  will  endanger  those  capacities,  or 
be  likely  to  destroy  us  ;  which  death  does  in  no  wise  appear 
to  be. 

And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may  pass 
into  new  sconces,  and  a  new  state  of  life  and  action,  just  as 
naturally  as  we  came  into  the  present.  And  this  new  state 
may  naturally  be  a  social  one.  And  the  advantages  of  it,  ad¬ 
vantages  of  ever}^' kind,  may  naturally  be  bestowed,  according 
to  some  fixed  general  laws  of  wisdom,  upon  every  one  in  jiro- 
portion  to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue.  And  thouglmhe  advanta¬ 
ges  of  that  future  natural  state  should  not  be  bestowed,  as  these 
of  the  present  in  some  ifieasure  are,  by  the  will  of  the  society, 
but  entirely  by  his  more  immediate  action,  upon  whom  the 
whole  frame  of  nature  depends,  yet  this  distribution  may  be 
just  as  natural,  as  their  being  distributed  here  by  the  instru¬ 
mentality  of  men.  And,  indeed,  though  one  were  to  allow 
any  confused  undetermined  sense,  which  people  please  to  put 
upon  the  word  natural^  it  would  be  a  shortness  of  thought 


CHAP.  I.] 


OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


53 


scarce  credible  to  imagine,  that  no  system  or  course  of  things 
can  be  so,  but  only  what  we  see  at  present  especially 
wliilst  the  probability  of  a  future  life,  or  the  natural  immor¬ 
tality  of  the  soul,  is  admitted  upon  the  evidence  of  reason  ; 
because  this  is  really  both  admitting  and  denying  at  once,  a 
state  of  being  different  from  the  present  to  be  natural.  But 
the  only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  is,  stated^  fixed ^  or 
tied ;  since  what  is  natural  as  much  requires;  and  presuppo¬ 
ses  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so,  i.  e.  to  effect  it  con¬ 
tinually,  or  at  stated  times,  as  what  is  supernatural  or  mi¬ 
raculous  does  to  effect  it  for  once.  And  from  hence  it  must 
follo\y,  that  persons’  notion  of  what  is  natural  will  be  enlar¬ 
ged,  in  proportion  to  their  greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of 
God  and  the  dispensations  of  his  Providence.  Nor  is  there 
any  absurdity  in  supposing,  that  there  may  be  beings  in  the 
universe,  whose  capacities,  and  knowledge,  and  views,  may 
be  so  extensive,  as  that  the  v/hole  Christian  dispensation  may 
to  them  appear  natural,  i.  e.  analogous  or  conformable  to 
God’s  dealings  with  other  parts  of  his  creation,  as  natural  as 
the  visible  known  course  of  things  appears  to  us.  For  there 
seems  scarce  any  other  possible  sense  to  be  put  upon  the 
word,  but  that  only  in  which  it  is  here  used  ;  similar,  stated, 
or  uniform. 

This  credibility  of  a,  future  life,  which  has 'been  here  in¬ 
sisted  upon,  how  little  soever  it  may  satisfy  our  curiosity, 
seems  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of  religion,  in  like  manner 
as  a  demonstrative  proof  would.  Indeed,  a  proof,  even  a  de¬ 
monstrative  one,  of  a  future  life,  would  not  be  a  proof  of  reli¬ 
gion.  For,  that  we  are  to  live  hereafter,  is  just  as  reconcilia- 
ble  with  the  scheme  of  atheism,  and  as  well  to'be  accounted 
for  by  it,  as  that  we  are  now  alive  is  ;  and  therefore  nothing 
can  be  more  absurd  than  to  argue  from  that  scheme,  that 
there  can  be  no  future  state.  But  as  religion  implies  a  fu¬ 
ture  state,  any  presumption  against  such  a  state  is  a  pre- 
Eumption  against  religion.  And  the  foregoing  observations 
lemove  all  presumptions  of  that  sort,  and  prove,  to  a  very 
considerable  degree  of  probability,  one  fundamental  doctrine 
of  religion  ;  which  if  believed,  would  greatly  open  and  dis¬ 
pose  the  mind  seriously  to  attend  to  the  general  evidence  of 
the  whole 


*  Se^  Fart  ii.  ch,  2.  and  Fart  ii.  ch.  3. 


54 


OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  [PART  1 


\ 


CHAPTER  11. 

Cy  ihe  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Vunishments ; 
and  particularly  of  the  latter. 

That  which  makes  the  question  concerning  a  future  life 
to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is  our  capacity  of  happi* 
ness  and  misery.  And  that  which  makes  the  consideration 
of  it  to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is  the  supposition  of 
our  happiness  and  misery  hereafter,  depending  upon  our  ac¬ 
tions  here.  Without  this,  indeed,  curiosity  could  not  but 
sometimes  bring  a  subject,  in  which  we  may  be  so  highly 
interested,  to  our  thoughts  ;  especially  upon  the  mortality 
of  others,  or  the  near  prospect  of  our  own.  But  reasonable 
men  would  not  take  any  farther  thought  about  hereafter, 
than  what  should  happen  thus  occasionally  to  rise  in  their 
minds,  if  it  were  certain  that  our  future  interest  no  way  de¬ 
pend  upon  our  present  behaviour  ;  whereas,  on  the  contrary, 
if  there  be  ground,  either  from  analogy  or  any  thing  else,  to 
think  it  does,  then  there  is  reason  also  for  the  most  active 
thought  and  solicitude  to  secure  that  interest ;  to  behave  so 
as  that  we  may  escape  that  misery,  and  obtain  that  happi¬ 
ness  in  another  life,  which  we  not  only  suppose  ourselves 
capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend  also  is  put  in  our  own 
power.  And  whether  there  be  ground  for  this  last  appre¬ 
hension,  certainly  would  deserve  to  be  most  seriously  consi¬ 
dered^  were  there  no  other  proof  of  a  future  life,  and  interest, 
than  that  presumptive  one  which  the  foregoing  observations 
aiHOunt  to. 

Now,  in  the  present  state,  all  which  we  enjoy,  and  a  great 
part  of  what  we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  own  power.  For  plea¬ 
sure  and  pain  are  the  consequences  of  our  actions  ;  and  we 
are  endued  by  the  Author  of  our  nature  with  capacities  of 
foreseeing  these  consequences.  We  find,  by  experience,  he 
does  not  so  much  as  preserve  our  lives  exclusively  of  our  own 
care  and  attention  to  provide  ourselves  with,  and  to  make 


CHAP.  11.]  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS. 


55 


use  of,  that  sustenance,  by  which  he  has  appointed  our  lives 
shall  be  preserved,  and  without  which  he  has  appointed  they 
shall  not  be  preserved  at  all.  And  in  general  we  foresee,  that 
the  external  things,  which  are  the  objects  of  our  various  pas¬ 
sions,  can  neither  be  obtained  nor  enjoyed,  without  exerting 
ourselves  in  such  and  such  manners  ;  but  by  thus  exerting 
ourselves,  we  obtain  and  enjoy,  these  objects,  in  which  our 
natural  good  consists,  or  by  this  means  God  gives  us  the  pos¬ 
session  and  enjoyment  of  them.  I  know  not  that  we  have 
any  one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoyment,  but  by  the  means  of 
our  own  actions.  And  by  prudence  and  care,  we  may,  for 
the  most  part,  pass  our  days  in  tolerable  ease  and  quiet :  or, 
on  the  contrary,  we  may,  by  rashness,  ungoverned  passion, 
wilfulness,  or  even  by  negligence,  make  ourselves  as  misera¬ 
ble  as  ever  we  please.  And  many  do  please  to  make  them¬ 
selves  extremely  miserable,  i.  e.  to  do  what  they  know  be¬ 
forehand  will  render  them  so.  They  follow  those  ways,  the 
fruit  of  which  they  know,  by  instruction,  example,  experi¬ 
ence,  will  be  disgrace,  and,  poverty,  and  sickness,  and 
untimely  death.  This  every  one  observes  to  be  the  general 
course  of  things  ;  though  it  is  to  be  allowed,  we  cannot  find 
by  experience,  that  all  our  sufferings  are  owing  to  our  own 
follies. 

Why  the  Author  of  Nature  does  not  give  his  creatures 
promiscuously  such  and  such  perceptions,  without  regard  to 
their  behaviour  ;  why  he  does  not  make  them  happy  with¬ 
out  the  instrumentality  of  their  own  actions,  and  prevent 
their  bringing  any  sufferings  upon  themselves,  is  another 
matter.  Perhaps  there  may  be  some  impossibilities  in  the 
nature  of  things,  which  we  are  unacquainted  with  Or  less 
happiness,  it  may  be,  would,  upon  the  whole,  be  produced 
by  such  a  method  of  conduct,  than  is  by  the  present :  Or, 
perhaps,  divine  goodness,  with  which,  if  I  mistake  not,  we 
make  very  free  in  our  speculations,  may  not  be  a  bare  single 
disposition  to  produce  happiness  ;  but  a  disposition  to  make 
the  good,  the  faithful,  the  honest  man,  happy.  Perhaps  an 
infinitely  perfect  Mind  may  be  pleased  with  seeing  his  crea¬ 
tures  behave  suitably  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  them ; 
to  the  relations  which  he  has  placed  them  in  to  each  other  ; 
and  to  that  which  they  stand  in  to  himself ;  that  relation  to 
himself,  which,  during  their  existence,  is  even  necessary,  and 
which  is  the  most  important  one  of  all.  Perhaps,  I  s-ay,  an 


*  Part  i.  chap.  7 


56 


OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  [PART  I 


infinitely  perfect  Mind,  may  be  pleased  with  this  moral  piety 
of  moral  agents,  in  and  for  itself,  as  well  as  upon  account  of 
its  being  essentially  conducive  to  the  happiness  of  his  crea¬ 
tion.  Or  the  whole  end,  for  which  God  made,  and  thus  go¬ 
verns  the  world,  may  be  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  our  fa=- 
Guides  :  There  may  be  somewhat  in  it  as  impossible  for  us 
to  have  any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind  man  to  have  a  con¬ 
ception  of  colors.  But  however  this  be,  it  is  certain  matter 
of  universal  experience,  that  the  general  method  of  divine  ad¬ 
ministration  is,  forewarning  us,  or  giving  us  capacities  to  fore¬ 
see,  with  more  or  less  clearness,  that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  wc 
shall  have  such  enjoyments,  if  so  and  so,  such  sufferings;  and 
giving  us  those  enjoyments,  and  making  us  feel  those  suffer¬ 
ings,  in  consequence  of  our  actions. 

‘  But  all  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course  of  na¬ 
ture-.’  True.  This  is  the  very  thing  which  1  am  observ¬ 
ing.  It  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course  of  nature  ; 
i.  e.  not  surely  to  the  words,  or  ideas,  Course  of  nature^  but 
to  him  who  appointed  it,  and  put  things  into  it ;  or  to  o 
course  of  operation,  from  its  uniformitj^  or  consistency,  call¬ 
ed  natural,  and  which  necessarily  implies  an  operating 
agent.  For  when  men  find  thcniselves  necessitated  to  con¬ 
fess  an  Author  of  Nature,  or  that  God  is  the  natural  gove- 
nor  of  the  world,  they  must  not  deny  this  again,  because 
his  government  is  uniform ;  they  muist  not  deny  that  he 
does  all  things  at  all,  because  he  does  them  constantlj^ ;  be¬ 
cause  the  effects  of  his  acting  are  peiTnanent,  whether  his 
acting  be  so  or  not ;  though  there  is  no  reason  to  think  it  is 
not.  •  In  short,  every  man,  in  every  thing  he  does,  naturally 
acts  upon  the  forethought  and  apprehension  of  avoiding 
evil,  or  obtaining  good  ;  and  if  the  natural  course  of  things 
be  the  appointment  of  God,  and  our  natural  faculties  of 
knowledge  and  experience  are  given  us  b}’-  him,  then  the 
good  and  bad  consequences  which  follow  our  actions  are  his 
appointment,  and  our  foresight  of  those  consequences  is  a 
warning  given  us  by  him,  how„vve  are  to  act. 

‘Is  the  ])leasure,  then,  naturally  accompanying  ev^ry  parti¬ 
cular  gratification  of  passion,  intended  to  put  us  upon  gra¬ 
tifying  ourselves  in  every  such  par'icular  instance,  and  as  a 
reward  to  us  for  so  doing  V  No,  certainly.  Nor  is  it  to  bo 
said,  that  our  eyes  wmre  .naturally  intended  to  give  us  the 
eight  of  each  particular  object  to  wliich  tliey  do  or  can  ox 


CHAP.  II.]  BY  REVvAP.BS  AND  PUNISHMENTS. 


51 


tend;  objects  which  are  destructive  of  them,  or  which,  for  any 
other  reason,  it  may  become  us  to  turn  our  eyes  horn.  Yet 
there  is  no  doubt,  but  that  our  eyes  were  intended  for  us  to 
see  wit  h.  So  neither  is  there  any  doubt,  but  that  the  foreseen 
pleasures  and  pains,  belonging  to  the  passions,  were^  inten¬ 
ded,  in  general,  to  induce  mankind  to  act  in  such  and  such 
manners. 

Now,  from  this  general  observation,  obvious  to  every  one, 
that  God  has  given  us  to  understand  he  has  appointed  satis¬ 
faction  and  delight  to  be  the  consequence  of  our  acting  in 
one  manner,  and  pain  and  uneasiness  of  our  acting  in  an¬ 
other,  and  of  our  not  acting  at  all ;  and  that  we  find  the 
consequences,  which  we  were  beforehand  informed  of,  uni¬ 
formly  to  follow  ;  we  may  learn,  that  we  are  at  present  ac¬ 
tually  under  his  government,  in  the  strictest  and  most  pro¬ 
per  sense  ;  in  such  a  sense,  as  that  he  rewards  and  punish¬ 
es  us  for  our  actions.  An  Author  of  Nature  being  suppo¬ 
sed,  it  is  not  so  much  a  deduction  of  reason  as  a  matter  of 
experience,  that  we  are  thus  under  his  government :  under 
his  government,  in  the  same  sense  as  we  are  under  the  go¬ 
vernment  of  civil  magistrates.  Because  the  annexing  plea¬ 
sure  to  some  actions,  and  pain  to  others,  in  our  power  to  do 
or  forbear,  and  giving  notice  of  this  appointment  beforehand 
to  those  whom  it  concerns,  is  the  proper  formal  notion  of  go¬ 
vernment.  Whether  the  pleasure  or  pain  which  thus  fol¬ 
lows  upon  our  behaviour,  be  owing  to  the  Author  of  Na¬ 
ture’s  acting  upon  us  ever}"  moment  which  we  feel  it,  or  to 
his  having  at  once  contrived  and  executed  his  own  part  in 
the  plan  of  the  world,  makes  no  alteration  as  to  the  matter  be¬ 
fore  us.  For,  if  civil  magistrates  could  make  the  sanction 
of  their  laws  take  place,  without  interposing  at  all,  aftei 
they  had  passed  them  ;  without  a  trial,  and  the  formalities 
of  an  execution  :  if  they  were  able  to  make  their  laws  exe 
cute  them  themselves  or  every  offender  to  execute  them 
upon  himself,  we  should  be  just  in  the  same  sense  un¬ 
der  their  government  then,  as  we  are  now  ;  but  in  a 
much  higher  degree,  and  more  perfect  manner.  Vain 
is  the  ridicule  with  which  one  foresees  some  persons  will 
divert  themselves,  upon  finding  lesser  pains  considered  as 
instances  of  divine  punishment.  There  is  no  possibility  of 
answering  or  evading  the  general  thing  here  intended,  with¬ 
out  denying  all  final  causes.  For,  final  causes  being  admit¬ 
ted,  the  pleasures  and  pains  now  mentioned  must  he  admitted 
too,  as  instances  of  them.  And  if  they  are  ;  if  God  annexe 

3* 


58  OF  THE  GOVENRNMENT  OF  GOD  [PART  I. 

es  delight  to  some  actions  and  uneasiness  to  others,  with  an 
apparent  design  to  induce  us  to  act  so  and  so,  then  he  not 
only  dispenses  happiness  and  misery,  but  also  rewards  anti 
punishes  actions.  If,  for  example,  the  pain  which  we  feel 
upon  doing  what  tends  to  the  destruction  of  our  bodies,  sup¬ 
pose  upon  too  near  approaches  to  foe,  or  upon  wounding 
ourselves,  be  appointed  by  the  Author  of  Nature  to  prevent 
our  doing  what  thus  tends  to  our  destruction  ;  this  is  alto¬ 
gether  as  much  an  instance  of  his  punishing  our  actions, 
and  consequently  of  our  being  under  his  government,  as  de¬ 
claring,  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  that  if  we  acted  so,  he 
would  inflict  such  pain  upon  us,  arid  inflicting  it  whether  it 
be  greater  or  less. 

Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion  or  conception  of  the 
Author  of  Nature,  is  that  of  a  master  or  governor,  prior  to 
the  consideration  of  his  moral  attributes.  The  fact  of  our 
case,  which  we  find  by  experience,  is,  that  he  actually  ex¬ 
ercises  dominion  or  government  over  us  at  present,  by  re¬ 
warding  and  punishing  us  for  our  actions,  in  as  strict  and 
proper  a  sense  of  these  words,  and  even  in  the  same  sense 
as  children,  servants,  subjects,  are  rewarded  and  punished  by 
those  who  govern  them. 

And  thus  the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  the  whole  present 
course  of  things,  most  fully  shows,  that  there  is  nothing  in¬ 
credible  in  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  God  will  re¬ 
ward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions  hereafter  ;  nothing 
incredible,  I  mean,  arising  out  of  the  notion  of  rewarding 
and  punishing,  for  the  whole  course  of  nature  is  a  present 
instance  of  his  exercising  that  government  over  us,  which 
implies  in  it  rewarding  and  punishing. 


But,  as  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly  object 
against,  and  are  most  unwilling  to  allow,  it  may  be  proper  to 
mention  some  circumstances  in  the  natural  course  of  pun¬ 
ishments  at  present,  which  are  analogous  to  what  religion 
teaches  us  concerning  a  future  state  of  punishment ;  indeed 
BO  analogous,  that  as  they  add  a  further  credibility  to  it,  so 
they  cannot  but  raise  a  most  serious  apprehension  of  it  in 
those  who  will  attend  to  them, 


CHAP.  II.]  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS. 


59 


It  has  been  now  observed,  that  such  and  such  miseries  na¬ 
turally  tollow  such  and  such  actions  of  imprudence  and  wil¬ 
fulness,  as  well  as  actions  more  commonly  and  more  distinct¬ 
ly  considered  as  vicious  ;  and  that  these  consequences,  when 
they  may  be  foreseen,  are  properly  natural  punishments  an¬ 
nexed  to  such  actions.  For  the  general  thing  here  insisted 
upon  is,  not  that  we  see  a  great  deal  of  mieery  in  the  world, 
but  a  great  deal  which  men  bring  upon  themselves  by  their 
own  behaviour,  which  they  might  have  foreseen  and  avoid¬ 
ed.  Now,  the  circumstances  of  these  natural  punishments, 
particularly  deserving  our  attention,  are  such  as  these ;  That 
oftentimes  they  follow,  or  are  inflicted  in  consequence  of  ac¬ 
tions  which  procure  many  present  advantages,  and  are  ac¬ 
companied  with  much  present  pleasure  ;  for  instance,  sick¬ 
ness  and  untimely  death  is  the  consequence  of  intemperance, 
though  accompanied  with  the  highest  mirth  and  jollity  ‘ 
That  these  punishments  are  often  much  greater  than  the  ad¬ 
vantages  or  pleasures  obtained  by  the  actions,  of  which  they 
are  the  punishments  or  consequences  :  That  though  we  may 
imagine  a  constitution  of  nature,  in  which  these  natural  pun¬ 
ishments,  which  are  in  fact  to  follow,  would  follow  immedi¬ 
ately  upon  such  actions  being  done,  or  very  soon  after  ;  we 
find,  on  the  contrary,  m  our  world,  that  they  are  often  delay¬ 
ed  a  great  while,  sometimes  even  till  long  after  the  actions 
occasioning  them  are  forgot ;  so  that  the  constitution  of  na¬ 
ture  is  such,  that  delay  of  punishment  is  no  sort  nor  degree 
of  presumption  of  final  impunity :  That,  after  such  delay, 
these  natural  punishments  or  miseries  often  come,  not  by  de¬ 
grees,  but  suddenly,  with  violence,  and  at  once ;  however, 
the  chief  misery  often  does  :  That,  as  certainty  of  such  dis¬ 
tant  misery  following  such  actions  is  never  afforded  persons, 
so,  perhaps,  during  the  actions,  they  have  seldom  a  distinct 
full  expectation  of  its  following  and  many  times  the  case 
is  only  thus,  that  they  see  in  general,  or  may  see,  the  credi¬ 
bility  that  intemperance,  suppose,  will  bring  after  its  diseases ; 
civil  crimes,  civil  punishments  ;  when  yet  the  real  probabili¬ 
ty  often  is,  that  they  shall  escape  ;  but  things  notwithstand¬ 
ing  take  their  destined  course,  and  the  misery  inevitable 
follows  at  its  appointed  time,  in  very  many  of  these  cases.  • 
Thus,  also,  though  youth  may  be  alleged  as  an  excuse  for 
rashness  and  folly,  as  being  naturally  thoughtless,  and  not 
clearly  foreseeing  all  the  consequences  of  being  untractable 


*  See  Part  ii.  chap.  6. 


60  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  [PART  I. 

and  profligate  ;  this  does  not  hinder  but  that  these  conse¬ 
quences  follow,  and  are  grievously  felt  throughout  the 
whole  course  of  future  life.  Habits  contracted,  even  in 
tiiat  age,  are  often  utter  ruin ;  and  men’s  success  in  the 
world,  not  only  in  the  common  sense  of  worldly  success,  but 
their  real  happiness  and  misery  depends,  in  a  great  degree, 
and  in  various  ways,  upon  the  manner  in  which  they  pass 
their  youth  ;  which  consequences  they,  for  the  most  part, 
neglect  to  consider,  and  perhaps  seldom  can  properly  be  said 
to  believe  beforehand.  It  requires  also  to  be  mentioned,  that, 
in  numberless  cases,  the  natural  course  of  things  iilfords  us 
opportunities  for  procuring  advantages  to  ourselves  at  certain 
times,  which  we  cannot  procure  when  we  will ;  nor  even 
recall  the  opportunities,  if  we  have  neglected  them.  Indeed, 
the  general  course  of  nature  is  an  example  of  this.  If,  dur¬ 
ing  the  opportunity  of,  youth,  persons  are  indocile  and  self- 
wdled,  they  inevitably  suffer  in  their  future  life,  for  want  of 
those  acquirements  which  they  neglected  the  natural  sea¬ 
son  of  attaining.  If  the  husbandman  lets  his  seed-time 
pass  without  sowing,  the  whole  year  is  lost  to  him  beyond 
recovery.  In  like  manner,  though  after  men  have  been 
guilty  of  folly  and  extravagance,  up  to  a  certain  degree^  it  is 
often  in  their  power,  for  instance,  to  retrieve  their  affairs,  to 
recover  their  health  and  character,  at  least  in  good  measure, 
yet  real  reformation  is,  in  many  cases,  of  no  avail  at  all  to¬ 
wards  preventing  the  miseries,  poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  na¬ 
turally  annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance,  exceeding  that  de¬ 
gree.  There  is  a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  misbe¬ 
haviour,  which  being  transgressed,  there  mmains  no  place 
for  repentance  in  the  natural  course  of  things.  It  is  fur¬ 
ther,  very  much  to  be  remarked,  that  neglects  from  inconsi¬ 
derateness,  want  of  attention,*  not  looking  about  us  to  see 
what  we  have  to  do,  are  often  attended  with  consequences 
altogether  as  dreadful  as  any  active  misbehaviour,  from  the 
most  extravagant  passion.  And,  lastly,  civil  government 
being  natural,  the  punishments  of  it  are  so  too  ;  and  some 
of  these  punishments  are  capital,  as  the  effects  of  a  disso¬ 
lute  course  of  pleasure  are  often  mortal.  So  that  many 
natural  punishments  are  final|  to  him  who  incurs  them,  if 

*  Part  ii.  chap.  6. 

T  The  general  consideration  of  a  future  state  of  punishment  most  evh 
dently  belongs  to  the  subject  of  natural  religion.  But  if  any  of  these  re¬ 
flections  should  be  thought  to  relate  more  particularly  to  this  doctrine,  as 
taught  in  scripture,  the  reader  is  desired  to  observe,  that  Gentile  writers, 


CHAP.  II.]  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS.  6l 

considered  only  in  his  temporal  capacity  ;  and  seem  inflic¬ 
ted  by  natural  appointment,  either  to  remove  the  offender 
out  of  the  way  of  being  further  mischievous,  or  as  an  ex 
ample,  though  frequently  a  disregarded  one,  to  those  who 
are  left  behind. 

These  things  are  not  what  we  call  accidental,  or  to  be 
met  with  only  now  and  then  ;  but  they  are  things  of  every 
day’s  experience ;  they  proceed  from  general  laws,  very 
general  ones,  by  which  God  governs  the  world,  in  the  na¬ 
tural  course  of  his  providence.  And  they  are  so  analogous 
to  what  religion  teaches  us  concerning  the  future  punish¬ 
ment  of  the  wicked,  so  much  of  apiece  with  it,  that, both 
would  naturally  be  expressed  in  the  very  same  words  and 
manner  of  description.'  In  the  book  of  Proverbs,"''^  for  in¬ 
stance,  Wisdom  is  introduced  as  frequenting  the  most  pub¬ 
lic  places  of  resort,  and  as  rejected  when  she  offers  herself 
as  the  natural  appointed  guide  of  human  life.  ‘  How  long,’ 
speaking  to  those  who  are  passing  through  it,  ‘  how  long, 
ye  simple  ones,  will  ye  love  folly,  and  the  scorners  delight  in 
their  scorning,  and  fools  hate  knowledge  1  Turn  ye  at  my 
reproof  Behold,  I  will  pour  out  my  spirit  upon  you,  T  will 
make  known  my  words  unto  you.’  But  upon  being  neg¬ 
lected,  ‘  Because  I  have  called,  and  ye  refused,  1  have 
stretched  out  my  hand,  and  no  man  regarded  ;  but  ye  have 
set  at  naught  all  ray  counsel,  and  would  none  of  my  re¬ 
proof  :  I  also  will  laugh,  at  your  calamity,  I  will  mock 
when  your  fear  cometh  ;  when  your  fear  cometh  as  deso¬ 
lation,  and  your  destruction  cometh  as  a  whirlwind  ;  when 

both  moralists  and  poets,  speak  of  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked, 
both  as  to  the  duration  and  dej^ree  of  it,  in  a  like  manner  of  expressioix 
and  of  description  as  the  Scripture  does.  So  that  all  which  can  positively 
be  asserted  to  be  matter  of  mere  revelation,  with  regard  to  this  doctrine, 
seems  to  be,  that  the  great  distinction  between  the  righteous  and  the 
wicked  shall  be  made  at  the  end  of  this  world  ;  that  each  shall  then  receive 
according  to  his  deserts.  Reason  did,  as  it  well  might,  conclude,  that 
It  should,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  be  well  with  the  righteous  and  ill 
with  the  wicked  ;  but  it  could  riot  be  deternrined,  upon  any  principles  of 
reason,  whether  huriian  creatrtres  might  not  have  been  appointed  to  pass 
through  other  states  of  life  and  being,  before  that  distributive  justice 
should  finally  and  effectually  take  place.  Revelation  teaches  us,  that  the 
next  state  of  things,  alter  Ihe  present,  is  appointed  for  the  exccutiorr  of 
this  justice;  that  it  shall  be  rro  longer  delayed;  but^/re  mystery  of  God^ 
the  great  mystery  of  his  suffering  vice  and  confusion  to  prevail,  shall  then 
be  finished  ;  and  he  will  take  to  him  his  great  power,  and  will  reign,  by 
tendering  to  every  one  according  to  his  w^orks. 


*  Chap.  1. 


@2  OF  TilE  G OVER!? MEN T  OF  GOD  [PARt  I. 

distress  and  anguish  cometh  upon  you.  Then  shall  they 
call  upon  me,  but  I  will  not  answer ;  they  shall  seek  me 
early,  but  they  shall  not  find  me.’  This  passage,  every  one 
sees,  is  poetical,  and  some  parts  of  it  are,  highly  figurative  ; 
but  their  meaning  is  obvious.  And  the  thing  intended  is  ex 
])ressed  more  literally  in  the  following  words ;  ‘  For  that 
they  hated  knowledge,  and  did  not  choose  the  fear  of  the 
Lord  ;  therefore  shall  they  eat  the  fruit  of  their  own  way, 
and  be  filled  with  their  own  devices.  For  the  security  of 
the  simple  shall  slay  them,  and  the  prosperity  of  fools  shall 
destroy  them.’  And  the  whole  passage  is  so  equallj^  appli¬ 
cable  to  what  we  experience  in  the  present  world,  concern¬ 
ing  the  consequences  of  men’s  actions  and  to  what  reli¬ 
gion  teaches  us  is  to  be  expected  in  another,  that  it 
may  be  questioned  which  of  the  two  was  principally  in¬ 
tended. 

Indeed,  when  one  has  been  recollecting  the  proper  proofs 
of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments,  nothing,  me- 
thinks.  can  give  one  so  sensible  an  apprehension  of  the  lat¬ 
ter,  or  representation  of  it  to  the  mind,  as  observing,  that 
after  the  many  disregarded  checks,  admonitions,  and  warn¬ 
ings,  which  people  meet  with  in  the  ways  of  vice,  and  folly, 
and  extravagance  ;  warnings  from  their  very  nature  ;  from 
the  examples  of  others;  from  the  lesser  inconveniences  which 
they  bring  upon  themselves  ;  from  the  instructions  of  wise 
and  virtuous  men  :  after  these  have  been  long  despised, 
scorned,  ridiculed  ;  after  the  chief  bad  consequences,  tem¬ 
poral  consequences,  of  their  follies,  have  been  delayed  for  a 
great  while  ;  at  length  they  break  in  irresistibly,  like  an 
armed  force  ;  repentance  is  too  late  to  relieve,  and  can  serve 
only  to  aggravate  their  distress  :  the  case  is  become  des¬ 
perate  ;  and  poverty  and  sickness,  remorse  and  anguish,  in¬ 
famy  and  death,  the  effects  of  their  own  doings,  overwhelm 
them,  beyond  possibility  of  remedy  or  escape.  This  is  an 
account  of  w^hat  is  in  fact  the  general  constitution  of  na¬ 
ture 

It  is  not  in  any  sort  meant,  that  according  to  what  ap¬ 
pears  at  present  of  the  natural  course  of  things,  men  are 
always  uniformly  punished  in  proportion  to  their  misbe¬ 
haviour  ;  but  that  there  are  very  many  instances  of  misbe¬ 
haviour  punished  in  the  several  ways  now  mentioned,  and 
very  dreadful  instances  too,  sufficient  to  show  what  the  laws 
of  the  universe  may  admit ;  and,  if  thoroughly  considered, 
sufficient  fully  to  answer  all  objections  against  the  credibili 


CHAP.  II. J  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS.  63 

ty  of  a  future  state  of  punishments,  from  any  imaginations, 
that  the  frailty  of  our  nature  and  external  temptations  al¬ 
most  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices  ;  as  well  as  objec¬ 
tions  of  another  sort ;  from  necessity  *  from  suppositions 
that  the  will  of  an  infinite  Being  cannot  be  contradicted  ;  or 
that  he  must  be  incapable  of  offence  and.  provocation.* 
Reflections  of  this  kind  are  not  without  their  terrors  to 
serious  persons,  the  most  free  from  enthusiasm,  and  of  the 
greatest  strength  of  mind  ;  but  it  is  fit  things  be  stated  and 
considered  as  they  really  are.  And  there  is,  in  the  present 
age,  a  certain  fearlessness  with  regard  to  what  may  be 
hereafter  under  the  government  of  God,  which  nothing  but 
an  universally  acknowledged  demonstration  on  the  side  of 
atheism  can  justify,  and  which  makes  it  quite  necessary  that 
men  be  reminded,  and,  if  possible,  made  to  feel,  that  there 
is  no  sort  of  ground  for  being  thus  presumptuous,  even 
upon  the  most  sceptical  principles.  For,  may  it  not  be  said 
of  any  person,  upon  his  being  born  into  the  world,  he  miay 
behave  so  as  to  be  of  no  service  to  it,  but  by  being  made  an 
example  of  the  woful  effects  of  vice  and  folly ;  That  he 
may,  as  any  one  may,  if  he  will,  incur  an  infamous  execu¬ 
tion  from  the  hands  of  civil  justice  ;  or  in  some  other  course 
of  extravagance  shorten  his  days  ;  or  bring  upon  himself 
infamy  and  diseases  worse  than  death  ?  So  that  it  had 
been  better  for  him,  even  with  regard  to  the  present  world, 
that  he  had  never  been  born.  And  is  there  any  pretence  of 
reason  for  people  to  think  themselves  secure,  and  talk  as  if 
they  had  certain  proof,  that,  let  them  act  as  licentiously  as 
they  will,  there  can  be  nothing  analogous  to  this,  with  re¬ 
gard  to  a  future  and  more  general  interest,  under  the  pro\i« 
ience  and  government  of  the  same  God  ? 

♦  See  Chap.  4  and  6i 


ot 


OF  THE  BIOEAL 


[part  I 


CHAPTER  HI. 

^  'j  Of  the  JVIoral  Government  of  God. 

}  As  the  manifold  appearances  of  design  and  of  final  cau 
[  ses,  in  the  constitution  of  the  world,  prove  it  to  be  the  work 
of  an  Intelligent  Mind,  so  the  particular  final  causes  of 
f  pleasure  and  pain,  distributed  amongst  his  creatures,  prove 
[  that  they  are  under  his  government ;  what  may  be  called 
his  natural  government  of  creatures  endued  with  sense  and 
reason.  This,  however,  implies  somewhat  more  than  seems 
usually  attended  to,  when  we  speak  of  God’s  natural  gov¬ 
ernment  of  the  v/orld.  It  implies  government  of  the  very 
same  kind  with  that  which  a  master  exercises  over  his  ser¬ 
vants,  or  a  eivil  magistrate  over  his  subjects.  These  latter 
instances  of  final  eauses  as  really  prove  an  intelligent  gov¬ 
ernor  of  the  world,  in  the  sense  now  mentioned,  and  before* 
distinctly  treated  of,  as  any  other  instances  of  final  causes 
prove  an  intelligent  JVIaker  of  it. 

But  this  alone  does  not  appear,  at  first  sight,  to  determine 
,  any  thing  certainly,  concerning  the  moral  character  of  the 
^  Author  of  nature,  considered  in  this  relation  of  governor  ; 

does  not  ascertain  his  government  to  be  moral,  or  prove  that 
r  he  is  the  righteous  Judge  of  the  world.  Moral  government 
consists,  not  barely  in  rewarding  and  punishing  men  for 
their  actions,  which  the  most  tyrannical  person  may  do ; 
but  in  reV/arding  the  righteous  and  punishing  the  wicked  ; 
in  rendering  to  men  aceording  to  their  actions,  considered  as 
^good  or  evil.  And  the  perfection  of  moral  government  con- 
/  I  sists  in  doing  this,  with  regard  to  all  intelligent  creatures, 
Y  I  in  an  exact  proportion  to  their  personal  merits  or  demerits. 

Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  character  of  the 
7  (^Author  of  nature  to  be  that  of  simple  absolute  benevolence. 
/  This,  considered  as  a  principle  of  action,  and  infinite  in  d&. 

!  gree,  is  a  disposition  to  produce  the  greatest  possible  happi- 


6 


*  Cliap.  2. 


CHAP.  Ill.j 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


65 


ness,  without  regard  to  persons’  behaviour,  otherwise  than  as 
such  regard  would  produce  higher  degrees>of  it.  And  sup-  . 
posing  this  to  be  the  only  character  of  God,  veracitj^  and 
justice  in  him  would  be  nothing  but  benevolence  conducted 
by  wisdom.  Now,  surely  this  ought  not  to  be  asserted,  un¬ 
less  it  can  be  proved  ;  for  we  should  speak  with  cautious  j 
reverence  upon  such  a  subject.  And  whether  it  can  be  ^ 
proved  or  no,  is  not  the  thing  here  to  be  inquired  into  ;  but 
whether,  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  the  world,  a 
righteous  government  be  not  discernibly  planned  out ;  which 
necessarily  implies  a  righteous  governor.  There  may  pos¬ 
sibly  be  in  the  creation  of  beings,  to  whom  the  author  of  ■ 
nature  manifests  himself  under  this  most  amiable  of  all  * 
characters,  this  of  infinite  absolute  benevolence  ;  for  it  is  the^' 
most  amiable,  supposing  it  not,  as  perhaps  it  is  not,  incom¬ 
patible  with  justice  :  but  he  manifests  himself  to  us  under 
the  character  of  a  righteous  governor.  He  may,  consist¬ 
ently  with  this,  be  simply  and  absolutely  benevolent,  in  the 
sense  now  explained ;  but  he  has,  for  he  has  given  us  a  \  , 
proof  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  the  world  that  he  is,  /  / 
a  governor  over  servants,  as  he  rewards  and  punishes  us  for  i 
our  actions.  And  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  it,  he 
may  also  have  given,  besides  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and 
the  natural  presages  of  conscience,  clear  and  distinct  inti¬ 
mations,  that  his  government  is  righteous  or  moral :  clear  to 
such  as  think  the  nature  of  it  deserving  their  attention  ;  and 
yet  not  to  every  careless  person  who  casts  a  transient  reflec¬ 
tion  upon  the  subject.* 

But  it  is  particularly  to  be  observed,  that  the  divine  go-'^ 
vernment,  which  we  experience  ourselves  under  in  the  pre¬ 
sent  state,  taken  alone,  is  allowed  not  to  be  the  perfection  of  ) 
moral  government.  And  yet  this  by  no  means  hinders,  but  A  ' 
that  there  may  be  somewhat,  be  it  more  or  less,  truly  moral 
in  it.  A  righteous  government  may  plainly  appear  to  be 
carried  on  to  some  degree  ;  enough  to  give  us  the  apprehen¬ 
sion  that  it  shall  be  completed,  or  carried  on  to  that  degree 

*  The  objections  against  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  its  not  being 
universal,  nor  so  strong  as  might  possibly  have  been,  may  be  urged, 
against  natural  religion,  as  well  as  against  revealed.  And,  therefore,  the 
consideration  of  them  belongs  to  the  first  part  of  this  Treatise,  as  well  as 
the  second.  But  as  these  objections  are  chiefly  urged  agamst  revealed 
religion,  I  chose  to  consider  them  in  the  second  part.  And  the  answer  to 
them  there.  Chap.  6,  as  urged  against  Christianity,  being  almost  equally 
applicable  to  them  as  urged  against  the  Religion  of  Nature,  to  avoid  repe- 
the  reader  is  referred  to  that  chapter. 


66 


OF  THE  MORAL 


fPART  L 


of  perfection  which  religion  teaches  us  it  shall ;  but  which 
cannot  appear,  till  much  more  of  the  divine  administration 
be  seen,  than  can  in  the  present  life.  And  the  design  of  this 
chapter  is  to  inquire  how  far  this  is  the  case  ;  how  far,  over 
and  above  the  moral  nature"'^  which  God  has  given  us,  and 
our  natural  notion  of  him,  as  righteous  governor  of  those 
l  is  creatures  to  whom  he  has  given  this  nature  I  saj  liow. 
far,  besides  this,  the  principles  and  beginnings  of  moral 
government  over  the  world  may  be  discerned  notwithstand¬ 
ing  and  amidst  all  the  confusion  and  disorder  of  it. 

Now  one  might  mention  here,  what  has  been  often  urged 
with  great  force,  that,  in  general,  less  uneasiness,  and  more 
satisfaction,  are  the  natural  consequences J  of  a  virtuous 
than  a  vicious  course  of  life,  in  the  present  state  as  an 
instance  of  moral  government  established  in  nature  ;  an 
instance  of  it  collected  from  experience  and  present  mat¬ 
ter  of  fact.  But  It  must  be  owned  a  thing  of  diffi^ 
culty  to  weigh  and  balance  pleasures  and  uneasinesses, 
each  among  themselves,  and  also  amongst  each  other, 
so  as  to  make  an  estimate  with  a.n  exactness,  of  the 
overplus  of  happiness  on  the  side  of  virtue.  And  it  is  not 
impossible,  that,  amidst  the  infinite  disorders  of  the  world, 
there  may  be  exceptions  to  the  happiness  of  virtue,  even 
with  regard  to  those  persons  whose  course  of  life,  from  their J 
youth  up,  has  been  blameless  ;  and  more  with  regard  to 
those,  who  have  gone  on  for  some  time  in  the  ways  of  vice, 
and  have  afterwards  reformed.  For  suppose  an  instance  of 
the  latter  case  ;  a  person  with  his  passions  inflamed,  his  na¬ 
tural  faculty  of  self-government  impaired  by  habits  of  in¬ 
dulgence,  and  with  all  his  vices  about  him,  like  so  many 
harpic-rs,  craving  for  their  accustomed  gratification :  who 
can  say  how  long  it  might  be  before  such  a  person  would 
find  more  satisfaction  in  the  reasonableness  and  present  good 
consequences  of  virtue,  than  difficulties  and  self-denial  in 
the  restraints  of  it  ?  .Experience  also  shows,  that  men  can, 
to  a  great  degree,  get  over  their  sense  of  shame,  so  as  that 
by  professing  themselves  to  be  without  principle,  and  avow 
ing  even  direct  villany,  they  can  support  themselves  against 
the  infamy  of  it.  But  as  the  ill  actions  of  any  one  will  pro^ 
bably  be  more  talked  of,  and  oftener  thrown  in  his  way,  upon 
his  reformation  ;  so  the  infamy  of  them  will  be  much  more 
felt,  after  the  natural  sense  of- virtue  and  of  honor  is  reco- 

*  Dissertation  2.  t  Chap.  6. 

t  See  Lord  Shaftesbury’s  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue.  Part  2. 


CHAP.  HI.] 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


67 


vered.  Uneasinesses  of  this  kind  ought  indeed  to  be  put  to 
the  account  of  former  vices  ;  yet  it  will  be  said,  they  are  in 
part  the  consequences  of  reformation.  Still  I  am  far  from 
allowing  it  doubtful,  whether  virtue,  upon  the  whole,  be  hap¬ 
pier  than  vice  in  the  present  world  ;  but  if  it  were,  yet  the  be¬ 
ginnings  of  a  righteous  administration  may,  beyond  all  ques¬ 
tion,  be  found  in  nature,  if  we  will  attentively  inquire  after 
them.  And, 

I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God’s  moral  govern¬ 
ment  over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if  it  did  not  appear 
whether  he  were,  in  a  proper  sense,  our  governor  at  all ;  yet 
when  it  is  certain  matter  of  experience,  that  he  does  mani¬ 
fest  himself  to  us  under  the  character  of  a  governor,  in  the 
sense  explained,*  it  must  deserve  to  be  considered,  whether 
there  be  not  reason  to  apprehend,  that  he  maybe  a  righteous 
or  moral  governor.  Since  it  appears  to  be  fact,  that 
God  does  govern  mankind  by  the  method  of  rewards 
and  punishments,  according  to  some  settled  rulers  of 
distribution,  it  is  surely  a  question  to  be  asked.  What  ' 
presumption,  is  there  against  his  finally  rewarding  and 
punishing  them  according  to  this  particlar  rule,  namely,  as 
they  act  reasonably  or  unreasonably,  virtuously  or  viciously  %  > 
since  rendering  man  happy  or  miserable  by  this  rule,  certain¬ 
ly  falls  in,  much  more  falls  in,  with  our  natural  apprehen¬ 
sions  and  sense  of  things,  than  doing  so  by  any  other  rule, 
whatever  ;  since  rewarding  and  punishing  actions  by  any 
other  rule,  would  appear  much  harder  to  be  accounted  for  by 
minds  formed  as  he  has  formed  ours.  Be  the  evidence  of  reli-  \ 
giori,  then,  more  or  less  clear,  the  expectation  which  it  raises 
in  us,  that  the  righteous  shall  upon  the  whole,  be  happy,  and 
the  wicked  miserable,  cannot,  however,  possibly  be  consi¬ 
dered  as  absurd  or  chimerical ;  because  it  is  no  more  than  an  ^ 
expectation,  that  a  method  of  government,  already  begun,  I 
shall  be  carried  on,  the  method  of  rewarding  and  punishing 
actions  ;  and  shall  be  carried  on  by  a  particular  rule,  which 
unavoidably  appears  to  us,  at  first  sight,  more  natural  than 
any  other,  the  rule  which  we  call  distributive  justice.  Nor, 

II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  passed  over,  that  tranquillity, ■>, 
satisfaction,  and  external  advantages,  being  the  natural  con-  1 
sequences  of  prudent  management  of  ourselves  and  our 
affairs ;  and  rashness,  profligate  negligence,  and  wilful 
folly,  bringing  after  them  many  inconveniencies  and  suffer¬ 
ings  ;  these  afford  instances  of  a  right  constitution  of  na- 


*  Chap.  3 


68 


OF  THE  MORAL 


[part  I. 


f 


ture  ;  as  the  correction  of  children,  for  their  oi\’n  sakes  and 
by  the  way  of  example,  when  they  run  into  danger  or  hurt 
themselves,  is  a  part  of  right  education.  And  thus,  that 
God  governs  the  world  by  general  fixed  laws  ;  that  he  has 
endued  us  with  capacities  of  reflecting  upon  this  constitu¬ 
tion  of  things,  and  forseeing  the  good  and  bad  consequences 
of  OLii  behaviour,  plainly  implies  some  sort  of  moral  govern* 
rr  ent :  since  from  such  a  constitution  of  things  it  cannot  but 
follow,  that  prudence  and  imprudence,  which  are  of  the  na¬ 
ture  of  virtue  and  vice,*  must  be,  as  they  are,  respectively 
rewarded  and  punished. 

iir.  From  the  natural  course  of  things,  vicious  actions 
are,  to  a- great  degree,  actually  punished  as  mischievous  to 
society  ;  and  besides  punishment  actually  inflicted  upon  this 
account,  there  is  also  the  fear  and  apprehension  of  it  in  those 
persons  whose  crimes  have  rendered  them  obnoxious  to  it 

Lin  case  of  a  discovery ;  this  state  of  fear  being  itself  often  a 
very  considerable  punishmelit.  The  natural  fear  and  appre¬ 
hension  of  it  too,  which  restrains  from  such  crimes,  is  a  dc- 
\^claration  of  nature  against  them.  It  is  necessary  to  the 
[very  being  of  society,  that  vices  destructive  of  it  should  be 
[  punished  as  being  so  ;  the  vices  of  falsehood,  injustice,  cruel¬ 
ty  ;  which  punishment,  therefore,  is  as  natural  as  society, 
and  so  is  an  instance  of  a  kind  of  moral  government, 
naturally  established,  and  actually  taking  place.  And, 
since  the  certain  natural  course  of  things  is  the  con¬ 
duct  of  Providence  or  the  government  of  God,  though 
I  carried  on  by  the  instrumentality  of  men,  the  observa- 
!  tion  here  made  amounts  to  this,  that  mankind  find  them- 
selves  placed  by  him  in  such  circumstances,  as  that  they 
are  unavoidably  accountable  for  their  behaviour,  and  are 
often  punished,  and  sometimes  rewarded,  under  his  go¬ 
vernment,  in  the  view  of  their  being  mischievous  or  eminent¬ 
ly  beneficial  to  society. 

If  it  be  objected  that  good  actions,  and  such  as  are  bene¬ 
ficial  to  society,  are  often  punished,  as  in  the  case  of  perse¬ 
cution,  and  in  other  cases,  and  that  ill  and  mischievous  ac¬ 
tions  are  often  rewarded  |  it  may  be  answered  distinctly, 
first,  that  this  is  in  no  sort  necessary,  and  consequently  not 
natural  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  necessary,  and  therefore 
natural,  that  ill  or  mischievous  actions  should  be  punished  ;  | 
and,  in  the  next  place,  that  good  actions  are  never  punished,  ^ 
considered  as  beneficial  to  society,  nor  ill  actions  rewarded 


*  See  Dissertation  2. 


CHAP. 


III.] 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


69 


/ 

t^l 


I 


V 


a. 


under  the  view  of  their  being  hurtful  to  it.  So  that  it 
stands  good,  without  any  thing  on  the  side  of  vice  to  be  set 
over  against  it,  that  the  A  uthor  of  nature  has  as  truly  di¬ 
rected  that  vicious  actions,  considered  as  mischievous  to  so¬ 
ciety,  should  be  punished,  and  put  mankind  under  a  neces¬ 
sity  of  thus  punishing  them,  as  he  has  directed  and  neces¬ 
sitated  us  to  preserve  our  lives  by  food. 

IV.  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  virtue,  as  such^  is 
actually  rewarded,  and  vice,  as  such^  punished  ;  which 
seems  to  afford  an  instance,  or  example,  not  only  of  govern¬ 
ment,  but  of  moral  government  begun  and  established  ; 
moral  in  the  strictest  sense,  though  not  in  that  perfection  of 
degree  which  religion  teaches  us  to  expect.  In  order  to  see 
this  more  clearly,  we  must  distinguish  between  actions  them¬ 
selves,  and  that  quality  ascribed  to  them,  which  we  call  vir¬ 
tuous  or  vicious.  The  gratification  itself  of  every  natural 
passion  must  be  attended  with  delight ;  and  acquisitions  of 
fortune,  however  made,  are  acquisitions  of  the  rrieans  or 
materials  of  enjoyment.  An  action,  then,  by  which  any 
natural  passion  is  gratified,  or  fortune  acquired,  procures  de¬ 
light  or  advantage,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the 
morality  of  such  action.  Consequently,  the  plet'sure  or  ad¬ 
vantage  in  this  case  is  gained  by  the  action  itself,  not  by  the 
morality,  the  virtuousiiess  or  viciousness  of  it,  though  it  be, 
perhaps,  virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus,  to  say  such  an  action, 
or  course  of  behaviour,  procured  such  pleasure  or  advantage, 
or  brought  on  such  inconvenience  and  pain,  is  quite  a  differ¬ 
ent  thing  from  saying,  that  such  good  or  bad  effect  was  ow 
ing  to  the  virtue  or  vice  of  such  an  action  or  behaviour. 
In  one  case  an  action,  abstracted  from  all  moral  considera¬ 
tion,  produced  its  effect ;  in  the  other  case,  for  it  will  appear 
that  there  are  such  cases,  the  morality  of  the  action,  the 
action  under  a  moral  consideration,  i.  e.  the  virtuousness  or 
viciousness  of  it,  produced  the  effect.  Now  I  say,  virtue, 
as  such,  naturally  procures  considerable  advantages  to  the 
virtuous,  and  vice,  as  such,  naturally  occasions  grea,t  incon- 
\  enience,  and  even  misery  to  the  vicious,  in  very  many  in¬ 
stances.  The  immediate  effects  of  virtue  and  vice  upon 
the  mind  and  temper  are  to  be  mentioned  as  instances  of 
it.  Vice,  as  such,  is^'naturally  attended  with  some  sort  of 
uneasiness,  and  not  uncommonly  with  great  disturbance 
and  apprehension.  That  inward  feeling  which  respecting 
lesser  matters  and  in  familiar  speech,  we  call  being  vexed 
with  one’s  self,  and  in  matters  of  importance,  and  in  more 


OF  THE  MORAL 


10 


[part  I. 


serious  language,  remorse,  is  an  uneasiness  naturally  arising 
from  an  action  of  man’s  own,  reflected  upon  by  himself  as 
wrong,  unreasonable,  faulty,  i.  e.  vicious  in  greater  or  less 
degrees  ;  and  this  manifestly  is  a  different  feeling  from  that 
uneasiness  which  arises  from  a  sense  of  mere  loss  or  harm. 
What  is  more  common  than  lo  hear  a  man  lamenting  an 
accident  or  event,  and  adding, — But,  however,  he  has  the 
satisfaction  that  he  cannot  blame  himself  for  it ;  or,  on  the 
contrary,  that  he  has  the  uneasiness  of  being  sensible  it  was 
his  own  doing  ?  Thus  also,  the  disturbance  and  fear  which 
often  follow  upon  a  man’s  having  done  an  injury,  arise  from 
a  sense  of  his  being  blame-worthy  ;  otherwise  there  would, 
in  many  cases,  be  no  ground  of  disturbance  nor  any  reason 
'  to  fear  resentment  or  sharhe.  On  the  other  hand,  inward 
security  and  peace,  and  a  mind  open  to  the  several  gratifi¬ 
cations  of  life,  are  the  natural  attendants  of  innocence  and 
virtue  ;  to  which  must  be  added,  the  complacency,  satisfac¬ 
tion,  and  even  joy  of  heart,  which  accompany  the  exercise, 
the  real  exercise,  of  gratitude,  friendship,  benevolence. 

And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned,  the  fears  of 
future  punishment,  and  peaceful  hopes  of  a  better  life,  in 
those  who ’fully  believe  or  have  any  serious  apprehension  of 
religion  ;  because  these  hopes  and  fears  are  present  uneasi¬ 
ness  and  satisfaction  to  the  mind,  and  cannot  be  got  rid'of  by 
great  part  of  the  world,  even  by  men  who  have  thought 
most  thoroughly  upon  that  subject  of  religion.  And  no 
one  can  say  how  considerable  this  uneasiness  and  sa¬ 
tisfaction  may  be,  or  what,  upon  the  whole,  it  may 
amount  to. 

• 

In  the  next  place  comes  in  the  consideration,  that  all 
honest  and  good  men  are  disposed  to  befriend  honest  good 
men,^  as  such,  and  to  discountenance  the  vicious,  as  such, 
and  do  so  in  some  degree,  indeed  in  a  considerable  degree  ; 
from  which  favor  and  discouragement  cannot  but  arise 
\  considerable  advantage  and  inconvenience.  And  though 
the  generality  of  the  world  have  little  regard  to  the  morality 
of  their  own  action's,  and  may  be  supposed  to  have  less  to 
that  of  others,  when  they  themselves  are  not  concerned  ;  yet, 
let  any  one  be  known  to  be  a  'man  of  virtue,  somehow  or 
other  he  will  be  favored,  and  gOod  offices  will  be  done  him 
from  regard  to  his  character,  without  remote  views,  occa¬ 
sionally,  and  in  some  low  degree,  I  think,  by  the  generali¬ 
ty  of  the  world,  as  it  happens  to  come  in  their  way.  Public 
honors,  too,  and  advantages,  are  the  natural  consequencesj 


CHAP.  III.J 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


^1 


are  sometimes  at  least  the  consequences  in  fact,  of  virtuous 
actions,  of  eminent  justice,  fidelity,  charity,  love  to  our  coun¬ 
try,  considered  in  the  view  of  being  virtuous.  And  some 
times  even  death  itself,  often  infamy  and  external  inconven¬ 
iences,  are  the  public  consequences  of  vice,  as  vice.  For”A 
instance,  the  sense  which  mankind  have  of  tyranny,  injus-  I 
tice,  oppression,  additional  to  the  mere  feeling  or  fear  of  mis-  i 
ery,  has  doubtless  been  instrumental  in  bringing  about  \ 
revolutions,  which  make  a  figure  even  in  the  history  of  the_^J 
world.  For  it  is  plain  men  resent  injuries  as  implying  fauK 
tiness,  and  retaliate,  not  merely  under  the  notion  of  having 
received  harm,  but  of  having  received  wrong ;  and  they 
have  this  resentment  in  behalf  of  others,  as  well  as  of  them-  ; 
selves.  So,  likewise,  even  the  generality  are,  in  some  de-"^ 
gree,  grateful  and  disposed  to  return  good  offices,  not  mere¬ 
ly  because  such  a  one  has  been  the  occasion  of  good  to 
them,  but  under  the  view  that  such  good  offices  implied 
kind  intention  and  good  desert  in  the  doer.  To  all  this  may 
be  added  two  or  three  particular  things,  which  many  per¬ 
sons  will  think  frivolous  ;  but  to  me  nothing  appears  so, 
which  at  all  comes  in  towards  determining  a  question  of  such 
importance,  as  whether  there  be  or  be  not  a  moral  institu¬ 
tion  of  government,  in  the  strictest  sense  moral,  visibly  es¬ 
tablished  and  begun  in  nature.  The  particular  things  are 
these  :  That  in  domestic  government,  which  is  doubtless 
natural,  children,  and  others  also,  are  very  generally  punish¬ 
ed  for  falsehood,  and  injustice,  and  ill -behaviour,  as  such,  and 
rewarded  for  the  contrary  ;  which  are  instances  where  vera¬ 
city,  and  justice,  and  right  behaviour,  as  such,  are  naturally 
enforced  by  rewards  and  punishments,  whether  more  or  less 
considerable  in  degree  :  that  though  civil  government  be\ 
supposed  to  take  cognizance  of  actions  in  no  other  view  ' 
than  as  prejudicial  to  society,  without  respect  to  the  mo¬ 
rality  of  them,  yet  as  such  actions  are  immoral,  so  the 
sense  which  men  have  of  the  immorality  of  them  very  great¬ 
ly  contributes,  in  different  ways,  to  bring  offenders  to  justice ; 
and  that  entire  absence  of  all  crime  and  guilt,  in  the  moral 
sense,  when  plainly  appearing,  will  almost  of  course  procure, 
and  circumstances  of  aggravated  guilt  prevent,  a  remission 
of  the  penalties  annexed  to  civil  crimes,  in,  many  cases, 
though  by  no  means  in  all. 

Upon  the  whole,  then,  besides  the  good  and  bad  effects 
of  virtue  and  vice  upon  men’s  own  minds,  the  course  of  the 
world  does,  in  some  measure,  turn  upon  the  approbation  and 


3 


/ 


0  y 


72 


OF  THE  MORAL 


[part  I. 


L 


i/ 


r 


disapprobalion  of  them,  as  such,  in  others.  The  sense  of 
well  and  ill  doing,  the  presages  of  conscience,  the  love  of 
good  characters  and  dislike  of  had  ones,  honor,  shame,  re* 
sentment,  gratitude  ;  all  these,  considered  in  themselves, 
and  in  their  effects,  do  afford  manifest  real  instances  of  vir* 
tue,  as  such,  naturally  favored,  and  of  vice,  as  such,  dis* 
countenanced,  more  or  less,  in  the  daily  course  of  human 
ife  ;  in  every  age,  in  every  relation,  in  every  general  cir¬ 
cumstance  of  it.  That  God  has  given  us  a  moral  nature,'^ 
may  most  justly  be  urged  as  a  proof  of  our  being  under  his 
moral  government ;  but  that  he  has  placed  us  in  a  condition, 
which  gives  this  nature,  as  one  may  speak,  scope  to  operate, 
and  in  which  it  does  unavoidably  operate,  i.  e.  influence 
mankind  to  act,  so  as  thus  to  favor  and  reward  virtue,  and 
discountenance  and  punish  vice  ;  this  is  not  the  same,  but  a 
further  additional  proof  of  his  moral  government ;  for  it  is 
an  instance  of  it.  The  first  is  a  proof  that  he  will  finally 
favor  and  support  virtue  effectually ;  the  second  is  an  ex¬ 
ample  of  his  favoring  and  supporting  it  at  present,  in  some 
degree. 

If  a  more  distinct  inquiry  be  made,  when  it  arises,  that 
virtue,  as  such,  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice,  as  such  is  pun 
ished,  and  this  rule  never  inverted  ;  it  will  be  found  to  pro¬ 
ceed,  in  part,  immediately  from  the  moral  nature  itself  which 
God  has  given  us  ;  and  also,  in  part,  from  his  having  given 
us,  together  with  this  nature,  so  great  a  power  over  each 
other’s  happiness  and  misery.  For,  Jirst,  it  is  certain,  that 
peace  and  delight,  in  some  degree  and  upon  some  occasions, 
is  the  necessary  and  present  effect  of  virtuous  practice  ;  an 
effect  arising  immediately  from  that  constitution  of  our  na¬ 
ture.  We  are  so  made,  that  well-doing,  as  such,  gives  us 
satisfaction,  at  least  in  some  instances  ;  ill-doing,  as  such,  in 
none.  And,  secondly^  from  our  moral  nature,  joined  with 
God’s  having  put  our  happiness  and  misery,  in  many  respects, 
m  each  other’s  power,  it  cannot  but  be  that  vice,  as  such, 
some  kinds  and  instances  of  it  at  least,  will  be  infamous,  and 
men  will  be  disposed  to  punish  it  as  in  itself  detestable  ;  and 
the  villain  will  by  no  means  be  able  always  to  avoid  feeling 
that  infamy,  any  more  than  he  will  be  able  to  escape  this 
further  punishment  which  mankind  will  be  disposed  to  in¬ 
flict  upon  him,  under  the  notion  of  his  deserving  it.  But 
there  can  be  nothing  on  the  side  of  vice  to  answer  this  j 


*  See  .Dissertation  2. 


CHAP.  III.] 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


*J3 


because  there  is  nothing  in  the  human  mind  contradictory, 
as  the  logicians  speak,  to  virtue.  For  virtue  consists  in  a 
regard  to  what  is  right  and  reasonable,  as  being  so  ;  in  a 
regard  to  veracity,  justice,  charity,  in  themselves  :  and  there 
is  surely  no  such  thing  as  a  like  natural  regard  to  false- 
nood,  injustice,  cruelty.  If  it  be  thought,  that  there  are  in¬ 
stances  of  an  approbation  of  vice,  as  such,  in  itself,  and  for 
its  own  sake,  (though  it  does  not  appear  to  me  that  there  is 
any  such  thing  at  all  ;  but,  supposing  there  be,)  it  is  evi¬ 
dently  monstrous  ;  as  much  so  as  the  most  acknowledged 
perversion  of  any  passion  whatever.  Such  instances  ol 
perversion,  then,  being  left  out  as  merely  imaginary,  or,  how¬ 
ever,  unnatural  ;|it  must  follow,  from  the  frame  of  our  nature, 'X 
and,hoiTi  our  condition,  in  the  respects  now  described,  that 
vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue  cannot  but  be,  favored,  as 
such,  by  others,  upon  some  occasions  ;  and  happy  in  itself,  J 
in  some  degree.  ^  For  what  is  here  insisted  upon,  is  not  in 
the  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice  are  thus  distinguished. 


but  only  the  thing  itself,  that  they  are  so  in  some  degree  ; 
though  the  whole  good  and  bad  effect  of  virtue  and  vice,  as 
such,  is  not  inconsiderable  in  degree,  f  But  that  they  must 
be  thus  distinguished,  in  some  degree,  is  in  a  manner  neces- 

of  daily  experience,  even  in  the 


f 


sary  ;  it  is  matter  of  fact, 
greatest  confusion  of  human  affairs. 

It  is  not  pretended  but  that,  in ‘the  natural  course  of 
things,  happiness  and  misery  appear  to  be  distributed  by 
other  rules^  than  only  the  personal  merit  and  demerit  of 
characters.  fThey  may  sometimes  be  distributed  by  way 
of  mere  discipline,  y  There  mciy  be  the  wisest  and  best  rea¬ 
sons  why  the  world  should  bo  governed  by  general  laws, 
from  whence  such  promiscuous  distribution  perhaps  must 
follow  ;  and  also  why  our  happiness  and  misery  should  bo 
put  in  each  other’s  power,  in  the  degree  which  they  are. 

And  these  things,  as  in  general  they  contribute  to  the  re¬ 
warding  virtue  and  punishing  vice,  as  such  ;  '‘^so  they  often 
contribute  also,  not  to  the  inversion  of  this,  which  is  impos¬ 
sible,  but  to  the  rendering  persons  prosperous  though  wick¬ 
ed,  afflicted  though  righteous  ;  and,  which  is  worse,  to  the 
rewarding  some  actions^  though  vicious,  and  punishing  other  I 
actions,  though  virtuous.  VBut  all  this  cannot  drown  the  i  . 
voice  of  nature  in  the  conduct  of  Providence  plainly  declar-  j  ^  / 
ing  itself  for  virtue,  by  way  of  distinction  from  vice,  and! 
preference  to  it  JlFor,  our  being  so  constituted  as  that  virtue  i  |  r, 
and  vice  are  trlus  na  turally  favored  and  disco untenanced^  /  ^  o 

4 


If 


74 


OF  THE  MORAL 


[part  I, 


S  -j 


rewarded  and  punished  respectively  as  such,  is  an  intuitive 
proof  of  the  intent  of  nature  that  it  should  be  so  ;|otherwise 
the  constitution  of  our  mind,  from  which  it  thus  immediately 
and  directly  proceeds,  would  be  absurd.  j^But  it  cannot  be 
said,  because  virtuous  actions  are  sometimes  punished,  and 
vicious  actions  rewarded,  that  nature  intended  it^  /Bor, 
though  this  great  disorder  is  brought  about,  as  all  actions 
are  done,  by  means  of  some  natural  passion,  yet  this  may  be^ 
as  it  undoubtedly  is,  brought  about  by  the  perversion  of  such 
passion,  implanted  in  us  for  other,  and  those  very  good  pur¬ 
poses.  1  nd  indeed  these  other  and  good  purposes,  even  of 
every  passion,  may  be  clearly  seen. 

/We  have  then  a  declaration,  in  some  degree  of  present 
effect,  from  him  who  is  supreme  in  nature,  which  side  he 
is  of  or  what  part  he  takes ;  a  dedaration  for  virtue,  and 
against  vice.)/So  far,  therefore,  as  a  man  is  true  to  virtue, 
to  veracity  and  justice,  to  equity  and  charity,  and  the  right 
of  the  case,  in  whatever  he  is  concerned,  so  far  he  is  on  the 
side  of  the  divine  adrhinistration,  and  cooperates  with  it  and 
from  hence,  to  such  a  man,  arises  naturally  a  secret  satisfac¬ 
tion  and  sense  of  security,  and  implicit  hope  of  somewhat 
further,  j  And,  > 

V.  Tkis  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  necessary  tendencies  Of 
virtue,  which,  though  not  of  present  effect,  yet  are  at  present 
discernible  in  nature ;  and  so  afford  an  instance  of  some¬ 
what  moral  in  the  essential  constitution  of  it.  There  is,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  a  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice  to  pro¬ 
duce  the  good  and  bad  effects  now  mentioned,  in  a  greater 
degree  than  they  do  in  fact  produce  them.  For  instance, 
good  and  bad  men  would  be  much  more  rewarded  and  pun¬ 
ished  as  such,  were  it  not  that  justice  is  often  artificially 
eluded,  that  characters  are  not  known,  and  many  who 
would  thus  favor  virtue  and  discourage  vice,  are  hindered 
from  doing  so  by  accidental  causes.  These  tendencies  of 
virtue  and  vice  are  obvious  with  regard  to  individuals.  But 
it  may  require  more  particularly  to  be  considered,  that  power 
in  a  society^  by  being  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  naturally 
increases,  and  has.  a  necessary  tendency  to  prevail  over  op¬ 
posite  power,  not  under  the  direction  of  it ;  in  like  maimer 
as  power,  by  being  under  the  direction  of  reason,  increases, 
and  has  a  tende;icy  to  prevail  over  brute  force.  There  are 
several  brute  creatures  of  equal,  and  several  of  superior 
strength,  to  that  of  men  ;  and  possibly  the  sum  of  the  whole 
strength  of  brutes  may  be  greater  than  that  of  mankind  ; 


CHAP.  HI.] 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


^5 


but  reason  gives  ns  the  advantage  and  superiority  over  them, 
and  thus  man  is  the  acknowledged  governing  animal  upon 
the  earth.  Nor  is  this  superiority  considered  by  any  as 
accidental ;  but  as  what  reason  has  a  tendency,  in  the  na¬ 
ture  of  the  thing,  to  obtain.  And  yet,  perhaps,  difficulties 
may  be  raised  about  the  meaning,  as  well  as  the  truth  of 
the  assertion,  that  virtue  has  the  like  tendency. 

To  obviate  these  difficulties,  let  us  see  more  distinctly 
how  the  case  stands  with  regard  to  reason,  which  is  so 
readily  acknowledged  to  have  this  advantageous  tendency. 
Suppose,  then,  two  or  three  men,  of  the  best  and  most  im¬ 
proved  understanding,  in  a  desolate  open  plain,  attacked  by 
ten  times  the  number  of  beasts  of  prey  ;  would  their  reason 
secure  them  the  victory  in  this  unequal  combat?  Power, 
then,  though  joined  with  reason,  and  under  its  direction, 
cannot  be  expected  to  prevail  over  opposite  power,  though 
merely  brutal,  unless  the  one  bears  some  proportion  to  the 
other.  Again,  put  the  imaginary  case,  that  rational  and 
irrational  creatures  were  of  like  external  shape  and  man¬ 
ner  ;  it  is  certain,  before  there  were  opportunities  for  the  first 
to  distinguish  each  other,  to  separate  from  their  adversaries, 
and  to  form  a  union  among  themselves,  they  might  be  upon 
a  level,  or,  in  several  respects,  upon  great  disadvantage, 
though,  united,  they  might  be  vastly  superior  ;  since  union 
is  of  such  efficacy,  that  ten  men,  united,  might  be  able  to 
accomplish  what  ten  thousand  of  the  same  natural  strength 
and  understanding,  wffiolly  ununited,  could  not.  In  this 
case,  then,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain  its  ground 
against  reason,  for  want  of  union  among  the  rational  crea¬ 
tures.  Or  suppose  a  number  of  men  to  land  upon  an  island 
inhabited  only  by  wild  beasts  ;  a  number  of  men,  who,  by 
the  regulations  of  civil  government,  the  inventions  of  art, 
and  the  experience  of  some  years,  could  they  be  preserved 
so  long,  would  be  really  sufficient  to  subdue  the  wild  beasts, 
and  to  preserve  themselves  in  security  from  them ;  yet  a 
conjecture  of  accidents  might  give  such  advantage  to  the 
^rational  animals  as  that  they  might  at  once  overpower, 
and  even  extirpate,  the  whole  species  of  rational  ones. 
Length  of  time,  then,  proper  scope  and  opportunities  for  rea¬ 
son  to  exert  itself,  may  be  absolutely  necessary  to  its  pre- 
vailinsr  over  brute  force.  Further  still ;  there  are  many  in- 
stances  of  brutes  succeeding  in  attempts  which  they  could 
not  have  undertaken,  had  not  their  irrational  nature  render¬ 
ed  them  incapable  of  forseeing  the  danger  of  such  attempts, 


OF  THE  MORAL 


[part  I. 


7G 

or  the  fury  of  passion  hindered  their  attending  to  it ;  and 
there  are  instances  of  reason,  and  real  prudence  preventing 
men’s  undertaking  what,  it  hath  appeared  afterwards,  they 
might  have  succeeded  in  by  a  lucky  rashness.  And  in  certain 
conjunctures,  ignorance  and  follj^,  weakness  and  discord, 
may  have  their  advantages.  So  that  rational  animals  have 
not  necessarily  the  superiority  over  irrational  ones ;  but, 
how  improbable  soever  it  may  be,  it  is  evidently  possible, 
that,  in  some  globes,  the  latter  may  be  superior.  And  wore 
the  former  wholly  at  variance  and  disunited,  by  false  self-in 
terest  and  envy,  by  treachery  and  injustice,  and  consequent 
rage  and  malice  against  each  other,  whilst  the  latter  were 
firmly  united  among  themselves  by  instinct,  this  might 
greatly  contribute  to  the  introducing  such  an  inverted  order 
of  things.  For  every  one  would  consider  it  as  inverted  ; 
since  reason  has,  in  the  nature  of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail 
over  brute  force,  notwithstanding  the  possibility  it  may  not 
prevail,  and  the  necessity  which  there  is  of  many  concur¬ 
ring  circumstances  to  render  it  prevalent. 

Now,  I  say,  virtue  in  a  society  has  a  like  tendency  to 
procure  superiority  and  additional  power,  whether  this  power 
be  considered  as  the  means  of  security  from  opposite  power, 
or  of  obtaining  other  advantages.  And  it  has  this  tenden¬ 
cy,  by  rendering  public  good  an  object  and  end  to  every 
member  of  the  society  ;  by  putting  every  one  upon  consi¬ 
deration  and  diligence,  recollection  and  self-government, 
both  in  order  to  see  what  is  the  most  effectual  method,  and 
also  in  order  to  perform  their  proper  part,  for  obtaining  and 
preserving  it ;  by  uniting  a  society  within  itself,  and  so  in¬ 
creasing  its  strength,  and,  which  is  particularly  to  be  men¬ 
tioned,  uniting  it  by  means  of  veracity  and  justice.  For  as 
these  last  are  principal  bonds  of  union,  so  benevolence,  or 
public  spirit,  undirected,  unrestrained  by  them,  is- — nobody 
knows  what. 

And  suppose  the  invisible  world,  and  the  invisible  dispen¬ 
sations  of  Providence,  to  be  in  any  sort  analogous  to  what 
appears ;  or,  that  both  together  make  up  one  uniform 
scheme,  the  two  parts  of  which,  the  part  which  we  see,  and 
that  which  is  beyond  our  observation,  are  analogous  to 
each  other  ;  then,  there  must  be  a  like  natural  tendency  in 
the  derived  power,  throughout  the  universe,  under  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  virtue,  to  prevail  in  general  over  that  which  is  not 
under  its  direction  ;  as  there  is  in  reason,  derived  reason  in 
the  universe,  to  prevail  over  brute  force.  But  then,  in  order 


CHAP.  III. 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


11 


to  the  prevaler?ce  of  virtue,  or  that  it  may  actually  produce 
what  it  has  a  tendency  to  produce,  the  like  concurrences 
are  necessary  as  are  to  the  prevalence  of  reason.  There 
must  be  some  proportion  between  the  natural  power  or  force 
which  is,  and  that  which  is  not,  under  the  direction  of  vir¬ 
tue  *  There  must  be  sufficient  length  of  time  ;  for  the  com¬ 
plete  success  of  virtue,  as  of  reason,  cannot  from  the  nature 
of  the  thing,  be  otherwise  than  gradual :  there  must  be,  as 
one  may  speak,  a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and  exten¬ 
sive  enough,  proper  occasions  and  opportunities  for  the  vir¬ 
tuous  to  join  together,  to  exert  themselves  against  lawless 
force,  and  to  reap  the  fruit  of  their  united  labours.  Now 
indeed  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that  the  disproportion  between  the 
good  and  the  bad,  even  here  on  earth,  is  not  so  great,  but 
that  the  former  have  natural  power  sufficient  to  their  pro 
vailing  to  a  considerable  degree,  if  circumstances  would 
permit  this  power  to  be  united.  For,  much  less,  very  much 
less  power,  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  wmuld  prevail  over 
much  greater,  not  under  the  direction  of  it.  However,  good 
men  over  the  face  of  the  earth  cannot  unite  ;  as  for  other 
reasons,  so  because  they  cannot  be  sufficiently  ascertained 
of  each  other’s  characters.  And  the  knowui  course  of  hu¬ 
man  things,  the  scene  we  are  now  passing  through,  parti¬ 
cularly  the  shortness  of  life,  denies  to  virtue  its  full  scope 
in  several  other  respects.  The  natural  tendency  which 
we  have  been  considering,  though  real,  is  hindered  from  be¬ 
ing  carried  into  effect  in  the  present  state,  but  these  hindran¬ 
ces  may  be  removed  in  a  future  one.  Virtue,  to  borrow  the 
Christian  allusion,  is  militant  .here,  and  various  untoward 
accidents  contribute  to  its  being  often  overborne  ;  but  it  may 
combat  with  greater  advantage  hereafter,  and  prevail  com¬ 
pletely  and  enjoy  its  consequent  rewards,  in  some  future 
states.  Neglected  as  it  is,  perhaps  unknown,  perhaps  des¬ 
pised  and  oppressed  here,  there  may  be  scenes  in  eternity, 
lasting  enough,  and  in  every  other  way  adapted,  to  afford  it 
a  sufficient  sphere  of  action,  and  a  sufficient  sphere  for  the 
natural  consequences  of  it  to  follow  in  fact.  If  the  soul  be 
naturally  immortal,  and  this  state  to  be  a  progress  towards 
a  future  one,  as  childhood  is  towards  mature  age,  good  men 
may  naturally  unite,  not  only  amongst  themselves,  but  also 
with  other  orders  of  virtuous  creatures,  in  that  future  state. 
For  virtue,  from  the  very  nature  of  it,  is  a  principal  and 
bond  of  union,  in  some  degree,  amongst  all  who  are  endued 
with  it|  and  known  to  each  other ;  so  as  that  by  it  a 


78 


OF  THE  MORAL 


[part  I 

good  man  cannot  but  recommend  himself  to  the  favor  and 
protection  of  all  virtuous  beings,  throughout  the  whole  uni¬ 
verse,  who  can  be  acquainted  with  his  character,  and  can 
any  way  interpose  in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of  his  duration. 
And  one  might  add,  that  suppose  all  this  advantageous  ten¬ 
dency  of  virtue  to  become  etfect  amongst  one  or  more  orders  of 
creatures,  in  any  distant  scenes  and  periods,  and  to  be  seen 
by  any  orders  of  vicious  creatures,  throughout  the  universal 
kingdom  of  God ;  this  happy  effect  of  virtue  would  have  a 
tendency,  by  way  of  example,  and  possibly  in  other  ways, 
to  amend  those  of  theili  who  are  capable  of  amendment, 
and  being  recovered  to  a  just  sense  ofvirtue.  If  our  notions 
of  the  plan  of  Providence  were  enlarged,  in  any  sort  pro¬ 
portionable  to  what  late  discoveries  have  enlarged  our  views 
with  respect  to  the  material  world,  representations  of  this 
kind  would  not  appear  absurd  or  extravagant.  However, 
they  are  not  to  be  taken  as  intended  for  a  literal  deline 
ation  of  wdiat  is  in  fact  the  particular  scheme  of  the  uni¬ 
verse,  which  cannot  be  known  without  revelation  ;  for  sup¬ 
positions  are  not  to  be  looked  on  as  true,  because  not  incre¬ 
dible,  but  they/  are  mentioned  to  show,  that  our  finding’ 
virtue  to  be  hindered  from  procuring  to  itself  such  superiority 
and  advantages,  is  no  objection  against'ks  having  in  the 
essential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to  procure  them. 
And  the  suppositions  now  mentioned  do  plainly  show  this  ; 
for  they  show,  that  these  hindrances  are  so  far  from  being 
necessary,  that  we  ourselves  can  easily  conceive  how  they 
may  be  removed  in  future  states,  and  full  scope  be  granted 
to  virtue.  And  all  these  advantageous  tendencies  of  it  are 
to  be  considered  as  declarations  of  God  in  its  favor.  '  This, 
however,  is  taking  a  pretty  large  compass;  though  it 'is 
certain,  that  as  the  material  world  appears  to  be,  in  a  man¬ 
ner,  boundless  and  immense,  there  must  be  some  scheme  of 
Providence  vast  in  proportion  to  it. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  earth,  our  habitation,  and  wn 
shall  see  this  happy  tendency  of  virtue,  by  imagining  an 
instance  not  so  vast  and  remote  ;  bj?-  supposing  a  kingdom, 
or  society  of  men,  upon  it,  perfectly  virtuous,  for  a  succession 
of  many  ages  ;  to  which,  if  you  please,  may  be  given  a  sit¬ 
uation  advantageous  to  universal  monarchy.  In  such  a 
state  there  would  be_no  such  thing  as  faction,  but  men  of 
the  greatest  capacity  would,  of  course,  all  along,  have  the 
chief  direction  of  affairs  willingly  yielded  to  them,  and  they 
would  share  it  among  themselves  without  envy.  Each  of 


CHAP.  III.] 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


79 


these  would  have  the  part  assigned  him  to  which  his  gen¬ 
ius  was  peculiarly  adapted  ;  and  others,  who  had  not  any 
distinguished  genius,  would  be  safe,  and  think  themselves 
very  happy,  by  being  under  the  protection  and  guidance  of 
those  who  had,  Public  determinations  would  really  be  the 
result  of  the  united  wisdom  of  the  community,  and  they 
would  faithfully  be  executed  by  the  .united  strength  of  it. 
Some  would  in  a  higher  way  contribute,  but  all  would  in 
some  way  contribute  to  the  public  prosperity,  and  in  it  each 
would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  And  as  injustice, 
whether  by  haud  or  force,  would  be  unknown  among  them¬ 
selves,  so  they  would  be  sufficiently  secured  from  it  in  their 
neighbors.  For  cunning  and  false  self-interest,  confedera-  " 
cies  in  injustice,  ever  slight  and  accompanied  with  faction 
and  intestine  treachery  ;  these,  on  one  hand,  would  be  found 
mere  childish  folly  and  weakness,  when  set  in  opposition 
against  wisdom,  public  spirit,  union  inviolable,  and  fidelity 
on  the  other,  allowing  both  a  sufficient  length  of  years  to 
try  their  force.  Add  the  general  influence  which  such  a 
kingdom  would  have  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  by  way  of 
example  particularly,  and  the  reverence  which  would  be 
paid  it.  It  would  plainly  be  superior  to  all  others,  and  the 
world  must  gradually  come  under  its  empire  ;  not  by  means 
of  lawless  violence,  but  partly  by  what  must  be  allowed  to 
be  just  conquest,  and  partly  by  other  kingdoms  submitting 
themselves  voluntarily  to  it  throughout  a  course  of  ages, 
and  claiming  its  protection,  one  after  another,  in  successive 
exigencies.  The  head  of  it  would  be  a  universal  monarch, 
in  another  sense  than  any  mortal  has  yet  been,  and  the  eas¬ 
tern  style  would  be  literally  applicable  to  him,  that  all  peo¬ 
ple^  nations,  and  languages  should  serve  him.  And  though 
indeed  our  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  the  whole  his¬ 
tory  of  mankind,  show  the  impossibility,  without  some  mi¬ 
raculous  interposition,  that  a  number  of  men  here  on  earth 
shall  unite  in  one  society  or  government,  in  the  fear  of  God 
and  universal  practice  of  virtue,  and  that  such  a  govern¬ 
ment  should  continue  so  united  for  a  succession  of  ages ; 
yet,  admitting  or  supposing  this,  the  effect  would  be  as  now 
drawn  out.  And  thus,  for  instance,  the  wonderful  power 
and  prosperity  promised  to  the  Jewish  nation  in  the  Scrip¬ 
ture,  would  be,  in  a  great  measure,  the  consequence  of 
what  is  predicatea  of  them  ;  that  the  ‘  people  should  be  all 
righteous  and  inherit  the  land  forever  were  we  to  under- 

♦  Isa,  Ix,  21. 


t 


80 


OF  THE  MORAL 


) PART  I 


stand  the  latter  phrase  of  a  long  continuance  only,  sufficieni 
to  give  things  time  to  work.  The  predictions  of  this  kind, 
for-  there  are  many  of  them,  cannot  come  to  pass  in  the 
present  known -course  of  nature  ;  but  suppose  them  come 
to  pass,  and  then  the  dominion  and  pre-eminence  promised 
must  naturally  follow,  to  a  very  considerable  degree. 

Consider,  now,  the  general  system  of  religion  ;  that  the 
government  of  the  world  is  uniform,  and  one,  and  moral; 
that  virtue  and  right  shall  finally  have  the  advantage,  and 
prevail  over  fraud  and  lawless  force,  over  the  deceits  as  well 
as  the  violence  of  wickedness,  under  the  conduct  of  one  su¬ 
preme  Governor  ;  and  from  the  observations  above  made  it 
will  appear,  that  God  has,  by  our  reason,  given  us  to  see  a 
peculiar  connexion  in  the  several  parts  of  this  scheme,  and 
a  tendency  towards  the  completion  of  it,  arising  out  of  the 
very  nature  of  virtue ;  which  tendency  is  to  be  considered 
as  somewhat  moral  in  the  essential  constitution  of  things 
If  any  one  should  think  all  this  to  be  of  little  importance,  I 
desire  him  to  consider  what  he  would  think,  if  vice  had,  es 
sentially  and  in  its  nature,  these  advantageous  tendencies^ 
or  if  virtue  had  essentially  the  direct  contrary  ones. 

But  it  maybe  objected,  that  notwithstanding  all  these 
natural  effects,  and  these  natural  tendencies  of  virtue,  yet 
things  may  be  noAv  going  on  throughout  the  universe,  and 
may  go  on  hereafter,  in  the  same  mixed  way  as  here  at 
present  upon  earth  ;  virtue  sometimes  prosperous,  some¬ 
times  depressed  :  vice  sometimes,  punished,  sometimes  suc¬ 
cessful.  The  answer  to  which  is,  that  it  is  not  the  purpose 
of  this  chapter,  nor  of  this  treatise,  properly  to  prove  God^s 
perfect  moral  government  over  the  world,  or  the  truth  of  re¬ 
ligion,  but  to  observe  what  there  is  in  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature  to  confirm  the  proper  proof  of  it,  supposed 
to  be  known,  and  that  the  weight  of  the  foregoing  observa¬ 
tions  to  this  purpose  may  be  thus  distinctly  proved.  Pleas¬ 
ure  and  pain  are  indeed,  to  a  certain  degree,  say  to  a  very 
high  degree,  distributed  amongst  us,  without  any  apparent 
regard  to  the  merit  or  demerit  of  characters.  And  were 
there  nothing  else,  concerning  this  matter,  discernible  in  the 
constitution  and  course  of  nature,  there  would  be  no  ground, 
from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  to  hope  or  to 
fear,  that  men  would  be  rewarded  or  punished  hereafter  ac¬ 
cording  to  their  deserts  ;  which,  however,  it  is  to  be  remark¬ 
ed,  implies,  that  even  then  there  would  be  no  ground,  from 
appearances,  to  think  that  vice,  upon  the  whole,  would  have 


CHAP.  Ill.j 


GOVEP.,NMENT  OE  GOD. 


81 


the  advantage,  rather  than  that  virtue  would.  And  thus 
the  proof  of  a  future  state  of  retribution  would  rest  upon  the 
usual  known  arguments  for  it ;  which  are,  I  think,  plainly 
unanswerable,  and  would  be  so,  though  there  were  no  addi 
tional  confirmation  of  them  from  the  things  above  insisted 
on.  But  these  things  are  a  very  strong  confirmation  of 
them :  For, 

First,  they  show  that  the  Author  of  nature  is  not  indiffer 
ent  to  virtue  and  vice.  They  amount  to  a  declaration  from 
him,  determinate,  and  not  to  be  evaded,  in  favor  of  one,  and 
against  the  other  ;  such  a  declaration  as  there  is  nothing  to 
be  set  over  against,  or  answer,  on  the  part  of  vice.  So  that 
were  a  man,  laying  aside  the  proper  proof  of  religion,  to 
determine  from  the  course  of  nature  only,  whether  it  were 
most  probable  that  the  righteous  or  the  wicked  would  have 
the  advantage  in  a  future  life,  there  can  be  no.  doubt  but 
that  he  would  determine  the  probability  to  be,  that  the  for¬ 
mer  would.  The  course  of  nature,  then,  in  the  view  of  it 
now  given,  furnishes  us  with  a  real  practical  proof  of  the 
obligations  of  religion. 

Secondly,  When,  conformably  to  what  religion  teaches  us, 
God  shall  reward  and  punish  virtue  and  vice,  as  such,  so  as 
that  every  one  shall,  upon  the  whole,  have  his  deserts,  tfiis 
distributive  justice  will  not  be  a  thing  different  in  kind,  but 
only  in  degree,  from  what  we  experience  in  his  present  gov¬ 
ernment.  It  will  be  that  in  effect,  toward  which  we  now  see 
a  tendency.  It  will  be  no  more  than  the  completion  of  that 
moral  government,  the  principles  and  beginning  of  which 
have  been  shown,  beyond  all  dispute,  discernible  in  the 
present  constitution  and  course  of  nature.  And  from  hence 
it  follows. 

Thirdly,  That  as,  under  the  natural  government  of  God, 
our  experience  of  those  kinds  and  degrees  of  happiness  and 
misery,  which  we  do  experience  at  present,  gives  just  ground 
to  hope  for  and  to  fear  higher  degrees  and  other  kinds  of 
both  in  a  future  state,  supposing  a  future  state  admitted  ;  so, 
under  his  moral  government,  our  experience  that  virtue  and 
vice  are,  in  the  manners  above-mentioned,  actually  reward¬ 
ed  and  punished  at  present,  in  a  certain  degree,  gives  just 
ground  to  hope  and  to  fear  that  they  may  be  rewarded  and 
punished  in  a  higher  degree  hereafter.  It  is  acknowledged, 
indeed,  that  this  alone  is  not  sufficient  ground  to  think,  that 
they  actually  will  be  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher  de¬ 
gree,  rather  than  in  a  lower  :  But  then, 


82 


OF  THE  MORAL 


[part  I. 


Lastly^  There  is  sufficient  ground  to  think  so,  from  the 
good  and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  these  ten¬ 
dencies  are  essential,  and  founded  in  the  nature  of  things  j 
whereas  the  hindrances,  to  their  becoming  effects  are,  in 
numberless -cases,  not  necessary,  but  artificial  only.  Now, 
it  may  be  much  more  strongly  urged,  that  these  tendencies, 
as  well  as  the  actual  rewards  and  punishments  of  virtue  and 
vice,  which  arise  directly  out  of  the  nature  of  things,  will 
remain  hereafter,  than  that  the  accidental  hinderances  of 
them  will.  And  if  these  hinderances  do  not  remain,  those 
rewards  and  punishments  cannot  but  be  carried  on  much 
further  towards  the  perfection  of  moral  government,  i.  e.  the 
tendency  of  virtue  and  vice  will  become  effect ;  but  when, 
or  where,  or  in  what  particular  way,  cannot  be  known  at 
all  but  by  revelation.  ■ 

Upon  the  whole,  there  is  a  kind  of  moral  government  im- 
plied  in  God’s  natural  government ;  virtue  and  vice  are 
naturally  rewarded  and  punished  as  beneficial  and  mis¬ 
chievous  to  society,  and  rewarded  and  punished  directly  as 
virtue  and  vice.  The  notion,  then,  of  a  moral  scheme  of 
government,  is  not  fictitious,  but  natural ;  for  it  is  suggested 
to  our  thoughts  by  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature, 
and  the  execution  of  this  scheme  is  actually  begun,  in  the 
instances  here  mentioned.  And  these  things  are  to  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  a  declaration  of  the  Author  of  nature,' for  virtue, 
and  against  vice  ;  they  give  a  .credibility  to  the  supposition 
of  their  being  rewarded  and  punished  hereafter,  and  also 
ground  to  hope  and  to  fear,  that  they  may  be  rewarded  and 
punished  in  higher  degrees  than  they  are  here.  And  as  all 
this  is  confirmed,  so  the  argument  for  religion,  from  the  con¬ 
stitution  and  course  of  nature,  is  carried  on  farther,  by  observ¬ 
ing,  that  there  are  natural  tendencies,  and,  in  innumerable 
cases,  only  artificial  hindrances,  to  tliis  moral  scheme  being 
carried  on  much  farther  towards  perfection  than  it  is  at  pre¬ 
sent.  The  notion,  then,  of  a  moral  scheme  of  govern¬ 
ment,  much  more  perfect  than  what  is  seen,  is  not  a  ficti¬ 
tious,  but  a  natural  notion,  for  it  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts 
by  ihe  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  And  these 
tendencies  are  to  ■’be  considered  as  intimations,  as  implicit 
promises  and  threatenings,  from  the  Author  of  nature,  of 
much  greater  rewards  and  punishments  to  follow  virtue  and 


CHAP.  III.] 


GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


83 


vice,  than  do  at  present.  And,  indeed,  every  natural  ten¬ 
dency,  which  is  to  continue,  but  which  is  hindered  from  be¬ 
coming  effect  by  only  accidental  causes,  affords  a  presump¬ 
tion,  that  such  tendency  will,  some  time  or  other,  become 
effect :  a  presumption  in  degree  proportionable  to  the  length 
of  the  duration  through  which  such  tendency  will  continue. 
And  from  these  things  together  arises  a  real  presumption, 
that  the  moral  scheme  of  government  established  in  nature, 
shall  be  carried  on  much  farther  towards  perfection  here¬ 
after,  and,  I  think,  a  presumption  that  it  will  be  absolutely 
completed.  But  from  these  things,  joined  with  the  moral 
nature  which^God  has  given  us,  considered  as  given  us  by 
him,  arises  a  practical  proofs  that  it  will  be  completed  ;  a 
proof  from  fact,  and  therefore  a  distinct  one  from  that  which 
is  deduced  from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  relations,  the 
fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions. 

♦  See  this  proof  drawn  but  briefiyi  chap.  6. 

*  »  - 
•  .  *  ‘ 


\ 


J 


CHAPTER  1 V. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation^  as  implying  Trial,  Difficulties,  and 

Danger. 

The  general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  our  present  life  is 
a  state  of  probation  for  a  future  one,  comprehends  under 
it  several  particular  things,  distinct  from  each  other.  But 
the  first  and  most  common  meaning  of  it  seems  to  be,  that 
our  future  interest  is  now  depending,  and  depending  upon 
ourselves  ;  that  we  have  scope  and  opportunities  here  foi 
that  good  and  bad  behaviour,  which  God  will  reward  and 
punish  hereafter  ;  together  with  temptations  to  one,  as  well 
as  inducements  of  reason  to  the  other.  And  this  is,  in  great 
measure,  the  same  with  saying,  that  we  are  under  the 
moral  government  of  God,  and  to  give  an  account  of  our 
actions  to  him.  For  the  notion  of  a  future  account,  and 
general  righteous  judgment,  implies  some  sort  of  tempta¬ 
tions  to  what  is  wrong,  otherwise  there  would  be  no  moral 
possibility  of  doing  wrong,  nor  ground  for  judgment  or  dis¬ 
crimination.  But  there  is  this  difference,  that  the  word  pro^ 
haiion  is  more  distinctly  and  particularly  expressive  of  allure¬ 
ments  to  wrong,  or  difficulties  in  adhering  uniformly  to  what 
is  right,  and  of  the  danger  of  miscarrying  by  such  tempta¬ 
tions,  than  the  words  moral  government.  A  state  of  proba¬ 
tion,  then,  as  thus  particularly  implying  in  it  trial,  difficulties, 
and  danger,  may  require  to  be  considered  distinctly  by  itself. 

And  as  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  religion 
teaches  us,  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial  with  regard 
to  a  future  world  ;  so  also  his  natural  government  over  us 
implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial,  in  a  like  sense,  with 
regard  to  the  present  world.  Natural  government,  by  re¬ 
wards  and  punishments,  as  much  implies  natural  trial,  as 
moral  government  does  moral  trial.  The  natural  govern- 


CHAP.  IV.] 


OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL. 


85 


ment  of  God  here  meant  *  consists  in  his  annexing  pleasure 
to  some  actions,  and  pain  to  others,  which  are  in  our  power 
to  do  or  forbear,  and  in  giving  us  notice  of  such  appoint¬ 
ment  beforehand.  This  necessarily  implies,  that  he  has 
made  our  happiness  and  misery,  or  our  interest,  to  depend 
in  part  upon  ouj‘selves.  And  so  far  as  men  have  tempta¬ 
tions  to  any  course  of  action,  which  will  probably  occasion 
them  greater  temporal  inconvenience  and  uneasiness  than 
satisfaction,  so  far  their  temporal  interest  is  in  danger  from 
themselves,  or  they  are  in  a  sta-t.e  of  trial  with  respect  to  it. 
Now,  people  often  blame  others,  and  even  themselves,  for 
their  misconduct  in  their  temporal  concerns.  And  we  find 
many  are  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  and  miss  of  that 
natural  happiness  which  they  might  have  obtained  in  the  ^ 
present  life  ;  perhaps  every  one  does  in  some  degree.  But 
many  run  themselves  into  great  inconvenience,  and  into  ex¬ 
treme  distress  and  misery,  not  through  incapacity  of  know¬ 
ing  better,  and  doing  better  for  themselves,  which  would  be 
nothing  to  the  present  purpose,  but  through  their  own  fault. 
And  these  things  necessarily  imply  temptation,  and  danger 
of  miiscarrying,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  with  respect  to 
our  worldly  interest  or  happiness.  Every  one,  too,  without 
having  religion  in  his  thoughts,  speaks  of  the  hazards  which 
young  people  run  upon  their  setting  out  in  the  world  ;  haz¬ 
ards  from  other  causes,  than  merely  their  ignorance,  and 
unavoidable  accidents.  And  some  courses  of  vice,  at  least, 
being  contrary  to  men’s  worldly  interest  or  good,  temptations 
to  these  must  at  the  same  time  be  temptations  to  forego  our 
present  and  our  future  interest.  Thus,  in  our  natural  or 
temporal  capacity,  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial,  i.  e..  of  difficulty 
and  danger,  analogous  or  like  to  our  moral  and  religious 
trial. 

This  will  more  distinctly  appear  to  any  one,  who  thinks 
it  worth  while,  more  distinctly,  to  consider  what  it  is  which 
constitutes  our  trial  in  both  capacities,,  and  to  observe  how 
mankind  behave  under  it. 

And  that  which  constitutes  this  our  trial,  in  both  these 
capacities,  must  be  somewhat  either  in  our  ex;ternal  circum¬ 
stances^  or  in  our  nature.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  persons 
may  be  betrayed  into  wrong  behaviour  upon  surprise,  or 
overcome  upon  any  other  very  singular  and  extraordinary 


*  Chap.  2. 


8G 


OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL. 


[part  I. 


external  occasions,  who  would,  otherwise,  have  preserved 
their  character  of  prudence  and  of  virtue ;  in  which  cases, 
everyone,  in  speaking  of  the  wrong  behaviour  of  these  per. 
sons,  would  impute_it.to  such  particular  external  circum¬ 
stances.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  men  who  have  contracted 
habits  of  vice  and  folly  of  any  kind,  or  have  some  particu¬ 
lar  passions  in  excess,  will  seek  opportunities,  and,  as  U 
were,  go  out  of  their  way,  to  gratify  themselves  in  these 
respects,  at  the  expense  of  their  wisdom  and  their  virtue  ; 
led  to  it,  as  every  one  would  say,  not  by  external  tempta¬ 
tions,  but  by  such  habits  and  passions.  And  the  account 
of  this  last  case  is,  that  particular  passions  are  no  more  co¬ 
incident  with  prudence,  or  that  reasonable  self-love,  the  end 
of  which  is  our  worldly  interest,  than  they  are  with  the  prin¬ 
ciple  of  virtue  and  religion,  but  often  draw  contrary  ways 
to  one  as  well  as  to  the  other  ;  and  so  such  particular  pas 
sions  are  as  much  temptations  to  act  imprudently  with  re¬ 
gard  to  oui  worldly  interest,  as  to  act  viciously.*  However 
as  when  \vt  say,  men  are  misled  by  eternal  circumstances  of 
temptation,  it  cannot  but  be  understood,  that  there  is  some 
what  within  themselves,  to  render  those  circumstances 
temptations,  or  to  render  them  susceptible  of  impressions 
from  them  ;  so,  when  we  say,  they  are  misled  by  passions, 
it  is  always  supposed,  that  there  are  occasions,  circum¬ 
stances,  and  objects,  exciting  these  passions,  and  affording 
means  for  gratifying  them.  And,  therefore,  temptations 
from  within,  and  from  without,  coincide,  and  mutually  imply 
each  other.  Now,  the  several  external  objects  of  the  appe¬ 
tites,  passions,  and  affections,  being  present  to  the  senses,  or 
offering  themselves  to  the  mind,  and  so  exciting  emotions 
suitable  to  their  nature,  not  only  in  cases  where  they  can 
be  gratified  consistently  with  innocence  and  piudence,  but 
also  in  cases  where  they  cannot,  and  yet  can  be  gratifi¬ 
ed  imprudently  and  viciously ;  this  as  really  puts  them  in 
danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing  Uheir  present  interest  or 
good,  as  their  future,  and  as  really  renders  self-denial  neces¬ 
sary  to  secure  one  as  the  other  ;  i.  e.  we  are  in  a  like  state 
of  trial  with  respect  to  both,  by  the  very  same  passions,  ex¬ 
ceed  by  the  very  same  means.  Thus,  mankind  having  a 
temporal  interest  depending  upon  themselves,  and  a  prudent 
course  of  behaviour  being  necessary  to  secure  it,  passions 

*  See  Sermons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  1726,  2d  Ed.  205,  &c.  Pref.  p. 
25,  &c.  Serm.  p.  21.  &c. 


CHAP.  IV.] 


OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL. 


87 


inordinately  excited,  whether  by  means  of  example  or  by 
any  other  external  circumstance,  towards  such  objects,  at 
such  times,  or  in  such  degrees,  as  that  they  cannot  be  grati¬ 
fied  consistently  with  worldly  prudence,  are  temptations 
dangerous,  and  too  often  successful  temptations,  to  forego  a 
greater  temporal  good  for  a  less  ;  i.  e.  to  forego  what  is,  upon 
the  whole,  our  temporal  interest,  for  the  sake  of  a  present 
gratification.  This  is  a  description  of  our  state  of* trial  in 
our  temporal  capacity.  Substitute  now  the  word  future  for 
temporal^  and  virtue  for  prudence^  and  it  will  be  just  as  proper 
a  description  of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  religious  capacity  , 
so  analogous  are  they  to  each  other. 

If,  from  consideration  of  this  our  like  state  of  trial  in  both 
capacities,  we  goon  to.  observe  farther,  how  mankind  be¬ 
have  under  it,  we  shall  find  there  are  some  who  have  so 
little  sense  of  it,,  that  they  scarce  look  beyond  the  passing 
,  day  ;  they  are  so  taken  up  with  present  gratifications,  as  to 
have,  in  a  manner,  no  feeling  of  consequences,  no  regard  to 
their  future  ease  or  fortune  in  this  life,  any  more  than  to  their 
happiness  in  another.  Some  appear  to  be  blinded  and  de¬ 
ceived  by  inordinate  passion,  in  their  worldly  concerns,  as 
much  as  in  religion.  Others  are,  not  deceived,  but,  as  it 
were,  forcibly  carried  away,  by  the  like  passions,  against 
their  better  judgment,  and  feeble  resolutions,  too,  of  acting 
better.  And  there  are  men  and  truly  they  are  not  a  few, 
who  shamelessly  avow,  not  their  interests,  but  their  mere 
will  and  pleasure,  to  be  their  law  of  life  ;  and  who,  in  open 
defiance  of  every  thing  that  is  reasonable,  will  go  on  in  a 
course  of  vicious  extravagance,  foreseeing,  with  no  remorse 
and  little  fear,  that  it  will  be  their  temporal  ruin  ;  and  some 
of  them,  under  the  apprehension  of  the  consequences  of 
wickedness  in  another  state  :  and,  to  speak  in  the  most 
moderate  way,  human  creatures  are  not  only  continually  lia¬ 
ble  to  go  wrong  voluntarily,  but  we  see  likewise  that  they 
often  actually  do  so,  with  respect  to  their  temporal  interests, 
as  well  as  with  respect  to  religion. 

Thus,  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  our  trials  in  our 
temporal  and  our  religious  cajDacity,  as  they  proceed  from 
the  same  causes,  and'  have  the  same  effect  upon  men’s 
beha  viour,  are  evidently  analogous,  and  of  the  same  kind. 

It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of 
miscarrying  in  our  religious  state  of  trial  are  greatly  in¬ 
creased,  and,  one  is  ready  to  think,  in  a  manner  wholly 
made^  by  the  ill-behaviour  of  others ;  by  a  wrong  education, 


88 


OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL. 


[part  I. 


wrong  in  a  moral  sense,  sometimes  positively  vicious  ;  by 
general  bad  example  ;  by  the  dishonest  artifices  which  are 
got  into  business  of  all  kinds  ;  and,  m  very  many  parts  of 
the  world,  by  religion  being  corrupted  intOw  superstitions 
which  indulge  men  in  their  vices  ;  so,  in  like  manner,  the 
difficulties  of  conducting  ourselves  prudently  in  respect  to 
our  present  interests,  and  our  danger  of  being  led  aside  from 
pursuing  it,  are  greatly  increased  by  a  foolish  education,  and, 
after  we  come  to  mature  age,  by  the  extravagance  and 
carelessness  of  others,  whom  we  have  intercourse  with ; 
and  by  mistaken  notions,  very  generally  prevalent,  and  ta¬ 
ken  up  from  common  opinion,  concerning  temporal  happi¬ 
ness,  and  wherein  it  consists.  And  persons,  by  their  own 
negligence  and  folly  in  their  temporal  affairs,  no  less  than 
by  a  course  of  vice,  bring  themselves  into  new  difficulties, 
and,  by  habits  of  indulgence,  become  less  qualified  to  go 
through  them;  and  one  irregularity  after  another  embar¬ 
rasses  things  to  such  a  degree,  that  they  know  not  where¬ 
about  they  are,  and  often  makes  the  path  of  conduct  so  in¬ 
tricate  and  perplexed,  that  it  is  difficult  to  trace  it  out ;  diffi¬ 
cult  even  to  determine  what  is  the  prudent  or  the  moral  part. 
Thus,  for  instance,  wrong  behaviour  in  one  stage  of  life, 
youth  ;  wrong,  I  mean,  considering  ourselves  only  in  oui 
temporal  capacity,  without  taking  in  religion  ;  this,  in  sev¬ 
eral  ways,  increases  the  difficulties  of  right  behaviour  in 
mature  age  ;  i.  e.  puts  us  into  a  more  disadvantageous  state 
of  trial  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God.  There 
are  natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  degra¬ 
dation  and  we  certainly  are  in  a  condition  which  does 
not  seem^  by  any  means,  the  most  advantageous  we  could 
imagine  or  desire,  either  m  our  natural  or  moral  capacity,  for 
securing  either  our  present  or  future  interest.  However, 
this  condition,  low,  and  careful,  and  uncertain  as  it  is,  does 
not  afford  any  just  ground  of  complaint :  For,  as  men  may 
manage  their  temporal  affairs  with  prudence,  and  so  pass 
their  days  here  on  earth  in  tolerable  ease  and  satisfaction,  by 
a  moderate  degree  of  care  ;  so,  likewise,  with  regard  to  reli¬ 
gion,  there  is  no  more  required  than  what  they  are  well  able 
to  do,  and  what  they  must  be  greatly  wanting  to  themselves 
if  they  neglect.  And  for  persons  to  have  that  put  upon 
them  which  they  are  well  able  to  go  through,  and  no  more, 


*  Part  2,  Chap.  5. 


CHAP.  IV.] 


OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL. 


89 


we  naturally  consider  as  an  equitable  thing,  supposing  it 
done  by  proper  authority.  Nor  have  we  any  more  reason  to 
compikin  of  it,  with  regard  to  the  Author  of  nature,  than 
of  his  not  having  given  us  other  advantages,  belonging  to 
other  orders  of  creatures. 

But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  the  state  of  trial 
which  religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  is  rendered  credi¬ 
ble,  b}'  its  being  throughout  uniform  and  of  a  piece 
with  the  general  conduct  of  Provddence  towards  us,  in 
all  other  respects  within  the  compass  of  our  knowledge. 
Indeed,  if  mankind,  considered  in  their  natural  capacity 
as  inhabitants  of  this  world  only,  found  themselves,  from 
their  birth  to  their  death  in  a  settled  state  of  security 
and  happiness,  without  any  solicitude  or  thought  of 
their  own  ;  or,  if  they  were  in  no  danger  of  being  brought 
into  inconveniences  and  distress  by  carelessness,  or  the  folly 
of  passion,  through  bad  example,  the  treachery  of  others, 
or  the  deceitful  appearances  of  things  ;  were  this  our  natur¬ 
al  condition,  then  it  might  seem  strange,  and  be  some  pre¬ 
sumption  against  the  truth  of  religion,  that  it  represents  our 
future  and  more  general  interest,  as  not  secure  of  course, 
but  as  depending  upon  our  behaviour  and  requiring  recollec¬ 
tion  and  self-government  to  obtain  it.  For  it  might  be  al¬ 
leged,  ‘  What  you  say  is  our  condition  in  one  respect,  is  not 
in  any  wise  of  a  sort  with  what  we  find,  by  experience,  our 
condition  is  in  another.  Our  whole  present  interest  is  secur¬ 
ed  to  our  hands,  without  any  solicitude  of  ours,  and  why 
should  not  our  future  interest,  if  we  have  any  such,  be  so 
too  f  But  since,  on  the  contrary,  thought  and  considera¬ 
tion,  the  voluntary  denying  ourselves  many  things  which 
we  desire,  and  a  course  of  behaviour  far  from  being  always 
agreeable  to  us,  are  absolutely  necessary  to  our  acting  even 
a  common  decent,  and  common  prudent  part,  so  as  to  pass 
with  aii}^  satisfaction  through  the  present  world,  and  be  re¬ 
ceived  upon  any  tolerable  good  terms  in  it ;  since  this  is  the 
case,  all  presumption  against  self-denial  and  attention  being 
necessary  to  secure  our  highest  interest,  is  removed.  Had 
we  not  experience,  it  might,  perhaps,  speciously  be  urged, 
that  it  is  improbable  any  thing  of  hazard  and  danger  should 
be  put  upon  us  by  an  infinite  Being,  when  every  thing 
which  is  hazard  and  danger  in  our  manner  of  conception, 
and  will  end  in  error,  confusion,  and  misery,  is  now  already 
certain  in  his  foreknowledge.  And,  indeed,  why  any  thing 
of  hazard  and  danger  should  be  put  upon  such  frail  creatures 


90  OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL.  [PART  I. 

as  we  are,  may  well  be  thought  a  difficulty  in  speculation ; 
and  cannot  but  be  so,  till  we  know  the  whole,  or,  however, 
much  more  of  the  case.  But  still  the  constitution  of  nature 
is  as  it  is.  Our  happiness  and  misery  are  trusted  to  our 
conduct,  and  made  to  depend  upon  it.  Somewhat,  and,  in 
many  circumstances,  a  great  deal  too,  is  put  upon  us,  either  to 
do,  or  to  suffer,  as  we  choose.  And  all  the  various  miseries 
of  life,  which  people  bring  upon  themselves  by  negligence 
and  folly,  and  might  have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are  in* 
stances  of  this  ;  which  miseries  are,  beforehand,  just  as  con¬ 
tingent  and  undetermined  as  their  conduct,  and  left  to  be 
determined  by  it. 

These  observations  are  an  answer  to  the  objections 
against  the  credibility  of  a  state  of  trial,  as  implying  temjv 
tations,  and  real  danger  of  miscarrying  with  regard  to  our 
general  interest,  under  the  moral  government  of  God  ;  and 
they  show,  that,  if  we  are  at  all  to  be  considered  in  such  a 
capacity,  and  as  having  such  an  interest,  the  general  analo¬ 
gy  of  Providence  must  lead  us  to  apprehend  ourselves  in 
danger  of  miscarrying,  in  different  degrees,  as  to  this  inter¬ 
est,  by  our  neglecting  to  act  the  proper  part  belonging  to  us 
in  that  capacity.  For  we  have  a  present  interest,  under 
the  government  of  God  which  we  experience  here  upon 
earth.  -  And  this  interest,  as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us,  so  nei¬ 
ther  is  it  offered  to  our  acceptance,  hut  to  our  acquisition 
in  such  sort,  as  that'we  are  in  danger  of  missing  it,  by 
means  of  temptations  to  neglect  or  act  contrary  to  it ;  and 
without  attention  and  self-denial,  must  and  do  miss  of  it.  It 
js  then  perfectly  credible,  that  this  may  be  our  case  with 
respect  to  that  chief  and  final  good  which  religion  proposes 
to  us. 


CHAP.  V.] 


MORAL  DISCIPLINE. 


91 


CHAPTER  V. 

0/  a  State  of  Probation^  as  intended  for  Moral  Discipline  and 

Improvement, 

From  the  consideration  of  our  being  in  a  probation-state, 
of  so  much  difficulty  and  hazard,  naturally  arises  the  ques¬ 
tion,  how  we  came  to  be  placed  in  it  ?  But  such  a  general 
inquiry  as  this  Vvmuld  be  found  involved  in  insuperable  diffi¬ 
culties.  For,  though  some  of  these  difficulties  would  be 
lessened  by  observing,  that  all  wickedness,  is  voluntary,  as 
is  implied  in  its  very  notion,  and  that  many  of  the  miseries  of 
life  have  apparent  good  effects,  yet  when  we  consider  other 
circumstances  belonging  to  both,  and  what  must  be  the  con¬ 
sequence  of  the  former  in  a  life  fo  come,  it  cannot  but  be 
acknowledged  plain  folly  and  presumption,  to  pretend  to 
give  an  account  of  the  whole  reasons  of  this  matter ;  the 
whole  reasons  of  our  being  alloted  a  condition,  out  of  which 
so  much  wickedness  and  misery,  so  circumstanced,  would 
ill  fact  arise.  Whether  it  be  not  beyond  our  faculties, 
not  only  to  find  out,  but  even  to  understand,  the  whole  ac¬ 
count  of  this  ;  or,  though  we  should  be  supposed  capable  of 
understanding  it,  yet,  whether  it  would  be  of  service  or  pre¬ 
judice  to  us  to  be  informed  of  it,  is  impossible  to  say.  But 
as  our  present  condition  can  in  no  wise  be  shown  inconsis¬ 
tent  with  the  perfect  moral  government  of  God  ;  so  reli¬ 
gion  teaches  us  we  are  placed  in  it,  that  we  might  qualify 
ourselves,  by  the  practice  of  virtue,  for  another  state,  which 
is  to  follow  it.  And  this,  though  but  a  partial  answer,  a 
very  partial  one  indeed,  to  the  inquiry  now  mentioned,  yet 
is  a  more  satisfactoiy  answer  to  another,  which  is  of  real, 
and  of  the  utmost  importance  to  us  to  have  answered — the 
inquiry,  What  is  our  business  here  ?  The  known  end,  then, 
why  we  are  placed  in  a  state  of  so  much  affliction,  hazard, 


/ 


92  OF  A  STATE  OF  [PART  J. 

and  difficulty,  is,  our  improvement  in  virtue  and  piety,  as 
the  requisite  qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security  and 
happiness. 

Now,  the  beginning  of  life,  considered  as  an  education  for 
mature  age  in  the  present  world,  appears  plainly,  at  first 
sight,  analogous  to  this  our  trial  for  a  future  one  ;  the  for¬ 
mer  being,  in  our  temporal  capacity,  what  the  latter  is  in 
our  religious  capacity.  But  some  observations  common  to 
both  of  them,  and  a  more  distinct  consideration  of  each,  will 
more  distinctly  show  the  extent  and  force  of  the  analogy  be¬ 
tween  them  ;  and  the  credibility,  which  arises  from  hence, 
as  well  as  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  that  the  present 
life  was  intended  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  a  future  one. 

I.  Every  species  of  creature  is,  we  see,  designed  for  a 

particular  way  of  life,  to  which  the  nature,  the  capacities, 

temper,  and  qualifications  of  each  species,  are  as  necessary 

as  their  external  circumstances.  Both  come  into  the  no- 

/ 

tion  of  such  state,  or  particular  way  of  life,  and  are  constitu 
ent  parts  of  it.  Change  a  man’s  capacities  or  character  to 
the  degree  in  which  it  is  conceivable  they  may  be  changed, 
and  he  would  be  altogether  incapable  of  a  human  course  of 
life  and  human  happiness;  as  incapable,  as  if,  his  nature  con¬ 
tinuing  unchanged,  he  were  placed  in  a  world  where  he 
had  no  sphere  of  action,  nor  any  objects  to  answer  his  appe¬ 
tites,  passions,  and  affections  of  any  sort.  One  thing  is  set 
over  against  another,  as  an  ancient  writer  expresses  it.  Our 
nature  corresponds  to  our  external  condition.  Without  this 
correspondence,  there  would  be  no  possibility  of  any  such 
thing  as  human  life  and  human  happiness  ;  which  life  and 
happiness  are,  therefore,  a  result  from  our  nature  and  condi¬ 
tion  jointly  ;  meaning  by  human  life,  not  living  in  the  liter¬ 
al  sense,  but  the  whole  complex  notion  commonly  under¬ 
stood  by  those  words.  So  that,  without  determining  what 
will  be  the  employment  and  happiness,  the  particular 
life  of  good  men  hereafter,  there  mqst  be  some  determinate 
capacities,  some  necessary  character  and  qualifications, 
without  which  persons  cannot  but  be  utterly  incapable  of  it ; 
in  like  manner  as  there  must  be  some,  without  which  men 
would  be  incapable  of  their  present  state  of  life.  Now, 

II.  The  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  indeed  of 
all  creatures  which  come  under  our  notice,  is  such,  as  that 
they  are  capable  of  naturally  becoming  qualified  for  states 
of  life,  for  which  they  were  once  wholly  unqualified.  In 
imagination  we  may  indeed  conceive  of  creatures,  as  inca- 


CHAP.  V.] 


MOPAL  DISCIPLINE. 


93 


pable  of  having  any  of  their  faculties  naturally  enlarged,  or 
as  being  unable  naturally  to  acquire  any  new  qualifications ; 
but  the  faculties  of  every  species  known  to  us  are  made  for 
enlargement,  for  acquirements  of  experience  and  habits. 
We  find  ourselves,  in  particular,  endued  with  capacities,  not 
only  of  perceiving  ideas,  and  of  knowledge  or  perceiving 
truth,  but  also  of  storing  up  our  ideas  and  knowledge  by 
memory.  We  are  capable,  not  only  of  acting,  and  of  hav* 
ing  different  momentary  impressions  made  upon  us,  but  of 
getting  a  new  facility  in  any  kind  of  action,  and  of  settled 
alterations  in  our  temper  or  character.  The  power  of  the 
two  last  is  the  power  of  habits.  But  neither  the  perception 
of  ideas,  nor  knowledge  of  any  sort,  are  habits,  though  ab¬ 
solutely  necessary  to  the  forming  of  them.  However,  ap¬ 
prehension,  reason,  memory,  which  are  the  capacities  of 
acquiring  knowledge,  are  greatly  improved  by  exercise. 
Whether  the  word  hahit  is  applicable  to  all  these  improve¬ 
ments,  and,  in  particular,  how  far  the  powers  of  memory  and 
of  habits  may  be  powers  of  the  same  nature,  I  shall  not  in¬ 
quire.  But  that  perceptions  come  into  our  minds  readily 
and  of  course,  by  means  of  their  having  been  there  before, 
seems  a  thing  of  the  same  sort,  as  readiness  in  any  particu¬ 
lar  kind  of  action,  proceeding  from  being  accustomed  to  it. 
And  aptness  to  recollect  practical  observations  of  service  in 
our  conduct,  is  plainly  habit  in  many  cases.  There  are 
habits  of  perception  and  habits  of  action.  An  instance 
of  the  former,  is  our  constant  and  even  involuntary  readi¬ 
ness  in  correcting  the  impressions  of  our  sight  concerning 
magnitudes  and  distances,  so  as  to  substitute  judgment  in 
the  room  of  sensation,  imperceptibly  to  ourselves.  And  it 
seems  as  if  all  other  associations  of  ideas,  not  naturally  con¬ 
nected,  might  be  called  passive  habits,  as  properly  as  our 
readiness  in  understanding  languages  upon  sight,  or  hearing 
of  words.  And  our  readiness  in  speaking  and  writing  them 
is  an  instance  of  the  latter,  of  active  habits.  For  distinct¬ 
ness,  we  may  consider  habits  as  belonging  to  the  body, 
or  the  mind,  and  the  latter  will  be  explained  by  the  form.er. 
Under  the  former  are  comprehended  all  bodily  activities  or 
motions,  whether  graceful  or  unbecoming,  which  are  owing 
to  use ;  under  the  latter,  general  habits  of  life  and  conduct, 
such  as  those  of  obedience  and  submission  to  authority,  or 
to  any  particular  person  ;  those  of  veracity,  justice,  and 
charity  ;  those  of  attention,  industry,  self-government,  envy, 
revenge.  And  habits  of  this  latter  kind  seem  produced  by 


94 


OF  A  STATE  OF 


[part  I. 


repeated  acts,  as  well  as  the  former.  And  in  like  manner, 
as  habits  belonging  to  the  body  are  produced  by  external 
acts,  so  habits  of  the  mind  are  produced  by  the  exertions  of 
inward  practical  principles  ;  i.  e.  by  carrying  them  into  act, 
or  acting  upon  them,  the  principles  of  obedience,  of  veraci¬ 
ty,  justice,  and  charity.  Nor  can  those  habits  be  formed  by 
any  external  course  of  action,  otherwise  than  as  it  proceeds 
from  these  principles  ;  because  it  is  only  these  inward  princi¬ 
ples  exerted,  which  are  strictly  acts  of  obedience,  of  veracity, 
of  justice,  and  of  charity.  So,  likewif^e,  habits  of  attention,  in¬ 
dustry,  self-government,  are,  in  the  same  manner,  acquired 
by  exercise  ;  and  habits  of  envy  and  revenge  by  indulgence, 
whether  in  outward  act  or  in  thought  and  intention  i.  e.  in¬ 
ward  act ;  for  such  intention  is  an  act.  Resolutions  to 
do  well  are  properly  acts :  and  endeavouring  to  enforce 
upon  our  own  minds  a  practical  sense  of  virtue,  or  to  beget  in 
others  that  practical  sense  of  it  which  a  man  really  has 
himself,  is  a  virtuous  act.  All  these,  therefore,  may  and  will 
contribute  towards  forming  good  habits.  But,  going  over 
the  theory  of  virtue  in  one’s  thoughts,  talking  well,  and  draw¬ 
ing  fine  pictures  of  it,  this  is  so  far  from  necessarily  or  cer¬ 
tainly  conducing  to  form  a  habit  of  it  in  him  who  thus  em¬ 
ploys  himself,  that  it  may  harden  the  mind  in  a  contrary 
course,  and  render  it  gradually  more  insensible,  i.  e.  form 
a  habit  of  insensibility  to  all  moral  considerations.  For, 
from  our  very  faculty  of  habits,  passive  impressions,  by  being 
repeated,  grow  weaker.  Thoughts,  by  often  passing  through 
the  mind,  are  felt  less  sensibly  ;  being  accustomed  to  danger, 
begets  intrepidity,  i.  e.  lessens  fear ;  to  distress,  lessens  the 
passion  of  pity  ;  to  instances  of  others’  mortality,  lessens 
the  sensible  apprehension  of  our  own.  And  from  these  two 
observations  together,  that  practical  habits  are  formed  and 
strengthened  by  repeated  acts,  and  that  passive  impressions 
grow  wmaker  by  being  repeated  upon  us,  it  must  follow, 
that  active  habits  may  be  gradually  forming  and  strength¬ 
ening,  by  a  course  of  acting  upon  such  and  such  motives 
and  excitements,  whilst  these  motives  and  excitements, 
themselves  are,  by  proportionable  degrees,  growing  less  sen¬ 
sible  ;  i.  e.  are  continually  less  and  less  sensibly  felt,  even 
as  the  active  habits  strengthen.  And  experience  confirms 
this ;  for  active  principles,  at  the  very  time  that  they  are 
less  lively  in  perception  than  they  were,  are  found  to  be 
some  how  wrought  more  thoroughly  into  the  temper  and 
character,  and  become  more  effectual  in  influencing  our 


CHAP.  V.] 


MORAL  DISCIPLINE. 


95 


practice.  The  three  things  just  mentioned  may  afford  in¬ 
stances  of  it.  Perception  of  danger  is  a  natural  excitement 
of  passive  fear,  and  active  caution ;  and,  by  being  inured  to 
danger,  habits  of  the  latter  are  gradually  wrought,  at  the 
same  time  that  the  former  gradually  lessens.  Perception 
of  distress  in  others  is  a  natural  excitement,  passively  to 
pity,  and  actively  to  relieve  it ;  but  let  a  man  set  himself  to 
attend  to,  inquire  out,  and  relieve  distressed  persons,  and  he 
cannot  but  grow  less  and  less  sensibly  affected  with  the  va¬ 
rious  miseries  of  life,  with  which  he  must  become  acquain¬ 
ted  ;  when  yet,  at  the  same  time,  benevolence,  considered 
not  as  a  passion,  but  as  a  practical  principal  of  action,  will 
strengthen ;  and,  whilst  he  passively  compassionates  the 
distressed  less,  he  will  acquire  a  greater  aptitude  actively  to 
assist  and  befriend  them.  So  also  at  the  same  time  that  the 
daily  instances  of  men’s  dying  around  us  give  us  daily  a 
less  sensible  passive  feeling  or  apprehension  of  our  own 
mortality,  such  instances  greatly  contribute  to  the  strength¬ 
ening  a  practical  regard  to  it  in  serious  men  ;  i.  e.  to  forming 
a  habit  of  acting  with  a  constant  view  to  it.  And  this 
seems  again  further  to  show,  that  passive  impressions  made 
upon  our  minds  by  admonition,  experience,  example,  though 
they  may  have  a  remote  efficacy,  and  a  very  great  one,  to¬ 
wards  forming  active  habits,  yet  can  have  this  efficacy  no 
otherwise  than  by  inducing  us  to  such  a  course  of  action  j 
and  that  it  is,  not  being  affected  so  and  so,.but  acting,  which 
forms  those  habits ;  only  it  must  be  always  remembered, 
that  real  endeavours  to  enforce  good  impressions  upon  our¬ 
selves,  are  a  species  of  virtuous  action.  Nor  do  we  know 
how  far  it  is  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  effects 
should  be  wrought  in  us  at  once  equivalent  to  habits,  i.  e. 
what  is'wrought  by  use  and  exercise.  However,  the  thing 
insisted  upon  is,  not  what  may  be  possible,  but  what  is  in  fact 
the  appointment  of  nature,  which  is,  that  active  habits  are 
to  be  formed  by  exercise.  Their  progress  may  be  so  gradu¬ 
al  as  to  be  imperceptible  of  its  steps  ;  it  may  be  hard  to  ex¬ 
plain  the  faculty  by  which  we  are  capable  of  habits,  through¬ 
out  its  several  parts,  and  to  trace  it  up  to  its  original,  so  as 
to  distinguish  it  from  all  others  in  our  mind  ;  and  it  seems  as 
if  contrary  effects  were  to  be  ascribed  to  it.  But  the  thing 
in  general,  that  our  nature  is  formed  to  yield,  in  some  such 
manner  as  this,  to  use  and  exercise,  is  matter  of  certain  ex¬ 
perience. 

Thus,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course  of  action 


96 


OF  A  STATE  OF 


[part  r. 


we  get  an  aptness  to  go  on,  a  facility,  readiness,  and  often 
pleasure  in  it.  The  inclinations  which  rendered  us  averse 
to  it  grow  weaker  ;  the  difficulties  in  it,  not  only  the  im¬ 
aginary,  but  the  real  ones,  lessen  ;  the  reasons  for  it  offer 
themselves  of  course  to  our  thoughts  upon  all  occasions  ; 
and  the  least  glimpse  of  them  is  sufficient  to  make  us  go 
on  in  a  course  of  action  to  which  we  have  been  aucustomed. 
And  practical  principles  appear  to  grow  stronger  absolutely 
in  themselves,  by  exercise,  as  well  as  relatively,  with  regard 
to  contrary  principles  ;  which,  by  being  accustomed  to  sub- 
mit,  do  so  habitually,  and  of  course.  And  thus  a  new  cha¬ 
racter,  in  several  respects,  may  be  formed  ;  and  many  habi¬ 
tudes  of  life,  not  given  by  nature,  but  which  nature  directs 
us  to  acquire. 

III.  Indeed  we  may  be  assured,  that  we  should  never  have 
had  these  capacities  of  improving  by  experience,  acquired 
knowledge  and  habits,  had  they  not  been  necessary,  and  in¬ 
tended  to  be  made  use  of  And,  accordingly,  we  find  them 
so  necessary,  and  so  much  intended,  that  without  them  we 
should  be  utterly  incapable  of  that  which  was  the  end,  for 
which  we  were  made,  considered  in  our  temporal  capacity 
only  ;  the  employments  and  satisfactions  of  our  mature 
state  of  life. 

Nature  does  in  no  wise  qualify  us  wholly,  much  less  at 
once,  for  this  mature  state  of  life.  Even  maturity  of  under¬ 
standing  and  bodily  strength  are  not  only  arrived  to  gradu¬ 
ally,  but  are  also  very  much  owing  to  the  continued  exer¬ 
cise  of  our  powers  of  body  and  mind  from  infancy.  But  if 
we  suppose  a  person  brought  into  the  world  with  both  these 
in  maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  conceivable,  he  would  plainly 
at  first  be  as  unqualified  for  the  human  life  of  mature  age,  as 
an  idiot.  He  would  be  in  a  manner  distracted  with  aston¬ 
ishment,  and  apprehension,  and  curiosity,  and  suspense  ; 
nor  can  one  guess  how  long  it  would  be  before  he  would  be 
familiarized  to  himself,  and  the  objects  about  him,  enough 
even  to  set  himself  to  any  thing.  It  may  be  questioned 
too,  whether  the  natural  information  of  his  sight  and  hear¬ 
ing  would  be  of  any  manner  of  use  at  all  to  him  in  acting, 
before  experience.  And  it  seems  that  men  would  be  strange¬ 
ly  headstrong  and  self-willed,  and  disposed  to  exert  them¬ 
selves  with  an  impetuosity  which  would  render  society  in¬ 
supportable,  and  the  living  in  it  impracticable,  were  it  not 
for  some  acquired  moderation  and  self-government,  some 
aptitude  and  readiness  in  restraining  themselves,  and  con- 


CHAP.  V.] 


MORAL  DISCIPLINE. 


97 


cealing  their  sense  of  things.  Want  of  every  thing  of  this 
kind  which  is  learned,  would  render  a  man  as  incapable  of 
society  as  want  of  language  would ;  or  as  his  natural 
ignorance  of  any  of  the  particular  employments  of  life,  would 
render  him  incapable  of  providing  himself  with  the  com¬ 
mon  conveniences  or  supplying  the  necessary  wants  of  it 
In  these  respects,  and  probably  in  many  more,  of  which  we 
have  no  particular  notion,  mankind  is  left  by  nature  an  un¬ 
formed,  unfinished  creature,  utterly  deficient  and  unqualified, 
before  the  acquirement  of  knowledge,  experience,  and 
habits,  for  that  mature  state  of  life,  which  was  the  end  of 
his  creation,  considering  him  as  related  only  to  this  world. 

But  then,  as  nature  has  endued  us  with  a  power  of  sup¬ 
plying  those  deficiencies,  by  acquired  knowledge,  experi¬ 
ence,  and  habits  ;  so,  likewise,  we  are  placed  in  a  condition, 
in  infancy,  childhood,  and  youth,  fitted  for  it ;  fitted  for  our 
acquiring  those  qualifications  of  all  sorts,  which  we  stand 
in  need  of  in  mature  age.  Hence  children,  from  their  very 
birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted  with  the  objects  about 
them,  with  the  scene  in  which  they  are  placed,  and  to  have 
a  future  part ;  and  learning  somewhat  or  other,  necessary 
to  the  performance  of  it.  The  subordinations,  to  which 
they  are  accustomed  in  domestic  life,  teach  them  self-gov¬ 
ernment  in  common  behaviour  abroad,  and  prepare  them  for 
subjection  and  obedience  to  civil  authority.  What  passes 
before  their  eyes,  and  daily  happens  to  them,  gives  them  ex¬ 
perience,  caution  against  treachery  and  deceit,  together  with 
numberless  little  rules  of  action  and  conduct,  which  we  could 
not  live  without,  and  which  are  learned  so  insensibly  and  so 
perfectly,  as  to  be  mistaken  perhaps  for  instinct ;  though  they 
are  the  effect  of  long  experience  and  exercise  :  as  much  so  as 
language,  or  knowledge  in  particular  business,  or  the  qualifi¬ 
cations  and  behaviour  belonging  to  the  several  ranks  and  pro¬ 
fessions.  Thus,  the  beginning  of  our  days  is  adapted  to  be, 
and  is,  a  state  of  education  in  the  theory  and  practice  of 
mature  life.  We  are  much  assisted  in  it  by  example,  in¬ 
struction,  and  the  care  of  others  ;  but  a  great  deal  is  left  to 
ourselves  to  do.  And  of  this,  as  part  is  done-  easily  and  of 
course,  so  part  requires  diligence  and  care,  the  voluntary 
foregoing  many  things  which  we  desire,  and  setting  our¬ 
selves  to  what  we  should  have  no  inclination  to,  but  for  the 
necessity  or  expedience  of  it.  For  that  labor  and  industry 
which  the  station  of  so  many  absolutely  requires,  they  would 
be  greatly  unqualified  for  in  maturity,  as  those  in  other  sta- 

6 


98 


OF  A  STATE  OF 


[part 


tions  would  be  for  any  other  sorts  of  application,  if  both  were 
not  accustomed  to  them  in  their  youth.  And  according  as 
persons  behave  themselves,  in  the  general  education  which 
all  go  through,  and  in  the  particular  ones  adapted  to  parti¬ 
cular  employments,  their  character  is  formed,  and  made  ap¬ 
pear  ;  they  recommend  themselves  more  or  less ;  and  are 
capable  of,  and  placed  in,  different  stations  in  the  society  of 
mankind. 

The  former  part  of  life,  then,  is  to  be  considered  as  an  im¬ 
portant  opportunity,  which  nature  puts  into  our  hands,  and 
which,  when  lost,  is  not  to  be  recovered.  And  our  being 
placed  in  a  state  of  discipline  throughout  this  life,  for  another 
world,  is  a  providential  disposition  of  things,  exactly  of  the 
same  kind  as  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  discipline  during 
childhood,  for  mature  age.  Our  condition  in  both  respects 
is  uniform  and  of  a  piece,  and  comprehended  under  one  and 
the  same  general  law  of  nature. 

And  if  we  are  not  able  at  all  to  discern,  how  or  in  what 
way  the  present  life  could  be  our  preparation  for  another, 
thi-s  would  be  no  objection  against  the  credibility  of  its  being 
50.  For  we  do  not  discern  how  food  and  sleep  contribute 
to  the  growth  of  the  body,  nor  could  have  any  thought  that 
they  would,  before  we  had  experience.  Nor  do  children  at 
all  think,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  sports  and  exercises,  to 
which  they  are  so  much  addicted,  contribute  to  their  health 
and  growth  ;  nor,  on  the  other,  of  the  necessity  which  theie 
is  for  their  being  restrained  in  them  ;  nor  are  they  capable 
of  understanding  the  use  of  many  parts  of  discipline,  which 
nevertheless  they  must  be  made  to  go  through,  in  order  to 
qualify  them  for  the  business  of  mature  age.  Were  we  not 
able,  then,  to  discovei  in  what  respect  the  present  life  could 
form  us  for  a  future  one,  yet  nothing  would  be  more  sup- 
posible  than  that  it  might,  in  some  respects  or  other,  from  the 
general  analogy  of  Providonce.  And  this,  for  aught  1  see, 
might  reasonably  be  said,  even  though  we  should  not  take 
in  the  consideration  of  God’s  moral  government  over  the 
world.  But, 

IV.  Take  in  this  consideration,  and  consequently,  that 
the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  necessary  qualification 
for  the  future  state,  and  then  we  may  distinctly  see  how, 
and  in  what  respects,  the  present  life  may  be  a  preparation  for 
it ;  since  we  loant^  and  are  capable  of  imp-rovement  in  that  char- 
acier^  by  moral  and  religious  habits  ;  and  the  present  life  is  ft 
to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  such  improvement ;  in  like  manner, 


CHAP.  -V  ] 


MORAL  DISCIPLINE. 


99 


as  we  have  already  observed,  how,  and  in  what  respects, 
infancy,  childhood,  and  youth,  are  a  necessary  preparation, 
and  a  natural  state  of  discipline,  for  mature  age. 

Nothing  which  we  at  present  see  would  lead  us  to  the 
thought  of  a  solitary  inactive  state  hereafter,  but,  if  we  judge 
at  all  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  we  must  suppose,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  Scripture  account  of  h,  that  it  will  be  a  communi¬ 
ty.  And  there  is  no  shadow  of  any  thing  unreasonable  in 
conceiving,  though  there  be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this  com¬ 
munity  will  be,  as  the  Scripture  represents  it,  under  the 
more  immediate,  or,  if  such  an  expression  may  be  used,  the 
more  sensible  government  of  God.  Nor  is  our  ignorance, 
what  will  be  the  employments  of  this  happy  community, 
nor  our  consequent  ignorance,  what  particular  scope  or  oc¬ 
casion  there  will  be  for  the  exercise  of  veracity,  justice,  and 
charity,  amongst  the  members  of  it  with  regard  to  each 
other,  any  proof  that  there  will  be  no  sphere  of  exercise  for 
those  virtues.  Much  less,  if  that  were  possible,  is  our  igno¬ 
rance  any  proof  that  there  will  be  no  occasion  for  that  frame 
of  mind,  or  character,  which  is  formed  by  the  daily  practice 
of  those  particular  virtues  here,  and  which  is  a  result  from 
it.  This  at  least  must  be  owned  in  general,  that  as  the  go¬ 
vernment  established  in  the  universe  is  moral,  the  character 
of  vii’tue  and  piety  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  be  the  con¬ 
dition  of  our  happiness,  or  the  qualification  for  it. 

Now,  from  what  is  above  observed  concerning  our  natu¬ 
ral  power  of  habits,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  we  are  capable  of 
moral  improvement  by  discipline.  And  how  greatly  we 
xuant  it,  need  not  be  proved  to  any  one  who  is  acquainted 
with  the  great  wickedness  of  mankind,  or  even  with  those 
imperfections  which  the  best  are  conscious  of  But  it  is  not 
perhaps  distinctly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the  occa¬ 
sions  which  human  creatures  have  for  discipline,  to  improve 
in  them  this  character  of  virtue  and  piety,  is  to  be  traced  up 
higher  than  to  excess  in  the  passions,  by  indulgence  and 
habits  of  vice.  Mankind,  and  perhaps  all  finite  creatures, 
from  the  very  constitution  of  their  nature,  before  habits  of 
virtue,  are  deficient,  and  in  danger  of  deviating  from  what  is 
right,  and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  virtuous  habits  for  a  se¬ 
curity  against  this  danger.  For,  together  with  the  general 
principal  of  moral  understanding,  we  have  in  our  inward 
frame  various  affections  towards  particular  external  objects. 
These  affections  are  naturally,  and  of  right,  subject  to  the 
government  of  the  moral  princiole,  as  to  the  occasions  upon 


100 


OF  A  STATE  OF 


[part  1, 


which  they  may  be  gratified,  as  to  the  times,  degrees,  and 
manner,  in  which  the  objects  of  them  may  be  pursued  ;  but 
then  the  principle  of  virtue  can  neither  excite  them,  nor  pre¬ 
vent  their  being  excited.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  natu¬ 
rally  felt,  when  the  objects  of  them  are  present  to  the  mind, 
not  only  before  all  consideration  whether  they  can  be  ob¬ 
tained  by  lawful  means,  but  after  it 'is  found  they  cannot.' 
For  the  natural  objects  of  affection  continue  so  ;  the  neces¬ 
saries,  conveniences,  and  pleasures  of  life,  remain  naturally 
desirable,  though  they  cannot  be  obtained  innocently  ;  nay, 
though  they  cannot  possibly  be  obtained  at  all.  And  when 
the  objects  of  any  affection  whatever  cannot  be  obtained 
without  unlawful  means,  but  may  be  obtained  by  them,  such 
affection,  though  its  being  excited,  and  its  continuing  some 
time  in  the  mind,  be  as  innocent  as  it  is  natural  and  necessa¬ 
ry,  yet  cannot  but  be  conceived  to  have  a  tendency  to  in¬ 
cline  persons  to  venture  upon  such  unlawful  means,  and 
therefore  must  be  conceived  as  putting  them  in  some  danger 
of  it.  Now,  what  is  the  general  security  against  this  dan¬ 
ger,  against  their  actually  deviating  from  right?  as  the 
danger  is,  so  also  must  the  security  be,  from  within,  from  the 
practical  principle  of  virtue."^  And  the  strengthening  or 
improving  this  principle,  considered  as  practical,  or  as  a 
principle  of  action,  will  lessen  the  danger  or  increase  the  se¬ 
curity  against  it.  And  this  moral  principle  is  capable  of 
improvement,  by  proper  discipline  and  exercise  ;  by  recol¬ 
lecting  the  practical  impressions  which  example  and  expet 
lienee  have  made  upon  us  ;  and,  instead  of  following  humor 
and  mere  inclination,  by  continually  attending  to  the  ecjuity 
and  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  we  are  engaged,  be  it  in 

*  It  may  be  thought  that  a  sense  of  interest  would  as  effectually  restrain 
creatures  from  doing  wrong.  But  if  by  a  sense  of  interest  is  meant,  a 
speculative  conviction  or  belief  that  such  and  suc.h  indulgence  would  occa¬ 
sion  them  greater  uneasiness,  upon  the  whole,  than  satisfaction,  it  is  con¬ 
trary  to  present  experience  to  say.  tliat  this  sense  of  interest  is  sufficient  to 
restrain  them  from  thus  indulging  themselves.  And  if  by  a  sense  of  in¬ 
terest  is  meant,  a  practical  regard  to  what  is  upon  the  whole  our  happi¬ 
ness,  this  is  not  only  coincident  with  the  principle  of  virtue  or  moral  recti¬ 
tude,  but  is  a  part  of  the  idea  itself.  And  it  is  evident  this  reasonable  self- 
love  wants  to  be  improved,  as  really  as  any  principle  in  our  nature.  For 
we  daily  see  it  overmatched,  not  only  by  the  more  boisterous  passions,  but 
by  curiosity,  shame,  love  of  imitation,  by  any  thing,  even  indolence :  espe¬ 
cially  if  the  interest,  the  temporal  interest,  suppose,  which  is  the  end  ol 
such  self-love,  be  at  a  distance.  So  greatly  are  profligate  men  mistaken, 
when  they  aflirm  they  are  wholly  governed  by  interestedness  and  self-love 
And  so  little  cause  is  there  for  moralists  to  disclaim  this  principle. 


CHAP.  V.] 


MORAL  DISCIPLINE. 


101 


greater  or  less  matters,  and  accustoming  ourselves  always 
to  act  upon  it,  as  being  itself  the  just  and  natural  motive  of 
action ;  and  as  this  moral  course  of  behaviour  must  neces¬ 
sarily,  under  divine  government,  be  our  final  interest.  Thus 
the  principle  of  virtue^  improved  into  a  hahit^  of  which  improve¬ 
ment  ive  are  thus  capable^  will  plainly  he,  in  proportion  to  the 
strength  of  it,  a  security  against  the  danger  which  finite  crea¬ 
tures  are  in,  from  the  very  nature  of  propension,  or  particular 
affections.  This  way  of  putting  the  matter  supposes  parti¬ 
cular  affections  to  remain  in  a  future  state,  which  it  is  scarce 
jiossible  to  avoid  supposing.  And  if  they  do,  we  clearly 
see,  that  acquired  habits  of  virtue  and  self-government  may 
be  necessary  for  the  regulation  of  them.  However,  though 
we  were  not  distinctl}^  to  take  in  this  supposition,  but  to 
speak  only  in  general,  the  thing  really  comes  to  the  same. 
For  habits  of  virtue,  thus  acquired  by  discipline,  are  improve¬ 
ment  in  virtue  ;  and  improvement  in  virtue  must  be  advance¬ 
ment  in  happiness,  if  the  government  of  the  universe  be  moral. 

From  these  things  we  may  observe,  and  it  will  farther 
show  this  our  natural  and  original  need  of  being  improved 
by  discipline,  how  it  comes  to  pass,  that  creatures,  made  up¬ 
right,  fall ;  and  that  those  who  preserve  their  uprightness, 
by  so  doing,  raise  themselves  to  a  more  secure  state  of  vir¬ 
tue.  To  say  that  the  former  is  accounted  for  by  the  nature 
of  liberty,  is  to  say  no  more  than  that  an  event’s  actually 
happening  is  accounted  for  by  a  mere  possibility  of  its  hap¬ 
pening.  But  it  seems  distinctly  conceiv  able  from  the  very 
nature  of  particular  affections  or  propensions.  For,  sup¬ 
pose  creatures  intended  for  such  a  particular  state  of  life, 
for ’which  such  propensions  were  necessary  ;  suppose  them 
endued  with  such  propensions,  together  with  moral  under¬ 
standing,  as  well  including  a  practical  sense  of  virtue  as  a 
speculative  perception  of  it ;  and  that  ail  these  several  prin¬ 
ciples,  both  natural  and  moral,  forming  an  inward  constitu¬ 
tion  of  mind,  were  in  the  most  exact  proportion  possible,  z.  e. 
in  a  proportion  the  most  exactly  adapted  to  their  intende-1 
state  of  life  ;  such  creatures  would  be  made  upright,  or  finite¬ 
ly  perfect.  Now,  particular  propensions,  from  ihar  very 
nature,mustbe  felt,  the  objects  of  them  being  present, ihough 
they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all,  or  not  with  the  allowance  of 
the  moral  principle.  But  if  they  can  be  gratified  without 
its  allowance,  or  by  contradicting  it,  then  they  must  be  con¬ 
ceived  to  have  some  tendency,  in  how  low  a  degree  soever, 
yot  some  tendency,  to  induce  persons  to  such  forbidden 


102 


OF  A  STATE  OF 


[part  I 


gratification.  This  tendency,  in  some  one  particular  pro* 
pension,  may  be  increased,  by  the  greater  frequency  of  oc* 
casions  naturally  exciting  it,  than  of  occasions  exciting 
others.  The  least  voluntary  indulgence  in  forbidden  cir¬ 
cumstances,  though  but  in  thought,  will  increase  this  wrong 
tendency,  and  may  increase  it  further,  till,  peculiar  conjec¬ 
tures  perhaps  conspiring,  it  becomes  effect ;  and  danger  of 
deviating  from  right,  ends  in  actual  deviation  from  it ;  a  dan¬ 
ger  necessarily  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  propension, 
and  which,  therefore,  could  not  have  been  prevented,  though 
it  might  have  been  escaped,  or  got  innocently  through.  The 
case  would  be,  as  if  we  were  to  suppose  a  straight  path 
marked  out  for  a  person,  in  which  such  a  degree  of  attention 
would  keep  him  stead}'' ;  but  if  he  would  not  attend  in  this 
degree,  any  one  of  a  thousand  objects  catching  his  eye,  might 
lead  him  out  of  it.  Now,  it  is  impossible  to  say,  how  much 
even  the  first  full  overt  act  of  irregularity  might  disorder  the 
inward  constitution,  unsettle  the  adjustments,  and  alter  the 
proportions  which  formed  it^  and  in  which  the  uprightness 
of  its  make  consisted.  But  repetition  of  irregularities  would 
produce  habits  :  emd  thus  the  constitution  would  be  spoiled, 
and  creatures,  made  upright,  become  corrupt  and  depraved 
in  their  settled  character,  proportionably  to  their  repeated 
irregularities  in  occasional  acts.  But,  on  the  contrary,  these 
creatures  might  have  improved  arid  raised  themselves  to  a 
higher  and  more  secure  state  of  virtue,  by  the  contrary  be¬ 
haviour,  by  steadily  following  the  moral  principle,  supposed 
to  be  one  part  of  their  nature,  and  thus  notwithstanding  that 
unavoidable  danger  of  defection,  which  necessarily  arose 
from  propension,  the  other  part  of  it.  For,  by  thus  preserv¬ 
ing  their  integrity  for  some  time,,  their  danger  would  lessen, 
since  propensions,  by  being  inured  to  submit,  would  do  it 
more  easily  and  of  course  ;  and  their  security  against  this 
lessening  danger  would  increase,  since  the  moral  principle 
would  gain  additional  strength  by  exercise  ;  both  which 
things  are  implied  in  the  notion  of  virtuous  habits.  Thus, 
then,  ,vicious  indulgence  is  not  only  criminal  in  itself,  but  also 
depraves  the  inward  constitution  and  character.  And  vir¬ 
tuous  self-government  is  not  only  right  in  itself,  but  also  im¬ 
proves  the  inward  constitution  or  character ;  and  may  im¬ 
prove  it  to  such  a  degree,  that  though  we  shou.ld  suppose  it 
impossible  for  particular  affections  to  be  absolutely  coinci¬ 
dent  with  the  moral  principle,  and  consequently  should  al¬ 
low  that  such  creatures  as  have  been  above  supposed  would 


CHAP.  V.] 


MORAL  DISCIPLINE. 


103 


for  ever  remain  defectible  ;  yet  their  danger  of  actually  do* 
viating  from  right  may  be  almost  infinitely  lessened,  and 
they  fully  fortified  against  what  remains  of  it ;  if  that  may 
be  called  danger,  against  which  there  is  an  adequate  effec¬ 
tual  security.  But  still,  this  their  higher  perfection  may 
continue  to  consist  in  habits  of  virtue  formed  in  a  state  of 
discipline,  and  this  their  more  complete  security  remain  to 
proceed  from  them.  And  thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable,  that 
creatures  without  blemish,  as  they  came  out  of  the  hands 
of  God,  may  be  in  danger  of  going  wrong,  and  so  may  stand 
in  need  of  the  security  of  virtuous  habits,  additional  to  the 
moral  principle  WTOught  into  their  natures  by  him.  That 
which  is  the  ground  of  their  danger,  or  their  want  of  securi¬ 
ty,  may  be  considered  as  a  deficiency  in  them,  to  which  vir¬ 
tuous  habits  are  the  natural  supply.  And  as  they  are  nat¬ 
urally  capable  of  being  raised  and  improved  by  discipline,  it 
may  be  a  thing  fit  and  requisite,  that  they  should  be  placed 
in  circumstances  wdth  an  eye  to  it ;  in  circumstances  pecu¬ 
liarly  fitted  to  be,  to  them,  a  state  of  discipline  for  their  im¬ 
provement  in  virtue. 

But  how  much  more  strong  must  this  hold  with  respect  to 
those  who  have  corrupted  their  natures,  are  fallen  from  their 
original  rectitude,  and  whose  passions  are  become  excessive 
by  repeated  violations  of  their  inward  constitution  ?  Up¬ 
right  creatures  may  ^vant  to  be  improved ;  depraved  crea¬ 
tures  want  to  be  renewed.  Education  and  discipline,  which 
may  be  in  all  degrees  and  sorts  of  gentleness  and  of  severi¬ 
ty,  is  expedient  for  those  ;  but  must  be  absolutely  necessary 
for  these.  For  these,  diciplme,  of  the  severer  sort  too,  and 
in  the  higher  degrees  of  it,  must  be  necessary,  in  order  to 
wear  out  vicious  habits  ;  to  recover  their  primitive  strength 
of  self-government,  which  indulgence  must  have  weakened ; 
to  repair,  as  well  as  raise  into  a  habit,  the  moral  principle,  in 
order  to, their  arriving  at  a  secure  state  of  virtuous  happiness. 

Now,  whoever  will  consider  the  thing  may  clearly  see, 
that  the'  present  world  is  peculiarly  jit  to  be  a  state  of  disci¬ 
pline  for  this  purpose,  to  such  as  will  set  themselves  to  mend 
and  improve.  For,  the  various  temptations  with  which  we 
are  surrounded  ;  our  experience  of  the  deceits  of  wicked¬ 
ness  ;  having  been  in  many  instances  led  wrong  ourselves ; 
the  great  viciousness  of  the  world  ;  the  infinite  disorders 
consequent  upon  it ;  our  being  made  acquainted  with  pain 
and  sorrow,  either  from  our  own  feeling  of  it,  or  from  the 
eight  of  it  in  others ;  these  things,  though  some  of  them  may 


104 


OF  A  STATE  OF 


[part.  I. 


indeed  produce  wrong  effects  upon  our  minds,  yet,  v/hen  du¬ 
ly  reflected  upon,  have  all  of  them  a  direct  tendency  to  bring 
us  10  a  settled  moderation  and  reasonableness  of  temper  ;  the 
contrary  both  to  thoughtless  levity,  and  also  to  that  unre¬ 
strained  self-will,  and  violent  bent  to  follow  present  inclina¬ 
tion,  which  ma}^  be  observed  in  undisciplined  minds.  Such 
experience,  as  the  present  state  affords,  of  the  frailty  of  our 
nature,  of  the  boundless  extravagance  of  ungoverned  pas¬ 
sion,  of  the  power  which  an  infinite  Being  has  over  us,  by 
the  various  capacities  of  misery  which  he  has  given  us  ;  in 
short,  that  kind  and  degree  of  experience  which  the  present 
state  affords  us,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  such  as  to 
admit  the  possibility,  the  danger,  and  the  actual  event,  of 
creatures  losing  their  innocence  and  happiness,  and  becom¬ 
ing  vicious,  and  wretched  ;  hath  a  tendency  to  give  a  prac¬ 
tical  sense  of  things  very  different  from  a  mere  speculative 
knowledge,  that  we  are  liable  to  vice,  and  capable  of  misery. 
And  who  knows,  whether  the  security  of  creatures  in  the 
highest  and  most  settled  state  of  perfection,  may  not,  in  part, 
arise  from  their  having  had  such  a  sense  of  things  as  this, 
formed,  and  habitually  fixed  within  them,  in  some  state  of 
probation?  And  passing  through  the  present  world  with 
that  moral  attention  which  is  necessary  to  the  acting  a  right 
part  in  it,  may  leave  everlasting  impressions  of  this  sort  up¬ 
on  our  minds.  But  to  be  a  little  more  distinct ;  allurements 
to  what  is  wrong  ;  difficulties  in  the' discharge  of  our  duty ; 
our  not  being  able' to  act  a  uniform  right  part  without  some 
thought  and  care  ;  and  the  opportunities  which  we  have,  or 
imagine  we  have,  of  avoiding  what  we  dislike,  or  obtaining 
what  we  desire,  by  unlawful  means,  when  we  either  cannot 
do  it  at  all,  or  at  least  not  so  easily,  by  lawful  ones  ;  these 
things,  i.  e.  the  snares  and  temptations  of  vice,  are  what  ren¬ 
der  the  present  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline 
to  those  who  will  preserve  their  integrity  ;  because  they  ren¬ 
der  being  upon  our  guard,  resolution,  and  the  denial  of  our 
passions,  necessary  in  order  to  that  end.  And  the  exercise 
of  such  ^  particular  recollection,  intention  of  mind,  and  self- 
government,  in  the  practice  of  virtue,  has,  from  the  make  of 
our  nature,  a  peculiar  tendency  to  form  habits  of  virtue,  as 
implying  not  only  a  real,  but  also  a  more  continued,  and  a 
more  intense  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle  ;  or  a  more 
constant  and  a  stronger  effort  of  virtue  exerted  into  act 
Thus,  suppose  a  person  to  know  himself  to  be  in  particular 
danger,  for  some  time,  of  doing  any  thing  wrong,  which  yet 


CHAP.  V.] 


MORAL  DISCIPLINE. 


105 


he  fully  resolves  not  to  do,  continued  recollection,  and  keep* 
ing  upon  his'  guard,  in  order  to  make  good  his  resolution,  is 
a  continued  exerting  of  that  act  of  virtue  in  a  high  degree^ 
which  need  have  been,  and  perhaps  would  have  been,  only 
instantaneous  and  loeak^  had  the  temptation  been  so.  It  is 
indeed  ridiculous  to  assert,  that  self-denial  is  essential  to  vir¬ 
tue  and  piety  ;  but  it  would  have  been  nearer  the  truth, 
though  not  strictly  the  truth  itself,  to  have  said,  that  it  is  es¬ 
sential  to  discipline  and  improvement.  For,  though  actions 
materially  virtuous,  which  have  no  sort  of  difficulty,  but  are 
perfectly  agreeable  to  our  particular  inclinations,  may  possi¬ 
bly  be  done  only  from  these  particular  inclinations,  and  so 
may  not  be  any  exercise  of  the  principle  of  virtue,  i.  e.  not 
be  virtuous  actions  at  all ;  yet,  on  the  contrary,  they  may  be 
an  exercise  of  that  principle,  and,  when  they  are,  they  have 
a  tendency  to  form  and  fix  the  habit  of  virtue.  But  when 
the  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle  is  more  continued,  of- 
tener  repeated,  and  more  intense,  as  it  must  be  in  circum¬ 
stances  of  danger,  temptation,  and  difficulty,  of  any  kind 
and  in  any  degree,  this  tendency  is  increased  proportionably, 
and  a  more  confirmed  habit  is  the  consequence. 

This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length,  but  how  far  it 
may  hold,  I  know  not.  Neither  our  intellectual  powers,  nor 
our  bodily  strength,  can  be  improved  beyond  such  a  degree ; 
and  both  may  be  over-wrought.  Possibly  there  may  be 
somewhat  analogous  to  this,  with  respect  to  the  moral  char¬ 
acter  ;  which  is  scarce  worth  considering.  And  I  mention 
it  only,  lest  it  should  come  into  some  persons  thoughts,  not 
as  an  exception  to  the  foregoing  observations,  which  per¬ 
haps  it  is,  but  as  a  confutation  of  them,  which  it  is  not. 
And  there  may  be  several  other  exceptions.  Observations 
of  this  kind  cannot  be ’supposed  to  hold  minutely,  and  in 
every  case.  It  is  enough  that  they  hold  in  general.  And 
these  plainly  hold  so  far,  as  that  from  them  may  be  seen  dis¬ 
tinctly,  which  is  all  that  is  intended  by  them,  that  the  pre¬ 
sent  world  is  peculiarly  Jit  to  he  a  state  of  discipline  for  our  irti- 
"provement  in  virtue  and  piety ;  in  the  same  sense  as  some 
sciences,  by  requiring  and  engaging  the  attention,  not  to  be 
sure  of  such  persons  as  will  not,  but  of  such  as  will,  set 
themselves  to  them,  are  fit  to  form  the '  mind  to  habits  of 
attention. 

Indeed,  the  present  state  is  so  far  from  proving,  in  event, 
a  discipline  of  virtue  to  the  generality  of  men,  that,  on  the 
contrary,  they  seem  to  make  it  a  discipline  of  vice.  And 

5* 


106 


OF  A  STATE  OF 


[part  1. 

the  viciousness  of  the  world  is,  in  different  ways,  the  great 
temptation,  which  renders  it  a  state  of  virtuous  discipline,  in 
the  degree  it  is,  to  good  men.  The  whole  end,  and  the 
whole  occasion  of  mankind  being  placed  in  such  a  state  as 
the  present,  is  not  pretended  to  be  accounted  for.  That 
which  appears  amidst  the  general  corruption  is,  that  there 
are  some  persons,  who,  having  within  them  the  principle  of 
amendment  and  recovery,  attend  to  and  follow  the  notices  of 
virtue  and  religion,  be  they  more  clear  or  more  obscure, 
which  are  afforded  them  ;  and  that  the  present  world  is,  not 
only  an  exercise  of  virtue  in  these  persons,  but  an  exercise 
of  it  in  ways  and  degrees  peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it apt 
to  improve  it,  in  some  respects,  even  beyond  what  would  be 
by  the  exercise  of  it  required  in  a  perfectly  virtuous  society, 
or  in  a  society  of  equally  imperfect  virtue  with  themselves. 
But  that  the  present  world  does  not  actually  become  a  state 
of  moral  discipline  to  many,  even  to  the  generality,  i.  e.  that 
they  do  not  improve  or  grow  better  in  it,  cannot  be  urged  as 
a  proof  that  it  was  not  intended  for  moral  discipline,  by  any 
who  at  all  observe  the  analogy  of  nature.  For  of  the  nu¬ 
merous  seeds  of  vegetables  and  bodies  of  animals,  which 
are  adapted  and  put  in  the  wayj  to  improve  to  such  a  point 
or  state  of  natural  maturity  and  perfection,  we  do  not  see 
perhaps  that  one  in  a  million  actually  does.  Far  the  great¬ 
est  part  of  them  decay  before  they  are  improved  to  it,  and 
appear  to  be  absolutely  destroyed.  Yet  no  one,  who  does 
not  deny  all  final  causes,  will  denjq  that  those  seeds  and  bo¬ 
dies  which  do  attain  to  that  point  of  maturity  and  perfection, 
answer  the  end  for  which  they  were  really  designed  by  na¬ 
ture  ;  and  therefore  that  nature  designed  them  for  such  per¬ 
fection.  And  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  though  it  is  not  to  the 
present  purpose,  that  the  appearance  of  such  an  amazing 
icaste  in  nature,  with  respect  to  these  seeds  and  bodies,  by 
foreign  causes,  is  to  us  as  unaccountable,  as,  what  is.  much 
more  terrible,  the  present  and  future  ruin  of  so  many  moral 
agents  by  themselves,  i.  e.  by  vice. 

Against  this  whole  notion  of  moral  discipline  it  may  be 
objected,  in  another  way,  that  so  far  as  a  course  of  beha¬ 
viour,  materially  virtuous,  proceeds  from  hope  and  fear,  so 
far  it  is  only  a  discipline  and  strengthening  of  self-love.  But 
doing  what  God  commands,  because  he  commands  it,  is 
obedience,  though  it  proceeds  from  hope  or  fear.  And  a 
course  of  such  obedience  will  form  habits  of  it ;  and  a  con¬ 
stant  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  and  charity,  may  form  dis- 


CHAP.  V.]  MORAL  DISCIPLINE.  107 

tinct  habits  of  these  particular  virtues,  and  will  certainl3> 
form  habits  of  self-government,  and  of  denying  our  inclina¬ 
tions,  whenever  veracity,  justice,  or  charity  requires  it.  Nor 
is  there  any  foundation  for  this  great  nicety,  with  which 
some  affect  to  distinguish  in  this  case,  in  order  to  depreciate 
all  religion  proceeding  from  hope  or  fear.  For  veracity,  jus¬ 
tice,  and  charity,  regard  to  God’s  authority,  and  to  our  own 
chief  interest,  are  not  only  all  three  coincident,  but  each  of 
them  is,  in  itself,  a  just  and  natural  motive  or  principle  of 
action.  And  he  who  begins  a  good  life  from  any  one  of 
them,  and  perseveres  in  it,  as  he  has  already  in  some  degree, 
so  he  cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more  of  that  cha¬ 
racter,  which  is  correspondent  to  the  constitution  of  nature 
as  moral,  and  to  the  relation  which  God  stands  in  to  us  as 
moral  governor  of  it ;  nor,  consequently,  can  he  fail  of  ob¬ 
taining  that  happiness,  which  this  constitution  and  relation 
necessarily  supposes  connected  with  that  character. 

These  several  observations,  concerning  the  active  princi¬ 
ple  of  virtue  and  obedience  to  God’s  commands,  are  applica¬ 
ble  to  passive  submission  or  resignation  to  his  will ;  which 
is  another  essential  part  of  a  right  character,  connected  with 
the  former,  and  very  much  in  our  power  to  form  ourselves 
to.  It  may  be  imagined,  that  nothing  but  afflictions  can 
give  occasion  for  or  require  this  virtue  ;  that  it  can  have  no 
respect  to,  nor  be  any  way  necessary  to  qualify  for  a  state 
of  perfect  happiness ;  but  it  is  not  experience  which  can 
make  us  think  thus :  Prosperity  itself,  whilst  any  thing  sup¬ 
posed  desirable  is  not  ours,  begets  extravagant  and  unboun¬ 
ded  thoughts.  Imagination  is  altogether  as  much  a  source 
of  discontent  as  any  thing  in  our  external  condition.  It  is 
indeed  true,  that  there  can  be  no  scope  for  patience,  when 
sorrow  shall  be  no  more  ;  but  there  may  be  need  of  a  tem¬ 
per  of  mind,  which  shall  have  been  formed  by  patience. 
For,  though  self-love,  considered  merely  as  an  active  princi¬ 
ple  leading  us  to  pursue  our  chief  interest,  cannot  but  be 
uniformly  coincident  with  the  principle  of  obedience  to  God’s 
commands,  our  interest  being  rightly  understood  ;  because 
this  obedience,  and  the  pursuit  of  our  own  chief  interest, 
must  be,  in  every  case,  one  and  the  same  thing ;  yet  it  may 
be  questioned,  whether  self-love,  considered  merely  as  the 
desire  of  our  own  interest  or  happiness,  can,  from  its  nature, 
be  thus  absolute  and  uniformly  coincident  with  the  will  of 
God,  any  more  than  particular  affection  can  ;  coincident  in 


108 


OF  A  STATE  OF 


[part  I. 


such  sort,  as  not  to  be  liable  to  be  excited  upon  occasions, 
and  in  degrees,  impossible  to  be  gratified  consistently  with 
the  constitution  of  things,  or  the  divine  appointments.  So 
that  habits  of  resignation  may,  upon  this  account,  be  requi¬ 
site  for  all  creatures  ;  habits,  I  say,  which  signify  what  is 
formed  by  use.  However,  in  general,  it  is  obvious,  that 
both  self  love  and  particular  affections  in  human  creatures, 
considered  only  as  passive  feelings,  distort  and  rend  the 
mind,  and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  discipline.  Now,  deni¬ 
al  of  those  particular  affections,  in  a  course  of  active  virtue 
and  obedience  to  God’s  will  has  a  tendency  to  moderate 
them,  and  seems  also  to  have  a  tendency  to  habituate  the 
mind  to  be  easy  and  satisfied  with  that  degree  of  happiness 
which  is  alloted  to  us,  i.  e.  to  moderate  self  love.  But  the 
proper  discipline  for  resignation  is  affliction.  For  a  right 
behaviour  under  that  trial,  recollecting  ourselves  so  as  to 
consider  it  in  the  view  in  which  religion  teaches  us  to  consi¬ 
der  it,  as  from  the  hand  of  God ;  receiving  it  as  what  he 
appoints,  or  thinks  proper  to  permit,  in  his  world  and  under 
his  government,  this  will  habituate  the  mind  to  a  dutiful 
submission  ;  and  such  submission,  together  with  the  active 
principle  of  obedience,  make  up  the  temper  and  character 
in  us  which  answers  to  his  sovereignty,  and  which  absolute¬ 
ly,  belongs  to  the  condition  of  our  being,  as  dependent  crea¬ 
tures.  Nor  can  it  be  said,  that  this  is  only  breaking  the 
mind  to  a  submission  to  mere  power,  for  mere  power  may 
be  accidental,  and  precarious,  and  usurped  ;  but  it  is  form¬ 
ing  within  ourselves  the  temper  of  resignation  to  his  right¬ 
ful  authority,  who  is,  by  nature,  supreme  over  all. 

Upon  the  whole,  such  a  character,  and  such  qualifica¬ 
tions,  are  necessary  for  a  mature  state  of  life  in  the  present 
world,  as  nature  alone  does  in  no  wise  bestow,  but  has  put 
it  upon  us  in  great  part  to  acquire,  in  our  progress  from  one 
stage  of  life  to  another,  from  childhood  to  mature  age  ;  put 
it  upon  us  to  acquire  them,  by  giving  us  capacities  of  doing 
it  and  by  placing  us,  in  the  beginning  of  life,  in  a  condition 
fit  for  it.  And  this  is  a  general  analogy  to  our  condition  in 
the  present  world,  as  in  a  state  of  moral  discipline  for  anoth¬ 
er.  It  is  in  vain,  then,  to  object  against  the  credibility  of 
the  present  life  being  intended  for  this  purpose,  that  all  the 
trouble  and  the  danger  unavoidably  accompanying  such 
discipline  might  have  been  saved  us,  by  our  being  made  at 
once  the  creatures  and  the  characters  which  loe  loere  to  he. 
For  we  experience,  that  what  loe  were  to  be,  was  to  be  the 


CHAP.  V.] 


iViORAL  DISCIPLINE. 


109 


effect  of  whai  lue  would  do  ;  and  that  the  general  conduct  of 
nature  is,  not  to  save  us  trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us 
capable  of  going  through  them,  and  to  put  it  upon  us  to  do 
so.  Acquirements  of  our  own  experience  and  habits,  are 
the  natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies,  and  security  against 
our  dangers ;  since  it  is  as  plainly  natural  to  set  ourselves  to 
acquire  the  qualifications  as  the  external  things  which  we 
stand  in  need  of  In  particular,  it  is  as  plainly  a  general 
law  of  nature,  that  we  should,  with  regard  to  our  temporal 
interest,  form  and  cultivate  practical  principles  within  us, 
by  attention,  use,  and  discipline,  as  any  thing  whatever  is  a 
natural  law ;  chiefly  in  the  begining  of  life,  but  also  through 
out  the  whole  course  of  it.  And  the  alternative  is  left  to 
our  choice,  either  to  improve  ourselves  and  better  our  condi¬ 
tion,  or,  in  default  of  such  improvement,  to  remain  deficient 
and  wretched.  It  is  therefore  perfectly  credible,  from  the 
analogy  of  nature,  that  the  same  may  be  our  case,  with  re¬ 
spect  to  the  happiness  of  a  future  state  and  the  qualifica¬ 
tions  necessary  for  it. 

There  is  a  third  thing,  which  may  seem  implied  in  the 
present  world  being  a  state  of  probation,  that  it  is  a  thea¬ 
tre  of  action  for  the  manifestation  of  persons’  characters, 
with  respect  to  a  future  one  ;  not,  to  be  sure,  to  an  all-know¬ 
ing  Being,  but  to  his  creation,  or  part  of  it.  This  may, 
perhaps,  be  only  a  consequence  of  our  being  in  a  state  of 
probation  in  the  other  senses.  However,  it  is  not  impossi¬ 
ble  that  men’s  showiiig  and  making  manifest  what  is  in  their 
heart,  what  their  real  character  is,  may  have  respect  to  a 
future  hfe,  in  ways  and  manners  which  we  are  not  acquain¬ 
ted  with  :  particularly  it  may  be  a  means,  for  the  Author  of 
nature  does  not  appear  to  do  any  thing  without  means,  of 
their  being  disposed  of  suitably  to  their  characters,  and  of 
its  being  knowm  to  the  creation,  by  way  of  example,  that 
they  are  thus  disposed  of  But  not  to  enter  upon  any  con¬ 
jectural  account  of  this,  one  may  just  mention,  that  the 
manifestation  of  persons’  characters  contributes  very  much, 
in  various  ways,  to  the  carrying  on  a  great  part  of  that  gene¬ 
ral  course  of  nature  respecting  mankind,  which  comes  un¬ 
der  our  observation  at  present.  I  shall  only  add,  that  pro¬ 
bation,  in  both  these  senses,  as  well  as  in  that  treated  of  in 
the  foregoing  chapter,  is  implied  in  moral  government ; 
since  by  persons’  behaviour  under  it,  their  characters  cannot 
but  be  manifested,  and  if  they  behave  well,  improved. 


110 


OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.  [PART  1 


I 


CHAPTER  VI. 


Of  the  opinion  of  JYecessity,  considered  as  infuencing 

Practice. 


Throughout  the  foregoing  Treatise  it  appears,  that  the 
condition  of  mankind,  considered  as  inhabitants  of  this 
world  only,  and  under  the  government  of  God  which  we 
experience,  is  greatly  analogous  to  otir  condition,  as  design¬ 
ed  for  another  world,  or  under  that  farther  government  which 
religion  teaches  us.  ]f,  therefore,  any  assert,  as  a  fatalist 
must,  that  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity  is  reconcilable 
with  the  former,  there  immediately  arises  a  question  in  the 
way  of  analogy  ;  whether  he  must  not  also  own  it  to  be 
reconcilable  with  the  latter,  i.  e.  with  the  system  of  religion 
itself,  and  the  proof  of  it.  The  reader,  then,  will  observe, 
that  the  question  now  before  us,  is  not  absolute,  whether  the 
opinion  of  fate  be  reconcilable  with  religion  ;  but  hypotheti¬ 
cal,  whether,  upon  supposition  of  its  being  reconcilable  with 
the  constitution  of  nature,  it  be  not  reconcilable  with  reli¬ 
gion  also  ?  or,  what  pretence  a  fatalist, — not  other  persons, 
but  a  fatalist — has  to  conclude,  from  his  opinion,  that  there 
can  be  no  such  thing  as  religion  ?  And  as  the  puzzle  and 
obscurity,  which  miust  unavoidably  arise  from  arguing  upon 
so  absurd  a  supposition  as  that  of  universal  necessity,  will, 
I  fear,  easily  be  seen,  it  will,  I  hope,  as  easily  be  excused. 

But  since  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for  granted,  as  a 
thing  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature, 
or  natural  Governor  of  the  world  ;  and  since  an  objection 
may  be  made  against  the  proof  of  this,  from  the  opinion  of 
universal  necessity,  as  it  may  be  supposed  that  such  necessi¬ 
ty  will  itself  account  for  the  origin  and  preservation  of  all 
things,  it  is  requisite  that  this  objection  be  distinctly  answer¬ 
ed  ;  or  that  it  be  shown,  that  a  fatality,  supposed  consistent 
with  what  we  certainly  experience,  does  not  destroy  the 
proof  of  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  nature,  be- 


CHAP.  VI.] 


AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE. 


Ill 


fore  we  proceed  to  consider,  whether  it  destroys  the  proof  of 
a  moral  Governor  of  it,  or  of  our  being  in  a  state  of 
religion. 

Now  when  it  is  said  by  a  fatalist,  that  the  whole  constitu¬ 
tion  of  nature,  and  the  actions  of  men,  that  every  thing  and 
every  mode  and  circumstance  of  every  thing,  is  necessary,  and 
could  not  possibly  have  been  otherwise,  it  is  to  be  observed, 
that  this  necessity  does  not  exclude  deliberation,  choice, 
preference,  and  acting  from  certain  principles,  and  to  certain 
ends ;  because  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted  experience, 
acknowledged  by  all,  and  what  every  man  may,  every  mo¬ 
ment,  be  conscious  of  And  from  hence  it  follows,  that  ne¬ 
cessity,  alone  and  of  itself,  is  in  no  sort  an  account  of  the 
constitution  of  nature,  and  how  things  came  to  he  and  to  con¬ 
tinue  as  they  are  ;  but  only  an  account  of  this  circumstance 
relating  to  their  origin  and  continuance,  that  they  could  not 
have  been  otherwise  than  they  are  and  have  been.  The  as¬ 
sertion,  that  every  thing  is  by  necessity  of  nature,  is  not  an 
answer  to  the  question,  Whether  the  world  came  into  being 
as  it  is  by  an  intelligent  Agent  forming  it  thus,  or  not ;  but 
to  quite  another  question,  Whether  it  came  into  being  as  it 
is,  in  that  way  and  manner  which  we  call  necessarily^  or  in 
that  way  and  manner  which  we  call  freely.  For,  suppose 
farther,  that  one,  who  was  a  fatalist,  and  one,  who  kept  to 
his  natural  sense  of  things,  and  believed  himself  a  free  agent, 
were  disputing  together,  and  vindicating  their  respective 
opinions,  and  they  should  happen  to  instance  in  a  house, 
they  would  agree  that  it  was  built  by  an  architect.  Their 
difference  concerning  necessity  and  freedom,  would  occasion 
no  difference  of  judgment  concerning  this,  but  only  concern¬ 
ing  another  matter,  whether  the  architect  built  it  necessarily 
or  freely.  Suppose,  then,  they  should  proceed  to  inquire, 
concerning  the  constitution  of  nature  ;  in  a  lax  way  of  speak¬ 
ing,  one  of  them  might  sa^q  it  was  by  necessity,  and  the 
other  by  freedom ;  but,  if  they  had  any  meaning  to  their 
words,  as  the  latter  must  mean  a  free  agent,  so  the  former 
must  at  length  be  reduced  to  mean  an  agent,  whether  he 
would  say  one  or  more,  acting  by  necessity  ;  for  abstract  no¬ 
tions  can  do  nothing.  Indeed,  we  ascribe  to  God  a  neces¬ 
sary  existence,  uncaused  by  any  agent.  For  we  find  with¬ 
in  ourselves  the  idea  of  infinity,  i.  e.  immensity  and  eternity, 
impossible,  even  in  imagination,  to  be  removed  out  of  being. 
We  seem  to  discern  intuitively,  that  there  must,  and  cannot 
but  be,  somewhat,  external  to  ourselves,  answering  this  idea. 


112 


OP  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [PART  I* 


or  the  archetype  of  it.  And  from  hence  (for  this  abstract^  as 
much  as  any  other,  implies  a  concrete)  we  conclude,  that  there 
is,  and  cannot  but  be,  an  infinite  and  immense  eternal  Being 
existing  prior  to  all  design  contributing  to  his  existence,  and 
exclusive  of  it.  And,  from  the  scantiness  of  language,  a 
manner  of  speaking  has  been  introduced,  that  necessity  is 
the  foundation,  the  reason,  the  account  of  the  existence  of 
God.  But  it  is  not  alledged,  nor  can  it  be  at  all  intended, 
that  every  thing  exists  as  it  does  by  this  kind  of  necessity 
a  necessity  antecedent  in  nature  to  design  ;  it  cannot,  I  say,* 
be  meant,  that  every  thing  exists  as  it  does,  by  this  kind  of 
necessity,  upon  several  accounts  ;  and  particularly,  because 
it  is  admitted,  that  design  in  the  actions  of  men,  contributes 
to  many  alterations  in  nature.  For,  if  any  deny  this,  I  shall 
not  pretend  to  reason  with  them. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  first,  That  when  a  fatalist 
asserts  that  every  thing  is  hy  necessity,  he  must  mean,  hy  an 
agent  acting  necessarily ;  he  must,  I  say,  mean  this  ;  for  I 
am  very  sensible  he  would  not  choose  to  mean  it.  And, 
secondly^  That  the  necessity,  by  which  such  an  agent  is  sup¬ 
posed  to  act,  does  not  exclude  intelligence  and  design.  So 
that,  were  the  system  of  fatality  admitted,  it  would  just  as 
much  account  for  the  formation  of  the  world,  as  for  the  struc¬ 
ture  of  a  house,  and  no  more.  Necessity  as  much  requires 
and  supposes  a  necessary  agent,  as  freedom  requires  and 
•  supposes  a  free  agent  to  be  the  former  of  the  world.  And 
the  appearance  of  design  and  of  final  causes  in  the  constitu¬ 
tion  of  nature,  as  really  prove  this  acting  agent  to  be  an  in¬ 
telligent  designer,  or  to  act  from  choice,  upon  the  scheme  of 
necessity,  supposed  possible,  as  upon  that  of  freedom. 

It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  necessity  does  not 
destroy  the  proof,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature 
and  natural  Governor  of  the  world,  the  present  question  which 
the  analogy  before  mentioned  suggests,  and  which,  I  think, 
it  will  answer,  is  this ;  whether  the  opinion  of  necessity, 
suppose  consistent  with  possibility,  with  the  constitution  of 
the  world,  and  the  natural  government  which  we  experi¬ 
ence  exercised  over  it,  destroys  all  reasonable  ground  of  be¬ 
lief,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion  ;  or  whether  that  opin¬ 
ion  be  reconcilable  with  religion,  with  the  system  and  the 
proof  of  it. 

Suppose,  then,  a  fatalist  to  educate  any  one,  from  his 


CHAP.  VI.] 


AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE. 


113 


his  youth  up  in  his  own  principles  ;  that  the  child  should  rea> 
Bon  upon  them,  and  conclude,  that  since  he  cannot  possibly 
beha^m  otherwise  than  he  does,  he  is  not  a  subject  of  blame 
or  commendation,  nor  can  deserve  to  be  rewarded  or  punish¬ 
ed  ;  imagine  him  to  eradicate  the  very  perceptions  of  blame 
and  commendation  out  of  his  mind,  by  means  of  this  system  ; 
to  form  his  temper,  and  character,  and  behaviour  to  it ;  and 
from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment  he  was  to  expect,  say,  from 
reasonable  men,  upon  his  coming  abroad  into  the  world,  as 
the  fatalist  judges  from  this  system,  what  he  is  to  expect 
from  the  Author  of  nature,  and  with  regard  to  a  future  state  ; 
T  cannot  forbear  stopping  here  to  ask,  whether  any  one  of 
common  sense  would  think  fit,  that  a  child  should  be  put 
upon  these  speculations,  and  be  left  to  apply  them  to  prac¬ 
tice  7  and  a  man  has  little  pretence  to  reason,  who  is  not 
sensible  that  We  are  all  children  in  speculations  of  this  kind. 
However,  the  child  would  doubtless  be  highly  delighted  to 
find  himself  freed  from  the  restraints  of  fear  and  shame,  with 
which  his  play-fellows  were  fettered  and  embarrassed  ;  and 
highly  conceited  in  his  superior  knowledge,  so  far  beyond 
his  years.  But  conceit  and  X^anity  would  be  the  least  bad 
part  of  the  influence  which  these  principles  must  have,  when 
thus  reasoned  and  acted  upon,  during  the  course  of  his  edu¬ 
cation.  He  must  either  be  allowed  to  go  on,  and  be  the 
plague  of  all  about  him,  and  himself  too,  even  to  his  own 
destruction,  or  else  correction  must  be  continually  made  use 
of,  to  supply  the  want  of  those  natural  perceptions  of  blame 
and  commendation,  which  we  have  supposed  to  be  removed, 
and  to  give  him  a  practical  impression  of  what  he  had  rea¬ 
soned  himself  out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  was,  in  fact,  an 
accountable  child,  and  to  be  punished  for  doing  what  he  was 
forbid.  It  is  therefore  in  reality  impossible,  but  that  the  cor¬ 
rection  wihich  he  must  meet  with,  in  the  course  of  his  edu¬ 
cation,  must  convince  him,  that  if  the  scheme  he  was  in¬ 
structed  in  were  not  false,  yet  that  he  reasoned  inconclusive¬ 
ly  upon  it,  and,  somehow  or  other,  misapplied  it  to  practice 
and  common  life  ;  as  what  the  fatalist  experiences  of  the 
conduct  of  Providence  at  present,  ought  in  all  reason,  to  con¬ 
vince  him,  that  this  scheme  is  misapplied,  when  applied  to 
tile  subject  of  religion.  But,  supposing  the  child’s  tem¬ 
per  could  remain  still  formed  to  the  system,  and  his  expecta¬ 
tion  of  the  treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the  world  be  regula- 


114  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [PART.  1. 

ted  by  it,  so  as  to  expect  that  no  reasonable  man  would  blame 
or  punish  him  for  any  thing  which  he  should  do,  because 
he  could  not  help  doing  it ;  upon  this  supposition,  it  is  mani¬ 
fest  he  would,  upon  his  coming  abroad  into  the  world,  be  in¬ 
supportable  to  society,  and  the  treatment  which  he  would 
receive  from  it,  would  render  it  so  to  him  ;  and  he  could  not 
fail  of  doing  somewhat  very  soon,  for  w^hich  he  would  be  de¬ 
livered  over  into  the  hands  of  civil  justice :  and  thus,  in  the 
end,  he  would  be  convinced  of  the  obligations  he  was  under 
to  his  wise  instructer.  Or  suppose  this  scheme  of  fatality, 
in  any  other  way,  applied  to  practice,  such  practical  appli¬ 
cation  of  it  will  be  found  equally  absurd,  equally  fallacious 
in  a  practical  sense.  For  instance,  that  if  a  man  be  destined 
to  live  such  a  time,  he  shall  live  to  it,  though  he  take  no 
care  of  his  own  preservation  ;  or  if  he  be  destined  to  die  be¬ 
fore  that  time,  no  care  can  prevent  it ;  therefore,  all  care 
about  preserving  one’s  life  is  to  be  neglected  :  which  is  the 
fallacy  instanced  in  by  the  ancients.  But  now,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  none  of  these  practical  absurdities  can  be  drawn,  from 
reasoning  upon  the  supposition,  that  w’e  are  free ;  but  all 
such  reasoning,  with  regard  to  the  common  affairs  of  life,  is 
justified  by  experience.  And,  therefore,  though  it  were  ad¬ 
mitted  that  this  opinion  of  necessity  were  speculatively  true, 
yet,  with  regard  to  practice,  it  is  as  if  it  were  false,  so  far  as 
our  experience  reaches  ;  that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our  present 
life.  For,  the  constitution  of  the  present  world,  and  the  con 
dition  in  which  we  are  actually  placed,  is  as  if  we  were  free. 
And  it  may  perhaps  justly  be  concluded,  that  .since  the  whole 
process  of  action,  through  every  step  of  it,  suspense,  delibe¬ 
ration,  inclining  one  way,  determining,  and  at  last  doing  as 
we  determine,  is  as  if  w^ere  free,  therefore  we  are  so.  But 
the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  under  the  present  na¬ 
tural  government  of  the  world,  we  find  we  are  treated  and 
dealt  with  as  if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all  consideration  wheth¬ 
er  we  are  or  not.  Were  this  opinion  therefore,  of  necessity, 
admitted  to  be  ever  so  true,  yet  such  is  in  fact  our  condition 
and  the  natural  course  of  things,  that,  whenever  we  apply 
it  to  life  and  practice,  this  application  of  it  always  misleads 
us,  and  cannot  but  mislead  us,  in  a  most  dreadful  manner, 
with  regard  to  our  present  interest.  And  how  can  people 
think  themselves  so  very  secure  then,  that  the  same  appli¬ 
cation  of  the  same  opinion  may  not  mislead  them  also  in 
some  analogous  manner,  with  respect  to  a  future,  a  more 
general,  and  more  important  interest  ?  For,  religion  being 


CHAP.  VI.] 


AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE. 


115 


a  practical  subject,  and  the  analogy  of  nature  showing  us, 
that  we  have  not  faculties  to  apply  this  opinion,  were  it  a 
true  one,  to  practical  subjects  ;  whenever  we  do  apply  it  to 
the  subject  of  religion,  and  then  conclude,  that  we  are  free 
from  its  obligations,  it  is  plain  this  conclusion  cannot  be  de¬ 
pended  upon.  There  will  still  remain  just  reason  to  think, 
whatever  appearances  are,  that  we  deceive  ourselves ;  in 
somewhat  of  a  like  manner  as  when  people  fancy  they  can 
draw  contradictory  conclusions  from  the  idea  of  infinity. 

From  these  things  together,  the  attentive  reader  will  see, 
it  follows,  that  if,  upon  supposition  of  freedom,  the  evidence 
of  religion  be  conclusive,  it  remains  so,  upon  supposition  of 
necessity  ;  because  the  notion  of  necessity  is  not  applica¬ 
ble  to  practical  subjects  ;  e.  with  respect  to  then.',  is  as  if 
it  were  not  true.  Nor  does  this  contain  any  reflection  upon 
reason,  but  only  upon  what  is  unreasonable.  For,  to  pre¬ 
tend  to  act  upon  reason,  in  opposition  to  practical  principles 
which  the  Author  of  our  nature  gave  us  to  act  upon,  and  to 
pretend  to  apply  our  reason  to  subjects  with  regard  to  which 
our  own  short  views,  and  even  our  experience,  will  show  us 
it  cannot  be  depended  upon, — and  such,  at  best,  the  subject 
of  necessity  must  be, — this  is  vanity,  conceit,  and  unrea¬ 
sonableness. 

But  this  is  not  all.  For  we  find  within  ourselves  a  will 
and  are  conscious  of  a  character.  Now,  if  this,  in  us,  be 
reconcilable  with  fate,  it  is  reconcilable  with  it  in  the  Author 
of  nature.  And,  besides,  natural  government  and  final 
causes  imply  a  character  and  a  will  in  the  Governor  and 
Designer  a  will  concerning  the  creatuies  whom  he  gov¬ 
erns.  The  Author  of  nature,  then,  being  certainly  of  some 
character  or  other,  notwithstanding  necessity,  it  is  evident 
this  necessity  is  as  reconcilable  with  the  particular  character 
of  benevolence,  veracity  and  justice,  in  him,  which  attri¬ 
butes  are  the  foundation  of  religion,  as  with  any  other  char¬ 
acter  ;  since  we  find  this  necessity  no  more  hinders  men  from 
being  benevolent  than  cruel ;  true,  than  faithless  ;  just,  than 
unjust,  or,  if  the  fatalist  pleases,  what  we  call  unjust.  For 
it  is  said  indeed,  that  what,  upon  supposition  of  freedom, 
would  be  just  punishment,  upon  supposition  of  necessity, 
becomes  manifestly  unjust ;  because  it  is  punishment  inflic- 

*  By  icill  and  character  is  meant  that,  which,  in  speaking  of  men,  we 
should  express,  not  only  by  these  words,  but  also  by  the  words  temper, 
taste,  dispositiorts,  practical  principles  ;  that  whole  frame  of  mind,  Jh  am 
whence  we  act  in  one  manner  rather  than  another. 


116 


OP  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [PART  I- 

tccl  for  doing  that  which  persons  could  not  avoid  doing.  Aa 
if  the  necessity,  which  is  supposed  to  destroy  the  injustice 
of  murder,  for  instance,  would  not  also  d-estroy  the  injustice 
of  punishing  it.  However,  as  little  to  the  purpose  as  this 
objection  is  in  itself,  it  is  very  much  to  the  purpose  to  observe 
from  it,  how  the  notions  of  justice  and  injustice  remain, 
even  whilst  we  endeavour  to  suppose  them  removed  ;  how 
they  force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  even  whilst  we  are 
making  suppositions  destructive  of  them  :  for  there  is  not, 
perhaps,  a  man  in  the  world,  but  would  be  ready  to  make 
this  objection  at  first  thought. 

But  though  it  is  most  evident,  that  universal  necessity,  if 
it  be  reconcilable  with  any  thing,  is  reconcilable  with  that 
character  in  the  Author  of  nature,  which  is  the  foundation 
of  religion  ;  ‘yet,  does  it  not  plainly  destroy  the  proof,  that 
he  is  of  that  character,  and  consequently  the  proof  of  reli¬ 
gion  V  By  no  means.  For  we  find,  that  happiness  and 
misery  are  not  our  fate,  in  any  such  sense  as  not  to  be  the 
consequences  of  our  behaviour,  but  that  they  are  the  conse¬ 
quences  of  it.*  We  find  God  exercises  the  same  kind  of 
government  over  us,  with  that  which  a  father  exercises  over 
his  children,  and  a  civil  magistrate  over  his  shbjects.  Now, 
whatever  becomes  of  abstract  questions  concerning  liberty 
and  necessity,  it  evidently  appears  to  us,  that  veracity  and 
justice  must  be  the  natural  rule  and  measure  of  exercising 
this  authority,  or  government,  to  a  Being,  who  can  have  no 
competitions,  or  interfering  of  interests,  with  his  creatures 
and  his  subjects,  ■< 

But  as  the  doctrine  of  liberty,  though  we  experience  its 
truth,  maybe  perplexed  with  difficulties  which  run  up  into 
the  most  abstruse  of  all  speculations,  and  as  the  opinion  of 
necessity  seems  to  be  the  very  basis  upon  which  infidelity 
grounds  itself,  it  may  be  of  some  use  to  offer  a  more  parti¬ 
cular  proof  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  which  may  dis¬ 
tinctly  be  shown  not  to  be  destroyed  by  this  opinion. 

The^proof,  from  final  causes,  of  an  intelligent  Author  of 
nature,  is  not  affected  by  the  opinion  of  necessity  ;  suppo¬ 
sing  necessity  a  thing  possible  in  itself,  and  reconcilable 
with  the  constitution  of  tilings.  And  it  is  a  matter  of  fact, 
independent  on  this  or  any  other  speculation,  that  he  gov¬ 
erns  the  world  by  the  method  of  rewards  and  punish 
ments and  also  that  he  hath  given  us  a  moral  faculty,  bj; 


*  Chap.  2. 


X  Chap.  2. 


CHAP.  VI.] 


AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE. 


117 


which  we  distinguish  between  actions,  and  approve  some  as 
virtuous  and  of  good  desert,  and  disapprove  others  as  vicious 
and  of  ill  desert.*  Now,  this  moral  discernment  implies,  in 
the  notion  of  it,  a  rule  of  action,  and  a  rule  of  a  very  pecu¬ 
liar  kind ;  for  it  carries  in  it  authority  and  a  right  of  direc 
tion ;  authority  in  such  a  sense,  as  that  we  cannot  depart 
from  it  without  being  self-condemned. f  And  that  the  dic¬ 
tates  of  this  moral  faculty,  which  are  by  nature  a  rule  to 
us,  are  moreover  the  laws  of  God,  laws  in  a  sense  including 
sanctions  maybe  thus  proved.  Consciousness  of  a  rule  or 
g^’ide  of  action,  in  creatures  who  are  capable  of  considering 
it  as  given  them  by  their  Maker,  not  only  raises  immediately 
a  sense  of  duty,  but  also  a  sense  of  security  in  following  it, 
and  of  danger  in  deviating  from  it.  A  direction  of  the  Au¬ 
thor  of  nature,  given  to  creatures  capable  of  looking  upon 
it  as  such,  is  plainly  a  command  from  him  ;  and  a  command 
from  him  necessarily  includes  in  it,  at  least,  an  implicit  pro¬ 
mise  in  case  of  obedience,  or  threatening,  in  case  of  disobe¬ 
dience.  But  then  the  sense  of  perception  of  good  and  ill 
desert, J  which  is  contained  in  the  moral  discernment,  ren¬ 
ders  the  sanction  explicit,  and  makes  it  appear,  as  one  may 
say,  expressed.  For,  since  his  method  of  government  is  to 
reward  and  punish  actions,  his  having  annexed  to  some 
actions  an  inseperable  sense  of  good  desert,  and  to  others  of 
ill,  this  surely  amounts  to  declaring  upon  whom  his  punish¬ 
ments  shall  be  inflicted,  and  his  rewards  be  bestowed.  For 
he  must  have  given  us  this  discernment  and  sense  of  things 
as  a  presentiment  of  what  is  to  be  hereafter  ;  that  is  by  way 
of  information  beforehand,  what  we  are  finally  to  expect  in 
his  world.  There  is,  then,  most  evident  ground  to  think, 
that  the  government  of  God,  upon  the  whole,  will  be  found 
to  correspond  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  us  ;  and 
that,  in  the  upshot  and  issue  of  things,  happiness  and  mise¬ 
ry  shall,  in  fact  and  event,  be  made  to  follow  virtue  and  vice 
respectively ;  as  he  has  already,  in  so  peculiar  a  manner, 
associated  the  ideas  of  them  in  our  minds.  And  from  hence 
might  easily  be  deduced  the  obligations  of  religious  worship, 
were  it  only  to  be  considered  as  a  means  of  preserving  upon 
our  minds  a  sense  of  this  moral  government  of  God,  and 
securing  our  obedience  to  it ;  which  yet  is  an  extremely  im¬ 
perfect  view  of  that  most  important  duty. 

*  Dissertation  2.  t  Sermon  2d  at  the  Rolls. 

t  Dissertation  2. 


118 


OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [PART  I. 


Now,  I  saj,  no  objection  from  necessity  can  lie  against 
this  general  proof  of  religion  :  none  against  the  proposition 
reasoned  upon,  that  we  have  such  a  moral  faculty  and  dis¬ 
cernment  ;  because  this  is  a  mere  matter  of  fact,  a  thing  of 
experience,  that  human  kind  is  thus  constituted  :  none 
against  the  conclusion  ;  because  it  is  immediate,  and  wholly 
from  this  fact.  For  the  conclusion,  that  God  will  finally  re¬ 
ward  the  righteous  and  punish  the  wicked,  is  not  here  drawm, 
from  its  appearing  to  us  fit  that  he  should^  but  from  its  ap¬ 
pearing,  that  he  has  told  us  he  will.  And  this  he  hath  cer¬ 
tainly  told  us,  in  the  promise  and  threatening,  which,  it  hath 
been  observed,  the  notion  of  a  command  implies,  and  the 
sense  of  good  and  ill  desert,  which  he  has  given  us,  more 
distinctly  expresses.  'And  this  reasoning  from  fact  is  confir¬ 
med,  and,  in  some  degree,  even  verified,  by  other  facts  ;  by 
the  natural  tendencies  of  virtue  and  of  vice  ;  and  by  this, 
that  God,  in  the  natural  course  of  his  providence,  punishes 
vicious  actions,  as  mischievous  to  society  ;  and  also  vicious 
actions,  as  such,  in  the  strictest  sense.  So  that  the  gene¬ 
ral  proof  of  religion  is  unanswerably  real,  even  upon  the 
wild  supposition  which  we  are  arguing  upon. 

It  must  likewise  be  observed  farther,  that  natural  religion 
hath,  besides  this,  an  external  evidence,  which  the  doctrine 
of  necessity,  if  it  could  be  true,  would  not  affect.-  For,  sup¬ 
pose  a  person,  by  the  observations  and  reasoning  above,  or 
by  any  other,  convinced  of  the  truth  of  religion  ;  that  there 
is  a  God,  who  made  the  world,  who  is  the  moral  Governor 
and  Judge  of  mankind,  and  will,  upon  the  whole,  deal  with 
every  one  according  to  his  works  ;  I  say,  suppose  a  person 
convinced  of  this  by  reason,  but  to  know  nothing  at  all  of 


*  However,  I  am  far  from  intending  to  deny,  that  the  will  of  God  is  de¬ 
termined  by  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and  reason  of  the  case ;  though  one 
chooses  to  decline  matters  of  such  abstract  speculation,  and  to  sj)eak  with 
caution  when  one  does  speak  of  them.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to  say, 
that  it  is  Jit  and  reasonable  for  every  one  to  consult  his  own  happiness^ 
then  fitness  of  action,  or  the  right  and  reason  of  the  case,  is  an  intelligi¬ 
ble  manner  of  speaking.  And  it  seems  as  inconceivable,  to  suppose  God 
to  approve  one  course  of  action,  or  one  end,  preferable  to  another,  which 
yet  his  acting  at  all  from  design  implies  that  he  docs,  without  supposing 
somewhat  pnor  in  that  end,  to  be  the  ground  of  the  preference ;  as  to  supi 
pose  him  to  discern  an  abstract  proposition  to  be  true,  without  supposing 
somewhat  prior  in  it  to  be  the  ground  of  the  discernment.  It  doth  not, 
therefore,  appear,  that  mor.al  right  is  any  more  relative  to  perception  than 
abstract  truth  is ;  or  that  it  is  any  more  improper  to  speak  of  the  fitnesa 
and  rightness  of  actions  and  ends,  as  founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  than 
to  speak  of  abstract  truth,  as  thus  founded. 


CHAP.  VI.]  AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE.  119 

B.ntiqmty  or  the  present  state  of  mankind,  it  would  be  nat 
ural  for  such  an  one  to  be  inquisitive,  what  was  the  history 
of  this  system  of  doctrine  ;  at  what  time,  and  in  what  man¬ 
ner,  it  came  first  into  the  world  ;  and  whether  it  were  believ¬ 
ed  by  any  considerable  part  of  it.  And  were  he  upon  in¬ 
quiry  to  find,  that  a  particular  person,  in  a  late  age,  first  of 
all  proposed  it  as  a  deduction  of  reason,  and  that  mankind 
were  before  wholly  ignorant  of  it ;  then  though  its  evidence 
from  reason  woulct  remain,  there  would  be  no  additional  jdi'O- 
bability  of  its  truth,  from  the  account  of  its  discovery.  But 
instead  of  this  being  the  fact  of  thacase,  on  the  contrary,  he 
would  find  what  could  not  but  afford  him  a  very  strong  con¬ 
firmation  of  its  truth :  Firsts  That  somewhat  of  this  system, 
with  more  or  fewer  additions  and  alterations,  hath  been  pro¬ 
fessed  in  all  ages  and  countries  of  which  we  have  any  cer¬ 
tain  information  relating  to  this  matter.  Secondly^  That  it 
is  certain  historical  fact,  so  far  as  we  can  trace  things  up,  that 
this  whole  system  of  belief,  that  there  is  one  God,  the  Crea¬ 
tor  and  moral  Governor  of  the  world,  and  that  mankind  is  in 
a  state  of  religion,  was  received  in  the  first  ages.  And,  third¬ 
ly^  That  as  there  is  no  hint  or  intimation  in  history,  that  this 
system  was  first  reasoned  out ;  so  there  is  express  historical 
or  traditional  evidence,  as  ancient  as  history,  that  it  was 
taught  first  by  revelation.  Now,  these  things  must  be  al¬ 
lowed  to  be  of  great  weight.  The  first  of  them,  general 
consent)  shows  this  system  to  be  conformable  to  the  common 
sense  of  mankind.  The  second,  namely,  that  religion  was 
believed  in  the  first  ages  of  the  world,  especially  as  it  does 
not  appear  that  there  were  then  any  superstitious  or  false  addi¬ 
tions  to  it,  cannot  but  be  a  farther  confirmation  of  its  truth.  For 
it  is  a  proof  of  this  alternative  ;  either  that  it  came  into  the 
world  by  relation,  or  that  it  is  natural,  obvious,  and  forces  it¬ 
self  upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  these  is  the  conclusion 
of  learned  men.  And  whoever  will  consider,  how  unapt  for 
speculation  rude  and  uncultivated  minds  are,  will,  perhaps 
from  hence  alone,  be  strongly  inclined  to  believe  it  the  truth. 
And  as  it  is  shown  in  the  second  part  of  this  Treatise,  that 
there  is  nothing  of  such  peculiar  presumption  against  a  reve¬ 
lation  in  the  begining  of  the  world,  as  there  is  supposed  to 
be  against  subsequent  ones  ;  a  sceptic  could  not,  I  think, 
give  any  account,  which  would  appear  more  probable  even 
to  himself,  of  the  early  pretences  to  revelation,  than  by  sup- 


♦  Chap.  2. 


120  OF  THE  OPJMON  OF  NECESSITY,  [PART  I. 

posing  some  real  original  one,  from  whence  they  were  copi* 
ed.  And  the  third  thing  above  mentioned,  that  there  is  ex¬ 
press  historical  or  traditional  evidence,  as  ancient  as  history, 
of  the  system  of  religion  being  taught  mankind  by  revela¬ 
tion  ;  this  must  be  admitted  as  some  degree  of  real  proof, 
that  it  was  so  taught.  For  why  should  not  the  most  ancient 
tradition  be  admitted  as  some  additional  proof  of  a  fact, 
against  whi^h  there  is  no  presumption.?  And  this  proof  is 
mentioned  nere,  because  it  has  its  weight  to  show,  that  reli¬ 
gion  came  into  the  world  by  revelation  prior  to  all  considera¬ 
tion  of  the  proper  authority  of  any  book  supposed  to  con¬ 
tain  it ;  and  even  prior  to  all  consideration,  whether  the  reve¬ 
lation  itself  be  uncorruptly  handed  down  and  related,  or 
mixed  and  darkened  with  fables.  Thus  the  historical  ac¬ 
count  which  we  have,  of  the  origin  of  religion,  taking  in  all 
circumstances,  is  a  real  confirmation  of  its  truth,  no  waj?"  af¬ 
fected  by  the  opinion  of  necessity.  And  the  external  evi¬ 
dence,  even  of  natural  religion,  is  by  no  means  inconsidera¬ 
ble.  > 

But  it  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to  be  recollec¬ 
ted  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion,  which  are  only 
general,  that  as  speculative  reasons  may  be  neglected,  pre¬ 
judiced,  and  deceived,  so  also  may  our  moral  understanding 
be  impaired  and  perverted,  and4he  dictates  of  it  not  impar¬ 
tially  attended  to.  This,  indeed,  proves  nothing  against  the 
reality  of  our  speculative  or  practical  faculties  of  perception ; 
against  their  - being  intended  by  nature  to  inform  us  in  the 
theory  of  things,  and  instruct  us  how  we  are  to  behave,  ana 
what  we  are  to  expect,  in  consequence  of  our  behaviour. — 
Yet  our  liableness,  in  the  degree  we  are  liable,  to  prejudice 
and  perversion,  is  a  most  serious  admonition  to  us  to  be  upon 
our  guard,  with  respect  to  what  is  of  such  consequence,  as 
our  determinations  concerning  virtue  and  religion  ;  and  par¬ 
ticularly,  not  to  take  custom,  and  fashion,  and  slight  notions 
of  honor,  or  imaginations  of  present  ease,  use,  and  conveni¬ 
ence  to  mankind,  for  the  only  moral  rule.* 

The  foregoing  observations,  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  ‘and  the  history  of  religion,  amount,  when  taken  to¬ 
gether,  to  a  real  practical  proof  of  it,  not  to  be  confuted  ; 
such  a  proof  as,  considering  the  infinite  importance  of  the 
thing,  I  apprehend,  would  be  admitted  fully  sufficient,  in 
reason,  to  influence  the  actions  of  men,  who  act  upon 


*  Dissertation  2. 


CHAP.  VI.] 


AS  INFLUENCING  PEaCTICE. 


121 


thought  and  reflection ;  if  it  were  admitted  that  there  is  no 
proof  of  the  contrary.  But  it  may  be  said  ;  ‘  There  are 
many  probabilities,  which  cannot  indeed  be  confuted,  i.  e. 
shown  to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet  may  be  overballanced 
by  greater  probabilities  on  the  other  side ;  much  more  by 
demonstration.  And  there  is  no  occasion  to  object  against 
particular  arguments  alleged  for  an  opinion,  when  the  opin¬ 
ion  itself  may  be  clearly  shown  to  be  false,  without  meddling 
with  such  arguments  at  all,  but  leaving  them  just  as  they 
are.  Now,  the  method  of  government  by  rewards  and 
punishments,  and  especially  rewarding  and  punishing  good 
and  ill  desert,  as  such,  respectively,  must  go  upon  supposi¬ 
tion,  that  we  are  free,  and  not  necessary  agents.  And  it  is 
incredible,  that  the  Author  of  nature,  should  govern  us  up¬ 
on  a  supposition  as  true,  which  he  knows  to  be  false  ;  and 
therefore  absurd  to  think,  he  will  reward  or  punish  us  for  our 
actions  hereafter ;  especially  that  he  will  do  it  under  the 
notion,  that  they  are  of  good  or  ill  desert.’  Here,  then,  the 
matter  is  brought  to  a  point.  And  the  answer  to  all  this  is 
full,  and  not  be  evaded  ;  that  the  whole  constitution  and 
course  of  things,  the  whole  analogy  of  providence  shows, 
beyond  possibility  of  doubt,  that  the  conclusion  from  this 
reasoning  is  false,  wherever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine 
of  freedom,  indeed,  clearly  shows  where  ;  in  supposing  our¬ 
selves  necessary,  when  in  truth  we  are  free  agents.  But, 
upon  the  supposition  of  necessity,  the  fallacy  lies  in  taking 
for  granted  that  it  is  incredible  necessary  agents  should  be 
rewarded  and  punished.  But  that,  somehow  or  other,  the 
conclusion  now  mentioned  is  false,  is  most  ceitain.  For  it 
is  fact,  that  God  does  govern  even  brute  creatures  by  the 
method  of  rewards  and  punishments,  in  the  natuial  course 
of  things.  And  men  are  rewarded  and  punished  for  their 
actions,  punished  for  actions  mischievous  to  society  as  being 
so,  punished  for  vicious  actions  as  such,  by  the  natural  in¬ 
strumentality  of  each  other,  under  the  present  conduct  of 
Providence.  Nay,  even  the  affection  of  gratitude,  and  the 
passion  of  resentment,  and  the  rewards  and  punishments 
(bllowing  from  them,  which  in  general  are  to  be  considered 
as  natural,  i.  e.  from  the  Author  of  nature ;  these  rewards 
and  punishments,  being  naturally  annexed  to  actions  con¬ 
sidered  as  implying  good  intention  and  good  desert,  ill  inten¬ 
tion  andiii  desert ;  these  natural  rewards  and  punishments, 


6 


122  OP  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [PART  I. 

I  say,  are  as  much  a  contradiction  to  the  conclusion  above, 
and  show  its  falsehood,  as  a  more  exact  and  complete  re¬ 
warding  and  punishing  of  good  and  ill  desert,  as  such.  So 
that,  if  it  be  incredible  that  necessary  agents  should  be  thus 
rewarded  and  punished,  then  men  are  not  necessary,  but 
free;  since  it  is  matter  of  fact  that  they  are  thus  rewarded 
and  punished.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  which  is  the  suppo 
sition  we  have  been  arguing  upon,  it  be  insisted,  that  men 
are  necessary  agents,  then  there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the 
farther  supposition  of  necessary  agents  being  thus  reward¬ 
ed  and  punished  ;  since  we  ourselves  are  thus  dealt  with. 

From  the  whole,  therefore,  it  must  follow,  that  a  ncces.si- 
ty  supposed  possible,  and  reconcilable  with  the  constitution 
of  things,  does  in  no  sort  prove,  that  the  Author  of  nature 
will  not,  nor  destroy  the  proof  that  he  will,  finally  and  upon 
the  whole,  in  his  eternal  government,  render  his  creatures 
happy  or  miserable,  by  some  means  or  other,  as  they  behave' 
well  or  ill.  Or,  to  express  this  conclusion  in  words  con¬ 
formable  to  the  title  of  the  chapter,  the  analogy  of  nature 
shows  us,  that  the  opinion  of  necessity,  considered  as  jaac- 
tical,  is  false.  And  if  necessity,, upon  the  supposition  above 
mentioned,  doth  not  destroy  the  proof  of  natural  religion,  it 
evidently  makes  no  alteration  in  the  proof  of  revealed. 

From  these  things,  likewise,  we  may  learn  in  what  sense 
to  understand  that  general  assertion,  that  the  opinion  of  ne¬ 
cessity  is  essentially  destiTictive  of  all  religion.  Firsts  In  a 
practical  sense  ;  that  by  this  notion  atheistical  men  pretend 
to  satisfy  and  encourage  themselves  in  vice,  and  justiiy  to 
others  their  disregard  to  all  religion.  And,  Secondly,  In  the 
strictest  sense  ;  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  the  whole  consti¬ 
tution  of  nature,  and  to  what  we  may  every  moment  expe¬ 
rience  in  ourselves,  and  so  overturns  every  thing.  But  by 
no  means  is  this  assertion  to  be  understood,  as  if  necessity, 
supposing  it  could  possibly  be  reconciled  with  the  constitution 
of  things,  and  with  what  we  experience,  were  not  also  recon¬ 
cilable  with  religion  ;  for  upon  this  supposition  it  demonstra¬ 
bly  is  so. 


CHAP  VII. 


A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 


123 


V 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  the  Government  of  God^  considered  as  a  Scheme^  or 
Constitution^  imperfectly  comprehended. 

Though  it  be,  as  it  cannot  but  be,  acknowledged,  that 
the  analogy  of  nature  gives  a  strong  credibility  to  the  gene¬ 
ral  doctrine  of  religion,  and  to  the  several  particular  things 
contained  in  it,  considered  as  so  many  matters  of  fact ;  and 
likewise,  that  it  shows  this  credibility  not  to  be  destroyed  by 
any  notions  of  necessity  ;  yet  still,  objections  may  be  insis¬ 
ted  upon  against  the  wisdom,  equity,  and  goodness  of  the 
divine  government,  implied  in  the  notion  of  religion,  and 
against  the  method  by  which  this  government  is  conducted, 
to  which  objections  analogy  can  be  no;  direct  answer.  For 
the  credibility,  or  the  certain  truth,  of  a  matter  of  fact,  does 
not  immediately  prove  any  thing  concerning  the  wisdom 
or  goodness  of  it ;  and  analogy  can  do  no  more,  immediate¬ 
ly  or  directly,  than  show  such  and  such  things  to  be  true  or 
credible,  considered  only  as  matters  of  fact.  But,  still,  if, 
upon  supposition  of  a  moral  constitution  of  nature  and  a 
moral  government  over  it,  analogy  suggests  and  makes  it 
credible,  that  this  government  must  be  a  scheme,  system,  or 
constitution  of  government,  as  distinguished  from  a  number 
of  single  unconnected  acts  of  distributive  justice  and  good¬ 
ness  ;  and  likewise,  that  it  must  be  a  scheme,  so  imperfectly 
comprehended,  and  of  such  a  sort  in  other  respects,  as  to 
afford  a  direct  general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the 
justice  and  goodness  of  it ;  then  analogy  is,  remotely,  of 
great  service  in  answ^ering  those  objections,  both  by  sug¬ 
gesting  the  answer,  and  showing  it  to  be  a  credible  one. 

Now,  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the  case. 
For,  first  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral  gov¬ 
ernment  over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural  govern¬ 
ment  suggests,  and  makes  it  credible,  that  his  moral  govern- 


124  the  government  of -god,  [fart  i. 

ment  must  be  a  scheme  quite  beyond  our  comprehension ; 
and  this  affords  a  general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the 
justice  and  goodness  of  it.  And,  secondly^  A  more  distinct 
observation  of  some  particular  things  contained  in  God’s 
scheme  of  natural  government,  the  like  things  being  suppos¬ 
ed,  by  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral  government,  will 
farther  show  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  these  objec¬ 
tions. 

1.  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral  govern¬ 
ment  over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural  government 
suggests  and  makes  it  credible,  that  his  moral  government 
must  be  a  scheme  quite  beyond  our  comprehension  ;  and 
this  affords  a  general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the  jus¬ 
tice  and  goodness  of  it.  It  is  most  obvious,  analogy  renders 
it  highly  credible,  that  upon  supposition  of  a  moral  govern¬ 
ment,  it  must  be  a  scheme, — for  the  world,  and  the  whole 
natural  government  of  it,  appears  to  be  so — to  be  a  scheme, 
system,  or  constitution,  whose  parts  correspond  to  each  oth¬ 
er,  and  to  a  whole,  as  really  as  any  work  of  art,  or  as  any 
particular  model  of  a  civil  constitution,  and  government.  In 
this  great  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  individuals  have  va¬ 
rious  peculiar  relations  to  other  individuals  of  their  own  spe¬ 
cies.  And  whole  species  are,  we  find,  variously  related  to 
other  species,  upon  this  earth.  *  Nor  do  we  know  how  much 
farther  these  kind  of  relations  may  extend.  And,  as  there 
is  not  any  action,  or  natural  event,  which  we  are  acquainted 
with,  so  single  and  unconnected  as  not  to  have  a  respect  to 
some  other  actions  and  events,  so,  possibly,  each  of  them, 
when  it  has  not  an  immediate,  may  yet  have  a  remote,  nat¬ 
ural  relation  to  other  actions  and  events,  much  beyond  the 
compass  of  this  present  world.  There  seem.s  indeed,  noth¬ 
ing  from  whence  we  can  so  much  as  make  a  conjecture, 
whether  all  creatures,  actions,  and  events  throughout  the 
whole  of  nature,  have  relations  to  each  other.  But,  as  it  is 
obvious  That  all  events  have  future  unknown  consequences, 
so,  if  v/e  trace  any,  as  far  as  we  can  go,  into  what  is  connec¬ 
ted  with  it,  we  shall  find,  that  if  such  event  were  not  con¬ 
nected  with  somewhat  farther,  in  nature  unknown  to  us, 
somewhat  both  past  and  present,  such  event  could  not  possi¬ 
bly  have  been  at  all.  Nor  can  we  give  the  whole  account 
of  any  one  thing  whatever  ;  of  all  its  causes,  ends,  and  ne¬ 
cessary  adjuncts ;  those  adjuncts,  I  mean,  without  which  it 
could  not  have  been.  By  this  most  astonishing  connexion, 
these  reciprocal  correspondences  and  mutual  relations,  every 


CHAP  VII.]  A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  125 

thing  which  we  see  in  the  course  of  nature,  is  actually 
brought  about.  And  things  seemingly  the  most  insignificant 
imaginable,  are  perpetually  observed  to  be  necessary  condi¬ 
tions  to  other  things  of  the  greatest  importance  ;  so  that  any 
one  thing  whatever  may,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contra¬ 
ry,  be  a  necessary  condition  to  any  other.  The  natural 
world,  then,  and  natural  government  of  it,  being  such  an  in¬ 
comprehensible  scheme  ;  so  incomprehensible,  that  a  man 
must  really,  in  the  literal  sense,  know  nothing  at  all,  who  is 
not  sensible  of  his  ignorance  in  it :  this  immediately  suggests, 
and  strongly  shows  the  credibility,  that  the  moral  world  and 
government  of  it  may  be  so  too.  Indeed,  the  natural  and 
moral  constitution  and  government  of  the  world  are  so  con¬ 
nected,  as  to  make  up  together  but  one  scheme  ;  and  it  is 
highly  probable,  that  the  first  is  formed  and  carried  on  mere¬ 
ly  in  subserviency  to  the  latter,  as  the  vegetable  world  is  for 
the  animal,  and  organized  bodies  for  minds.  But  the  tl  ing 
intended  here  is,  without  inquiring  how  far  the  administra¬ 
tion  of  the  natural  world  is  subordinate  to  that  of  the  moral, 
only  to  observe  the  credibility,  that  one  should  be  analagous 
or  similar  to  the  other  ;  that,  therefore,  every  act  of  divine 
justice  and  goodness  may  be  supposed  to  look  much  beyond 
itself  and  its  immediate  object ;  may  have  some  reference  to 
other  parts  of  God’s  moral  administration,  and  to  a  general 
moral  plan  ;  and  that  every  circumstance  of  this  his  moral 
government  may  be  adjusted  beforehand  with  a  view  to  the 
whole  of  it.  Thus,  for  example  :  the  determined  length  of 
time,  and  the  degrees  and  ways  in  which  virtue  is  to  remain 
in  a  state  of  warfare  and  discipline,  and  in  which  wickedness 
is  permitted  to  have  its  progress  ;  the  times  appointed  for  the 
execution  of  justice  ;  the  appointed  instruments  of  it ;  the 
kinds  of  rewards  and  punishments,  and  the  manners  of  their 
distribution ;  all  particular  instances  of  divine  justice  and 
goodness,  and  every  circumstance  of  them,  may  have  such 
respects  to  each  other,  as  to  make  up  altogether  a  whole, 
connected  and  related  in  all  its  parts  ;  a  scheme,  or  system, 
which  is  as  properly  one  as  the  natural  world  is,  and  of  the 
like  kind.  And  supposing  this  to  be  the  case,  it  is  most  evi¬ 
dent  that  we  are  not  competent  judges  of  this  scheme,  from 
the  small  parts  of  it  which  come  within  our  view  in  the  pre¬ 
sent  life  ;  and  therefore  no  objections  against  any  of  these 
parts  can  be  insisted  upon  by  reasonable  men. 

This  our  ignorance,  and  the  consequence  here  drawn  from 
It;  are  universaliy  acknowledged  upon  other  occasions ;  and, 


120 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD,  [PART  I 

though  scarce  denied,  yet  are  universally  forgot,  when 
persons  come  to  argue  against  religion.  And  it  is 
not  perhaps  easy,  even  for  the  most  reasonable  men,  al¬ 
ways  to  bear  in  mind  the  degree  of  our  ignorance,  and 
make  due  allowances  for  it.  Upon  these  accounts,  it 
may  not  be  useless  to  go  on  a  little  farther,  in  order  to  show 
more  distinctly,  how  just  an  answer  our  ignorance  is,  to  ob¬ 
jections  against  the  scheme  of  Providence.  Suppose,  then, 
a  person  boldly  to  assert,  that  the  things  complained  of,  the 
origin  and  continuance  of  evil,  might  easily  have  been  pre¬ 
vented  by  repeated  interpositions  ;  *  interpositions  so  guard¬ 
ed  and  circumstanced,  as  would  prelude  all  mischief  arising 
from  them  :  or,  if  this  were  impracticable,  that  a  scheme  of 
government  is  itself  an  imperfection  ;  since  more  good  might 
have  been  produced  without  any  scheme,  system,  or  consti¬ 
tution  at  all,  by  continued  single  unrelated  acts  of  distribu¬ 
tive  justice  and  goodness,  because  these  would  have  occa¬ 
sioned  no  irregularities  :  and  farther  than  this,  it  is  presum¬ 
ed,  the  objections  will  not  be  carried.  Yet  the  answer  is  ob¬ 
vious  ;  that,  were  these  assertions  true,  still  the  observations 
above,  concerning  our  ignorance  in  the  scheme  of  divine 
government,  and  the  consequence  drawn  from  it,  would  hold 
in  great  measure,  enough  to  vindicate  religion  against  all 
objections  from  the  disorders  of  the  present  state.  Were 
these  assertions  true,  yet  the  government'of  the  world  might 
be  just  and  good  notwithstanding ;  for,  at  the  most,  they 
would  infer  nothing  more  than  that  it  might  have  been  bet¬ 
ter.  But,  indeed,  they  are  mere  arbitrarj?- assertions.;  no 
man  being  sufficient!}'’  acquainted  with  the  possibilities  of 
things,  to  bring  an}'’  proof  of  them  to  the  lowest  degree  of 
probability.  For,  however  possible  what  is  asserted  may 
seem,  yet  many  instances  may  be  alledged,  in  things  much 
less  out  of  our  reach,  of  suppositions  absolutely  impossible  and 
reducible  to  the  most  palpable  self-contradictions,  which  not 
every  one  by  any  means  could  perceive  to  be  such,  nor  per¬ 
haps  any  one  at  first  sight  suspect.  From  these  things  it  is 
easy  to  see  distinctly,  how  our  ignorance,  as  it  is  the  com¬ 
mon,  is  really  a  satisfactory  answer  to  all  objections  against 
the  justice  and  goodness  of  Providence.  If  a  man,  contem¬ 
plating  any  one  providential  dispensation,  which  had  no  re¬ 
lation  to  any  others,  should  object,  that  he  discerned  in  it  8 
disregard  to  justice,  or  a  deficiency  of  goodness,  nothing 


CHAP.  VII.]  A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 


127 


would  be  less  an  answer  to  such  objection,  than  our  igno¬ 
rance  in  other  parts  of  Providence,  or  in  the  possibilities  of 
things,  no  way  related  to  what  he  was  contemplating.  But 
when  we  know  not  but  the  parts  objected  against  may  be 
relative  to  other  parts  unknown  to  us,  and  when  we  are  un¬ 
acquainted  with  what  is,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  practi¬ 
cable  in  the  case  before  us,  then  our  ignorance  is  a  satisfac¬ 
tory  answer ;  because  some  unknown  relation,  or  some  un¬ 
known  impossibility,  may  render  jvhat  is  objected  against 
just  and  good  ;  nay,  good  in  the  highest  practical  degree. 

II.  And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  such  objec¬ 
tions  will  farther  appear,  by  a  more  distinct  observation  of 
some  particular  things  contained  in  the  natural  government 
of  God,  the  like  to  which  may  be  supposed  from  analogy,  to 
be  contained  in  his  mural  government. 

Firsts  As,  in  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  no  ends  ap¬ 
pear  to  be  accomplished  without  means  ;  so  we  find  that 
means  very  undesirable  often  conduce  to  bring  about  ends 
in  such  a  measure  desirable,  as  greatly  to  over-balance  the 
disagreeableness  of  the  means.  And  in  cases  where  such 
means  are  conducive  to  such  ends,  it  is  not  reason,  but  ex¬ 
perience,  which  shows  us  that  they  are  thus  conducive. 
Experience  also  shows  many  means  to  be  conducive  and 
necessary  to  accomplish  ends,  which  means,  before  experi¬ 
ence,  we  should  have  thought  would  have  had  even  a  con¬ 
trary  tendency.  Now,  from  these  observations  relating  to 
the  natural  scheme  of  the  world,  the  moral  being  supposed 
analogous  to  it,  arises  a  great  credibility,  that  the  putting 
our  misery  in  each  other’s  power  to  the  degree  it  is,  and 
making  men  liable  to  vice  to  the  degree  we  are ;  and,  in 
general,  that  those  things  which  are  objected  against  the 
moral  scheme  of  Providence  may  be,  upon  the  whole,  friend¬ 
ly  and  assistant  to  virtue,  and  productive  of  an  over  balance 
of  happiness  ;  i.  e.  the  things  objected  against  may  be  means 
by  which  an  over-balance  of  good  will,  in  the  end,  be  found 
produced.  And,  from  the  same  observations,  it  appears  to  be 
no  presumption  against  this,  that  we  do  not,  if  indeed  we  do 
not,  see  those  means  to  have  any  such  tendency,  or  that 
they  seem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary  one.  Thus,  those  things 
whicn  we  call  irregularities,  may  not  be  so  at  all ;  because 
they  may  be  means  of  accomplishing  wise  and  good  ends 
more  considerable.  And  it  may  be  added,  as  above,  that 
they  may  also  be  the  only  means  by  which  these  wise  and 
good  ends  are  capable  of  being  accomplished. 


123 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD 


[part.  I. 


After  these  observations  it  may  he  proper  to  add,  in  order 
to  obviate  an  absurd  and  wicked  conclusion  from  any  of 
them,  that  though  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  from  whence 
we  are  capable  of  vice  and  misery,  may,  as  it  undoubtedly 
does,  contribute  to  the  perfection  and  happiness  of  the  world  ; 
and  though  the  actual  permission  of  evil  may  be  beneficial 
to  it,  (z.  e.  it  would  have  been  more  mischievous,  not  that  a 
wicked  person  had  himself  abstained  from  his  own  wicked¬ 
ness,  but  that  any  one  had  forcibly  prevented  it,  than  that  it 
was  permitted ;)  yet,  notwithstanding,  it  might  have  been 
much  better  for  the  world  if  this  very  evil  had  never  been 
done.  Nay,  it  is  most  clearly  conceivable,  that  the  very 
commission  of  wickedness  may  be  beneficial  to  the  world, 
and  yet  that  it  would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  for  men  to 
refrain  from  it.  For  thus,  in  the  wise  and  good  constitution 
of  the  natural  world,  there  are  disorders  which  bring  their 
own  cures  ;  diseases  which  are  themselves  remedies.  Many 
a  man  would  have  died,  had  it  not  been  for  the  gout  or  fever  ; 
yet  it  would  be  thought  madness  to  assert,  that  sickness  is  a 
better  or  more  perfect  state  than'  health  ;  though  the  like, 
with  regard  to  the  moral  world,  has  been  asserted.  But, 
Secondly^  The  natural  government  of  the  v/orld  is  carried 
on  by  general  laws.  For  this  there  may  be  wise  and  good 
reasons  ;  the  wisest  and  best,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  con¬ 
trary.  And  that  there  are  such  reasons,  is  suggested  to  our 
thoughts  by  the  analogy  of  nature  ;  by  our  being  made  to 
experience  good  ends  to  be  accomplished,  as  indeed  all  the 
good  which  we  enjoy  is  accomplished,  by  this  means,  that 
the  laws,  by  which  the  world  is  governed,  are  general.  For 
we  have  scarce  aii}^  kind  of  enjoyments,  but  what  we  are, 
in  some  way  or  other,  instrumental  in  procuring  ourselves, 
by  acting  in  a  manner  which  we  foresee  likely  to  procure 
them :  now  this  foresight  could  not  be  at  all,  were  not  the 
government  of  the  world  carried  on  bj^  general  laws.  And 
though,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  every  single 
case  may  be,  at  length,  found  to  have  been  provided  for  even 
by  these,  yet  to  prevent  all  irregularities,  or  remedy  them  as 
they  arise,  by  the  wisest  and  best  general  laws,  may  be  im¬ 
possible  in  the  nature  of  things,  as  we  see  it  is  absolutely 
impossible  in  civil  government.  But  then  we  are  ready  to 
think,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  remaining  as  it  is,  and 
the  course  of  things  being  permitted  to  go  on,  ir  other  re¬ 
spects,  as  it  does,  there  might  be  interpositions  to  prevent 
irregularities,  though  they  could  not  have  been  prevented  oi 


CHAP.  VII.]  A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 


129 


remedied  by  any  general  laws.  And  there  would  indeed  be 
reason  to  wish — which,  by  the  way,  is  very  different  from  a 
right  to  claim — that  all  irregularities  were  prevented  or 
remedied  by  present  interpositions,  if  these  interpositions 
would  have  no  other  effect  than  this.  But  it  is  plain  they 
would  have  some  visible  and  immediate  bad  effects  ;  for  in¬ 
stance,  they  would  encourage  idleness  and  negligence,  and 
they  would  render  doubtful  the  natural  rule  of  life,  which  is 
ascertained  by  this  very  thing,  that  the  course  of  the  world 
is  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  farther,  it  is  certain  they 
would  have  distant  effects,  and  very  great  ones  too,  by 
means  of  the  wonderful  connexions  before  mentioned.  So 
that  we  cannot  so  much  as  guess,  what  would  be  the  whole 
result  of  the  interpositions  desired.  It  may  be  said,  any  bad 
result  might  be  prevented  by  farther  interpositions,  whenever 
there  was  occasion  for  them  ;  but  this  again  is  talking  quite 
at  random,  and  in  the  dark.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  we  see 
wise  reasons  whj?-  the  course  of  the  world  should  be  carried 
on  by  general  laws,  and  good  ends  accomplished  by  this 
means,  and,  for  aught  we  know,  there  may  be  the  wisest 
reasons  for  it,  and  the  best  ends  accomplished  by  it.  We 
have  no  ground  to  believe,  that  all  irregularities  could  be 
remedied  as  they  arise,  or  could  have  been  precluded  by  gene¬ 
ral  laws.  We  find  that  interpositions  would  produce  evil, 
and  prevent  good ;  and,  for  aught  we  know,  they  would 
produce  greater  evil  than  they  would  prevent,  and  prevent 
greater  good  than  they  would  produce.  And  if  this  be  the 
case,  then,  the  not  interposing  is  so  far  from  being  a  ground 
of  complaint,  that  it  is  an  instance  of  goodness.  This  is  in¬ 
telligible  and  sufficient ;  and  going  farther  seems  beyond  the 
utmost  reach  of  our  faculties. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  ‘  after  all,  these  supposed  im¬ 
possibilities  and  relations  are  what^we  are  unacquainted 
with  ;  and  we  must  judge  of  religion,  as  of  other  things,  by 
what  we  do  know,  and  look  upon  the  rest  as  nothing  :  or, 
however,  that  the  answers  here  given  to  what  is  objected 
against  religion,  may  equally  be  made  use  of  to  invalidate 
the  proofs  of  it,  since  their  stress  lies  so  very  much  upon  our 
ignorance.’  But, 

Fzrs^,  Though  total  ignorance  in  any  matter  does  indeed 
equally  destroy,  or  rather  preclude,  all  proof  concerning  it, 
and  objections  against  it,  yet  partial  ignorance  does  not. 


6* 


130  the  government  of  god,  [part  I. 

For  we  may  in  any  degree  be  convinced,  that  a  person  is  of 
such  a  character,  and  consequently  will  pursue  such  ends, 
though  we  are  greatly  ignorant  what  is  the  proper  way  of 
acting,  ip  order  the  most  effectually  to  obtain  those  ends  ; 
and  in  this  case,  objections  against  his  manner  of  acting,  as 
seemingly  not  conducive  to  obtain  them,  might  be  answer¬ 
ed  by  our  ignorance,  though  the  proof  that  such  ends  were 
intended,  might  not  at  all  be  invalidated  by  it.  Thus,  the 
proof  of  religion  is  a  proof  of  the  moral  character  of  God, 
and,  consequently,  that  his  government  is  moral,  and  that 
every  one,  upon  the  whole,  shall  receive  according  to  liLs 
deserts;  a  proof  that  this  is  the  designed  end  of  his  gover- 
inent.  But  we  are  not  competent  judges  what  is  the  proper 
way  of  acting,  in  order  the  most  effectually  to  accomplish 
this  end.  Therefore  our  ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objec¬ 
tions  against  the  conduct  of  Providence,  in  permitting  irregu¬ 
larities,  as  seeming  contradictory  to  this  end.  Now,  since 
it  is  so  obvious  that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  satisfactory  an¬ 
swer  to  objections  against  a  thing,  and  yet  not  affect  the 
proof  of  it ;  till  it  can  be  shown,  it  is  frivolous  to  assert,  that 
our  ignorance  invalidates  the  proof  of  rehgion,  as  it  does  the 
objections  against  it. 

Secondly,  Suppose  unknown  impossibilities,  and  unknown 
relations,  might  justly  be  urged  to  invalidate  the  proof  of  re¬ 
ligion,  as  well  as  to 'answer  objections  against  it,  and  that, 
in  consequence  of  this,  the  proof  of  it  were  doubtful ;  yet 
still,  let  the  assertion  be  despised,  or  let  it  be  ridiculed,  it  is 
undeniably  true,  that  moral  obligations  would  remain  cer¬ 
tain,  though  it  were  not  certain  what  would,  upon  the 
whole,  be  the  consequences  of  observing  or  violating  them. 
For  these  obligations  arise  immediately  and  necessarily  from 
the  judgment  of  our  own  mind,  unless  perverted,  which  we 
cannot  violate  without  being  self-condemned.  And  they 
would  be  certain,  too,  from  considerations  of  interest.  For, 
though  it  were  doubtful  what  will  be  the  future  consequen¬ 
ces  of  virtue  and  vice,  yet  it  is  however  credible,  that  they 
may  have  those  consequences  which  religion  teaches  us 
they  will ;  and  this  credibility  is  a  certain  obligation  in 
point  of  prudence,  to  abstain  from  all  wickedness,  and  to  live 
in  the  conscientious  practice  of  all  that  is  good.  But, 

Thirdly,  The  answers  above  given  to  the  objections  against 
religion,  cannot  equally  be  made  use  of  to  invahdate  the 


CHAP.  VII.]  A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 


131 


proof  of  it.  For,  upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a 
moral  government  over  the  world,  analogy  does  most  strong¬ 
ly  lead  us  to  conclude,  that  this  moral  government  must  be 
a  scheme,  or  constitution,  beyond  our  comprehension.  And 
a  thousand  particular  analogies  show  us,  that  parts  of  such 
a  scheme,  from  their  relation  to  other  parts,  may  conduce  to 
accomplish  ends,  which  we  should  have  thought  they  had 
no  tendency  at  all  to  accomplish  ;  nay,  ends,  which,  before 
experience,  we  should  have  thought  such  parts  were  contra¬ 
dictory  to,  and  had  a  tendency  to  prevent.  And,  therefore, 
all  these  analogies  show,  that  the  way  of  arguing  made  use 
of  in  objecting  against  religion,  is  delusive ;  because  they 
show  it  is  not  at  all  incredible,  that,  could  we  comprehend 
the  whole,  we  should  find  the  permission  of  the  disorders 
objected  against,  to  be  consistent  with  justice  and  goodness, 
and  even  to  be  instances  of  them.  Now  this  is  not  applica¬ 
ble  to  the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  is  to  the  objections  against 
it ;  and  therefore  cannot  invalidate  that  proof,  as  it  does 
these  objections. 

Lastly^  From  the  observations  now  made,  it  is  easy  to 
see,  that  the  answers  above  given  to  the  objections  against 
Providence,  though,  in  a  general  way  of  speaking,  they  may 
be  said  to  be  taken  from  our  ignorance,  yet  are  by  no  means 
taken  merely  from  that,  but  from  somewhat  which  analogy 
shows  us  concerning  it.  For  analogy  shows  us  positively, 
that  our  ignorance  in  the  possibilities  of  things,  and  the  vari¬ 
ous  relations  in  nature,  renders  us  incompetent  judges,  and 
leads  us  to  false  conclusions,  in  cases  similar  to  this,  in  which 
we  pretend  to  judge  and  to  object.  So  that  the  things  above 
insisted  upon,  are  not  mere  suppositions  of  unknown  impos- 
sibiliues  and  relations  ;  but  they  are  suggested  to  our  . 
thoughts,  and  even  forced  upon  the  observations  of  serious 
men,  and  rendered  credible,  too,  by  the  analogy  of  nature. 
And,  therefore,  to  take  these  things  into  the  account,  is  to 
judge  by  experience,  and  what  we  do  know  ;  and  it  is  not 
judgmg  so,  to  take  no  notice  of  them. 


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CONCLUSIOJN. 


»  X~  ‘ 

X 

The  observations  of  the  last  chapter  lead  us  to  consider 
this  little  scene  of  human  life,  in  which  we  are  so  busily  en¬ 
gaged,  as  having  reference,  of  some  sort  or  other,  to  a  much 
larger  plan  of  things.  Whether  we  are  any  way  related  to 
the  more  distant  parts  of  the  boundless  universe  into  which 
we  are  brought,  is  altogether  uncertain.  But  it  is  evident, 
that  the  course  of  things  which  comes  within  our  view,  is 
connected  with  somewhat  past,  present,  and  future  beyond 
it.  So  that  we  are  placed,  as  one  may  speak,  in  the  mid¬ 
dle  of  a  scheme,  not  a  fixed,  but  a  progressive  one,  every  way 
incomprehensible  ;  incomprehensible,  in  a  manner,  equally 
with  respect  to  what  has  been,  what  now  is,  and  what  shall 
be  hereafter.  And  this  scheme  cannot  but  contain  in  it  some¬ 
what  as  wonderful,  and  as  much  beyond  our  thought  and 
conception,’!'  as  any  thing  in  that  of  religion.  For,  will  any 
man  in  his  senses  say,  that  it  is  less  difficult  to  conceive  how 
the  world  came  to  be,  and  continued  as  it  is,  without,  than 
with,  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  it  %  admitting 
an  intelligent  Governor  of  it,  that  there  is  some  other  rule  of 
government  more  natural,  and  of  easier  conception,  than  that 
which  we  call  moral  ?  Indeed,  without  an  intelligent  Au¬ 
thor  and  Governor  of  nature,  no  account  at  all  can  be  given, 
how  this  universe,  or  the  part  of  it  particularly  in  which  we 
are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and  the  course  of  it  to  be  carried, 
on,  as  it  is  ;  nor  any  of  its  general  end  and  design,  without 
a  mom]  Governor  of  it.  That  there  is  an  intelligent  Author 
of  nature  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world,  is  a  principle 
gone  upon  in  the  foregoing  treatise,  as  proved,  and  generally 
known  and  confessed  to  be  proved.  And  the  very  notion  of 
and  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  proved  by  particular  final 


T  See  Part  ii  chap,  2. 


134 


CONCLUSION. 


[part.  I. 


causes,  implies  a  will  and  a  character.  Now,  as  our  whole 
nature,  the  nature  which  he  has  given  us,  leads  us  to  con¬ 
clude  his  will  and  character  to  be  moral,  just,  and  good  ;  so 
we  can  scarce  in  imagination  conceive,  what  it  can  be  other¬ 
wise.  However,  in  consequence  of  this  his  will  and  charac¬ 
ter,  whatever  it  be,  he  formed  the  universe  as  it  is,  and  car¬ 
ries  on  the  course  of  it  as  he  does,  rather  than  in  any  other 
manner  ;  and  has  assigned  to  us,  and  to  all  living  creatures, 
a  part  and  a  lot  in  it.  Irrational  creatures  act  this  their  part, 
and  enjoy  and  undergo  the  pleasures  and  the  pains  allotted 
them,  without  any  reflection.  But  one  would  think  it  im 
possible,  that  creatures  endued  with  reason  could  avoid  re¬ 
flecting  sometimes  upon  all  this  ;  reflecting,  if  not  from 
whence  we  came,  yet,  at  least,  whither  we  are  going,  and 
what  the  mysterious  scheme  in  the  midst  of  which  we  find 
ourselves,  will  at  length  come  out  and  produce  ;  a  scheme 
in  which  it  is  certain  we  are  highly  interested,  and  in  which 
we  maybe  interested  even  beyond  conception.  For  many 
things  prove  it  palpably  absurd  to  conclude,  that  we  shall 
cease  to  be  at  death.  Particular  analogies  do  most  sensibly 
show  us,  that  there  is  nothing  to  be  thought  strange  in  our 
being  to  exist  in  another  state  of  life.  And  that  we  are  now 
living  beings,  afibrds  a  strong  probability  that  we  shall  con¬ 
tinue  so  ;  unless  there  be  some  positive  ground,  and  there  is 
none  from  reason  or  analogy,  to  think  death  will  destroy  us. 
Were  a  persuasion  of  this  kind  ever  so  well  grounded,  there 
would,  surely,  be  little  reason  to  take  pleasure  in  it.  But, 
indeed,  it  can  have  no  other  ground  than  some  such  imagina¬ 
tion,  as  that  of  our  gross  bodies  being  ourselves  ;  which  is 
contrary  to  experience.  Experience,  too,  most  clearly  shows 
us  the  folly  of  concluding,  from  the  body  and  the  living  agent 
affecting  each  other  mutually,  that  the  dissolution  of  the 
former  is  the  destruction  of  the  latter.  And  there  are  remark¬ 
able  instances  of  their  not  affecting'  each  other,  which  lead 
us  to  a  contrary  conclusion.  The  supposition,  then,  which 
in  all  reason  we  are  to  go  upon,  is,  that  our  living  nature 
will  continue  after  death.  And  it  is  infinitely  unreasonable 
to  form  an  institution  of  life,  or  to  act  upon  any  other  suppo¬ 
sition.  Now,  all  expectation  of  immortality,  whether  more 
or  less  certain,  opens  an  unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes 
and  our  fears ;  since  we  see  the  constitution  of  nature  is  such 
as  to  admit  of  misery,  as  well  as  to  be  productive  of  happi- 


PART.  I.J 


CONCLUSION. 


135 


ness,  and  experience  ourselves  to  partake  of  both  in  some 
degree  ;  and  since  we  cannot  but  know  what  higher  degrees 
of  both  we  are  capable  of  And  there  is  no  presumption 
against  believing  farther,  that  our  future  interest  depends 
upon  our  present  behaviour  ;  for  we  see  our  present  interest 
doth ;  and  that  the  happiness  and  misery,  which  are  natural¬ 
ly  annexed  to  our  actions,  very  frequently  do  not  folio v/  till 
long  after  the  actions  are  done  to  which  they  are  respective¬ 
ly  annexed.  So  that,  were  speculation  to  leave  us  uncer¬ 
tain,  whether  it  were  likely  that  the  Author  of  nature,  in 
giving  happiness  and  misery  to  his  creatures,  hath  regard  to 
their  actions  or  not ;  yet,  since  we  find  by  experience  that 
he  hath  such  regard,  the  whole  sense  of  things  v^hich  he 
has  given  us,  plainly  leads  us,  at  once,  and  without  any 
elaborate  inquiries,  to  think  that  it  may,  indeed  must,  be  to 
good  actions  chiefly  that  he  hath  annexed  happiness,  and  to 
bad  actions  misery  ;  or  that  he  will,  upon  the  whole,  reward 
those  who  do  well,  and  punish  those  who  do  evil.  To  con¬ 
firm  this  from  the  constitution  of  the  world,  it  has  been  ob¬ 
served,  that  some  sort  of  moral  government  is  necessarily 
implied  in  that  natural  government  of  God  which,  we  expe¬ 
rience  ourselves  under  ;  that  good  and  bad  actions,  at  pre¬ 
sent,  are  naturally  rewarded  and  punished,  not  only  as  bene¬ 
ficial  and  mischievous  to  society,  but  also  as  virtuous  and 
vicious  ;  and  that  there  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  a 
tendency  to  their  being  rew  arded  and  punished  in  a  much 
higher  degree  than  they  are  at  present.  And  though  this 
higher  degree  of  distributive  justice,  which  nature  thus 
points  out  and  leads  towards,  is  prevented  for  a  time  from  ta 
king  place,  it  is  by  obstacles  which  the  state  of  this  world 
unhappily  throws  in  its  way,  and  which,  therefore,  are  in 
their  nature  temporary.  Now,  as  these  things,  in  the  natu¬ 
ral  conduct  of  Providence,  are  observable  on  the  side  of  vir¬ 
tue,  so  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  against  them  on  the  side  of 
vice.  A  moral  scheme  of  government,  then,  is  visibly  es¬ 
tablished,  and  in  some  degree  carried  into  execution  ;  and 
this,  together  with  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice 
duly  considered,  naturally  raise  in  us  an  apprehension  that 
it  will  be  carried  on  farther  towards  perfection  in  a  future 
state,  and  that  every  one  shall  there  receive  according  to  his 
deserts.  And  if  this  be  so,  then  our  future  and  general  in¬ 
terest,  under  the  moral  government  of  God,  is  appointed  to 
depend  upon  our  behaviour,  notwithstanding  the  difficulty 
which  this  may  occasion  of  securing  it,  and  the  danger  of  lo- 


130 


CONCLUSION 


[part  I. 


sing  it ;  just  in  the  same  manner  as  our  temporal  interest, 
under  his  natural  government,  is  appointed  to  depend  upon 
our  behaviour,  notwithstanding  the  like  difficulty  and  danger. 
For,  from  our  original  constitution,  and  that  of  the  world 
which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally  trusted  with  ourselves, 
with  our  own  conduct  and  our  own  interest.  And  from  the 
same  constitution  of  nature,  especially  joined  with  that 
course  of  things  which  is  owing  to  men,  we  have,  tempta¬ 
tions  to  be  unfaithful  in  this  trust,  to  forfeit  this  interest,  to 
neglect  it,  and  run  ourselves  into  misery  and  ruin.  From 
these  temptations  arise  the  difficulties  of  behaving  so  as  to 
secure  our  temporal  interest,  and  the'hazard  of  behaving  so 
as  to  miscarry  in  it.  There  is,  therefore,  nothing  incredible 
in  supposing,  there  may  be  the  like  difficulty  and  hazard 
with  regard  to  that  chief  and  final  good  which  religion  lays 
before  us.  Indeed,  the  whole  account,  how  it  came  to  pass 
that  we  were  placed  in  such  a  condition  as  this,  must  be  be¬ 
yond  our  comprehension.  But  it  is  in  part  accounted  for  by 
what  religion  teaches  us,  that  the  character  of  virtue  and 
piety  must  be  a  necessary  qualification  for  a  future  state  of 
security  and  happiness,  under  the  moral  government  of  God ; 
in  like  manner,  as  some  certain  qualifications  or  other  are 
necessary  for  every  particular  condition  of  life,  under  his 
natural  government ;  and  that  the  present  state  was  inten¬ 
ded  to  be  a  school  of  discipline,  for  improving  in  ourselves 
that  character.  Now,  this  intention  of  nature  is  rendered 
highly  credible  by  observing,  that  we  are  plainly  made  for 
improvement  of  all  kinds  ;  that  it  is  a  general  appointment 
of  Providence,  that  we  cultivate  practical  principles,  and 
form  within  ourselves  habits  of  action,  in  order  to  become  fit 
for  what  we  were  wholly  unfit  for  before  ;  that,  in  particu¬ 
lar,  childhood  and  youth  is  naturally  appointed  to  be  a  state 
of  discipline  for  mature  age  ;  and  that  the  present  world  is 
peculiarly  fitted  for  a  state  of  moral  discipline.  And,  where¬ 
as  objections  are  urged  against  the  whole  notion  of  moral 
government  and  a  probation  state,  from  the  opinion  of  neces- 
sity,  it  has  been  shown,  that  God  has  given  us  the  evidence, 
as  it  were,  of  experience,  that  all  objections  against  religion 
on  this  head  are  vain  and  delusive.  He  has  also,  in  his  na¬ 
tural  government,  suggested  an  answer  to  all  our  short  sight¬ 
ed  objections  against  the  equity  and  goodness  of  his  moral 
government ;  and,  in  general,  he  has  exemplified  to  us  the 
latter  by  the  former. 

These  things,  which,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are  matters 


PART  I.] 


CONCLUSION. 


137 


of  fact,  ought,  in  all  common  sense,  to  awaken  mankind,  to 
induce  them  to  consider,  in  earnest,  their  condition,  and  what 
they  have  to  do.  It  is  absurd, — alDsurd  to  the  degree  of  be* 
ing  ridiclous,  if  the  subject  where  not  of  so  serious  a  kind,  for 
men  to  think  themselves  secure  in  a  vicious  life,  or  even  in 
that  immoral  thoughtlessness  which  far  the  greatest  part  of 
them  are  fallen  into.  And  the  credibility  of  religion,  arising 
from  experience  and  facts  here  considered,  is  fully  sufficient, 
in  reason,  to  engage  them  to  live  in  the  general  practice  of 
all  virtue  and  piety ;  under  the  serious  apprehensioUj  though 
it  should  be  mixed  with  some  doubt,*  of  a  righteous  adminis¬ 
tration  established  in  nature,  and  a  future  judgment  in  conse¬ 
quence  of  it ;  especially  when  we  consider,  how  very  ques¬ 
tionable  it  is  whether  any  thing  at  all  can  be  gained  by  vice  ; 
how  unquestionably  little,  as  well  as  precarious,  the  plea¬ 
sures  ahd  profits  of  it  are  at  the  best,  and  how  soon  they 
must  be  parted  with  at  the  longest.  For,  in  the  deliberations 
of  reason,  concerning  what  we  are  to  pursue  and  what  to 
avoid,  as  temptations  to  any  thing  from  mere  passion  are 
supposed  out  of  the  case  ;  so  inducements  to  vice  from  cool 
expectations  of  pleasure  and  interest,  so  small,  and  uncer¬ 
tain,  and  short,  are  really  so  insignificant,  as,  in  the  view  of 
reason,  to  be  almost  nothing  in  themselves,  and,  in  compari¬ 
son  with  the  importance  Of  religion,  they  quite  disappear  and 
are  lost.  Mere  passioh,  indeed,  may  be  alleged,  though  not 
as  a  reason,  yet  as  an  excuse  for  a  vicious  course  of  life. 
And  how  sorry  art  excuse  it  is  will  be  manifest  by  observing, 
that  we  are  placed  in  a  condition  in  whicii  we  are  unavoida¬ 
bly  inured  to  govern  our  passions,  b}’-  being  necessitated  to 
govern  them  ;  and  to  lay  ourselves  under  the  same  kind  of 
restraints,  and  as  great  ones  too,  from  temporal  regards,  as 
virtue  and  piety,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  thingSj  require. 
The  plea  of  ungovernable  passion,  then.  Oh  the  side  of  vice, 
is  the  poorest  of  all  things  ;  for  it  is  no  reason  ;  ahd  but  a 
poor  excuse.  But  the  proper  motives  to  religion,  are  the 
proper  proofs  of  it,  from  our  moral  nature,  from  the  presages 
of  conscience,  and  our  natural  apprehension  of  God,  under 
the  character  of  a  righteous  Governor  and  Judge  j  a  nature, 
and  conscience,  and  apprehension  given  us  by  him  ;  and 
from  the  confirmation  of  the  dictates  of  reason,  by  life  and 
immortality  brought  to  light  by  the  gospel ;  and  the  wrath  of 
God  revealed  from  heaven^  against  all  ungodliness  and  unrighte^ 
ousness  of  men. 

♦  Part  ii.  chap.  6. 


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:-.-tiA 


THE 


ANALOGY 

OP 

religion. 

TO  THE 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE 


PART  II. 

OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 


CHAP.  I. 

i)f  the  Importance  of  Christianity. 

Some  personS)  upon  pretence  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  light  ^ 
of  nature,  avowedly  reject  all  revelation,  as,  in  its  very  notion, 
incredible,  and  what  must  be  fictitious.  And,  indeed,  it  is 
certain  i.o  revelation  would  have  been  given,  had  the  light 
of  nature  been  sufficient  in  such  a  sense  as  to  render  one  not 
wanting  and  useless.  But  no  man,  in  seriousness  and  sim¬ 
plicity  of  mind,  can  possibly  think  it  so,  who  considers  the 
state  of  religion  in  the  heal  hen  world  before  revelation,  and 
its  present  state  in  those  places  which  have  borrowed  no  ‘i 
light  from  it;  particularly,  the  doubtfulness  of  some  of  the-‘J 
greatest  men  concerning  things  of  the  utmost  importance,  aa 
well  as  the  natural  inattention  and  ignorance  of  mankind  in 
general.  It  is  impossible  to  say  who  would  have  been  able  ' 
to  have  reasoned  out  that  whole  system,  which  we  call  nu-  ' 
tural  religion',  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  clear  of  superstition  ,  | 

■  but  there  is  certainly  no  ground  to  affirm  that  the  generality  ; 
could  :  if  they  could,  there  is  no  sort  of  probability  that  they 
would.  Admitting  there  were,  they  would  highly  want  a 


140  OF  THE  IMPOilTANcH  [PAUT  11. 

Standing  admonition,  to  remind  them  of  it,  and  inculcate  it 
upon  them.  And,  farther  still,  were  they  as  much  disposed 
to  attend  to  religion  as  the  teitier  sort  of  men  are,  yet,  even 
upon  this  supposition,  there  would  be  various  occasions  for 
supernatural  instruction  and  asistance,  and  the  greatest  ad¬ 
vantages  might  be  afforded  by  them.  So  that  to  say,  reve¬ 
lation  is  a  thing  superfluous,  what  there  was  no  need  6f,  and 
what  can  be  of  no  service,  is  I  think,  to  talk  quite  wildly  and 
at  random.  Nor  woiild  it  be  more  extiavagant  to  affirm, 
that  mankind  is  so  entirely  a  t  ease  in  the  present  state,  and 
life  so  completely  happy,  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  suppose 
our  condition  capable  of  being  in  any  respect  better. 

There  are  other  persons,  not  to  be  ranked  with  these,  who 
seem  to  be  getting  into  a  way  of  neglecting,  and,  as  it 
were,  overlooking  revelation  as  of  small  importance,  provi¬ 
ded  natural  religion  to  be  kept  to.  With  little  regard,  either 
to  the  evidence  of  the  fortner,  or  to  the  objections  against  it, 
and  even  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  ‘  the  only  design  of  it,’ 
say  they,  ‘  must  be  to  establish  a  belief  of  the  moral  system 
of  nature,  and  to  enforce  the  practice  of  natural  piety  and 
virtue.  The  belief  and  practice  of  these  things  were,  perhaps, 
much  promoted  by  the  first  publication  of  Christianity  ;  but 
whether  they  are  believed  and  practised,  upon  the  evidence 
and  motives  of  nature  or  of  revelation,  is  no  great  matter 
This  way  of  edrisidering  revelation,  though  it  is  not  the  same 
with  the  former, yet  borders  nearly  upon  it  and  very  much,  at 
length,  runs  up  into  it,  and  requires  to  be  particularly,  con¬ 
sidered,  with  regard  to  the  p’ersoHs  who  seem  to  be  getting 
into  this  way.  The  ednsideration  of  it  will,  likewise,  farther 
show  the  extravagance  of  the  former  opinion,  and  the  truth 
df  the  observations  in  answer  to  it,  just  mentioned.  And  an 
inquiry  into  the  Importance  of  Christianity,  cahhot  be  ari 
improper  introduction  to  a  treatise  concerning  the  tredibility 
6f  it. 

Now,  if  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  mankind,  ahd  com¬ 
manded  those  things  which  are  commanded  in  Christianity, 
it  is  evident,  at  first  sight,  that  it  cannot  in  any  wise  be  an 
indifferent  matter,  whether  we  obey  or  disobey  those  com^ 

♦  Invenis  multos - propterca  nolle  fieri  Christianos,  quia  quasi  suffi- 

eiunt  sibi  de  bona  vita  siia.  Bene  vivere  opus  cst,  ait.  filuid  mihi  prai- 
cepturus  est  Christ, us  7  TTt,  bene  vivatn  7  Jam  bene  vivo.  Gluid  mihi 
hecessarius  est  Cnristusl  Nullum  homicidium,  nullum  furtum,  nullarn 
rupinam  faclo,  res  alienas  non  concupisco,  nullo  adulterio  containinor.  Nam 
inveniatur  in  vita  mea  aliquid  quod  reprehendatur,  et  qui  reprehenderit  fa¬ 
cial  Christian um. — Aug.  in  Psalm  xxxi. 


PART  II.J 


OF  CHRISTIANITY. 


141 


\ 


I 

1 


mands,  unless  we  are  certainly  assured,  that  we  Jmow  all 
the  reasons  for  them,  and  that  all  those  reasons  are  now 
ceased,  with  regard  to  mankind  in  general,  or  to  ourselves 
in  particular.  And  it  is  absolutely  impossible  we  can  be 
assured  of  this  ;  for  our  ignorance  of  these  reasons  proves 
nothing  in  the  case,  since  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  shows, 
what  is  indeed  in  itself  evident,  that  there  may  be  infinite 
reasons  for  things,  with  which  we  are  not  acquainted. 

But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more  distinctly 
appear,  by  considering  it  more  distinctly  :  First,  As  a  re¬ 
publication,  and  external  institution,  of  natural  or  essential 
religion,  adapted  to  the  present  circumstances  of  maukirid, 
and  intended  to  promote  natural  piety  and  virtue  ;  and  sa- 
Gondly,  As  containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things, 
not  discoverable  by  reason,  in  consequence  of  which  several 
distinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  For,  though  natural  reli¬ 
gion  is  the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Christianity,  it  is 
not  in  any  sense  the  whole  of  it. 

I.  Christianity  is  a  republication  of  natural  religion.  It 
instructs  mankind  in  the  moral  system  of  the  world  ;  that  it 
is  the  work  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  and  under  his  go¬ 
vernment  ;  that  virtue  is  his  law  ;  and  that  he  will  finally 
judge  mankind  in  righteousness,  and  render  to  all  according 
to  their  works,  in  a  future  state.  And,  which  is  very  mate¬ 
rial,  it  teaches  natural  religion  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  free 
from  those  superstitions  with  which  it  was  totally  corrupted, 
and  under  which  it  was  in  a  manner  lost. 

Revelation  is,  farther,  an  authoritative  publication  of  na¬ 
tural  religion,  and  so  affords  the  evidence  of  testimony  for 
the  truth  of  it.  Indeed,  the  miracles  and  prophecies  record¬ 
ed  in  Scripture,  were  intended  to  prove  a  particular  dispensa¬ 
tion  of  Providence — the  redemption  of  the  world  by  the  Mes¬ 
siah  ;  but  this  does  not  hinder  but  that  they  may  also  provo 
God’s  general  providence  over  the  world,  as  our  Moral  Go¬ 
vernor  and  Judge.  And  they  evidently  do  prove  it ;  be¬ 
cause  this  character  of  the  Author  of  nature  is  necessarily 
connected  with  and  implied  in  that  particular  revealed  dis¬ 
pensation  of  things  ;  it  is  likewise  continually  taught  ex» 
pressly;  and  insisted  upon,  by  those  persons  who  wrought 
the  miracles  and  delivered  the  prophecies.  So  that,  indeed, 
natural  religion  seems  as  much  proved  by  the  Scripture  reve¬ 
lation,  as  it  would  have  been,  had  the  design  of  revelation 
been  nothing  else  than  to  prove  it. 

But  it  may  possibly  be  disputed,  how  far  miracles  can 


142 


OF  THE  IMPORTANCE 


[PART  II, 


prove  natural  religion  ;  and  notable  objections  may  be  urged 
against  this  proof  of  it,  considered  as  a  matter  of  specula¬ 
tion  ;  but,  considered  as  a  practical  thing,  there  can  be  none. 
For,  suppose  a  person  to  teach  natural  religion  to  a  nation 
who  had  lived  in  total  ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of  it,  and 
to  declare  he  was  commissioned  by  God  so  to  do  ;  suppose 
him,  in  proof  of  his  commission,  to  foretell  things  future, 
j  which  no  human  foresight  could  have  guessed  at  ]  to  divide 
the  sea  with  a  word  ;  feed  great  multitudes  with  bread  from 
heaven;  cure  all  manner  of  diseases;  and  raise  the  dead, 
even  himself,  to  life  ; — would  not  this  give  additional  credi-. 
bility  to  his  teaching,  a  credibility  beyond  what  that  of  a 
1  common  man  would  have,  and  be  an  authoritative  publica- 
j  tion  of  the  law  of  nature,  i  e.  a  new  proof  of  it  ?  It  would 
1  be  a  practical  one,  of  the  strongest  kind,  perhaps,  which  hu- 
^  man  creatures  are  capable  of  having  given  them.  The  law 
of  Moses,  then,  and  the  gospel  of  Christ,  are  authoritative 
;  publications  of  the  religion  of  nature  :  they  afford  a  proof  of 
i  God’s  general  providence,  as  moral  Governor  of  the  world, 
i  as  well  as  of  his  particular  dispensations  of  Providence  to¬ 
wards  sinful  creatures,  revealed  in  the  law  of  the  gospel. 
As  they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the  latter,  so  they  are  an 
additional  eyidence  of  the  former. 

*  To  show  this  further,  let  us  suppose  a  man  of  the  great-: 
esi  and  most  improved  capacity,  who  had  never  heard  of 
revelation,  convinced  upon  the  whole,  notwithstanding  the 
disorders  of  the  world,  that  it  was  under  the  direction  and 
moral  government  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  but  ready 
to  question,  whether  he  were  not  got  beyond  the  reach  of  his 
faculties  ;  suppose  him  brought,  by  this  suspicion,  into  great 
danger  of  being  carried  away  by  the  universal  bad  example 
of  almost  every  one  around  him,  who  appeared  to  have  no 
sense,  no  practical  sense  at  least,  of  these  things  ;  and  this 
perhaps,  would  be  as  advantageous  a  situation,  with  regard 
to  religion,  as  nature  alone  ever  placed  any  man  in.  'What 
a  confirmation  now  naust  it  be  to  such  a  person,  all  at  once 
to  find,  that  this  moral  system  of  things  was  revealed  to 
mankind,  in  the  name  of  that  infinite  Being  whom  he  had, 
from  principles  of  reason,  believed  in  ;  and  that  the  publish¬ 
ers  of  the  revelation  proved  their  commission  from  him,  by 
making  it  appear  that  he  had  intrusted  them  with  a  power 
of  suspending  and  changing  the  general  laws  of  nature  ! 

Nor  must  it,  by  anj'-  means,  be  omitted  ;  for  it  is  a  thing 
of  the  utmost  importance,  that  life  and  immortality  are  em*- 


OF  CHRISTIANITY. 


143 


CHAP.  I.] 

inently  brought  to  light  by  the  gospel.  The  great  doctrines  ) 
of  a  future  state,  the  danger  of  a  course  of  wickedness,  and  ' 
the  efficacy  of  repentance,  are  not  only  confirmed  in  the  gos¬ 
pel,  but  are  taught,  especially  the  last  is,  with  a  degree  of 
light ;  to  which  that  of  nature  is  but  darkness. 

Farther:  As  Christianity  served  these  ends  and  purposes, 
when  it  was  first  published,  by  the  miraculous  publication  it¬ 
self,  so  it  was  intended  to  serve  the  same  purposes,  in  future 
ages,  by  means  of  the  settlement  of  a  visible  church  ;  of  a  so¬ 
ciety,  distinguished  from  common  ones,  and  from  the  rest  of 
the  world,  by  peculiar  religious  institutions  ;  by  an  instituted 
method  of  instruction,  and  an  instituted  form  of  external  re¬ 
ligion.  Miraculous  powers  were  given  to  the  first  preachers 
of  Christianity,  in  order  to  their  introducing  it  into  the  world  : 
a  visible  church  was  established,  in  order  to  continue  it,  and  ' 
carry  it  on  successively  throughout  all  ages.  Had  Moses  . 
and  the  Prophets,  Christ  and  his  Apostles,  only  taught,  and 
by  miracles  proved,  religion  to  their  contemporaries  the  benefits 
of  their  instructions  would  have  reached  but  to  a  small  part  ■ 
of  mankind.  Christianity  must  have  been,  in  a  great  de-  ^ 
gree,  sunk  and  forgot  in  a  very  few  ages.  To  prevent  this 
appears  to  have  been  one  reason  why  a  visible  church  was 
instituted  ;  to  be,  like  a  city  upon  a  hill,  a  standing  memo¬ 
rial  to  the  world  of  the  duty  which  we  owe  our  Maker  ;  to 
call  men  continually,  both  by  example  and  instruction,  to  at¬ 
tend  to  it,  and,  by  the  form  of  religion  ever  before  their  eyes, 
remind  them  of  the  reality  ;  to  be  the  repository  of  the  ora¬ 
cles  of  God  ;  to  hold  up  the  light  of  revelation  in  aid  to  that 
of  nature,  and  propagate  it  throughout  all  generations  to 
the  end  of  the  world — the  light  of  revelation,  considered  ■ 
here  in  no  other  view,  than  as  designed  to  enforce  natural  re¬ 
ligion.  And,  in  proportion  as  Christianity  is  professed  and 
taught  in  the  world,  religion,  natural  or  essential  religion,  is 
thus  distinctly  and  adv^antageously  laid  before  mankind,  and 
brought  again  and  again  to  their  thoughts,  as  a  matter  of 
infinite  importance.  A  visible  church  has  also  a  farther  ten-  S 
dency  to  promote  natural  religion,  as  being  an  instituted^ 
method  of  education,  originally  intended  to  be  of  more  pecul-  • 
iar  advantage  to  those  who  would  conform  to  it.  For  one, 
end  of  the  institution  was,  that,  by  admonition  and  reproof, 
as  well  as  instruction ;  by  a  general  regular  discipline,  and 
public  exercises  of  religion,  the  body  of  Christy  as  the  Scrip¬ 
ture  speaks,  should  be  edified  ;  i.  e.  trained  up  in  piety  and 
virtue,  foi  a  higher  and  a  better  state.  This  settlement  then. 


144 


or  THE  IMPORTANCE 


[part  II. 


appearing  thus  beneficial;  tending,  in  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  to  answer,  and  in  some  degree  actually  answering, 
those  ends  ;  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  the  very  notion  of 
it  implies  positive  institutions  ;  for  the  visibility  of  the  church 
consists  in  them.  Take  away  every  thing  of  this  kind,  and 
you  lose  the  very  notion  itself.  So  that,  if  the  things  now 
mentioned  are  advantages,  the  reason  and  importance  of 
positive  institutions  in  general  is  most  obvious  ;  since  with' 
out  them,  these  advantages  could  riot  be  secured  to  the  world 
And  it  is  mere  idle  wantonness,  to  insist  upon  knowing  the 
reasons  why  such  particular  ones  were  fixed  upon  rather 
than  others. 

The  benefit  arising  from  this  supernatural  assistance, 
which  Christianity  affords  to  natural  religion,  is  what  some 
persons  are  very  slow  in  apprehending’;  and  yet  it  is  a  thing 
distinct  in  itself,  and  a  very  plain  obvious  one.  For  will 
any,  in  good  earnest,  really  say,  that  the  bulk  of  mankind 
in  the  heathen  world  were  in  as  advantageous  a  situation, 
with  regard  to  natural  religion,  as  they  are  now  amongst 
us  ?  that  it  was  laid  before  them,  and  enforced  upon  them, 
in  a  manner  as  distinct,  and  as  much  tending  to  influence 
their  practice  ? 

The  objections  against  all  this,  from  'the  perversion  of 
Christianity,  and  from  the  supposition  of  its  having  had  but 
little  good  influence,  however  innocently  they  may  be  pro¬ 
posed,  yet  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  conclusive,  upon  any 
principles  but  such  as  lead  to  downright  atheism  ;  because 
the  manifestation  of  the  law  of  nature  by  reason,  which,  up¬ 
on  all  principles  of  theism,  must  have  been  from  God,  has  been 
perverted  and  rendered  ineffectual  in  the  same  manner.  It 
may  indeed,  I  think,  truly  be  said  that  the  good  effects  of 
Christianity  have  not  been  small ;  nor  its  supposed  ill  effects 
at  ail  of  it,  properly  speaking.  Perhaps,  too,  the  things 
themselves  done  have  been  aggravated  ;  and  if  not,  Chris¬ 
tianity  hath  been  often  only  a  pretence  ;  and  the  same  evils, 
in  the  main,  would  have  been  done  upon  some  other  pretence. 
However,  great  and  shocking  as  the  corruptions  and  abuses 
of  it  have  really  been,  they  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  argu¬ 
ments  against  it,  upon  principles  of  theism.  For  one  can¬ 
not  proceed  one  step  in  reasoning  upon  natural  religion,  any 
more  than  upon  Christianity,  without  laying  it  down  as  a 
first  principle,  that  the  dispensations  of  Providence  are  not 
to  be  judged  of  by  their  perversions,  but  by  their  genuine 
tendencies  ;  not  by  what  they  do  actually  seem  to  effect,  but 


CHAP.  I.] 


OP  CHRISTIANITY. 


14s 


by  what  they  would  effect  if  mankind  did  their  part,  that 
part  which  is  justly  put  and  left  upon  them.  It  is  altogeth¬ 
er  as  much  the  language  of  one,  as  of  the  other  :  He  that 
is  unjust^  let  him  he  unjust  still ;  and  he  that  is  holy^  let  him  he 
holy  still*  The  light  of  reason  does  not,  any  more  than 
that  of  revelation,  force  men  to  submit  to  its  authority  :  both 
admonish  them  of  what  they  ought  to  do  and  avoid,  togeth¬ 
er  with  the  consequences  of  each  ;  and,  after  this,  leave 
them  at  full  liberty  to  act  just  as  they  please,  till  the  appoin¬ 
ted  time  of  judgment.  Every  moment’s  experience  shows, 
that  this  is  God’s  general  rule  of  government. 

To  return,  then :  Christianity  being  a  promulgation  of  the 
law  of  nature  ;  being,  moreover,  an  authoritative  promulga¬ 
tion  of  it,  with  new  light  and  other  circumstances  of  pecu-' 
liar  advantage,  adapted  to  the  wants  of  mankind ;  these 
things  fully  show  its  importance.  And  it  is  to  be  observed 
farther  that  as  the  nature  of  the  case  requires,  so  all  Chris¬ 
tians  are  commanded  to  contribute,  by  their  profession  of 
Christianity,  to  preserve  it  in  the  world,  and  render  it  such 
a  promulgation  and  enforcement  of  religion.  For  it  is  the 
very  scheme  of  the  gospel,  that  each  Christian  should,  in 
his  degree,  contribute  towards  continuing  and  carrying  it  on  ; 
all  by  uniting  in  the  public  profession,  and  external  practice 
of  Christianity  ;  some  by  instructing,  by  having  the  over¬ 
sight,  and  taking  care  of  this  religious  community,  the 
Church  of  God.  Now  this  farther  shows  the  importance 
of  Christianity,  and,  which  i»  what  I  chiefly  intend,  its  im¬ 
portance  in  a  practical  sense,  or  the  high  obligations  we  are 
under,  to  take  it  into  our  most  serious  consideration  :  and  the 
danger  there  must  necessarily  be,  not  only  in  treating  it 
despitefully,  which  I  am  not  now  speaking  of,  but  in  disre¬ 
garding  and  neglecting  it.  For  this  is  neglecting  to  do 
what  is  expressly  enjoined  us,  for  continuing  those  benefits 
to  the  world,  and  transmitting  them  down  to  future  times, 
A.nd  all  this  holds,  even  though  the  only  thing  to  be  consi¬ 
dered  in  Christianity  were  its  subserviency  to  natural  reli¬ 
gion.  But, 

II.  Christianity  is  to  be  considered  in  a  further  view,  as 
containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things,  not  at  all 
discoverable  by  reason,  in  consequence  of  which  several  dis¬ 
tinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  Christianity  is  not  only 
an  external  institution  of  natural  religion,  and  a  new  pro- 

*  Rev.  xxii,  11. 

7 


146 


OF  THE  IMPORTANCE 


[part  n. 


miilgation  of  God’s  general  providence,  as  righteous  Gover¬ 
nor  and  Judge  of  the  world  ;  but  it  contains  also  a  revelation 
of  a  particular  dispensation  of  Providence,  carrying  on  by 
his  Son  and  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  salvation  of  mankind, 
who  are  represented,  in  Scripture,  to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin. 
And,  in  consequence  of  this  revelation  being  made,  we  are 
commanded  to  be  baptized^  not  only  in  the  name  of  the  Father^ 
but  also  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Gho^t ;  and  other  obliga¬ 
tions  of  duty,  unknown  before,  to  the  Son  and  the  Holy 
Ghost,  are  revealed.  Now,  the  importance  of  these  duties 
may  be  judged  of,  by  observing  that  they  arise,  not  from 
positive  command  merely,  but  also  from  the  offices  which 
appear,  from  Scripture,  to  belong  to  those  divine  persons  in 
the  gospel  dispensation,  or  from  the  relations  which,  we  are 
there  informed,  they  stand  in  +o  us.  By  reason  is  revealed 
the  relation  which  God  the  Father  stands  in  to  us.  Hence 
arises  the  obligation  of  duty  which  we  are  under  to  him.  In 
Scripture  are  revealed  the  relations  which  the  Son  and  Holy 
Spirit  stand  in  to  us.  Hence  arise  the  obligations  of  duty 
which  we  are  under  to  them.  The  truth  of  the  case,  as  one 
may  speak,  in  each  of  these  three  respects,  being  4J,dmitted, 
that  God  is  the  Governor  of  the  World,  upon  the  evidence  of 
reason  ;  that  Christ  is  the  Mediator  between  God  and  man, 
and  the  Holy  Ghost  our  Guide  and  Sanctifier,  upon  the  evi¬ 
dence  of  revelation ;  the  truth  of  the  case,  I  say,  in  each  of 
these  respects,  being  admitted,  it  is  no  more  a  question,  why 
it  should  be  commanded  that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of 
the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  than  that  we  be  baptized  in 
the  name  of  the  Father.  This  matter  seems  to  require  to 
be  more  fully  stated.* 

Let  it  be  remembered,  then,  that  religion  comes  under  the 
twofold  consideration  of  intGrnal  and  external ;  for  the  latter 
is  as  real  a  part  of  religion,  of  true  religion,  as  the  former. 
Now,  when  religion  is  considered  under  the  first  notion  as 
an  inward  principle,  to  be  exerted  in  such  and  such  inward 
acts  of  the  mind  and  heart,  the  essence  of  natural  religion 
may  be  said  to,  consist  in  religious  regards  to  God  the  Fathei 
Almighty  ;  and  the  essence  of  revealed  religion,  as  distin 
guisbed  from  natural,  to  consist  in  religious  regards  to  the 
Son,  and  to  the  Holy  Ghost.  And  the  obligation  we  are  un¬ 
der,  of  paying  these  religious  regards  to  each  of  these  di 

*  See  the  Nature,  Obligation,  and  Efficacy,  of  the  Christian  Sacra- 
meats,  &c.  and  Colliber  on  Revealed  religion,  as  there  quoted. 


CHAP.  I.] 


OF  CHRISTIANITY. 


147 


vine  persons  respectively,  arises  from  the  respective  relation? 
>\^hich  they  each  stand  in  to  us.  How  these  relations  are  ' 
made  known,  'whether  by  reason  or  revelatic-n,  makes  no  al-  | 
teration  in  the  case  ;  because  the  duties  arise  out  of  the  rela-  „ 
lions  themselves,  not  out  of  the  manner  in  which  we  are  in- 
formed  of  them.  The  Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper 
office  in  that  great  dispensation  of  Providence,  the  redemp¬ 
tion  of  the  world  ;  the  one  onr  Mediator,  the  other  our  Sanc¬ 
tifier.  Does  not,  then,  the  duty  of  religious  regards  to  both 
these  divine  persons,  as  immediately  arise,  to  the  view  of 
reason,  out  of  the  very  nature  of  these  offices  and  relaTions, 
as  the  inward  good  will  and  kind  attention,  which  we  owe  to 
our  fellow-creatures,  arises  out  of  the  common  relations  be¬ 
tween  us  and  them  ?  But  it  will  be  asked,  ‘  What  are  the 
inward  religious  regards,  appearing  thus  obviously  due  to  the 
Son  and  Holy  Spirit,  as  arising,  not  merely  from  command 
in  Scripture,  but  from  the  verj^  nature  of  the  revealed  rela¬ 
tions  which  they  stand  in  to  us  ?  ’  I  answer,  the  religious  ] 
regards  of  reverence,  honor,  love,  trust,  gratitude,  fear,  hope,  f 
In  what  external  manner  this  inward  wmrship  is  to  be  ex¬ 
pressed,  is  a  matter  of  pure  revealed  command  ;  as  perhaps, 
the  external  manner  in  which  God  the  Father  is  to  be  wor¬ 
shipped,  may  be  more  so  than  we  are  ready  to  think  ;  but 
the  worship,  the  internal  v/orship  itself,  to  the  Son  and  Ho¬ 
ly  Ghost,  is  no  farther  matter  of  pure  revealed  command,  \ 
than  as  the  relations  they  stand  in  to  us,  are  matter  of  pure  \ 
revelation  ;  for  the  relations  being  known,  the  obligations  to  \ 
such  internal  worship  are  obligations  of  reason,  arising  out  t 
of  those  relations  themselves.  In  short,  the  history  of  the 
gospel  as  immediately  shows  us  the  reason  of  these  obliga¬ 
tions,  as  it  shows  us  the  meaning  of  the  wmrds,  Son  and  Ho¬ 
ly  Ghost. 

If  this  account  of  the  Christian  religion  he  just,  those  per¬ 
sons  who  can  speak  lightly  of  it,  as  of  little  consequence,  provi¬ 
ded  natural  religion  be  kept  to,  plainly  forget,  that  Chris-  4 
tianit}^,  even  what  is  peculiarly  so  called,  as  distinguished 
from  natural  religion,  has  yet  somewhat  very  important,  even 
of  a  m.oral  nature.  F  or  the  office  of  our  Lord  bein.g  made  known . 
and  the  relation  he  stands  in  to  us,  the  obligation  of  religious 
regards  to  him  is  plainl}^  moral,  as  much  as  charity  to  man-  i 
kind  is :  since  this  obligation  arises,  before  external  com- 
mand,  immediately  out  of  that  his  office  and  relation  itself. 
Those  persons  appear  to  forget,  that  revelation  is  to  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  informing  us  of  somewhat  new  in  the  state  of  man-  » 


148 


OF  THE  IMPORTANCE 


[part  IL 


kind,  and  in  the  goverment  of  the  world  ;  as  acquainting  ua 
with  some  relations  we  stand  in,  which  could  not  otherwise 
have  been  known.  And  these  relations  being  real,  (though 
before  revelation  we  could  be  under  no  obligations  from  them, 
yet  upon  their  being  revealed,)  the^e  is  po  ?-eason  to  think, but 
that  neglect  of  behaving  suitably  to  them  will  be  attended 
with  the  same  kind  of  consequences  under  God’s  government, 
as  neglecting  to  behave  suitably  to  any  other  relations  made 
known  to  us  by  reason.  And  ignorance,  whether  unavoida¬ 
ble  or  voluntary,  so  far  as  we  can  possibly  see,  will,  just  as 
much,  and  just  as  little,  excuse  in  one  case  as  in  the  other : 
the  ignorance  being  suppiosed  equally  unavoidable,  or 
equally  voluntary,  in  both  cases. 

If,  therefore,  Christ  he  indeed  the  Mediator  between  Gk)d 
and  man,  i.  e.  if  Christianity  be  true  ;  if  he  be  indeed  our 
Lord,  our  Saviour,  and  our  God,  no  one  pan  say  what  may 
follow,  not  only  the  obstinate,  but  the  careless,  disregard  to 
him  in  those  high  relations.  Nay,  no  one  can  say  what 
may  follow  such  disregard,  even  in  the  way  of  natural  con¬ 
sequence.  For,  as  the  natural  consequences  of  vice  in  this 
life  are  doubtless  to  be  considered  as  judicial  punishments 
inflicted  by  God,  so  likewise,  for  aught  we  know,  the  judicial 
punishments  of  the  future  life  may  be,  in  a  like  way,  or  a 
like  sense,  the  natural  consequence  of  vice  jj*  of  men’s  vio-^ 
lating  or  disregarding  the  relations  which  God  has  placed 
them  in  here,  and  made  known  to  them. 

Again,  If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  depraved  in  their 
moral  character,  and  so  are  unfit  for  that  state  which  Christ 
is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples  ;  and  if  the  assistance  of 
God’s  Spirit  be  necessary  to  renew  their  nature,  in  a  degree 
requisite  to  their  being  qualified  for  that  state  ;  all  which  is 
implied  in  the  express,  though  figurative,  declaration,  Ex¬ 
cept  a  man  he  horn  of  the  Spirit^  he  cannot  enter  into  the  king¬ 
dom  of  God  :J  supposing  this,  is  it  possible  any  serious  per¬ 
son  can  think  it  a  slight  matter,  whether  or  no  he  makes 
use  of  the  means,  expressly  commanded  by  God,  for  obtain¬ 
ing  this  divine  assistance  ?  especially  since  the  whole  analo¬ 
gy  of  nature  shows,  that  we  are  not  to  expect  any  benefits, 
without  making  use  of  the  appointed  mearis  for  obtaining  or 
enjoying  them.  Now,  reason  shows  us  nothing  of  the  par¬ 
ticular  iipmediate  means  of  obtaining  either  temporal  oj 


t  Chap.  5. 


t  John  iii.  5. 


CHAP.  I.] 


OP  CHRISTIANITY. 


U9 


Bpiritiial  benefits.  This,  therefore,  we  must  learn,  eithei 
from  experience  or  revelation.  And  experience  the  present 
case  does  not  admit  of. 

The  conclusion  from  all  this  evidently  is,  that  Christianity 
being  supposed  either  true  or  credible,  it  is  unspeakable 
irreverence,  and  really  the  ipost  presumptuous  rashness,  to 
treat  it  as  a  light  matter,  It  can  never  justly  be  esteemed 
of  little  consequence,  till  it  be  positively  supposed  false.  Nor 
do  I  know  a  higher  and  more  important  obligation  which 
we  are  under,  than  that  qf  examining  most  seriously  into 
the  evidence'  of  it,  supposing  its  credibility  ;  and  of  embrac¬ 
ing  it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth. 

The  two  following  deductions  may  be  proper  to  be  added, 
in  order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  observations,  and  to  pre¬ 
vent  their  being  mistaken. 

First,  Hence  we  may  clearly  see,  where  lies  the  distinc¬ 
tion  between  what  is  positive  and  what  is  moral  in  religion. 
Moral  precepts  are  precepts,  the  reasons  of  which  we  see  ; 
positive  precepts  are  precepts,  the  reasons  of  which  we  do.. 
not  see.^  j^Moral  duties  arise  out  of,  the  nature  of  the  case 
itself,  prior  to  external  command.  Positive  duties  do  not 
arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case,  but  frqm  external  com¬ 
mand  ;  nor  would  they  be  duties  at  all,  were  it  not  for  such 
command  received  from  him,  whose  creatures  and  subjects 
we  are.  But  the  manner  in  which  the  nature  of  the  case, 
or  the  fact  of  the  relatiori,  is  made  known,  this  doth  not  de¬ 
nominate  any  duty,  either  positive  or  moral.  That  we  be 
baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  is  as  much  a  positive 
duty  as  that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son  ;  be¬ 
cause  both  arise  equally  from  revealed  command  :  though 
the  relation  which  we  stand  in  to  God  the  Father,  is  made 
known  to  us  by  reason  ;  the  relation  we  stand  in  to  Christ, 
by  revelation  only.  On  the  other  hand,  the  dispensation  of 
the  gospel  admitted,  gratitude  as  immediately  becomes  due 
to  Christ,  from  his  being  the  voluntary  minister  of  this  dis¬ 
pensation,  as  it  is  due  to  Gqd  the  Father,  from  his  being  the 
fountain  of  all  good  ;  though  the  first  is  made  known  to  us 
by  revelation  only,  the  second  by  reason.  Hence  also  we 

*  This  is  the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts,  consider¬ 
ed  respectively  as  such.  But  yet,  since  the  latter  have  somewhat  of  a  mo¬ 
ral  nature,  we  may  see  the  reason  of  them  considered  in  this  view.  Mo¬ 
ral  and  positive  precepts  are  in  some  respects  alike,  in  other  respects  differ¬ 
ent.  So  far  as  they  are  alike,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  both ;  so  far  as 
they  are  difibitent,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  the  former,  but  not  of  the  lat¬ 
ter. 


150 


OP  THE  IMPORTANCE 


[part  U 


may  see,  and,  for  distinctness  sake,  it  may  be  worth  men¬ 
tioning,  that  positive  institutions  come  under  a  twofold  con¬ 
sideration.  They  are  either  institutions  founded  on  natural 
religion,  as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Father  ;  though  this 
has  also  a  particular  reference  to  the  gospel  dispensation, 
for  it  is  in  the  name  of  God,  as  the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ ;  or  they  are  external  institutions  founded  on  revealed 
religion,  as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy 
Ghost. 

Secondly^  From  the  distinction  between  what  is  moral  and 
what  is  positive  in  religion,  appears  the  ground  of  that  pe¬ 
culiar  preference,  which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  to  be  due 
to  the  former. 

The  reason  of  positive  institutions  in  general  is  very  obvi¬ 
ous,  though  we  should  not  see  the  reason  why  such  parti¬ 
cular  ones  are  pitched  upon,  rather  than  others.  Whoever, 
therefore,  instead  of  cavilling  at  words,  will  attend  to  the 
thing  itself,  may  clearly  see,  that  positive  institutions  in 
general,  as  distinguished  from  this  or  that  particular  one, 
have  the  nature  of  moral  commands  :  since  the  reasons  of 
them  appear.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  external  worship  of 
God  is  a  moral  duty,  though  no  particular  mode  of  it  be  so. 
Care  then  is  to  be  taken,  when  a  comparison  is  made  be¬ 
tween  positive  and  moral  duties,  that  they  be  compared  no 
farther  than  as  they  are  different ;  no  farther  than  as  the 
former  are  positive,  or  arise  out  of  mere  external  command, 
the  reasons  of  which  we  are  not  acquainted  with  ;  and  as 
the  latter  are  moral,  or  arise  out  of  the  apparent  reason  of 
the  case,  without  such  external  command.  Unless  this  cau¬ 
tion  be  observed,  we  shall  run  into  endless  confusion. 

Now,  this  being  premised,  suppose  two  standing  precepts 
enjoined  by  the  same  authority ;  that,  in  certain  conjunctures 
it  is  impossible  to  obey  both ;  that  the  former  is  moral,  i.  e.  a 
precept  of  which  we  see  the  reasons,  and  that  they  hold  in 
the  particular  case  before  us  ;  but  that  the  latter  is  positive, 

.  i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  do  not  see  the  reasons ;  it  is  in¬ 
disputable  that  our  obligations  are  to  obey  the  former,  because 
there  is  an  apparent  reason  for  this  preference,  and  none 
against  it.  F arther,  positive  institutions.  I  suppose  all  those 
which  Christianity  enjoins,  are  means  to  a  moral  end  ;  and 
the  end  must  be  acknowledged  more  excellent  than  the 
^  means.  Nor  is  observance  of  these  institutions  any  religious 
obedience  at  all,  or  of  any  value,  otherwise  than  as  it  pro¬ 
ceeds  from  a  moral  principle.  This  seems  to  be  the  strict 


CHAP.  I.] 


OF  CHRISTIANITY. 


151 


log'ical  way  of  stating  and  determining  this  matter ;  but 
will,  perhaps,  be  found  less  applicable  to  practice,  than  may 
be  thou2:ht  at  first  sio:ht. 

And  therefore,  in  a  more  practical,  though  more  lax  way 
of  consideration,  and  taking  the  words,  moral  law  and  positive 
institutions^  in  the  popular  sense ;  I  add,  that  the  whole 
moral  law  is  as  much  matter  of  revealed  command,  as  posh  , 
live  institutions  arc ;  for  the  scripture  enjoins  every  moral  \ 
virtue.  In  this  respect,  then,  they  are  both  upon  a  level, 
But  the  moral  law  is,  moreover,  written  upon  our  hearts,  in¬ 
terwoven  into  our  very  nature.  And  this  is 'a  plain  intima¬ 
tion  of  the  Author  of  it,  which  is  to  be  preferred,  when  they 
interfere. 

But  there  is  not  altogether  so  much  necessity  for  the  de¬ 
termination  of  this  question  as  some  persons  seem  to  think, 
Nor  are  we  left  to  reason  alone  to  determine  it.  For,  firsts 
'Though  mankind  have  in  all  ages  been  greatly  prone  to 
iilace  their  religion  in  peculiar  positive  rites,  by  way  of  equi- 
valen  for  obedience  to  moral  precepts  ;  yet,  without  making 
any  comparison  at  all  between  them,  and  consequently  with¬ 
out  determining  which  is  to  have  the  preference,  the  nature 
of  the  thing  abundantly  shows  all  notions  of  that  kind  to  be 
utterly  subversive  of  true  religion  ;  as  they  are,  moreover, 
contrary  to  thf^  whole  general  tenor  of  Scripture,  and  like? 
wuse  to  the  most  express  particular  declarations  of  it,  that 
nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of  God,  without  moral  virtue, 
Secondhj^  Upon  the  occasion  of  mentioning  together  positive 
and  moral  duties,  'the  Scripture  always  puts  the  stress  of  re¬ 
ligion  upon  the  latter,  and  never  upon  the  former  ;  which,  t,' 
though  no  sort  of  allow^ance  to  neglect  the  former,  when  they 
io  not  interfere  with  the  latter,  yet  is  a  plain  intimation,  that  , 
when  they  do,  the  latter  are  to  be  preferred.  And,  farther, 
as  mankind  are  for  placing  the  stress  of  their  religion  any 
where,  rather  than  upon  virtue,  lest  both  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  and  the  general  spirit  of  Christianity,  appearing  in  the 
intimation  now  mentioned,  should  be  ineffectual  against  this 
prevalent  folly  :  our  Lord  himself,  from  whose  command 
alone  the  obligation  of  positive  institutions  arises,  has  taken 
occasion  to  make  the  comparison  between  them  and  moral 
precepts,  when  the  Pharisees  censured  him  for  eating  with 
publicans  and  sinners ;  and  also  when  they  censured  his  dis’* 
ciples  for  plucking  the  ears  of  corn  on  the  Sabbath  day.  Upon 
this  comparison  he  has  determined  expressly,  and  in  form, 
which  shall  have  the  preference  when  they  interfere.  And 


152 


OF  THE  IMPORTANCE 


[PART  IJ. 


by  delivering  his  authoritative  determination  in  a  proverbial 
manner  of  expression,  he  has  made  it  general :  I  luill  have 
mercy ^  and  not  sacrifice.*-  The  propriety  of  the  word  prover¬ 
bial  is  not  the  thing  insisted  upon,  though,  I  think,  the  man¬ 
ner  of  speaking  is  to  be  called  so.  But  that  the  manner  of 
speaking  very  remarkably  renders  the  determination  general, 
is  surely  indisputable.  For,  had  it,  in  the  latter  case,  been 
said  only,  that  God  preferred  mercy  to  the  rigid  observance 
of  the  Sabbath,  even  then,  by  parity  of  reason,  most  justly 
might  we  have  argued,  that  he  preferred  mercy,  likewise,  to 
the  observance  of  other  ritual  institutions,  and,  in  general, 
moral  duties  to  positive  ones.  And  thus  the  determination 
would  have  been  general,  though  its  being  so  were  inferred, 
and  not  expressed.  But  as  the  passage  really  stands  in  the 
gospel,  it  is  much  stronger  ;  for  tl)e  sense,  and  the  very  lite¬ 
ral  words  of  our  Lord’s  answer,  are  as  applicable  to  any 
other  instance  of  a  comparison,  between  positive  and  moral 
duties,  as  to  this  upon  which  they  were  spoken.  And  if,  in 
case  of  competition,  mercy  is  to  be  preferred  to  positive  in¬ 
stitutions,  it  will  scarce  be  thought,  that  justice  is  to  give 
place  to  them.  It  is  remarkable,  too,  that,  as  the  words  are 
a  quotation  from  tjie  Old  Testament,  they  are  introduced,  on 
both  of  the  forementioned  occasions,  with  a  declaration,  that 
the  Pharisees  did  not  understand  the  meaning  of  them,  This, 
I  say,  is  very  remarkable ;  for,  since  it  is  scarce  possible  for 
the  most  ignorant  person  not  to  understand  the  literal  sense 
of  the  passage  in  the  Prophet,  |  and  since  understanding  the 
literal  sense  would  not  have  prevented  their  condemning  the 
guiltless^’^,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted,  that  the  thing  w^hich  our 
Lord  really  intended  in  that  declaration  was,  that  the  Phari¬ 
sees  had  not  learnt  from  it,  as  they  might,  wherein  the  gene¬ 
ral  spirit  of  religion  consists  ;  that  it  consists  in  moral  piety 
and  virtue,  as  distinguished  from  forms  and  ritual  observan¬ 
ces.  However,  it  is  certain  we  may  learn  this  from  his  di¬ 
vine  application  of  the  passage,  in  the  gospel. 

But, as  it  is  oneof  the  peculiar  weaknesses  of  human  nature, 
when,  upon  a  comparison  of  two  things,  one  is  found  to  be  of 
greater  importance  than  the  other,  to  consider  this  other  as 
of  scarce  any  importance  at  all ;  it  is  highly  necessary  that 
we  remind  ourselves,  how  great  presumption  it  is  to  make  light 

*  Matt.  ix.  13,  and  xii.  7,  t  Hoa.  vl 

It  See  Matt.  xii.  7. 


CHAP,  I.] 


OF  CIIRISTIA??ITY. 


15^ 


of  any  institutions  of  divine  appointment ;  that  our  obligations 
to  obey  all  God’s  commands  whatever,  are  absolute  and  in¬ 
dispensable  ;  and  that  commands  merely  positive,  admitted 
to  be  from  him,  lay  us  under  a  moral  obligation  to  obey  them  ; 
an  obligation  moral  in  the  strictest  and  most  proper  sense. 

To  these  things!  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the  account 
now  given  of  Christianity  most  strongly  shows  and  enforces 
upon  us  the  obligation  of  searching  the  Scriptures,  in  order 
to  see  what  the  scheme  pf  revelation  really  is  instead  of  deter¬ 
mining  beforehand,  from  reason,  what  the  scheme  of  it 
m,ust  be.*  Indeed,  if  in  revelation  there  be  found  any  pas¬ 
sages,  the  seeming  meaning  of  which  is  contrary  to  natural 
religion,  we  may  most  certainly  conclude  such  seeming 
meaning  not  to  be  the  real  one.  But  it  is  not  any  degree  of 
presumption  against  an  interpretation  of  Scriptures,  that  such 
interpretation  '  contains  a  doctrine,  which  the  light  of  nature 
cannot  discover,  or  a  precept,  w'hich  the  law  of  nature  does 
not  oblige  to. 


154 


OP  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION  [PART  11. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  Supposed  'Presumption  against  a  "Revelation^  consid¬ 
ered  as  JMiraculous. 

Having  shown  the  importance  of  the  Christian  revela¬ 
tion,  and  the  obligations  which  we  are  under  seriously  to  at¬ 
tend  to  it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth  or  its  credibility ;  the 
next  thing  in  order  is,  to  consider  the  supposed  presumptions 
against  revelation  in  general,  which  shall  be  the  subject  of 
this  chapter ;  and  the  objections  against  the  Christian  in 
particular,  which  shall  be  the  subject  of  some  following 
ones  *  For  it  seems  the  most  natural  method  to  remove 
these  prejudices  against  Christianity,  before  we  proceed  to 
the  consideration  of  the  positive  evidence  for  it,  and  the  ob¬ 
jections  against  that  evidence. I 

It  is,  I  think,  commonly  supposed,  that  there  is  some  pe¬ 
culiar  presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  the 
Christian  scheme  of  things,  at  least  against  miracles ;  so  as 
that  stronger  evidence  is  necessary  to  prove  the  truth  and 
reality  of  them,  than  would  be  sufficient  to  convince  us  of 
other  events  or  matters  of  fact.  Indeed,  the  consideration 
of  this  supposed  presumption  cannot  but  be  thought  very  in¬ 
significant  by  many  persons  ;  yet,  as  it  belongs  to  the  sub 
ject  of  this  treatise,  so  it  may  tend  to  open  the  mind,  and  re¬ 
move  some  prejudices  ;  however  needless  the  consideration 
of  it  be,  upon  its  own  account. 

I.  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  presumption,  from  the  anal¬ 
ogy  of  nature,  against  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity, 
that  God  created  and  invisibly  governs  the  world  by  Jesus 
Christ,  and  by  him  also  will  hereafter  judge  it  in  righteous¬ 
ness,  i.  e.  render  to  every  one  according  to  his  works  ;  and 
that  good  men  are  under  the  secret  influence  of  his  Spirit. 


*  Cbap.  3,  4}  5,  6 


t  Chap.  7. 


CHAP.  II.] 


AGAINST  MIRACLES. 


15& 


Whether  these  things  are,  or  are  not,  to  be  called  miraculous, 
is,  perhaps,  only  a  question  about  words  ;  or,  however,  is  of 
no  moment  in  the  case.  If  the  analogy  of  nature  raises  any  j 
presumption  against  this  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  it 
must  be,  either  because  it  is  not  discoverable  by  reason 
or  experience,  or  else  because  it  is  unlike  that  course  of  na? ' 
ture,  which  is.  But  analogy  raises  no  presumption  against 
the  truth  of  this  scheme,  upon  either  of  these  accounts. 

Firs^,  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against  the 
truth  of  it,  upon  account  of  its  not  being  discoverable  by 
reason  or  experience.  For,  suppose  one  who  never  heard 
'of  revelation,  of  the  most  improved  understanding,  and  ac^ 
quainted  with  our  whole  system  of  natural  philosophy  and 
natural  religion  ;  such  a  one  could  not  but  be  sensible,  thai 
it  was  but  a  very  small  part  of  the  natural  and  moral  system 
of  the  universe,  which  he  was  acquainted  with.  He  could 
not  but  be  sensible,  that  there  must  be  innumerable  things, 
in  the  dispensations  of  Providence  past,  in  the  invisible  go¬ 
vernment  over  the  world  at  present  carrying  on,  and  in  what 
is  to  come,  of  which  he  was  v/holly  ignorant,  and  which 
could  not  be  discovered  without  revelation.  Whether  the 
scheme  of  nature  be,  in  the  strictest  sense,  infinite  or  not,  it 
is  evidently  vast,  even  beyond  all  possible  imagination. 
And,  doubtless,  that  part  of  it  which  is  opened  to  our  view, 
is  but  as  a  point,  in  comparison  of  the  whole  plan  of  Provi¬ 
dence,  reaching  throughout  etermty,  past  and  future  ;  in 
comparison  of  what  is  even  now  going  on  in  the  remote  parts 
of  the  boundless  universe  ;  nay,  in  comparison  of  the  whole 
scheme  of  this  world.  And,  therefore,  that  things  lie  beyond  ^ 
the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties,  is  no  sort  of  presumption  , 
against  the  truth  and  reality  of  them  ;  because  it  is  certain,  / 
there  are  innumerable  things  in  the  constitution  and  govern¬ 
ment  of  the  universe,  which  are  thus  bejmnd  the  natural 
reach  of  our  faculties.  Secondly^  Analogy  raises  no  pre¬ 
sumption  against  any  of  the  things  contained  in  this  general 
doctrine  of  Scripture  now  mentioned,  upon  account  of  their 
being  unlike  the  known  course  of  nature.  For  there  is  no 
presumption  at  all,  from  analogy,  that  the  xohole  course  of 
things,  or  divine  government,  naturally  unknown  to  us,  and 
every  thing  in  it,  is  like  to  any  thing  in  that  which  is  known  ; 
and  therefore  no  peculiar  presumption  against  any  thing  in 
tlie  former,  upon  account  of  its  being  unlike  to  any  thing  in 


0^ 


I 

1 


156  OF  THi;  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION  [PAI^T  If. 

the  latter.  And  in  the  constitution  and  natural  government 
of  the  world,  as  well  as  in  the  moral  government  of  it,  we 
see  things,  in  a  great  degree,  unlike  one  another  :  and  there¬ 
fore  ought  not  to  wonder  at  such  unlikeness  between  things 
visible  and  invisible.  However,  the  scheme  of  Christianity 
is  by  no  means  entirely  unlike  the  scheme  of  nature  ;  as  will 
appear  i.n  the  following  part  of  this  treatise. 

The  notion  of  a  rniracle,  considered  as  a  proof  of  a  di¬ 
vine  mission,  has  been  stated  with  great  exactness  by  di¬ 
vines  ;  and  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  understood  by  every  one, 
There  are  also  iavisible  miracles  ;  the  incarnation  of  Christ, 
for  instance,  which,  beipg  secret,  cannot  be  alledged  as  a. 
proof  of  such  a  missiori ;  but  require  themselves  to  be  pro¬ 
ved  by  visible  EQiracles.  Revelation,  itself,  too,  is  miraculous 
and  miracles  are  the  proof  of  it ;  and  the  supposed  presump¬ 
tion  against  these  shall  presently  be  considered.  All  which 
I  have  been  observing  here  is,  that,  whether  we  choose  to 
call  every  thing  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence,  not  dis¬ 
coverable  without  revelation,  nor  like  the  known  course  of 
things,  miraculous  ;  and  whether  the  general  Christian  dis¬ 
pensation  now  mentioned,  is  to  be  called  so,  or  not ;  the  forer 
going  observations  seem  certainly  to  show,  that  there  is  no 
presumption  against  it,  from  the  analogy  of  nature. 

II.  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  agairist  some 
operations,  which  we  should  now  call  miraculous  ;  particu¬ 
larly,  none  against  a  revelation,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
world  ;  nothing  of  such  presumptions  against  it,  as  is  sup¬ 
posed  to  be  implied  or  expressed  in  the  word  miraculous. 
For  a  inirpLcle,  ip  its  very  notion,  is  relative  to  a  course  of 
nature  ;  and  implies  spm.ewhat  different  from  it,  considered 
as  being  so.  Now,  either  there  was  no  epurse  of  nature  at 
the  time  which  we  are  speaking  of ;  or  if  there  were,  we  are 
not  acquainted  what  the  course  of  nature  is  upon  the  first 
peopling  of  worlds.  Apd  therefore  the  question,  whethejf 
mankind  had  a  revelatiop  made  to  them  at  that  time  is  to  be 
considered,  not  as  a  question  concerning  a  miracle,  but  as  a 
common  question  of  fact.  And  we  have  the  Ijke  t'eason,  be 
it  more  or  less,  to  admit  the  report  pf  tradition  concerning 
this  question  and  concerning  common  matters  of  fact  of  the 
same  antiquity ;  for  instance,  what  part  of  the  earth  was 
first  peopled. 

Or  thus :  When  mapkind  was  first  placed  in  this  state, 
there  was  a  power  exerted,  totally  different  from  the  present 
course  of  nature.  Now,  whether  this  power,  thus  wholly 


CHAP.  li.l 


AGAINST  MlRACLilS. 


i5t 

different  from  the  present  course  of  nature  ;  for  vve  cannot 
properly  apply  to  it  the  word  miraculous  ;  whether  this  power 
stopped  immediately  after  it  had  made  man,  or  went  on,  and 
exerted  itself  farther  in  giving  him  a  revelation,  is  a  fjtiestion 
of  the  same  kind^  as  whether  an  ordinary  power  exerted  itself 
in  such  a  particular  degree  and  manner,  or  not. 

Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of  the  world 
/  be  considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather,  be  called  by  the  name, 
the  case  will  not  be  different ;  since  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
,that  such  a  power  was  exerted.  For  supposing  it  acknow¬ 
ledged  that  our  Saviour  spent  some  years  in  a  course  of 
working  miracles  ;  there  is  no  more  presumption,  worth  meh* 
tioning,  against  his  having  exerted  this  miraculous  power, 
in  a  certain  degree  greater,  than  in  a  certain  degree  less  ;  in 
one  or  two  more  instances,  than  in  one  or  two  fewer  ;  in  this, 
than  in  another  manner. 

It  is  evident,  thenj  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar  presuihption, 
from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  supposing  a  revelation, 
when  man  was  first  placed  upon  the  earth. 

Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  least  intimation  in 
history  or  tradition,  that  religion  was  first  reasoned  out ;  but 
I  I  the  whole  of  history  and  tradition  makes  for  the  other  side, 
thdt  it  came  into  the  world  by  revelation.  Indeed,  the  state 
of  religion  in  the  first  ages,  of  which  we  have  any  account 
seems  to  suppose  and  imply,  that  this  was  the  original  of 
it  amongst  mankind.  And  these  reflections  together,  with* 
out  taking  in  the  peculiar  authority  of  Scripture,  amount  to 
real  and  very  material  degree  of  evidence,  that  there  was  a 
revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world.  Now  this,  as  it  is 
a  confirmation  of  natural  religion,  and  therefore  mentioned  in 
the  former  part  of  this  treatise  5  so,  likewise,  it  has  a  ten¬ 
dency  to  remove  any  prejudices  against  a  subsequent  revela¬ 
tion. 

III.  But  still  it  may  be  objected,  that  there  is  some  pecu¬ 
liar  presumption  from  analogy,  against  miracles  ;  particular¬ 
ly  against  revelation,  after  the  settlement  and  during  the 
continuance  of  a  course  of  nature. 

Now,  with  regard  to  this  supposed  presumption,  it  is  to 
be  observed  in  general,  that  before  we  can  have  ground  foi 
raising  what  can,  with  any  propriety,  be  called  an  argument 
from  analogy,  for  or  against  revelation  considered  as  some* 
what  miraculous,  we  must  be  acquainted  with  a  similar  or 


i58  OP  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION  [PART  II, 

parallel  case.  But  the  history  of  some  other  world,  seemingly 
in  like  circumstances  with  our  own,  is  no  more  than  a  parallel 
Case ;  and  therefore  nothing  short  of  this  can  be  so.  Y et, 
could  we  come  at  a  presumptive  proof,  for  or  against  a  reve¬ 
lation,  from  being  informed  whether  such  world  had  one,  or 
not ;  such  a  proof,  being  drawn  from  one  single  instance 
only,  must  be  infinitely  precarious.  More  particularly :  First 
of  all.  There  is  a  very  strong  presumption  against  common 
speculative  truths,  and  against  the  most  ordinary  facts,  before 
the  proof  of  them ;  which  yet  is  overcome  by  almost  any 
proof  There  is  a  presumption  of  millions  to  one,  against  the 
Story  of  CcBsar,  or  of  any  other  man.  For  suppose  a  number 
of  common  facts  so  and  so  circumstanced,  of  "tvhich  one  had 
no  kind  of  proof,  should  happen  to  come  into  one’s  thoughts  ; 
every  one  wouldj  without  any  possible  doubt,  conclude  them 
to  be  false.  And  the  like  may  be  said  of  a  single  common 
fact.  And  from  hence  it  appears,  that  the  question  of  im¬ 
portance,  as  to  the  matter  before  us,  is,  concerning  the  degree 
of  the  peculiar  presumption  supposed  against  miracles  ;  not 
whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all  against 
them.  For,  if  there  be  the  presumption  of  millions  to  one, 
against  the  most  common  facts,  what  can  a  small  presump¬ 
tion,  additional  to  this,  amount  to,  though  it  be  peculiar  ?  It 
cannot  be  estimated,  and  is  as  nothing.  The  only  material 
question  is,  whether  there  be  any  such  presumption  against 
miracles,  as  to  render  them  in  any  sort  incredible  ?  Secondly^ 
if  we  leave  out  the  consideration  of  religion,  we  are  in  such 
total  darkness,  upon  what  causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  cir¬ 
cumstances,  the  present  course  of  nature  depends,  that  there 
does  not  appear  any  improbability  for  or  against  supposing, 
that  five  or  six  thousand  years  may  have  given  scope  for 
causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  circumstances,  from  whence 
miraculous  interpositions  may  have  arisen.  And  from  this, 
joined  with  the  foregoing  observation,  it  will  follow,  that  there 
must  be  a  presumption,  beyond  all  comparison,  greater,  against 
the  'particular  common  facts  just  now  instanced  in,  than 
against  miracles  in,  general ;  before  any  evidence  of  either. 
But,  thirdly,  Take  in  the  consideration  of  religion,  or  the 
moral  system  of  the  world,  and  then  we  see  distinct  particu¬ 
lar  reasons  for  miracles  ;  to  afihrd  mankind  instruction  addi¬ 
tional  to  that  of  nature,  and  to  attest  the  truth  of  it.  And 
this  gives  a  real  credibility  to  the  supposition,  that  it  might  be 
part  of  the  original  plan  of  things,  that  there  should  be  mi¬ 
raculous  interpositions.  Then,  lastly^  Miracles  must  not  be 


AGAINST  MIRACLES. 


159 


CHAP.  II.] 


compared  to  common  natural  events;  or  to  events  which, 
though  uncommon,  are  similar  to  what  we  daily  experience  ; 
but  to  the  extraordinary  phenomena  of  nature.  And  then 
the  comparison  will  be,  between  the  presumption  against 
miracles,  and  the  presumption  against  such  uncommon  ap¬ 
pearances,  suppose,  as  comets,  and  against  there  being  any 
such  powers  in  nature  as  magnetism  and  electricity,  so  con¬ 
trary  to  the  properties  Of  other  bodies  not  endued  with  these 
powers.  And  before  any  one  can  determine,  whether  there 
be  any  peculiar  presumption  against  miracles,  more  than 
a.gainst  Other  extraordinary  things,  he  must  consider,  what, 
upon  iirst  hearing,  would  be  the  presumption  against  the  last 
mentioned  appearances  and  powers,  to  a  person  acquainted 
only  with  the  daily,  monthly,  and  annual  course  of  nature 
respecting  this -earth,  and  with  those  common  powers  of 
matter  which  we  every  day  see. 

Upon  all  this  I  conclude.  That  there  certainly  is  no  such 
presumption  against  miracles,  as  to  render  them  in  any  wise 
incredible ;  that,  on  the  contrary,  our  being  able  to  discern 
reasons  for  them,  gives  a  positive  credibility  to  the  history  of 
them,  in  cases  where  those  reasons  hold ;  and  that  it  is  by 
no  means  certain,  that  there  is  any  peculiar  presumption  at 
all,  from  analogy,  even  in  the  lowest  degree,  against  miracles, 
as  distinguished  from  other  extraordinary  phenomena ;  though 
it  is  not  worth  while  to  perplex  the  reader  with  inquiries  into 
the  abstract  nature  of  evidence,  in  order  to  determine  a  ques¬ 
tion,  which,  without  such  inquiries,  we  see  is  of  no  impor¬ 
tance. 


/ 


/ 


1 

\ 


V 


l(jy 


tHE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  fpART  II. 


! 

CHAPTER  nl. 


Of  our  Incapacity  of  Judging,  what  were  to  be  expected  iii 
a  Revelation  ;  and  the  Credibility  from  Analogy,  that  it 
must  contain  Things  appearing  liable  to  Objections. 

/  Besides  the  objections  against  the  evidence  for  Christianity, 
f  many  are  alleged  against  the  scheme  of  it ;  against  the  whole 
manner  in  which  it  is  put  and  left  with  the  world ;  as  well  as 
against  several  particular  relations  in  Scripture :  objections 
drawn  from  the  deficiencies  of  revelation  :  from  things  in  it  ap 
pearing  to  men  foolishness  from  its  containing  matters  of 
offence,  which  have  led,  and  it  must  have  been  foreseen, 
would  lead,  into  strange  enthusiasm  and  superstition,  and  be 
made  to  serve  the  purposes  of  tyranny  and  wickedness ;  from 
its  not  being  universal ;  and,  which  is  a  thing  of  the  same 
kind,  from  its  evidence  not  being  so  convincing  and  satisfac- 
^  tory  as  it  might  have  been ;  for  this  last  is  sometimes  turned 
into  a  positive  argument  against  its  truth.l  It  would  be  te¬ 
dious,  indeed  impossible,  to  enumerate  the  several  particulars 
comprehended  under  the  objections  here  referred  to,  they 
being  so  various,  according  to  the  different  fancies  of  men. 
There  are  persons,  who  think  it  a  strong  objection  against 
the  authority  of  Scripture,  that  it  is  not  edmposed  by  rules  of 
art,  agreed  upon  by  critics,  for  polite  and  correct  writing. 
And  the  scorn  is  inexpressible,  with  which  some  of  the  pro¬ 
phetic  parts  of  Scripture  are  treated;  partly  through  the 
rashness  of  interpreters,  but  very  much  also  on  account  of  the 
hieroglyphical  and  figurative  language  in  which  they  are 
left  us.  Some  of  the  principal  things  of  this  sort  shall  be 
particularly  considered  in  the  following  chapters.  But  my 
design  at  present  is  to  observe,  in  general,  with  respect  to  this 
whole  way  of  arguing,  that,  upon  supposition  of  a  revelation, 


1  Cor*  i.  18. 


t  See  Chap.  6. 


1 


CHAP.  III.]  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS  161 

ix  is  highly  credible  beforehand,  we  should  be  incompetent 
judges  of  it,  to  a  great  degree ;  and  that  it  would  contain 
many  things  appearing  to  us  liable  to  great  objections,  in  case 
we  judge  of  it  otherwise  than  by  the  analogy  of  nature.  And, 
therefore,  though  objections  against  the  evidence  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  are  more  seriously  to  be  considered,  yet  objections 
against  Christianity  itself  are^  in  a  great  measure,  frivolous ; 
almost  all  objections  against  it,  excel)tihg  those  which  are  al¬ 
leged  against  the  particular  proofs  of  its  coming  from  God. 
I  express  myself  with  caution,  lest  I  should  be  mistaken  to 
vilify  reason,  which  is  indeed  the  only  faculty  we  have 
wherewith  to  judge  concerning  any  thing,  even  revelation 
itself ;  or  be  misunderstood  to  assert,  that  a  supposed  revela¬ 
tion  cannot  be  proved  false  from  internal  characters.  For, 
it  ma}^  contain  clear  immoralities  or  contradictions  ;  and  either 
of  these  would  prove  it  false.  Nor  will  I  take  upon  me  to 
affirm,  that  nothing  else  can  possibly  render  any  supposed 
revelation  incredible.  Yet  still  the  observation  above  is,  I 
think,  true  beyond  doubt,  that  objections  against  Christianity, 
as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its  evidence,  are 
frivolous.  To  make  out  this,  is  the  general  design  of  the 
present  chapter.  And,  with  regard  to  the  whole  of  it,  I  can¬ 
not  but  particularly  wish,  that  the  proofs  might  be  attended 
to,  rather  than  the  assertions  cavilled  at,  upon  account  of  any 
unacceptable  consequences,  whether  real  or  supposed,  which 
may  be  drawn  from  them.  For  after  all,  that  which  is  true, 
must  be  admitted  ;  though  it  should  show  Us  the  shortness  of 
our  faculties,  and  that  we  are  in  nowise  judges  of  many 
things  of  which  we  are  apt  to  think  ourselves  very  compe¬ 
tent  ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any  objection  with  reasonable 
men ;  at  least,  upon  second  thought,  it  will  not  be  ahy  objec¬ 
tion  with  such,  against  the  justness  of  the  following  observa¬ 
tions. 

As  God  governs  the  world,  and  instructs  his  creatures,  ac¬ 
cording  to  certain  laws  or  rules,  in  the  known  course  of  na¬ 
ture,  known  by  reason  together  with  experience ;  so  the 
Scripture  informs  us  of  a  scheme  of  divine  Providence,  addi¬ 
tional  to  this,  it  relates,  that  God  has,  by  revelation,  in¬ 
structed  men  in  things  concerning  his  government,  which 
they  could  not  otherwise  have  known,  and  reminded  them  of 
things  which  they  might  otherwise  know  ;  and  attested  the 
truth  of  the  whole  by  miracles.  Now,  if  the  natural  and  the 
revealed  dispensation  of  things  are  both  from  God,  if  they 
coincide  with  each  other,  and  together  ma^^s  up  “^heme 


162 


THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  [PART  11* 


of  Providence,  our  being  incompetent  judges  of  one,  must 
render  it  credible  that  we  may  be  incompetent  judges  also  of 
the  other.  Since,  upon  experience,  the  acknowledged  con¬ 
stitution  and  course  of  nature  is  found  to  be  greatly  different 
from  what,  before  experience,  would  have  been  expected ; 
and  such  as,  men  fancy,  there  lie  great  objections  agtiinst : 
This  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible,  that  they  may 
find  the  revealed  dispensation  likewise,  if  they  judge  of  it  as 
they  do  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  very  diflerent  from  ex¬ 
pectations  formed  beforehand ;  and  liable,  in  appearance,  to 
great  objections :  objections  against  the  scheme  itself,  and 
against  the  degrees  and  manners  of  the  miraculous  interposi¬ 
tions,  by  which  it  was  attested  and  carried  on  Thus,  sup¬ 
pose  a  prince  to  govern  his  dominions  in  the  wisest  manner 
possible,  by  common  known  laws  ;  and  that  upon  some  exi¬ 
gencies  he  should  suspend  these  laws,  and  govern,  in  several 
instances,  in  a  different  manner :  if  one  of  his  subjects  were 
not  a  competent  judge  beforehand,  by  what  common  rules 
the  government  should  or  would  be  carried  on,  it  could  not  be 
expected  that  the  same  person  would  be  a  competent  judge, 
in  what  exigencies,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to  what  degree, 
those  laws  commonly  observed  would  be  suspended  or  de¬ 
viated  from.  If  he  v/ere  not  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  the 
ordinary  administration,  there  is  no  reason  to  think  he  would 
be  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  the  extraordinary.  Fhe  thought 
he  had  objections  against  the  former,  doubtless,  it  is  highly 
supposable,  he  might  think  also,  that  he  had  objections 
against  the  latter.  And  thus,  as  we  fall  into  infinite  follies 
and  mistakes,  whenever  we  pretend,  otherwise  than  from  ex¬ 
perience  and  analogy,  to  judge  of  the  constitution  and  course 
of  nature,  it  is  evidently  supposable  beforehaml,  that  we  should 
fall  into  as  great,  in  pretending  to  judge,  in  like  manner,  con¬ 
cerning  revelation.  Nor  is  there  any  more  ground  to  expect 
that  this  latter  should  appear  to  us  clear  of  objections,  than 
that  the  former  should. 

These  observations,  relating  to  the  whole  of  Christianity, 
are  applicable  to  inspiration  in  particular.  As  we  are  in  no 
sort  judges  beforehand,  by  what  laws  or  rules,  in  what  degree, 
or  by  what  means,  it  were  to  have  been  expected  that  God 
would  naturally  instruct  us ;  so,  upon  supposition  of  his 
affording  us  light  and  instruction  by  revelation,  additional  to 
what  he  has  afforded  us  by  reason  and  experience,  we  are  in 
no  sort  judges,  by  what  methods,  and  in  what  proportion,  it 
were  to  be  expected  that  this  supernatural  light  and  instruc- 


C3HAP.  III.]  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS  163 

tion  would  be  afforded  us.  We  know  not  beforehand,  what 
degree  or  kind  of  natural  information  it  were  to  be  expected 
God  would  afford  men,  each  by  his  own  reason  and  experi¬ 
ence  ;  nor  how  far  he  would  enable,  and  effectually  dispose 
them  to  communicate  it,  whatever  it  should  bej  to  each  other ; 
nor  whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain,  highly  pro¬ 
bable,  or  doubtful ;  nor  whether  it  would  be  given  with  equal 
clearness  and  conviction  to  all.  Nor  could  we  guess,  upon 
any  good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natural  knowledge,  or 
even  the  faculty  itself  by  which  we  are  capable  of  attaining 
it,  reason,  would  be  given  us  at  once,  or  gradually.  In  like 
manner,,  we  are  wholly  ignorant  what  degree  of  new  know¬ 
ledge  it  were  to  be  expected  God  would  give  mankind  by 
revelation,  upon  supposition  of  his  affording  one  ;  or  how  far, 
or  in  what  way,  he  'Would  interpose  miraculously,  to  qualify 
them,  to  whom  he  should  originally  make  the  revelation,  for 
communicating  the  knowledge  given  by  it ;  and  to  secure 
their  doing  it  to  the  age  in  which  they  should  live,  and  to 
secure  its  being  transmitted  to  posterity.  We  are  equally 
ignorant,  whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain,  or 
highly  probable,  or  doubtful  er  whether  all  who  should 
have  any  degree  of  instruction  from  it,  and  any  degree  of  evi¬ 
dence  of  its  truth,  would  have  the  same ;  or  whether  the 
scheme  would  be  revealed  at  once,  or  unfolded  gradually. 
Nay,  we  are  not  in  any  sort  able  to  judge,  whether  it  were  to 
have  been  expected,  that  the  revelation  should  have  been 
committed  to  writing  ;  or  left  to  be  handed  down,  and  conse¬ 
quently  corrupted,  by  verbal  tradition,  and  at  length  sunk 
under  it,  if  mankind  so  pleased,  and  during  such  tirr.e  as  they 
are  permitted,  in  the  degree  they  evidently  are^  to  act  as  they 
will 

But  it  may  be  said,  ‘  that  a  revelation  in  some  of  the 
above-mentioned  circumstances  ;  one,  for  instance,  which  was 
not  committed  to  writing,  and  thus  secured  against  danger  of 
corruption,  would  not  have  answered  its  purpose.’  I  ask, 
what  purpose  ?  It  would  not  have  answered  all  the  purposes 
which  it  has  now  answered,  aUd  in  the  same  degree  ;  but  it 
would  have  answered  others,  or  the  same  in  different  degrees. 
And  which  of  these  were  the  purposes  of  God,  and  best  fell 
in  with  his  general  government,  we  could  not  at  all  have  de¬ 
termined  beforehand. 

f  Now  since  it  has  been  shown,  that  we  have  no  principles 


*  See  Chap.  6. 


164 


THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  [PART  11 

of  reason  upon  which  to  judge  beforehand,  how  it  were  to  be 
expected  revelation  should  have  been  left,  or  what  was  most 
suitable  to  the  divine  plan  of  government,  in  any  of  the  fore- 
mentioned  respects  ;  it  must  be  quite  frivolous  to  object  after¬ 
wards  as  to  any  of  them,  against  its  being  left  in  one  way, 
rather  than  another ;  for  this  would  be  to  object  against 
things,  upon  account  of  their  being  different  from  expecia- 
tions  which  have  been  shown  to  be  without  reason.  And 
thus  we  see,  that  the  only  question  concerning  the  truth  of 
Christianity  is,  whether  it  be  a  real  revelation ;  hot 'Whether 
it  be  attended  with  every  circumstance  which  we  should 
have  looked  for :  and  concerning  the  authority  of  Scripture, 
whether  it  be  W'^hat  it  claims  to  be  ;  not  whether  it  be  a  book 
of  such  sort,  and  so  promulged,  as  w’'eak  men  are  apt  to 
fancy  a  book  containing  a  divine  revelation  should.  And 
therefore  neither  obscurity,  nor  seeming  inaccuracy  of  style, 
nor  various  readings,  nor  early  disputes  about  the  authors  of 
particular  parts,  nor  any  other  things  of  the  Jike  kind,  though’ 
they  had  been  much  more  considerable  in  degree  than-  they 
are,  could  overthrow  the  authority  of  the  Scripture ;  unless 
the  Prophets,  Apostles,  or  our  Lord,  bed  promised,  that  the 
book,  containing  the  divine  revelation,  should  be  secure  from 
those  things.  Nor  indeed  can  any  objections  overthrow  such 
a  kind  of  revelation  as  the  Christian  claims  to  be,  since  there 
are  no  objections  against  the  morality  of  it,  but  such  as  can 
show,  that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought  originally  in 
attestation  of  it  ;  no  appearance  of  any  thing  miraculous  in 
its  obtaining  in  the  wmrld  ;  nor  any  of  prophecy,  that  is, 
of  events  foretold,  which  human  sagacity  could  not  foresee. 
If  it  can  be  shown,  that  the  proof  alleged  for  all  these  is  ab¬ 
solutely  none  at  all,  then  is  revelation  overturned.  But  were 
it  allowed,  that  the  proof  of  any  one,  or  all  of  them,  is  lower 
than  is  allowed  ;  yet  whilst  any  pfoOf  of  them  remains,  reve¬ 
lation  will  stand  upon  much  the  same  foot  it  does  at  present^ 
as  to  all  the  purposes  of  life  and  practice,  arid  ought  to  have 
the  like  influence  upon  our  behaviour. 

From  the  foregoing  observations,  toO,  it  will  follow,  arid 
those  who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  revelation  will  find 
it  worth  remarking,  that  there  are  several  w^ays  of  arguing, 
which,  though  just  wflth  regard  to  other  waitings,  are  not  ap¬ 
plicable  to  Scripture  ;  at  least  not  to  the  prophetic  parts  of  it. 
We  cannot  argue,  for  instance,  that  this  cannot  be  the  sense 


CHAP.  III.] 


LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS. 


165 


or  intent  of  such  a  passage  of  Scripture,  for  if  it  had,  it  would 
have  been  expressed  more  plainly,  or  have  been  represented 
untler  a  more  apt  figure  or  hieroglyphic  ;  yet  we  may  justly 
argue  thus,  with  respect  to  common  books.  And  the  reason 
of  this  diflference  is  very  evident ;  that  in  Scripture  we  are  not 
competent  judges,  as  we  are  in  common  books,  how  plainly  j 
it  were  to  have  been  expected,  what  is  the  true  sense  should  - 
have  been  expressed,  or  under  how  apt  an  image  figured. 
The  only  question  is,  what  appearance  there  is  that  this  is 
the  sense  ?  and  scarce  at  all,  how  much  more  determinately 
or  accurately  it  might  have  been  expressed  or  figured  1 

‘  But  is  it  not  self-evident,  that  internal  improbabilities  of 
all  kinds,  weaken  external  pr''bable  proof  V  Doubtless.  But 
to  what  practical  purpose  can  this  be  alleged  here,  when  it 
has  been  proved  before,  that  real  internal  improbabilities, 
which  rise  even  to  moral  certainty,  are  overcome  by  the  most 
ordinary  testimony  %  and  when  it  now  has  been  made  appear, 
that  we  scarce  know  what  are  improbabilities,  as  to  the  mat¬ 
ter  we  are  here  considering  ?  as  it  will  farther  appear  from 
what  follows. 

For  though,  from  the  observations  above  made,  it  is  mani-  ‘• 
fest,  that  we  are  not  in  any  sort  competent  judges,  what  -su¬ 
pernatural  instruction  were  to  have  been  expected ;  and 
though  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  objections  of  an  incompetent 
judgment  must  be  frivolous  ;  yet  it  may  be  proper  to  go  one 
step  farther,  and  observe,  that  if  men  will  be  regardless  of 
these  things,  and  pretend  to  judge  of  the  Scripture  by  pre¬ 
conceived  expectations,  the  analogy  of  nature  shows  before¬ 
hand,  not  only  that  it  is  highly  credible  they  may,  but  also 
probable  that  they  will,  imagine  they  have  strong  objections 
against  it,  however  really  unexceptionable ;  for  so,  prior  to 
experience,  they  would  think  they  had,  against  the  circum¬ 
stances,  and  degrees,  and  the  whole  manner  of  that  instruc¬ 
tion,  which  is  afforded  by  the  ordinary  course  of  nature. 
Were  the  mstruction  which  God  affords  to  brute  creatures  by 
instincts  and  mere  propensions,  and  to  mankind  by  these  to¬ 
gether  with  reason,  matter  of  probable  proof,  and  not  of  cer¬ 
tain  observation,  it  would  be  rejected  as  incredible,  in  many 
instances  of  it,  only  upon  account  of  the  means  by  which  this 
instruction  is  given,  the  seeming  disproportions,  the  limita¬ 
tions,  necessary  conditions,  and  circumstances  of  it.  For  in¬ 
stance  :  Would  it  not  have  been  thought  highly  improbable,  \ 


106  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  [PART  IL 

that  men  should  have  been  so  much  more  capable  of  disco* 
vering,  even  to  certainty,  the  general  laws  of  matter,  and  the 
magnitudes,  paths,  and  revolutions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  ; 
than  the  occasions  and  cures  of  distempers,  and  many  other 
things,  in  which  human  life  seems  so  much  more  nearly  con¬ 
cerned,  than  in  astronomy  1  How  capricious  and  irregular  a 
way  of  information,  would  it  be  said,  is  that  of  invention,  by 
means  of  which  nature  instructs  us  in  matters  of  science,  and 
in  many  things  upon  which  the  affairs  of  the  world  greatly 
depend  ;  that  a  man  should,  by  this  faculty  be  made  ac¬ 
quainted  with  a  thing  in  an  instant,  when,  perhaps,  he  is 
thinking  of  somewhat  else,  which  he  has  in  vain  been  search¬ 
ing  after,  it  may  be,  for  years.  So  likewise  the  imperfections 
attending  the  only  method  by  which  nature  enables  and  di¬ 
rects  us  to  communicate  our  thoughts  to  each  other,  are  in¬ 
numerable.  Language  is,  in  its  very  nature,  inadequate, 
ambiguous,  liable  to  infinite  abuse,  even  from  negligence ; 
and  so  liable  to  it  from  design,  that  every  man  can  deceive 
and  betray  by  it.  And,  to  mention  but  one  instance  more^ 
that  brutes,  without  reason,  should  act,  in  many  respects, 
with  a  sagacity  and  foresight  vastly  greater  than  what  men 
have  in  those  respects,  would  be  thought  impossible.  Yet  it 
is  certain  they  do  act  with  such  superior  foresight ;  whether 
it  be  their  own,  indeed,  is  another  question.  From  these 
things  it  is  highly  credible  beforehand,  that  upon  supposition 
God  should  afford  men  some  additional  instruction  by  revela¬ 
tion,  it  would  be  with  circumstances,  in  manners,  degrees, 
and  respects,  which  we  should  be  apt  to  fancy  we  had  great 
objections  against  the  credibility  of.  Nor  are  the  objections 
against  the  Scripture,  nor  against  Christianity  in  general,  at 
all  more  or  greater  than  the  analogy  of  nature  would  before¬ 
hand, — not  perhaps  give  ground  to  expect ;  for  this  analogy 
may  not  be  sufficient,  in  some  cases,  to  ground  an  expecta¬ 
tion  upon ; — but  no  rnore  nor  greater,  than  analogy  would 
show  it,  beforehand,  to  be  supposable  and  credible,  that  there 
might  seem  to  lie  against  revelation. 

By  applying  these  general  observations  to  a  particular  ob¬ 
jection,  it  will  be  more  distinctly  seen,  how'"  they  are  applica¬ 
ble  to  others  of  the  like  kind ;  and  indeed  to  almost  all  ob¬ 
jections  against  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections 
against  its  evideiice.  It  appears  from  Scripture,  that  as  it  was 
not  unusual,  in  the  apostolic  age,  for  persons,  upon  their  con¬ 
version  to  Christianity,  to  be  endued  with  miraculous  gifts  ; 
so,  some  of  those  persons  exercised  these  gifts  in  a  strangely 


CHAP.  III.J 


LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS. 


167 


irregular  and  disorderly  manner  :  and  this  is  made  an  objec¬ 
tion  against  their  being  really  miraculous.  Now,  the  fore¬ 
going  observations  quite  remove  this  objection,  how  consider¬ 
able  soever  it  may  appear  at  first  sight.  For,  consider  a  per¬ 
son  endued  with  any  of  these  gifts,  for  instance,  that  of 
tongues ;  it  is  to  be  supposed,  that  he  had  the  same  power 
over  this  miraculous  gift,  as  he  would  have  had  over  it,  had 
it  been  the  effect  of  habit,  of  study,  and  use,  as  it  ordinarily 
is ;  or  the  same  power  over  it,  as  he  had  over  any  other  na¬ 
tural  endowment.  Consequently,  .he  would  use  it  in  the  same 
manner  he  did  any  other  ;  either  regularly  and  upon  proper 
occasions  only,  or  irregularly  and  upon  improper  ones ;  ac¬ 
cording  to  his  sense  of  decenejq  and  his  character  of  prudence. 
Where,  then,  is  the  objection  1  Whjq  if  this  miraculous  pow¬ 
er  was  indeed  given  to  the  world  to  propagate  Christianity 
and  attest  the  truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  seems,  have  expected, 
that  other  sort  of  persons  should  have  been  chosen  to  be  in 
vested  with  it ;  or  that  these  should,  at  the  same  time,  have 
been  endued  with  prudence  ;  or  that  they  should  have  been 
continually  restrained  and  directed  in  the  exercise  of  it ;  i.  e. 
that  God  should  have  miraculously  interposed,  if  at  all,  in  a 
different  manner  or  higher  degree.  But,  from  the  observa¬ 
tions  made  above,  it  is  undeniably  evident,  that  we  are  not 
judges  in  what  degrees  and  manners  it  were  to  have  been  ex¬ 
pected  he  should  miraculously  interpose ;  upon  supposition 
of  his  doing  it  in  some  degree  and  manner.  Nor,  in  the  na¬ 
tural  course  of  Providence,  are  superior  gifts  of  memory,  elo¬ 
quence,  knowledge,  and  othei  talents  of  great  influence,  con¬ 
ferred  only  on  j}ersons  of  prudence  and  decency,  or  such  as 
are  disposed  to  make  the  properest  use  of  them.  Nor  is  the 
instruction  and  admonition  naturally  afforded  us  for  the  con¬ 
duct  of  life,  particularly  in  our  education,  commonly  given  in 
a  manner  the  most  stiited  to  recommend  it ;  but  often  with 
circumstances,  apt  to  prejudice  us  against  such  instruction,  . 

One  might  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a  great  resemblance 
between  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revelation,  in  several  other 
respects.  Practical  Christianity,  or  that  faith  and  behaviour 
which  renders  a  man  a  Christian,  is  a  plain  and  obvious 
thing  ;  like  the  common  rules  of  conduct,  with  respect  to  our 
ordinary  temporal  affairs.  The  more  distinct  and  particular 
knowledge  of  those  things,  the  stud}^  of  which  the  Apostle 
calls,  going  on  unio  perfeciiou*  and  of  the  prophetic  parts 


*  Heb.  VL  1. 


168 


THE  CREDIBILITY  OP  REVELATION  [PART  II. 

of  revelation,  like  many  parts  of  natural  and  even  civil  know* 
ledge,  may  require  very  exact  thought  and  careful  considera¬ 
tion.  The  hinderances,  too,  of  natural  and  of  supernatural 
light  and  knowledge,  have  been  of  the  same  kind,  And  as 
it  is  owned  the  whole  scheme  of  Scripture  is  not  yet  under¬ 
stood,  so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  understood,  before  the  restitu¬ 
tion  of  all  things^*  and  without  miraculous  interpositions,  it 
must  he  in  the  same  way  as  natural  knowledge  is  come  at ; 
by  the  continuance  and  progress  of  learning  and  of  liberty, 
and  by  particular  persons,  attending  to,  comparing  and  pur¬ 
suing,  intimations  scattered  up  and  down  it,  which  are  over¬ 
looked  and  disregarded  by  the  generality  of  the  wcrld.  For 
this  is  the  way  in  which  all  improvements  are  made ;  by 
thoughtful  men  tracing  on  obscure  hints,  as  it  were,  dropped 
us  by  nature  accidentally,  or  which  seem  to  come  into  our 
minds  by  chance.  Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible,  that  a  book,  which 
has  been  so  long  in  the  possession  of  mankind,  should  con¬ 
tain  many  truths  as  yet  undiscovered.  For,  all  the  same 
phenomena,  and  the  same  faculties  of  investigation,  from 
which  such  great  discoveries  in  natural  knowledge  have  been 
made  in  the  present  and  last  age,  were  equally  in  the  pos¬ 
session  of  mankind  several  thousand  years  before.  And  pos¬ 
sibly  it  might  be  intended,  that  events,  as  they  come  to  pass, 
should  open  and  ascertain  the  meaning  of  several  parts  of 
Scripture. 

It  may  be  objected,  that  this  analogy  fails  in  a  material  re¬ 
spect  ;  for  that  natural  knowledge  is  of  little  or  no  conse¬ 
quence.  But  I  have  been  speaking  of  the  general  instruction, 
which  nature  does  or  does  not  afford  us.  And  besides,  some 
parts  of  natural  knowledge,  in  the  more  comtnon  restrained 
sense  of  the  words,  are  of  the  greatest  consequence  to  the 
ease  and  convenience  of  life.  But  suppose  the  analogy  did, 
as  it  does  not,  fail  in  this  respect,  yet  it  might  be  abundantly 
supplied  from  the  whole  constitution  and  course  of  nature  ; 
which  shows,  that  God  does  not  dispense  his  gifts  according 
to  our  notions  of  the  advantage  and  consequence  they  would 
be  of  to  us.  And  this  in  general,  with  his  method  of  dis¬ 
pensing  knowledge  in  particular,  would  togethev  make  out 
an  analogy  full  to  the  point  before  us. 

But  it  may  be  objected  still  farther,  and  more  generally  ; 
‘The  Scripture  represents  the  world  as  in  a  state  of  ruin,  and 
Christianity  as  an  expedient  to  recover  it,  to  help  in  these  le- 


*  Acts  iii.  21. 


CHAP.  III.] 


LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS. 


109 


spects  where  nature  fails  ;  in  particular  to  supply  the  deficien¬ 
cies  of  natural  light.  Is  it  credible,  then,  that  so  many  ages 
should  have  been  let  pass,  before  a  matter  of  such  a  sort,  of 
so  great  and  so  general  importance,  was  made  known  to  man¬ 
kind  ;  and  then  that  it  should  be  made  known  to  so  small  a 
part  of  them  %  Is  it  conceivable,  that  this  supply  should  be 
so  very  deficient,  should  have  the  like  obscurity  and  doubtful¬ 
ness,  be  liable  to  the  like  perversions,  in  short,  lie  open  to  all 
the  like  objections,  as  the  light  of  nature  itself  Without 
determining  how  far  this  in  fact  is  so,  I  answer,  it  is  by  no 
means  incredible  that  it  might  be  so,  if  the  light  of  nature  and 
of  revelation  be  from  the  same  hand.  Men  are  naturally  liable 
to  diseases  ;  for  which  God,  in  his  good  providence,  has  pro¬ 
vided  natural  remedies,  j*  But  remedies  existing  in  nature 
have  been  unknown  to  mankind  for  many  ages  ;  are  known 
but  to  few  now ;  probably  many  valuable  ones  are  not  known 
yet.  Great  has  been,  and  is,  the  obscurity  and  difficulty,  in 
the  nature  and  application  of  them.  Circumstances  seem 
often  to  make  them  very  improper,  where  they  are  absolutely 
necessary.  It  is  after  long  labor  and  study,  and  many  unsuc¬ 
cessful  endeavours,  that  they  are  brought  to  be  as  useful  as 
they  are ;  after  high  contempt  and  absolute  rejection  of  the 
most  useful  we  have  ;  and  after  disputes  and  doubts,  which 
have  seemed  to  be  endless.  The  best  remedies,  too,  when 
unskilfully,  much  more  if  dishonestly,  applied,  may  produce 
new  diseases  ;  and,  with  the  rightest  application,  the  success 
of  them  is  often  doubtful.  In  many  cases,  they  are  not  at 
all  effectual ;  where  they  are,  it  is  often  very  slowly  ;  and  the 
application  of  them,  and  the  necessary  regimen  accompany¬ 
ing  it,  is,  not  uncommonly,  so  disagreeable,  that  some  will 
not  submit  to  them  ;  and  satisfy  themselves  with  the  excuse, 
that  if  they  would,  it  is  not  certain  whether  it  would  be  suc¬ 
cessful.  And  many  persons,  who  labor  under  diseases,  for 
which  there  are  known  natural  remedies,  are  not  so  happy  as 
to  be  always,  if  ever,  in  the  way  of  them.  In  a  word,  the 
remedies  which  nature  has  provided  for  diseases,  are  neither 
certain,  perfect,  nor  universal.  And  indeed  the  same  princi¬ 
ples  of  arguing,  which  would  lead  us  to  conclude  that  they 
must  be  so,  would  lead  us  likewise  to  conclude  that  there  could 
be  no  occasion  for  them ;  i.  e.  that  there  could  be  no  diseases 
at  all.  And,  therefore,  our  experience  that  there  are  diseases, 
shows,  that  it  is  credible  beforehand,  upon  supposition  nature 


*  Chap.  6. 


28 


t  See  Chap,  5. 


170 


THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION 


i'ART  II. 


has  ’provided  remedies  for  them,  that  these  remedies  may  be 
as  by  experience  we  find  they  are,  not  certain,  nor  perfect,  noi 
universal ;  because  it  shows,  that  the  principles  upon  which 
we  should  expect  the  contrary,  are  fallacious. 

And  now,  what  is  the  just  consequence  from  all  these 
things  ?  Not  that  reason  is  no  judge  of  what  is  offered  to  us  as 
being  of  divine  revelation.  For  this  would  be  to  infer,  that  we 
are  unable  to  judge  of  any  thing,  because  we  are  unable  to 
judge  of  all  things.  Reason  can,  and  it  ought  to  judge, 
not  only  of  the  meaning,  but  also  of  the  morality  and  the 
evidence,  of  revelation.  Ffrsf,  It  is  the  province  of  rea¬ 
son  to  judge  of  the  morality  of  the  Scripture  ;  i.  e.  not  whe¬ 
ther  it  contains  things  different  from  what  we  sho>ild  have 
expected  from  a  wise,  just  and  good  Being  ;  for  objections 
from  hence  have  been  now  obviated  ;  but  whether  it  contains 
things  plainly  contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice,  or  goodness ;  to 
what  the  light  of  nature  teaches  us  of  God.  And  1  know  np- 
Ihing  of  this  sort  objected  against  Scripture,  excepting  such  ob¬ 
jections  as  are  formed  upon  suppositions,  which  would  equally 
conclude,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  contradictory  to 
wisdom,  justice,  or  goodness  ;  which  most  certainly  it  is  not. 
Indeed,  there  are  some  particular  precepts  in  Scripture,  given 
to  particular  persons,  requiring  actions,  which  would  be  im¬ 
moral  and  vicious,  were  it  not  for  such  precepts.  But  it  is 
easy  to  see,  that  all  these  are  of  such  a  kind,  as  that  the  pre¬ 
cept  changes  the  whole  nature  of  the  case  and  of  the  ac¬ 
tion  ;  and  both  constitutes  and  shows  that  not  to  be  unjust  or 
immoral,  which,  prior  to  the  precept,  must  have  appeared  and 
really  have  been  so :  which  may  well  be,  since  none  of  these 
precepts  are  contrary  to  immutable  morality.  If  it  were  com¬ 
manded,  to  cultivate  the  principles,  and  act  from  the  spirit  of 
treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty  ;  the  command  would  not  alter 
the  nature  of  the  case,  or  of  the  action  in  any  of  these  instan¬ 
ces.  But  it  is  quite  other wi&e  in  precepts  which  require  only 
the  doing  an  external  action  ;  for  instance,  taking  away  the 
property  or  life  of  any.  For  men  have  no  right  to  either  life 
or  property,  but  what  arises  solely  frc^i  the  grant  of  God. 
When  this  grant  is  revoked,  they  cease  to  have  any  rights  at 
ail  in  either  ;  and  when  this  revocation  is  made  known,  as 
surely  it  is  possible  it  may  be,  it  must  cease  to  be  unjust  to 
deprive  them  of  either.  And  though  a  course  of  external 
acts,  which  without  command  v/ouid  be  immoral,  must  make 
an  immoral  habit,  yet  a  few  detached  commands  have  no  such 


CHAP.  III.]  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  171 

natural  tendency.  I  thought  proper  to  say  thus  much  of  the 
few  Scripture  precepts,  which  require,  not  vicious  acrions, 
but  actions  which  would  have  been  vicious,  had  it  not  been 
for  such  precepts  ;  because  they  are  sometimes  weakly  urged 
as  immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon  objections  drawn 
from  them.  But  to  me  there  seems  no  difficulty  at  all  in 
these  precepts,  but  what  arises  from  their  being  offences ; 
i.  e.  from  their  being  liable  to  be  perverted,  as  indeed  they 
are,  by  wicked  designing  men,  to  serve  the  most  horrid  pur¬ 
poses,  and  perhaps,  to  mislead  the  weak  and  enthusiastic.  And 
objections  from  this  head  are  not  objections  against  revela¬ 
tion,  but  against  the  whole  notion  of  religion,  as  a  trial ;  and 
against  the  general  constitution  of  nature.  Secondly^  Rea¬ 
son  is  able  to  judge,  and  must,  of  the  evidence  of  revelation, 
and  of  the  objections  urged  against  that  e^ddence ;  which 
shall  be  the  subject  of  a  following  chapter.* 

But  the  consequence  of  the  foregoing  observations  is,  that 
the  question  upon  which  the  truth  of  Christianity  depends,  is 
scarce  at  all,  what  objections  there  are  against  its  scheme, 
since  there  are  none  against  the  morality  of  it ;  but  what  ob¬ 
jections  there  are  against  its  evidence  :  or,  what  froof  there 
remains  of  it^  after  due  alloivances  made  for  the  objections 
against  that  proof.  Because  it  has  been  shown,  that  the  ob¬ 
jections  against  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections 
against  its  evidence,  are  frivolous.  For  surely  very  little 
weight,  if  any  at  ail,  is  to  be  laid  upon  a  way  of  arguing  and 
objecting,  which,  when  applied  to  the  general  constitution  of 
nature,  experience  shows  nottobe  conclusive:  and  such,  I  think, 
is  the  whole  way  of  objecting  treated  of  throughout  this  chap¬ 
ter.  It  is  resolvable  into  principles,  and  goes  upon  suppositions, 
which  mislead  us  to  think,  that  the  Author  of  nature  would 
not  act,  as  we  experience  he  does  ;  or  would  act,  in  such  and 
such  cases,  as  we  experience  he  does  not  in  like  cases.  But 
the  unreasonableness  of  this  way  of  objecting  will  appear 
yet  more  evidently  from  hence,  that  the  chief  things  thus  ob¬ 
jected  against,  are  justified,  as  shall  be  farther  shown, j*  by 
distinct,  particular,  and  full  analogies,  in  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature. 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  as  frivolous  as  objections 
of  the  foregoing  sort  against  revelation  are,  yet,  when  a  sup¬ 
posed  revelation  is  more  consistent  with  itself,  and  has  a 


Chap.  7. 


t  Chap.  4,  latter  part;  and  5^6. 


172 


THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION,  &C.  [PART  IL 

more  general  and  uniform  tendency  to  promote  virtue,  than, 
all  circumstances  considered,  could  have  been  expected  from 
enthusiam  and  political  views  ;  this  is  a  presumptive  proof  of 
its  not  proceeding  from  them,  and  so  of  its  truth  ;  because 
we  are  competent  judges,  what  might  have  been  expected 
from  enthusiasm  and  political  views. 


CHAP,  iv  ]  CHRISTIANITY  AS  A  SCHEME,  &C. 


173 


( 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  Christianity^  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Constitution^ 

imperfectly  comprehended. 


It  hath  been  now  shown,*  that  the  analogy  of  nature  ren- 
I  ders  it  highly  credible  beforehand,  that,  supposing  a  revelation 
I  to  be  made,  it  must  contain  many  things  very  different  from 
^  what  we  should  have  expected,  and  such  as  appear  open  to 
great  objections  ;  and  that  this  observation,  in  good  measure, 
I  takes  off  the  force  of  those  objections,  or  rather  precludes  them, 
j  But  it  may  be  alleged,  that  this  is  a  very  partial  answer  to 
/  such  objections,  or  a  very  unsatisfactory  way  of  obviating 
1  them :  because  it  doth  not  show  at  all,  that  the  things  object- 
(  ed  against  can  be  wise,  just,  and  good  ;  much  less,  that  it 
^  is  credible  they  are  so.  It  will  therefore  be  proper  to  show 
this  distinctly,  by  applying  to  these  objections  against  the  wis¬ 
dom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  Christianity,  the  answer  abovef 
given  to  the  like  objections  against  the  constitution  of  nature  ; 
before  we  consider  the  particular  analogies  in  the  latter,  to  the 
particular  things  objected  against  in  the  former.  Now,  that 
which  affords  a  sufficient  answer  to  objections  against  the 
wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  the  constitution  of  nature, 
is  its  being  a  constitution,  a  system  or  scheme,  imperfectly 
comprehended ;  a  scheme,  in  which  means  are  made  use  of 
tc  accomplish  ends  ;  and  which  is  carried  on  by  general  laws. 
For,  from  these  things  it  has  been  proved,  not  only  to  be  pos- 
,  sible,  but  also  to  be  credible,  that  those  things  which  are  ob¬ 
jected  against,  may  be  consistent  with  wisdom,  justice,  and 
goodness  ;  nay,  may  be  instances  of  them :  and  even  that 
the  constitution  and  government  of  nature  may  be  perfect  in 
the  highest  possible  degree.  If  Christianity,  then,  be  a  scheme, 

'  and  of  the  like  kind,  it  is  evident,  the  like  objections  against 
it  must  admit  of  the  like  answer.  And, 


♦  In  the  foregoing  Chapter. 

T  Part  i»  Chap.  7,  to  which  this  all  along  refers. 


174 


CHRISTIANITY  A  SCHEME 


[pAliT  II. 


/  I.  Christianitj  is  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  comprehen¬ 
sion.  The  moral  government  of  God  is  exercised,  by  giadu- 
^  ally  conducting  things  so  in  the  course  of  his  providence,  ttiai 
every  one,  at  length,  and  upon  the  whole,  shall  receive  accord¬ 
ing  to  his  deserts ;  and  neither  fraud  nor  violence,  but  truth 
and  right,  shall  finally  prevail.  Christianity  is  a  particular 
scheme  under  this  general  plan  of  providence,  and  a  part  of  it, 
conducive  to  its  completion,  with  regard  to  mankind  ;  consist¬ 
ing  itself  also  of  various  parts,  and  a  mysterious  economy 
which  has  been  carrying  on  from  the  time  the  world  came 
into  its  present  wretched  state,  and  is  still  carrying  on,  for  its 
recovery,  by  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah  ;  *  who  is  to  gather 
together  in  on*^,  the  children  of  God  that  are  scattered  abroad, 
and  establish  ‘  an  everlasting  kingdom,  wherein  dwelleth 
righteousness.’!  And  in  order  to  it,  after  various  manifesta¬ 
tions  of  things,  relating  to  this  great  and  general  scheme  ol 
Providence,  through  a  succession  of  many  ages  ; — (‘  for  the 
Spirit  of  Christ,  which  was  in  the  prophets,  testified  before¬ 
hand  his  sufferings,  and  the  glory  that  should  follow :  unto 
whom  it  was  revealed,  that  not  unto  themselves,  but  unto  us, 
they  did  minister  the  things  which  are  now  reported  unto  us  by 
them  that  have  preached  the  gospel ;  which  things  the  angels 
desire  to  look  into  :’J) — after  various  dispensations,  looking 
forward  and  preparatory  to  this  final  salvation,  ‘  In  the  fulness 
of  time,’  when  infinite  wisdom  thought  fit.  He,  ‘  being  in  the 
form  of  God,  made  himself  of  no  reputation,  and  took  upon 
himself  the  form  of  a  servant,  and  was  made  in  the  likeness 
of  men ;  and  being  found  in  fashion  as  a  man,  he  humbled 
himself,  and  became  obedient  to  death,  even  the  death  of  the 
cross:  wherefore  God  also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  and 
given  him  a  name  which  is  above  every  name ;  that  at  the 
name  of  Jesus  every  knee  should  bow,  of  things  in  heaven, 
and  things  in  the  earth,  and  things  under  the  earth  ;  and  that 
ev’ery  tongue  should  confess,  that  Jesus  Christ  is  Lord,  to  the 
glory  of  God  the  Father.’§  Parts  likewise  of  this  economy 
are  the  miraculous  mission  of  the  Holj^  Ghost,  and  his  ordl- 
'  nary  assistances  given  to  good  men  ;  the  invisible  government 
wdiich  Christ  at  present  exercises  over  his  Church :  that  which 
j  he  himself  refers  to  in  these  words, ||  ‘In  my  father’s  house 
I  are  many  mansions — I  go  to  prepare  a  place  for  you ;’  and 
\  his  future  return  to  ‘judge  the  wmrld  in  righteousness,  and 

V/  ♦  John  xi.  52.  1 2  Pet.  iii.  13- 

I  1  Pet.  1.  11,  12.  j  Phil  it 

II  Jolin  xiv.  2. 


CHAP.  IV.]  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED. 


175 


completely  re-establish  the  kingdom  of  God.  ‘  For  the  Fa¬ 
ther  judgeth  no  man  ;  but  hath  committed  all  judgment  unto 
the  Son  :  that  all  men  should  honour  the  Son,  even  as  thej 
honour  the  Father.*  All  power  is  given  unto  him  in  heaven 
and  in  earth. "f  And  he  must  reign,  till  he  hath  put  all  ene¬ 
mies  under  his  feet.  Then  cometh  the  end,  when  he  shall 
have  delivered  up  the  kingdom  to  God,  even  the  Father ; 
when  he  shall  have  put  down  all  rule,  and  all  authority  and 
power.  And  when  -all  things  shall  be  subdued  unto  him, 
then  shall  the  Son  also  himself  be  subject  unto  him  that  put  f 
all  things  under  him,  that  God  may  be  all  in  all.’J  Now^m 
little,  surely,  need  be  said  to  show,  that  this  system,  or  scheme  i 
of  things,  is  but  imperfectly  comprehended  by  us.  The  j 
Scripture  expressly  asserts  it  to  be  so.  And,  indeed,  one  { 
cannot  read  a  passage  relating  to  this  ‘  great  mystery  of 
godliness,’ §  but  what  immediately  runs  up  into  something  , 
which  shows  us  our  ignorance  in  it ;  as  every  thing  in  nature  j 
shows  us  our  ignorance  in  the  constitution  of  nature.  And 
whoever  will  seriously  consider  that  part  of  the  Christian 
scheme  which  is  revealed  in  Scripture,  will  find  so  much 
more  unrevealed,  as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the  purpo¬ 
ses  of  judging  and  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of  it,  as  of  the 
constitution  of  nature.  Our  ignorance,  therefore,  is  as  much 
an  answer  to  our  objections  against  the  perfection  of  one,  as  j 
against  the  perfection  of  the  other. 

II.  It  is  obvious,  too,  that  in  the  Christian  dispensation,  as 
much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of  things,  means  are  made  use 
of  to  accomplish  ends.  And  the  observation  of  this  furnishes 
us  with  the  same  answers  to  objections  against  the  perfection 
of  Christianity,  as  to  objections  of  the  like  kind  against  the  con¬ 
stitution  of  nature.  It  shows  the  credibility,  that  the  things 
objected  against,  how  foolish^  soever  they  appear  to  men, 
may  be  the  very  best  means  of  accomplishing  the  very  best 
ends.  And  their  appearing  foolishness  is  no  presumption 
against  this,  in  a  scheme  so  greatly  beyond  our  comprehen¬ 
sion. 

III.  The  credibility,  that  the  Christian  dispensation  may 
have  been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  general  laws,  no  less" than 
the  course  of  nature,  may  require  to  be  more  distinctly  made 
out.  Consider,  then,  upon  what  ground  it  is  we  say,  that  the 


*  John  V.  22,  23. 
§  1  Tim,  iii.  i6. 


t  Matt,  xxviii.  18. 


J  1  Cor.  XV. 

H  1  Cor.  i.  18,  &c. 


176 


CHRISTIANITY  AS  A  SCHEME 


[part  II. 


whole  common  course  of  nature  is  carried  on  according  to  gen¬ 
eral  fore-ordained  laws.  We  know,  indeed,  several  of  the  gen¬ 
eral  laws  of  matter;  and  a  great  part  qf  the  natural  behaviour 
of  living  agents  is  reducible  to  general  laws.  But  we  know,  in 
a  manner,  nothing,  by  what  laws,  storms,  and  tempests,  earth¬ 
quakes,  famine,  pestilence,  become  the  instruments  of  destruc¬ 
tion  to  mankind.  And  the  laws  by  which  persons  born  into 
the  world  at  such  a  time  and  place,  are  of  such  capacities,  ge¬ 
niuses,  tempers  ;  the  laws,  by  which  thoughts  come  into  oui 
mind,  in  a  multitude  of  cases  ;  and  by  which  innumerable 
things  happen,  of  the  greatest  influence  upon  the  affairs  and 
state  of  the  world :  these  laws  are  so  wholly  unknown  to  us, 
that  we  call  the  events,  which  come  to  pass  by  them,  acci¬ 
dental  ;  though  all  reasonable  men  know  certainly,  that  there 
cannot,  in  reality,  be  any  such  thing  as  chance  ;  and  conclude, 
drat  the  things  which  have  this  appearance,  are  the  result  of 
general  laws,  and  may  be  reduced  into  them.  It  is  then  but 
an  exceeding  little  way,  and  hit  but  a  very  few  respects,  that 
we  can  trace  up  the  natural  course  of  things  before  us,  to 
general  laws.  And  it  is  only  from  analogy  that  we  conclude 
the  whole  of  it  to  be  capable  of  being  reduced  into  them  , 
only  from  our  seeing,  that  part  is  so.  It  is  ifom  pur  finding, 
that  the  course  of  nature,  in  some  respects  and  so  far,  goes  on 
by  general  laws,  that  we  conclude  this  of  the  rest.  And  if 
that  be  a  just  ground  for  such  a  conclusion,  it  is  a  just  ground 
also,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  comprehend,  to  render  it  suppos- 
able  and  credible,  which  is  sufficient  for  answering  objections, 
that  God’s  miraculous  interpositions  may  have  been,  all  along, 
in  like  manner,  by  general  laws  of  wisdom.  Thus,  that  mira¬ 
culous  powers  should  be  exerted  at  such  times,  upon  such 
occasions,  in  such  degrees  and  manners,  and  with  regard  to 
such  persons,  rather  than  others  ;  that  the  affairs  of  the 
world,  being  permitted  to  go  on  in  their  natural  course  so  far, 
should,  just  at  such  a  point,  have  anew  direction  given  them 
by  miraculous  interpositions  ;  that  these  interpositions  should 
be  exactly  in  such  degrees  and  respects  only :  all  this  may 
have  been  by  general  laws.  These  laws  are  unknown, 
indeed,  to  us ;  but  no  more  unknown,  than  the  laws  from 
whence  it  is,  that  some  die  as  soon  as  they  are  boni,  and 
others  live  to  extreme  old  age  ;  that  one  man  is  so  superior  to 
another  in  understanding ;  with  innumerable  more  things, 
which,  as  was  before  observed,  we  cannot  reduce  to  any  laws 
or  rules  at  all,  though  it  is  taken  for  granted,  they  are  as 
much  reducible  to  general  ones  as  gravitation.  ^JSTow,  if  the 


CHAP.  IV.  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED.  Ill 

revealed  dispensations  of  Providence,  and  miraculous  interpo^ 
sitions,  be  bj  general  laws,  as  well  as  God’s  ordinary  govern¬ 
ment  in  the  course  of  nature,  made  known  by  reason  and 
experience  ;  there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect  that  every  exi¬ 
gence,  as  it  arises,  should  be  provided  for  by  these  general 
laws  of  miraculous  interposition,  than  that  every  exigence  in 
nature  should,  by  the  general  laws  of  nature  :  yet  there  might 
be  wise  and  good  reasons,  that  miraculous  interpositions  should 
be  by  general  laws  ;  and  that  these  laws  should  not  be  broken 
in  upon,  or  deviated  from,  by  other  miracles. 

Upon  the  whole,  then,  the  appearances  of  deficiencies  and 
irregularities  in  nature,  is  owing  to  its  being  a  scheme  but  in 
part  made  known  and  of  such  a  certain  particular  kind  in 
other  respects.  Now  we  see  no  more  reason,  why  the  frame 
and  course  of  nature  should  be  such  a  scheme,  than  why 
Christianity  should.  And  that  the  former  is  such  a  scheme, 
renders  it  credible,  that  the  latter,  upon  supposition  of  its 
truth,  may  be  so  too.  And  as  it  is  manifest,  that  Christianity 
is  a  scheme  revealed  but  in  part,  and  a  scheme  in  which 
means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  like  to  that  of 
nature ;  so  the  credibility  that  it  may  have  been  all  along 
carried  on  by  general  laws  no  less  than  the  course  of  nature, 
has  been  distinctly  proved.  And  from  all  this  it  is  beforehand 
credible,  that  there  might,  I  think  probable  that  there  v/ould, 
be  the  like  appearance  of  deficiencies  and  irregularities  in 
Christianity  as  in  nature ;  i.  e.  that  Christianity  would  be 
liable  to  the  like  objections,  as  the  frame  of  nature.  And 
these  objections  are  answered  by  these  observations  concern¬ 
ing  Christianity ;  as  the  like  objections  against  the  frame  of 
nature,  are  answered  by  the  like  observations  concerning  the 
frame  of  nature. 


The  objections  against  Christianity,  considered  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  having,  in  general,  been  obviated  in  the  preceding 
chapter :  and  the  same,  considered  as  made  against  the  wis¬ 
dom  and  goodness  of  it,  having  been  obviated  in  this ;  the 
next  thing,  according  to  the  method  proposed,  is  to  show,  that 
the  principal  objections  in  particular,  against  Christianity, 
may  be  answered  by  particular  and  full  analogies  in  nature. 
And  as  one  of  them  is  made  against  the  whole  scheme  of  it 


CHRISTIANITY  AS  A  SCHEME  [PART  H. 


lYS 


I 


together,  as  just  now  described,  I  choose  to  consider  it  here, 
rather  than  in  a  distinct  chapter  by  itself.  The  thing  objected 
against  this  scheme  of  the  gospel  is,  ‘  That  it  seems  to  sup¬ 
pose  God  was  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  a  long  series  of  in¬ 
tricate  means,  in  order  to  accomplish  his  ends,  the  recovery 
and  salvation  of  the  world ;  in  like  sort  as  men,  for  want  of 
understanding,  or  power,  not  being  able  to  come  at  their  ends 
directly,  are  forced  to  go  round  about  ways,  and  make  use  of 
many  perplexed  contrivances  to  arrive  at  them.’  Now,  every 
thing  which  we  see  shows  the  folly  of  this,  considered  as  an 
objection  against  the  truth  of  Christianity.  For,  according 
to  our  manner  of  conception,  God  makes  use  of  variety  of 
means,  what  we  often  think  tedious  ones,  in  the  natural 
course  of  providence,  for  the  accomplishment  of  all  his  ends. 
Indeed,  it  is  certain,  there  is  somewhat  in  this  matter  quite 
beyond  our  comprehension ;  but  the  mystery  is  as  great  in 
nature  as  in  Christianity.  We  know  what  we  ourselves  aim 
at,  as  final  ends  ;  and  what  courses  we  take,  merely  as  means 
conducing  to  those  ends.  But  we  are  greatly  ignorant,  how 
far  things  are  considered  by  the  Author  of  nature,  under  the 
single  notion  of  means  and  ends  ;  so  as  that  it  may  be  said, 
this  is  merely  an  end,  and  that  merely  means,  in  his  regard. 
And  whether  there  be  not  some  peculiar  absurdity  in  our  very 
manner  of  conception  concerning  this  matter  somewhat  con¬ 
tradictory,  arising  from  our  extremely  imperfect  views  of 
things,  it  is  impossible  to  say.  However,  thus  much  is  mani¬ 
fest,  that  the  whole  natural  world  and  government  of  it  is  a 
scheme,  or  system ;  not  a  fixed,  but  a  progressive  one :  a 
scheme,  in  which  the  operation  of  various  means  takes  up  a 
great  length  of  time,  before  the  ends  they  tend  to  can  be  at 
tained.  The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of  the  fruits  ol 
the  earth,  the  very  history  of  a  flower,  is  an  instance  of  this ; 
and  so  is  human  life.  Thus,  vegetable  bodies,  and  those  oi 
animals,  though  possibly  formed  at  once,  yet  grow  up  by  de¬ 
grees  to  a  mature  state.  And  thus  rational  agents,  who 
animate  these  latter  bodies,  are  naturally  directed  to  form, 
each  his  own  manners  and  character,  by  the  gradual  gaining 
of  knowledge  and  experience,  and  by  a  long  course  of  action. 
Our  existence  is  not  onlj'-  successive,  as  it  must  be  of  necessity, 
but  one  state  of  our  life  and  being  is  appointed  by  God  to  be 
a  preparation  for  another ;  and  that,  to  be  the  means  of  at¬ 
taining  to  another  succeeding  one :  Infancy  to  childhood ; 
childhood  to  youth ;  youth  to  mature  age.  Men  are  impa¬ 
tient,  and  for  precipitating  things ;  but  the  Author  of  nature 


CHAP.  IV.] 


IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED. 


119 


appears  deliberate  throughout  his  operations  ;  accomplishing 
his  natural  ends  by  slow  successive  steps.  And  theie  is  a 
plan  of  things  beforehand  laid  out,  which,  from  the  nature  of  :  '  j  i 
it,  requires  various  systems  of  means,  as  well  as  length  of  ^ 
time,  in  order  to  the  carrying  on  its  several  parts  into  execu-  I 
tion.  Thus,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  providence,  God  ; 
operates  in  the  very  same  manner  as  in  the  dispensation  of  1 
Christianity :  making  one  thing  subservient  to  another  ;  this, 
to  somewhat  farther  ;  and  so  on,  through  a  progressive  series 
of  means,  which  extend,  both  backward  and  forward,  beyond 
our  utmost  view.  Of  this  manner  of  operation,  every  thing 
we  see  in  the  course  of  nature  is  as  much  an  instance,  as  ajiv 
part  of  the  Christian  dispensation. 


m 


Cj 


THE  APPOINTMENT  OP 


[part  n. 


ISO 


CHAPTER  V, 


Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity  ;  the  Appointment 

of  a  Alediator^  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World  by  him. 

_  » 

There  is  not,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  Christianity, 
I  which  has  been  more  objected  against,  than  the  mediation  of 
Christ,  in  some  or  other  of  its  parts.  Yet,  upon  thorough 
consideration,  there  seems  nothing  less  justly  liable  to  it. 
For, 

I.  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  imagined  pre¬ 
sumption  against  the  general  notion  of  ‘  a  Mediator  between 
God  and  man.’*  For  we  find,  all  living  creatures  are  brought 
into  the  world,  and  their  life  in  infancy  is  preserved,  by  the 
instrumentality  of  others  ;  and  every  satisfaction  of  it,  some 
way  or  other,  is  bestowed  by  the  like  means.  So  that  the 
visible  government,  which  God  exercises  over  the  world,  is  by 
the  instrumentality  and  mediation  of  others.  And  how  far 
his  invisible  government  be  or  be  not  so,  it  is  impossible  to 
determine  at  all  by  reason.  And  the  supposition,  that  part 
of  it  is  so,  appears,  to  say  the  least,  altogether  as  credible  as 
the  contrary.  There  is  then  no  sort  of  objection,  from  the 
light  of  nature,  against  the  general  notion  of  a  mediator  be¬ 
tween  God  and  man,  considered  as  a  doctrine  of  Christianity, 
or  as  an  appointment  in  this  dispensation ;  since  we  find,  by 
experience,  that  God  does  appoint  mediators,  to  be  the  instru¬ 
ments  of  good  and  evil  to  us,  the  instruments  of  his  justice 
and  his  mercy.  And  the  objection  here  referred  to  is  urged, 
not  against  mediation  ih  that  high,  eminent,  and  peculiar 
sense,  in  which  Christ  is  our  mediator ;  but  absolutely  against 
the  whole  notion  itself  of  a  mediator  at  all. 

II.  As  we  must  suppose,  that  the  world  is  under  the 


*  1  Tim,  ii.  5. 


CHaK  V.  ]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER. 


isi 


proper  moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  state  of  religion,  be» 
fore  we  can  enter  into  consideration  of  the  revealed  doctrine 
concerning  the  redemption  of  it  hy  Christ  j  so  that  supposi¬ 
tion  is  here  to  be  distinctly  taken  notice  of.  Now,  the  divine 
moral  government  which  religion  teaches  us,  implies,  that  the 
consequence  of  vice  shall  be  misery,  ill  some  future  state,  by 
the  righteous  judgment  of  God.  That  such  coiisequelit  pun¬ 
ishment  shall  take  effect  by  his  appointment,  is  necessaiily*- 
implied.  But,  as  it  is  riot  in  any  sort  to  be  supposed,  that  we 
are  made  acquainted  with  all  the  ends  or  reasons  for  which 
it  is  fit  future  punishment  should  be  inflicted,  or  why  God 
has  appointed  such  arid  such  consequent  misery  should  fol¬ 
low  vice ;  and  as  we  are  altogether  in  the  dark,  how  or  in 
ivhat  manner  it  shall  follow,  by  what  immediate  Occasions, 
or  by  the  instriimeiitality  of  what  means ;  there  is  n  j  ab- ' 
surdity  in  supposing,  it  may  follow  in  a  way  analogous  to 
that  in  which  many  miseries  follow  such  and  such  course.^ 
of  action  at  present ;  poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  untimely 
death  by  discasesj  death  from  the  hands  of  civil  justice 
There  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  future  punishment  may 
follow  wickedness  of  course,  as  we  speak,  or  in  the  way  of 
natural  consequences,  from  God’s  original  constitution  of  the  i 
world ;  from  the  nature  he  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condi  i 
tion  hi  which  lie  places  us  :  or,  in  like  manner,  as  a  person  i 
rashly  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural  conse- ! 
quence,  falls  down  ;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  breaks  j 
his  limbs,  suppose  ;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  of  this,  j 
without  help,  perishes.  ...  ^ 

Some  good  raeii  may,  perhaps,  be  offended,  with  hearing 
it  spoken  of  as  a  supposable  thing,  that  the  future  punish¬ 
ments  of  wickedness  may  be  in  the  way  of  natural  conse¬ 
quence  ;  as  if  this  were  taking  the  execution  of  justice  out  of 
the  hands  of  God,  and  giving  it  to  liature.  But  they  should 
remember  that  when  things  come  to  pass  according  to  the 
course  of  nature,  this  does  not  hinder  them  from  being  his 
doings  who  is  the  God  of  nature  ;  and  that  tile  Scripture  as¬ 
cribes  those  punishments  to  divine  justice,  which  are  knowli 
to  be  natural ;  and  which  must  be  called  so,  when  distin¬ 
guished  from  such  as  afe  miraculous.  But,  after  all,  thk 
supposition,  or  rather  this  way  of  speakihg,  is  liere  made  use 
of  only  by  way  of  illustration  of  the  subject  before  us.  For, 
since  it  must  be  admitted,  that  tire  future  punishment  of 
wickedness  is  not  a  matter  of  arbitrary  appointment,  but  of 
reason,  equity,  and  justice ;  it  comes,  for  aught  I  see,  to  the 


162 


THE  APPOINTMENT  OF 


[part  li. 


ejame  thing,  whether  it  is  supposed  to  be  inflicted  in  a  way 
analogous  to  that  in  which  the  temporal  punishments  of  vice 
and  folly  are  inflicted,  or  in  any  other  waj^  And  though 
there  were  a  difference,  it  is  allowable  in  the  present  case  to 
make  this  supposition,  plainly  not  an  incredible  one,  That 
Future  punishment  may  follow  wickedness  in  the  way  of 
natural  consequence,  or  according  to  some  general  laws  of 
government  already  established  in  the  universe. 

III.  Upon  this  supposition,  or  even  without  it,  we  may 
j  observe  somewhat,  much  to  the  present  purpose,  in  the  con- 
I  stitution  of  nature,  or  appointments  of  Providence :  the  pro¬ 
vision  which  is  made,  that  all  the  bad  natural  consequences 
,  of  men’s  actions  should  not  always  actually  follow  ;  or,  that 
such  bad  consequences,  as,  according  to  the  settled  course 
of  things,  would  inevitably  have  followed,  if  not  prevented, 
should,  in  certain  degrees,  be  prevented.  We  are  apt,  pre* 
sumptuously,  to  imaginej  that  the  world  might  have  been  so 
eonstituted,  as  that  there  would  not  have  been  any  such  thing 
as  misery  or  evil.  On  the  contrary,  we  find  the  Author  of 
nature  permits  it.  But  then,  he  has  provided  reliefs,  and, 
in  many  cases,  perfect  remedies  for  it,  after  some  pains  and 
difficulties  ;  reliefs  and  remedies  even  for  that  evil,  which  is 
the  fruit  of  our  owil  misconduct,  and  which,  in  the  course  of 
nature,  would  have  continued,  and  ended  in  our  destruction, 
but  for  such  remedies.  And  this  is  an  iilstarlce  both  of  se¬ 
verity  and  of  indulgence,  in  the  constitution  of  nature.  Thus, 
all  the  bad  consequences,  now  meiitidned,  of  a  man’s  trifling 
upon  a  precipice,  might  be  prevented.  And,  though  all  were 
not,  yet  some  of  them  might,  by  proper  interposition,  if  not 
rejected ;  by  another’s  coming  to  the  rash  man’s  relief,  with 
his  own  laying  hold  on  that  relief,  in  such  sort  as  the  case 
requires.  Iversons  may  do  a  great  deal  themselves  towards 
preventing  the  bad  consequences  of  their  follies  ;  and  more 
may  be  done  by  themselves,  together  with  the  assistance  of 
othsrs,  their  fellow  creatures ;  which  assistance  nature  re¬ 
quires  and  prompts  us  to.  This  is  the  general  constitution  of 
the  world.  Now,  suppose  it  had  been,  so  constituted,  that 
after  such  actions  were  done,  as  were  foreseen  naturally  to 
draw  after  them  misery  to  the  doer,  it  should  have  been  no 
more  in  human  power  to  have  prevented  that  naturally  con¬ 
sequent  misery,  in  any  instance,  than  it  is,  in  all ;  no  one  can 
say,  whether  such  a  more  severe  constitution  of  things  might 
not  yet  have  been  really  good.  But  that,  on  the  contrary, 
provision  is  male  by  nature,  that  we  may  and  do,  to  so  great 


euAP.  V.] 


A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER. 


degree,  prevent  the  bad  natural  effects  of  our  follies  ;  this*^ 
may  be  called  mercy,  or  compassion,  in  the  original  constitu¬ 
tion  of  the  world ;  compassion,  as  distinguished  from  good-j 
ness  in  general.  And,  the  whole  known  constitution  and 
course  of  things  affording  us  instances  of  such  compassion, 
it  would  be  according  to  the  analogy  of  nature  to  hope,  that, 
however  ruinous  the  natural  consequences  of  vice  might  be,  i 
from  the  genera,!  laws  of  God’s  government  over  the  universe,  J 
yet  provision  might  be  made,  possibly  might  have  been  i 
originally  made,  for  preventing  those  ruinoiis  consequences  • 
from  inevitably  following ;  at  least  from  following  universally,  j 
and  in  all  cases. 

Many,  I  am  sensible,  will  tvmnder  at  finding  this  made  a 
question,  or  spoken  of  as  in  any  degree  doubtful.  The  gene¬ 
rality  of  mankind  are  so  far  from  having  that  awful  sense  of 
things,  which  the  present  state  of  vice  and  misery  and  dark¬ 
ness  seems  to  make  but  reasonable,  that  they  have  scarce  any 
apprehension,  or  thought  at  all,  about  this  matter,  any  way  ; 
and  some  serious  persons  may  have  spoken  unadvisedly  com 
cerning  it.  But  let  us  observe,  what  we  experience  to  be,  and  , 
what,  from  the  very  constitution  of  nature,  cannot  but  be,  the 
consequences  Of  irregular  ahd  disorderly  behaviour  ;  even  of 
such  rashness,  wilfulness,  neglects,  as  We  scarce  call  viciOus. 
Now,  it  is  natural  to  apprehend,  that  the  bad  consequences  of 
irregularity  will  be  greater,  in  proportion  as  the  irregularity  is  J 
so.  And  there  is  no  comparison  between  these  irregularities, 
and  the  greater  instances  of  vice,  or  a  dissolute  profligate  dis¬ 
regard  to  all  religion ;  if  there  be  any  thing  at  all  in  religion 
For,  consider  what  it  is  for  creatures,  moral  agents,  presump 
tuously  to  introduce  that  confusion  and  misery  into  the  king¬ 
dom  of  God,  which  mankind  have,  in  fact,  introduced ;  to  blas¬ 
pheme  the  sovereign  Lord  of  all ;  to  contemn  his  authoiity  ; 
to  be  injurious  to  the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fellow-creatures, 
the  creatures  of  God.  Add,  that  the  effects  of  vice,  in  the  pre^t 
sent  world,  are  often  extreme  misery,  irretrievable  ruin,  and  | 
even  death  :  and,  upon  putting  all  this  together,  it  will  appear, 
that  as  no  one  can  say,  in  what  degree  fatal  the  unprevented 
consequences  of  vice  may  be,  according  to  the  general  rule  of 
divine  government ;  so  it  is  by  no  means  intuitively  certain, 
how  far  these  consequences  could  possibly,  in  the  nattire  of  the! 
thing,  be  prevented,  consistently  with  the  eternal  rule  of  right,  \ 
or  with  what  is,  in  fact,  the  moral  constitution  of  nature/ 
However,  there  would  be  large  ground  to  hope,  that  the  uni-  j 
versal  government  was  not  so  severely  strict,  but  that  there/ 


■  / 
J 


184 


THE  APPOINTMENT  OF 


PART  n 


was  room  for  pardon,  or  for  having  those  penal  consequences 
prevented.  Yet, 

IV.  There  seems  no  probability,  that  any  thing  we  could 
do,  would  alone,  and  of  itself,  prevent  them ;  prevent  their  fol¬ 
lowing,  or  being  inflicted.  But  one  would  think,  at  least,  it 
were  impossible  that  the  contrary  should  be  thought  certain. 
For  we  are  not  acquainted  with  the  whole  of  the  case.  We 
are  not  informed  of  all  the  reasons,  which  render  it  fit  that 
future  punishments  should  be  inflicted  ;  and,  therefore,  cannot 
know,  whether  any  thing  we  could  do  would  make  such  an 
alteration,  as  to  render  it  fit  that  they  should  be  remitted.  We 
do  not  know,  what  the  whole  natural  or  appointed  consequen¬ 
ces  of  vice  are,  nor  in  what  way  they  would  follow,  if  not  pre¬ 
vented  ;  and,  therefore,  can  in  no  sort  say,  whether  we  could 
do  any  thing,  which  would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  them. 
Our  ignorance  being  thus  manifest,  let  us  recollect  the  analogy 
of  nature,  or  providence.  F  or  though  this  may  be  but  a  slight 
ground  to  raise  a  positive  opinion  upon  in  this  matter,  yet  it  is 
sufficient  to  answer  a  mere  arbitrary  assertion,  without  any 
I  kind  of  evidence,  urged  by  way  of  objection  against  a  doctrine, 
\  the  proof  of  which  is  not  reason,  but  revelation.  Consider, 
/then,  people  ruin  their  fortunes  by  extravagance  ;  they  bring 
diseases  upon  themselves  by  excess  ;  they  incur  the  penalties 
of  civil  laws,  and  surely  civil  government  is  natural :  will  sor¬ 
row  for  these  follies  past,  and  behaving  well  for  the  future, 
alone  and  of  itself,  prevent  the  natural  consequences  of  them  ? 
\On  the  coritrary,  men’s  natural  abilities  of  helping  themselves 
are  often  impaired ;  or,  if  not,  yet  they  are  forced  to  be  be¬ 
holden  to  the  assistance  of  others,  upon  several  accounts,  and 
in  different  ways:  assistance  which  they  would  have  had  no 
occasion  for,  had  it  not  been  for  their  misconduct ;  but  which, 
in  the  disadvantageous  condition  they  have  reduced  them¬ 
selves  to,  is  ab^lutely  necessarj'-  to  their  recovery,  and  re¬ 
trieving  their  affairs.  Now,  since  this  is  our  case,  considering 
ourselves  merely  as  inhabitants  of  this  world,  and  as  having 
a  temporal  interest  here,  under  the  natural  government  of 
God,  which,  however,  has  a  great  deal  moral  in  it ;  why  is 
it  not  supposable,  that  this  may  be  our  case  also  in  our  more 
important  capacity,  as  under  his  perfect  moral  government, 
and  havirlg  a  more  general  and  future  interest  depending  ?  If 
we  have  misbehaved  in  this  higher  capacity,  and  rendered 
ourselves  obnoxious  to  the  future  punishment  which  God  has 
annexed  to  vice  ;  it  is  plainly  credible,  that  behaving  well  fol 


185 


CHAiP.  V.]  A  MeDiatoJi  and  redeemed. 

the  time  to  come,  may  be — not  useless,  God  forbid — but 
wholly  insufficient,'  alone  and  of  itself,  to  prevent  that  punish- 
ment ;  or  to  put  us  in  the  condition  which  we  should  have 
been  in,  had  we  preserved  our  innocence. 

And  though  we  ought  to  reason  with  all  reverence,  when¬ 
ever  we  reason  concerning  the  divine  conduct,  yet  it  may  be 
added,  that  it  is  clearly  contrary  tO  all  our  notions  of  govern¬ 
ment,  as  well  as  to  what  is,  in  fact,  the  general  constitution 
of  naturcj  to  suppose  that  doing  well  for  the  future,  should 
in  all  cases,  prevent  all  the  judicial  bad  consequences  of  hav¬ 
ing  done  evil,  or  all  the  punishment  annexed  to  disobedience. 
And  we  have  manifestly  nothing  from  whence  to  determine, 
in  what  degree,  and  in  what  cases,  reformation  would  pro 
vent  this  punishm-ent,  even  supposing  that  it  would  in  some. 
And,  though  the  efficacy  of  repentance  itself  alone,  to  pre¬ 
vent  what  mankind  had  rendered  themselves  obnoxious  to, 
and  recover  what  they  had  forfeited,  is  now  insisted  upon,  in 
opposition  to  Christianity ;  jmt,  by  the  general  prevalence  of 
propitiatory  sacrifices  over  the  heathen  world,  this  notion,  of 
repentance  alohe  being  sufficient  to  expiate  guilt,  appears  to 
be  contrary  to  the  general  sense  of  mankind. 

Upon  the  whole,  then,  had  the  laws,  the  general  laws  of 
God’s  government,  been  permitted  to  operate,  without  any 
interposition  in  our  behalf,  the  future  punishment,  for  aught 
w'e  know  to  the  contrary,  or  have  any  reason  to  think,  must 
inevitably  have  followed,  notwithstanding  any  thing  we  could 
have  done  to  prevent  it.  Now, 

V.  In  this  darkness,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call  it  which  you 
please,  revelation  comes  in;  confirms  every  doubting  fear,  wffiich 
could  enter  into  the  heart  of  man,  concerning  the  future  Un¬ 
prevented  consequence  of  wickedness  ;  supposes  the  world 
to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin,  (a  supposition  which  seems  the  very 
ground  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  which,  if  notproveable 
by  reason,  yet  it  is  in  no  wise  contrary  to  it ;)  teaches  us,  too, 
that  the  rules  of  divine  government  are  such,  as  not  to  admit  of 
pardon  immediately  aUd  directly  upon  repentance,  or  by  the 
sole  efficacy  of  it ;  but  then  teaches,  at  the  same  time,  what 
nature  might  justly  have  hoped,  that  the  moral  government  of 
the  universe  was  not  so  rigid,  but  that  there  was  room  for  an 
interposition  to  avert  the  fatal  consequences  of  vice ;  which 
therefore,  by  this  means,  does  admit  of  pardon.  Revelation 
teaches  us,  that  the  unknown  laws  of  God’s  more  general 
government,  no  less  than  the  particular  laws  by  which  we 


THE  APPOINTMENT  OP 


[part  JI, 


186 

\ 

experience  be  governs  us  at  present,  are  compassionate,*  as 
well  as  good,  in  the  more  general  notion  of  goodness  ;  and 
that  he  hath  mercifully  provided,  that  there  should  he  an 
interposition  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  human  kind,  what¬ 
ever  that  destruction  unprevented  would  have  been.  ‘  God  so 
loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son,  that 
whosoever  believeth,’  not,  to  be  sure,  in  a  speculative,  but  in 
a  practical  sense,  ‘  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should  not 
perish; ’'I'  gave  his  son  in  the  same  way  of  goodness  to  the 
world,  as  he  affords  particular  persons  the  friendly  assistance 
of  their  fellow-creatures,  when,  without  it,  their  temporal  ruin 
would  be  the  certain  consequence  of  their  follies ;  in  the 
same  way  of  goodness,  I  say,  though  in  a  transcendent  and 
infinitely  higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God  ‘  loved  us,  and 
have  himself  for  us,’  with  a  love  which  he  himself  compares 
to  that  of  human  friendship  ;  though,  in  this  case,  all  com-  • 
parisons  must  fall  infinitely  short  of  the  thing  intended  to 
be  illustrated  by  them.  He  interposed  in  such  a  manner,  as 
was  necessary  and  effectual  to  prevent  that  execution  of  jus¬ 
tice  upon  sinners,  which  God  had  appointed  should  otherwise 
have  been  executed  upon  them  ;  or  in  such  a  manner,  as 
to  prevent  that  punishment  from  actually  following,  which, 
according  to  the  general  laws  of  divine  government,  must 
have  followed  the  sins  of  the  world,  had  it -not  been  for  such 
interposition.J 

If  any  thing  here  said  should  appear,  upon  first  thought, 
inconsistent  with  divine  goodness,  a  second,  I  am  persuaded, 

*  Page  128, &c.  f  John  iii.  16i 

1  It  cannot,  I  suppose,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  most  cursory  reader, 
that  it  is,  in  any  sort,  affii'med,  or  implied,  in  any  thing  said  in  this  chap¬ 
ter,  that  none  can  have  the  benefit  of  the  general  redemption,  but  such 
as  have  the  advantage  of  being  made  acquainted  with  it  in  the  present 
life. — But,  it  may  be  needful  to  mention,  that  several  questions,  which 
have  been  brought  into  the  subject  before  us,  and  determined,  are  not  in 
the  least  entered  into  here;  questions  which  have  been,  I  fear,  rashly 
determined,  and,  perhaps,  Avith  equal  rashness,  contrary  Avays.  For  in¬ 
stance  :  Whether  God  could  have  sa\'ed  the  Avorld  by  other  means  than 
the  death  ofChrist,  consistently  Avith  the  general  laws  of  hisgovernment  ? 
And,  had  not  Christ  came  into  the  Avorld,  Avhat  AVould  haA^e  been  the 
future  condition  of  the  better  sort  of  men  ;  those  just  persons  oA'er  the 
face  of  the  earth,  for  whom  Manasses  in  his  prayer  asserts,  repentance 
was  not  appointed  ?  The  meaning  of  the  first  of  these  questions  is 
greatly  ambiguous  ;  and  neither  of  theni  can  properly  be  answ'ered, 
without  going  upon  that  infinitely  absurd  supposition,  that  we  know 
the  Avhole  of  the  case.  And,  perhaps,  the  very  inquiry,  what  wmdd  have 
followed  if  God  had  not  done  as  he  has  7  may  have  in  it  some  very  great 
impropriety  ;  and  ought  not  to  be  carried  on  any  farther  than  is  neces- 
t^ry  to  help  our  partial  and  inadequate  conceptions  of  things. 


CHAP.  V.]  A  HEDIATOH  AND  REDEEMER.  l87 

will  entirely  remove  that  appearance.  For,  were  we  to  sup¬ 
pose  the  constitution  of  things  to  be  such,  as  that  the  whole 
creation  must  have  perished,  had  it  not  been  for  somewhat, 
which  God  had  appointed  should  be  in  order  to  prevent  that 
rum  ;  even  this  supposition  would  not  be  inconsistent,  in  any  de¬ 
gree,  with  the  most  absolutely  perfect  goodness.  But  still  itmay 
be  thought,  that  this  whole  manner  of  treating  the  subject  be¬ 
fore  us,  supposes  mankind  to  be  naturally  in  a  very  strange 
state.  And  truly  so  it  does.  But  it  is  not  Christianity  v.  hich  , 
has  put  us  into  this  state  Whoever  will  consider  the  manifold 
miseries,  and  the  extreme  wickedness  of  the  world  ;  that  the 
best  have  great  wrongnesses  with  themselves,  which  they 
con  plain  of,  and  endeavour  to  amend;  but,  that  the  gene¬ 
rality  grow  more  profligate  and  corrupt  with  age  ;  that  hea¬ 
then  moralists  thought  the  present  state  to  be  a  state  of  punish¬ 
ment;  and,  what  might  be  added,  that  the  earth,  ourhabitalioU, 
has  the  appearance  of  being  a  ruin  :  whoever,  I  say,  '^vill  con¬ 
sider  all  these,  and  some  other  obvious  things,  will  think  he 
has  little  reason  to  object  against  the  Scripture  account,  that 
mankind  is  in  a  state  of  degradation  ;  against  this  being  the 
fact :  how  difficult  soever  he  may  think  it  to  account  for, 
or  even  to  form  a  distinct  conception  of,  the  Occasions  and  cir-^ 
cumstances  of  it.  But  that  the  crime  of  our  first  parents  was^> 
the  occasion  of  oUr  being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous 
condition,  is  a  thing  throughout,  and  particularly  analogous 
to  what  we  see,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  Providence  ;  as 
the  recovery  of  the  world,  by  the  interposition  of  Christ,  has 
been  shown  to  be  so  in  general. 

VI.  The  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  interposed  in  the 
redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office  as  Mediator,  in  the 
largest  sense,  between  God  and  man^  is  thus  represented  to 
us  in  the  Scripture  :  ‘  He  is  the  light  of  the  world  the  re- 
vealer  of  the  will  of  God  in  the  most  eminent  sense  :  He  is  a 
propitiatory  sacrifice  ;p  ‘  the  Lamb  of  God  ;’t  and  as  he  vo¬ 
luntarily  offered  himself  up,  he  is  styled  our  High- Priest. § 
And,  which  seems  of  peculiar  weight,  he  is  described  before, 
hand  in  the  Old  Testament,  under  the  same  characters  of  a 
priest,  and  expiatory  victim.  [|  And  whereas  it  is  objected, 

*  John  i.  and  viii.  12. 

t  Rom.  iii.  25,  and  v.  11.  1  Cor.  v.  7.  Eph.  v.  2.  1  Jtohn  IL  2. 

Matt.  xxvi.  28. 

I  John  i.  29,  36,  and  throughout  the  book  of  Revelation. 

§  Throughout  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 

||  Isa  liii.  Dan.  ix.  24.  Psalm  cx.  4. 


188 


THE  APPOINTMENT  OF 


[part  II. 


tliat  all  this  is  merely  by  way  of  allusion  to  the  sacrifices  of 
the  Mosaic  law,  the  apostle,  on  the  contrary,  affirms,  that  thfe 
‘  law  was  a  shahow  of  good  things  to  come,  and  not  the  very 
image  of  the  things  and  that  the  piiests  that  offer  gifts 
according  to  the  law — serve  unto  the  example  and  shadow 
of  heavenly  things,  as  Moses  was  admonished  of  God,  when 
he  was  about  to  make  the  tabernacle.  ‘  For  see,’  saith  he, 

‘  that  thou  make  all  things  according  to  the  pattern  showed 
to  thee  in  the  mount  f'f  i.  e.  the  Levitical  priesthood  was  a 
shadow  of  the  priesthood  of  Christ,  in  like  manner  as  the  ta¬ 
bernacle  made  b}^  Moses  .was  according  to  that  showed  him 
in  the  Mount.  The  priesthood  of  Christ  and  the  tabernacle 
in  the  Mount,  weie  the  originals ;  of  the  former  of  which,  the 
Levitical  priesthood  was  a  type  ;  and  of  the  latter,  the  taber¬ 
nacle  made  by  Moses  was  a  copy.  The  doctrine  of  this 
epistle,  then,  plainly  is,  that  the  le^al  sacrifices  were  allusions 
to  the  great  and  final  atonement  to  be  made  by  the  blood  of 
Christ ;  and  not  that  this  was  an  allusion  to  those.  Nor  can 
any  thing  be  more  express  and  determinate,  than  the  follow¬ 
ing  passage  ;  ‘  It  is  not  possible  that  the  blood  of  bulls  and  of 
goats  should  take  away  sin.  Wherefore,  when  he  cometh 
into  the  world,  he  saith.  Sacrifice  and  offering,’  i.  e.  of  bulla 
and  of  goats,  ‘  thou  wouldst  not,  but  a  body  hast  thou  pre¬ 
pared  me- — Lo,  I  come  to  do  thy  will,  O  God. — By  which 
will  we  are  sanctified,  through  the  oft'ering  of  the  body  of 
Jesus  Christ  once  for  all.’J  And  to  add  one  passage  more 
of  the  like  kind  :  ‘  Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear  the  sins  of 
many ;  and  unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall  he  appear  the 
second  time,  without  sin  ;’  i.  e.  without  bearing  sin,  as  he  did 
at  his  first  coming,  by  being  an  offering  for  it ;  without 
having  our  iniquilics  again  laid  upon  him^  without  being  any/ 
more  a  sin-offering  ‘  Unto  them  that  look  fOr  him  shall  lieK 
appear  the  second  time,  without  sin,  unto  salvation.’^  Nor  ' 
do  the  inspired  writers  at  all  confine  themselves  to  this  man 
ner  of  speaking  concerning  the  satisfaction  of  Christ,  but  de¬ 
clare  an  efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  suffered  for  us,  additional 
to,  and  beyond  mere  instruction,  example,  and  government, 
in  a  great  variety  of  expression :  ‘  ff'hat  Jesus  should  die  for 
that  nation/  the  Jews  ;  ‘  and  not  for  that  nation  only,  but  that 
also,’  plainly  by  the  efficacy  of  his  death,  ‘  he 
together  in  one  the  children  of  God  that  " 

+  Heb.  X.  1.  t  Heb.  viii.  4,  5.  tHeb.  x.  4,  5,  7,  9,  IC). 

§  Heb.  ix.  28. 


should  gather 
i^ere  scattered. 


CHAP.  V.j 


A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER. 


189 


abroad  that  ‘  he  suffered  for  sins,  the  just  for  the  unjust 
that  ‘  he  gave  liis  life,  himself,  a  ransom J  that  ‘  we  are 
bought,  bought  with  a  price  :’§  that  ‘  he  redeemed  us  with 
his  blood ;  redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  being 
made  a  curse  for  us jj  that  he  is  our^  ‘  advocate,  intercessor, 
and  propitiation  fU  that  ‘  he  was  made  perfect  (or  consum¬ 
mate)  through  sufferings  ;  and  being  thus  made  perfect,  he 
became  the  author  of  salvation:’^*  that  ‘God  was  in  Christ, 
reconciling  the  world  to  himself,  bj  the  death  of  his  Son.  bj 
the  cross ;  not  imputing  their  trespasses  unto  them  ■f'f  and, 
lastly,  that  ‘through  death  he,^  destroyed  him  that  had  the 
power  of  death.’ JJ  Christ,  then,  having  thus  ‘humbled 
himself,  and  become  obedient  to  death,  even  the  death  of  the 
cross,  God  also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a 
name  which  is  above  every  name  ;  hath  given  all  things  into 
his  hands ;  hath  committed  all  judgment  unto  him  ;  that  all 
men  should  honor  the  Son,  even  as  they  honor  the  , Father. ’§§ 
For,  ‘worthy  is  the  Lamb  that  was  slain,  to  receive  power, 
and  riches,  and  uisdom,  and  strength,  and  honor,  and  glory, 
and  blessing !  And  every  creature  which  is  in  heaven,  and 
on  the  earth,  heard  I,  saying.  Blessing,  and  honor,  and  glory, 
and  power,  be  unto  him  that  sitteth  upon  the  throne,  and 
unto  the  Lamb,  for  ever  and  ever  !’||jj 

These  passages  of  Scripture  seem  to  comprehend  and  ex 
press  the  chief  parts  of  Christ’s  office,  as  mediator  between 
God  and  man  ;  so  far,  I  mean,  as  the  nature  of  this  his  office 
is  revealed,  and  it  is  usually  treated  of  by  divines  under 
three  heads. 

First,  He  was,  by  the  way  of  eminence,  the  Prophet ;  ‘  that 
Prophet  that  should  come  into  the  world,’irTr  to  declare  the  di¬ 
vine  will.  He  published  anew  the  law  of  nature,  which  men 
had  corrupted ;  and  the  very  knowledge  of  which,  to  some 
degree,  was  lost  among  them.  He  taught  mankind,  taught 
us  authoritatively,  to  ‘  live  soberly,  righteously  and  godly  in 

+  John  xi.  51 ,52.  1 1  Pet.  iii.  18. 

f  Matt.  XX.  23.  Mark  x.  45.  1  Tim.  ii.  6. 

h  2  Pet,  ii.  1.  Rev.  xiv.  4.  1  Cor.  vi.  20. 

{(  1  Pet.  i.  19.  Rev.  v.  9.  Gal.  iii,  13. 
k  Heb.  vii.  25.  I  John  ii.  1,  2. 

**  Heb.  ii.  10,  and  v.  9. 

tt  2  Cor.  V.  ik  Rom.  v.  10.  Eph.  ii.  16. 

JJ  Heb.  ii.  14.  See  also  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  book  (rf  Job, 
xxxiii.  24. 

§§Phil.  ii.  8,  9.'  John  iii.  35,  and  y,.  22,  23. 

[j[jRev.  V.  12,  13.  ^^Johnvi.  14. 


190 


THE  APPOINTMENT  OP 


[part  II. 


tliis  present  world/  in  expectation  of  the  future  judgment  of 
God.  He  confirmed  the  truth  of  this  moral  system  of  nature, 
and  gave  us  additional  evidence  of  it :  the  evidence  of  testi¬ 
mony.*  He  distinctly  revealed  the  manner  in  which  God 
would  be  worshipped,  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  and  the  re¬ 
wards  and  punishments  of  a  future  life.  Thus  he  was  a  pro¬ 
phet  in  a  sense  in  which  no  other  ever  was.  To  which  is  to 
be  added,  that  he  set  us  a  perfect  ‘  example,  that  we  siiould 
follow  his  steps.’-' 

Secondly j  He  has  a  ‘  kingdom,  which  is  not  of  this  world.’ 
He  founded  a  church,  to  be  to  mankind  a  standing  memorial 
of  religion,  and  invitation  to  it ;  which  he  promised  to  be  with 
always,  even  to  the  end.  He  exercises  an  invisible  govern¬ 
ment  over  it  himself,  and  by  his  Spirit ;  over  that  part  of  ic 
which  is  militant  here  on  earth,  a  government  of  discipline, 
‘  for  the  perfecting  of  the  saints,  for  the  edifying  his  body  ;  till 
we  all  come  in  the  unity  of  the  faith,  and  of  the  knowledge  of 
the  Son  of  God,  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the 
stature  of  the  fulness  of  Christ.’j*  Of  this  church,  all  persons 
scattered  over  the  world,  who  live  in  obedience  to  his  laws, 
are  members.  For  these  he  is  ‘  gone  to  prepare  a  place,  and 
will  come  again  to  receive  them  unto  himself,  that  where  he 
is,  there  they  may  be  also  ;  and  reign  with  him  for  ever  and 
ever  and  likewise  ‘  to  take  vengeance  on  them  that  know 
not  God,  and  obey  not  his  gospel. ’§ 

Against  these  parts  of  Christ’s  office,  I  find  no  objections 
but  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  beginning  of  this  Chapter. 
^  Lastly^  Christ  offered  himself  a  propitiatory  sacrifice,  and 
1  made  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the  world  :  which  is  mentioned 
last,  in  regard  to  what  is  objected  against  it.  Sacrifices  of  ex¬ 
piation  were  commanded  the  Jews,  and  obtained  amongst  most 
other  nations^  from  tradition,  whose  original  probably  was  reve- 
^  lation.  And  they  were  continually  repeated,  both  occasion- 
I  ally  and  at  the  returns  of  stated  times  ;  and  made  up  great 
part  of  the  external  religion  of  mankind.  ‘  But  now  once  in 
[  the  end  of  the  world  Christ  appeared,  to  put  away  sin  by  the 
!  sacrifice  of  himself.’ ||  And  this  sacrifice  was  in  the  highest 
degree,  and  with  the  most  extensive  influence,  of  that  efficacj' 
for  obtaining  pardon  of  sin,  which  the  heathens  may  be  sup¬ 
posed  to  have  thought  their  sacrifices  to  have  been,  and  which\ 


*  Page  163,  &c.  I  Epli.  iv.  12,  13. 

f  John  xiv.  2,  3.  Rev.  iii,  21,  and  xi.  15. 

§  2  Thess.  i.  8.  11  Hcb,  ix.  26,. 


CHAP.  V. 


A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER. 


191 


the  Jewish  sacrifices  really  were  in  some  degree,  and  with 
regard  to  some  persons. 

How,  and  in  what  particular  way,  it  had  this  efficacy,  there 
are  not  wanting  persons  who  have  endeavoured  to  explain ; 
but  I  do  not  find  that  the  Scripture  has  explained  it.  We 
seem  to  be  very  much  in  the  dark  concerning  the  manner  in 
which  the  ancients  understood  atonement  to  be  made,  i.  c.  par¬ 
don  to  be  obtained,  by  sacrifices.  And  if  the  Scripture  has, 
as  surely  it  has,  left  this  matter  of  the  satisfaction  of  Christ 
mysterious,  left  somewhat  in  it  unrevealed,  all  conjectures 
about  it  must  be,  if  not  evidently  absurd,  yet  at  least  uncer¬ 
tain.  Nor  has  any  one  reason  to  complain  for  want  of  far¬ 
ther  information,  unless  he  can  sho^v  his  claim  to  it. 

Some  have  endeavoured  to  explain  the  efficacy  of  what 
Christ  has  done  and  suffered  for  us,  beyond  what  the  Scrip 
ture  has  authorized  ;  others,  probably  because  they  could  not 
explain  it,  have  been  for  taking  it  away,  and  confining  his  office 
as  Redeemer  of  the  world,  to  his  instruction,  example,  and  go 
vernment  of  the  church  ;  whereas  the  doctrine  of  the  gospel 
appears  to  be,  not  only  that  he  taught  the  efficacy  of  repen¬ 
tance,  but  rendered  it  of  tire  efficacy  which  it  is,  by  what  he 
did  and  suffered  for  us ;  that  lie  obtained  for  us  the  benefit  of 
having  our  repentance  accepted  unto  eternal  life  ;  not  only  that 
he  revealed  to  sinners,  that  they  were  in  a  capacity  of  salva¬ 
tion,  and  how  they  might  obtain  it ;  but,  moreover,  that  he  put 
them  into  this  capacity  of  salvation,  by  what  he  did  and  suf¬ 
fered  for  them  ;  put  us  into  a  capacity  of  escaping  future  pun¬ 
ishment,  and  obtaining  future  happiness.  And  it  is  our  wis¬ 
dom  thankfully  to  accept  the  benefit,  bj^  performing  the  con¬ 
ditions  upon  which  it  is  offered,  on  our  part,  without  disputing 
how  it  was  procured  on  his.  For, 

VII.  Since  we  neither  know  by  what  means  punishment 
in  a  future  state  would  have  followed  wickedness  in  this  ;  nor 
in  what  manner  it  would  have  been  inflicted,  had  it  not  been 
prevented  ;  nor  all  the  reasons  why  its  infliction  would  have 
been  needful ;  nor  the  particular  nature  of  that  state  of  hap¬ 
piness  which  Christ  has  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples ; 
and  since  we  are  ignorant  how  far  any  thing  which  we  could 
do,  would,  alone  and  of  itself,  have  been  effectual  to  prevent 
that  punishment  to  which  we  are  obnoxious,  and  recover  that 
happiness  which  we  had  forfeited  ;  it  is  most  evident  we  are 
not  judges,  antecedently  to  revelation,  whether  a  mediator 
was  or  was  not  necessary  to  obtain  those  ends ;  to  prevent 
that  future  punishment,  and  bring  mankind  to  the  final  hap 


; 


192 


THE  APPOINTMENT  OF 


[part  II, 


piiiess  of  their  nature.  And  for  the  very  same  reasons,  upon 
supposition  of  the  necessity  of  a  mediator,  we  are  no  more 
judges,  antecedently  to  revelation,  of  the  whole  nature  of  his 
/  office,  or  the  several  parts  of  which  it  consists  ;  of  what  was 
fit  and  requisite  to  be  assigned  him,  in  order  to  accomplish  the 
ends  of  divine  Providence  in  the  appointment.  And  from 
hence  it  follows,  that  to  object  against  the  expediency  or  use¬ 
fulness  of  particular  things  revealed  to  have  been  done  or 
suffered  by  him,  because  we  do  not  see  how  they  were 
conducive  to  those  ends,  is  highly  absurd.  Yet  nothing  is 
more  common  to  be  met  with,  than  this  absurdity.  But  if  it 
be  acknowledged  beforehand,  that  we  are  not  judges  in  the 
case,  it  is  evident  that  no  objection  can,  with  any  shadow  of 
reason,  be  urged  against  any  particular  part  of  Christ’s  medi¬ 
atorial  office  revealed  in  Scripture,  till  it  can  be  shown  posi¬ 
tively,  not  to  be  requisite,  or  conducive,  to  the  ends  proposed 
to  be  accomplished  ;  or  that  it  is  in  itself  unreasonable. 

And  there  is  one  objection  made  against  the  satisfaction  of  \ 
Christ,  which  looks  to  be  of  this  positive  kind ;  that  tire  doc¬ 
trine  of  his  being  appointer]  to  suffer  for  the  sins  of  the  world, 
represents  God  as  being  indifferent  whetlier  he  punished  the 
innocent  or  the  guilty.  Now,  from  the  foregoing  observa 
'  tions,  we  may  see  the  extreme  slightness  of  all  such  objec 
tions  ;  and,  (though  it  is  most  certain  all  who  make  them  do 
not  see  the  consequence,)  that  they  conclude  altogether  as 
much  against  God’s  whole  original  constitution  of  nature, 
and  the  whole  daily  course  of  divine  Providence,  in  the  go¬ 
vernment  of  the  world,  i.  e.  against  the  whole  scheme  of 
theism  and  the  whole  notion  of  religion,  as  against  Christianity". 

For  the  world  is  a  constitution,  or  system,  whose  parts  have 
a  mutual  reference  to  each  other;  apd  there  is  a  scheme  of 
things  gradually  carrying  on,  called  the  course  of  nature,  to 
the  carrying  on  of  which  God  has  appointed  us,  in  various 
ways,  to  contribute.  And  when,  in  the  daily  course  of 
natural  providence,  it  is  appointed  that  innocent  people  should 
suffer  for  the  faults  of  the  guilty,  this  is  liable  to  the  very 
same  objection  as  the  instance  we  are  now  considering.  The 
infinitely  greater  importance  of  that  appointment  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  which  is  objected  against,  does  not  hinder  but  it  may 
be,  as  it  plainly  is,  an  appointment  of  the  very  same  kind 
with  what  the  world  affords  us  daily  examples  of  Nay,  if 
there  were  any  force  at  all  in  the  objection,  it  would  be 
I  stronger,  in  one  respect,  against  natural  providence,  than 
against  Christianity ;  because,  under  the  former,  we  are  in 


CHAP.  V.] 


A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER. 


193 


many  cases  commanded,  and  even  necessitated,  whether  we 
will  or  no,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  others  ;  whereas  the 
sufferings  of  Christ  were  voluntary.  The  world’s  being 
under  the  righteous  government  of  God,  does  indeed  imply, 
that  finally,  and  upon  the  whole,  every  one  shall  receive  ac-  \ 
cording  to  his  personal  deserts  ;  and  the  general  doctrine  of 
the  whole  Scripture  is,  that  this  shall  be  the  completion  of 
the  divine  government.  But,  during  the  progress,  and,  for 
ought  we  know,  even  in  order  to  the  completion  of  this  moral 
scheme,  vicarious  punishments  may  be  fit,  and  absolutely 
necessary.  Men,  by  their  follies,  run  themselves  into  ex¬ 
treme  distress;  into  difficulties  which  would  be  absolutely 
fatal  to  them,  were  it  not  for  the  interposition  and  assistance 
of  others.  God  commands  by  the  law  of  nature,  that  we 
afford  them  this  assistance,  in  many  cases  where  we  cannot 
do  it  without  very  great  pains,  and  labour,  and  sufferings  to 
ourselves.  And  we  see  in  what  variety  of  ways  one  person’s 
sufferings  contribute  to  the  relief  of  another ;  and  how,  or  by 
what  particular  means,  this  comes  to  pass,  or  follows,  from 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  nature,  which  come  under  our 
notice ;  and  being  familiarized  to  it,  men  are  not  shocked 
with  it.  So  that  the  reason  of  their  insisting  upon  objections  ■ 
of  the  foregoing  kind,  against  the  satisfaction  of  Christ,  is,  | 
either  that  they  do  not  consider  God’s  settled  and  uniform  ap-  ! 
pointment  as  his  appointment  at  all,  or  else  they  forget  that  ; 
vicarious  punishment  is  a  providential  appointment  of  every  ^ 
day’s  experience :  and  then,  from  their  being  unacquainted 
with  the  more  general  laws  of  nature,  or  divine  government 
over  the  world,  and  not  seeing  how  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
could  contribute  to  the  redemption  of  it,  unless  by  arbitrary 
and  tyrannical  will,  they  conclude  his  sufferings  could  not 
contribute  to  it  any  other  way.  And  yet,  what  has  been  '' 
often  alleged  in  justification  of  this  doctrine,  even  from  the  | 
apparent  natural  tendency  of  this  method  of  our  redemption — 
its  tendency  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God’s  laws,  and 
deter  his  creatures  from  sin :  this  has  never  yet  been  an¬ 
swered,  and  is,  I  think,  plainly  unanswerable  ;  though  I  am 
far  from  thinking  it  an  account  of  the  whole  of  the  case.  But 
without  taking  this  into  consideration,  it  abundantly  appears, 
from  the  observations  above  made,  that  this  objection  is,  not 
an  objection  against  Christianity,  but  against  the  whole 
general  constitution  of  nature.  And  if  it  were  to  be  consid-  \ 
ered  as  an  objection  against  Christianity,  or  considering  it  as  I 
H  is,  an  obiection  against  the  constitution  of  nature,  it  amounts  J 

9 


194 


THE  APPOINTMENT  OF 


[part  II, 


I  to  no  more  in  conclusion  than  this,  that  a  divine  appointment 
>  cannot  be  necessary,  or  expedient,  because  the  objector  does 
I  not  discern  it  to  be  so  ;  though  he  must  own  that  the  nature 
I  of  the  case  is  such,  as  renders  him  incapable  of  judging  whe« 
I  ther  it  be  so  or  not ;  or  of  seeing  it  to  be  necessary,  though  it 
were  so. 

y  It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reasonable  men, 
/  to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner ;  objecting  against  the 
/  credibility  of  such  particular  things  revealed  in  Scripture,  that 
they  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  them.  For, 
though  it  is  highly  right,  and  the  most  pious  exercise  of  our 
understanding,  to  inquire  with  due  reverence  into  the  ends 
and  reasons  of  God’s  dispensations  ;  yet,  when  those  reasons 
are  concealed,  to  argue  from  our  ignorance,  that  such  dis¬ 
pensations  cannot  be  from  God,  is  infinitely  absurd.  The 
presumption  of  this  kind  of  objections  seems  almost  lost  in 
the  folly  of  them.  And  the  folly  of  them  is  yet  greater,  when 
they  are  urged,  as  usually  they  are,  against  things  in  Chris¬ 
tianity  analogous,  or  like  to  those  natural  dispensations  of 
Providence,  which  are  matter  of  experience.  Let  reason  be 
kept  to ;  and,  if  any  part  of  the  Scripture  account  of  the  re¬ 
demption  of  the  world  by  Christ  can  be  shown  to  be  really  con¬ 
trary  to  it,  let  the  Scripture,  in  the  name  of  God  be  given  up : 
but  let  not  such  poor  creatures  as  we,  go  on  objecting  against  an 
infinite  scheme,  that  we  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  usefulness 
of  all  its  parts,  and  call  this  reasoning  ;  and,  which  sLll  far- 
'  ther  heightens  the  absurdity  in  the  present  case,  parts  uhich 
we  are  not  actively  concerned  in.  For,  it  may  be  worth  men¬ 
tioning. 


Lasthjj  That  not  only  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but  the  whole 
analogy  of  nature,  should  teach  us,  not  to  expect  to  have  the 
like  information  concerning  the  divine  conduct,  as  concerning 
our  own  duty.  God  instructs  iis  by  experience,  (for  it  is 
not  reason,  but  experience,  which  instructs  us,)  what  good 
or  bad  consequences  wall  follow^  from  our  acting  in  such 
and  such  manners  ;  and  by  this  he  directs  us  how  we  are 
to  behave  ourselves.  But,  though  we  are  sufficiently  in¬ 
structed  for  the  common  purposes  of  life,  yet  it  is  but  an 
almost  infinitely  small  part  of  natural  providence  which  we 
are  at  all  let  into.  The  case  is  the  same  with  regard  to 
revelation.  The  doctrine  of  a  mediator  between  God  and 
man,  against  which  it  is  objected,  that  the  expediency  of 
some  things  in  it  is  not  understood,  relates  only  to  wdiat  was 
done  op  God’s  part  in  the  appointment,  and  on  the  Mediator’s 


CHAP,  V,] 


A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER. 


195 


in  the  execution  of  it.  For  what  is  required  of  us,  in  con* 
eequence  of  this  gracious  dispensation,  is  another  subject,  in 
which  none  can  complain  for  want  of  information.  The  con¬ 
stitution  of  the  world,  and  God’s  natural  governme'iit  over  it,  , 
is  all  mystery,  as  much  as  the  Christian  dispensation.  Yet  ; 
under  the  first,  he  has  given  men  all  things  pertaining  to  life ;  / 
and  under  the  other,  all  things  pertaining  unto  godliness.  AndJ 
it  may  be  added,  that  there  is  nothing  hard  to  be  accounted 
for  in  any  of  the  common  precepts  of  Christianity  ;  though, 
if  there  were,  surely  a  divine  command  is  abundantly  suf¬ 
ficient  to  lay  us  under  the  strongest  obbgations  to  obedience. 
But  the  fact  is,  that  the  reasons  of  all  the  Christian  preceptsV  / 
are  evident.  '  Positive  institutions  are  manifestly  necessary  to 
keep  up  and  propagate  religion  among/ 1  mankind.  And  bur  ^ 
duty  to  Christ,  the  internal  and  external  worship  of  him  ;  this 
part  of  the  religion  of  the  gospel  manifestly  arises  out  of  what 
he  has  done  and  suffered,  his  authority  and  dominion,  and 
the  relation  which  he  is  revealed  to  stand  in  to  us. 

) 


19G 


REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL  : 


[part  II. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


Of  the  want  of  Universality  in  Revelation ;  and  of  the  sttp^ 
posed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it. 

It  has  been  thought  by  some  persons,  that  if  the  evidence 
of  revelation  appears  doubtful,  this  itself  turns  into  a  positive 
argument  against  it ;  because  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that,  if 
it  were  true,  it  would  be  left  to  subsist  upon  doubtful  evidence 
And  the  objection  against  revelation,  from  its  not  being  uni* 
versal,  is  often  insisted  upon  as  of  great  weight. 

Now,  the  weakness  of  these  opinions  may  be  shown,  by 
observing  the  suppositions  on  which  they  are  founded,  which 
are  really  such  as  these ; — that  it  cannot  be  thought  God 
would  have  bestowed  any  favour  at  all  upon  us,  unless  in  the 
degree  which,  we  think,  he  might,  and  which,  we  imagine, 
would  be  most  to  our  particular  advantage  ;  and  also,  that  it 
cannot  be  thought  he  would  bestow  a  favour  upon  any,  unless 
he  bestowed  the  same  upon  all :  suppositions  which  we  find 
contradicted,  not  by  a  few  instances  in  God’s  natural  govern¬ 
ment  of  the  world,  but  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature 
together. 

Persons  who  speak  of  the  erddence  of  religion  as  doubtful, 
and  of  this  supposed  doubtfulness  as  a  positive  argument 
against  it,  should  be  put  upon  considering,  what  that  evidence 
indeed  is,  which  they  act  upon  with  regard  to  their  tempo¬ 
ral  interests.  For,  it  is  not  only  extremely  difficult,  but,  in 
many  cases,  absolutely  impossible,  to  balance  pleasure  and 
pain,  satisfaction  and  uneasiness,  so  as  to  be  able  to  say,  on 
which  side  the  overplus  is.  There  are  the  like  difficulties  and 
impossibilities,  in  making  the  due  allowances  for  a  change  of 
temper  and  taste,  for  satiety,  disgusts,  ill  health  ;  any  of  which 
render  men  incapable  of  enjoying,  after  they  have  obtained, 
what  they  most  eagerly  desired.  Numberless,  too,  are  the 
accidents,  besides  that  one  of  untimely  death,  which  may 
even  probably  disappoint  the  best  concert’er''  schemes :  and 


CHAP.  VI.J  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF. 


197 


Strong  objections  are  often  seen  to  lie  against  them,  not  to  be 
removed  or  answered,  but  which  seem  overbalanced  by  rea¬ 
sons  on  the  other  side  ;  so  as  that  the  certain  difficulties  and 
dangers  of  the  pursuit  are,  by  every  one,  thought  justly  dis¬ 
regarded,  upon  account  of  there  appearing  greater  advantages 
in  case  of  success,  though  there  be  but  little  probability  of  it. 
Lastly,  Every  one  observes  our  liableness,  if  we  be  not  upon 
our  guard,  to  be  deceived  by  the  falsehood  of  men,  and  the  false 
appearances  of  things ;  and  this  danger  must  be  greatly  in¬ 
creased,  if  there  be  a  strong  bias  within,  suppose  from  indulged 
passion,  to  favour  the  deceit.  Hence  arises  that  ,great  uncer¬ 
tainty  and  doubtfulness  of  proof,  wherein  our  temporal  inter¬ 
est  really  consists ;  what  are  the  most  probable  means  of 
attaining  it  ;  and  whether  those  means  will  eventually  be 
successful.  And  numberless  instances  there  are,  in  the  dailj^ 
course  of  life,  in  which  all  men  think  it  reasonable  to  engage 
in  pursuits,  though  the  probability  is  greatlj^  against  succeed¬ 
ing  ;  and  to  make  such  provision  for  themselves,  as  it  is  sup- 
posable  they  may  have  occasion  for,  though  the  plain  acknow¬ 
ledged  probability  is,  that  thej^  never  shall.  Then  those  who 
think  the  objection  against  revelation,  from  its  light  not  being  . 
universal,  to  be  of  weight,  should  observe,  that  the  Author  of 
nature,  in  numberless  instances,  bestows  that  upon  some, 
which  he  does  not  upon  others,  who  seem  equallj^  to  stand  in 
need  of  it.  Indeed,  he  appears  to  bestow  all  his  gifts  with 
the  most  promiscuous  variety,  among  creatures  of  the  same 
species  :  health  and  strength,  capacities  of  prudence  and  of 
knowledge,  means  of  improvement,  riches,  and  all  external  ad¬ 
vantages.  And  as  there  are  not  any  two  men  found  of  exactly 
like  shape  and  features,  so,  it  is  probable,  there  are  not  any  two  i 
of  an  exactly  like  constitution,  temper,  and  situation,  with  re^- 
gard  to  the  goods  and  evils  of  life.  Yet,  notwithstanding 
these  uncertainties  and  varieties,  God  does  exercise  a  natural 


government  over  the  world  ;  and  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a 


prudent  and  imprudent  institution  of  life,  with  regard  tc  our  j 
health  and  our  affairs,  under  that  his  natural  government.  ^ 
As  neither  the  Jewish  nor  Christian  revelation  have  been 
universal,  and  as  they  have  been  afforded  to  a  greater  or  less 
part  of  the  world,  at  different  times,  so,  likewise,  at  different  , 
times,  both  revelations  have  had  different  degrees  of  evidence. 
The  Jews  who  lived  during  the  succession  of  prophets,  that  ^ 
is,  from  Moses  till  after  the  Captivity,  had  higher  evidence  of  ,■ 
the  truth  of  their  religion,  than  those  had  who  lived  in  the 
interval  between  the  last-mentioned  period  and  the  coming  of 


198  '  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL  :  [PART  li. 

Christ.  And  the  first  Chrisiians-had  higher  evidence  of  the 
miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity  than  what  we 
have  now.  They  had  also  a  strong  presumptive  proof  of  the 
truth  of  it,  perhaps  of  much  greater  force,  in  way  of  argu¬ 
ment,  than  many  may  think,  of  which  we  have  very  little  re¬ 
maining  I  mean,  the  presumptive  proof  of  its  truth  from  the 
influence  which  it  had  upon  the  lives  of  the  generality  of  its 
professors.  And  we,  or  future  ages,  may  possibly  have  a  proof 
of  it,  which  they  could  not  have,  from  the  conformity  between 
the  prophetic  history,  and  the  state  of  the  world,  and  of  Chris¬ 
tianity.  And  farther  :  If  we  were  to  suppose  the  evidence, 
which  some  have  of  religion,  to  amount  to  little  more  than 
seeing  that  it  may  be  true,  but  that  they  remain  in  great  doubts 
and  uncertainties  about  both  its  evidence  and  its  nature,  and 
great  perplexities  concerning  the  rule  of  life;  others  to  have 
a  full  conviction  of  the  truth  of  religion,  with  a  distinct  know 
ledge  of  their  duty  ;  and  others  severally  to  have  all  the  inter¬ 
mediate  degrees  of  religious  light  and  evidence,  which  lie  be¬ 
tween  these  two. — If  we  put  the  case,  that  for  the  present  it 
was  intended  revelation  should  be  no  more  than  a  small  light, 
in  the  midst  of  a  world  greatly  overspread,  notwithstanding  it, 
with  ignorance  and  darkness ;  that  certain  glimmerings  of 
this  light  should  extend,  and  be  directed,  to  remote  distances, 
in  such  a  manner  as  that  those  who  really  partook  of  it 
should  not  discern  from  whence  it  originally  came  ;  that 
some,  in  a  nearer  situation  to  it,  should  have  its  light  ob¬ 
scured,  and,  in  different  ways  and  degrees,  intercepted  ;  and 
that  others  should  be  placed  within  its  clearer  influence,  and 
be  much  more  enlivened,  cheered,  and  directed  by  it ;  but  yet, 
that  even  to  these  it  should  be  no  more  than  ‘  a  light  shining 
in  a  dark  place  f  all  this  would  be  perfectly  uniform  and  of  a 
piece  with  the  conduct  of  Providence,  in  the  distribution  of  its 
other  blessings.  If  the  fact  of  the  case  really  were,  that 
some  have  received  no  light  at  all  from  the  Scrinture  ;  as 
many  ages  and  countries  in  the  heathen  world  ;  that  others, 
though  they  have,  by  means  of  it,  had  essential  or  natural 
religion  enforced  upon  their  consciences,  yet  have  never  had 
the  genuine  Scripture  revelation,  with  its  real  evidence,  pro¬ 
posed  to  their  consideration ;  and  the  ancient  Persians  and 
modern  Mahometans  may  possibly  be  instances  of  people  in  a 
situation  somewhat  like  to  this :  that  others,  though  they 
have  had  the  Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of  divine  revela¬ 
tion,  yet  ha^'e  had  it  with  the  system  and  evidence  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  so  interpolated,  the  system  so  corrupted,  the  evidence 


CHAP.  VI.]  SUPPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF. 


199 


BO  blended  with  false  miracles,  as  to  leave  the  mind  in  the 
utmost  doubtfulness  and  uncertainty  about  the  whole  ;  which 
may  be  the  state  of  some  tho'ughtful  men  in  most  of  those  na¬ 
tions  who  call  themselves  Christian :  and,  lastly ^  that  others 
have  had  Christianity  offered  to  them  in  its  genuine  simpiicity, 
and  with  its  proper  evidence,  as  persons  in  countries  and 
churches  of  civil  and  of  Christian  liberty  ;  but,  however,  that 
even  these  persons  are  left  in  great  ignorance  in  many 
respects,  and  have  by  no  means  light  afforded  them  enough 
to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  but  only  to  regulate  their  life,  to 
teach  them  their  duty,  and  encourage  them  in  the  careful 
discharge  of  it :  I  say,  if  we  were  to  suppose  this  somewhat 
of  a  general  true  account  of  the  degrees  of  moral  and  reli¬ 
gious  light  and  evidence,  which  were  intended  to  be  afforded 
mankind,  and  of  what  has  actually  been  and  is  their  situa¬ 
tion,  in  their  moral  and  religious  capacity,  there  would  be 
nothing  in  all  this  ignorance,  doubtfulness,  and  uncertainty, 
in  all  these  varieties  and  supposed  disadvantages  of  some  in 
comparison  of  others,  respecting  religion,  but  may' be  paralleled 
by  manifest  analogies  in  the  natural  dispensations  of  Provi¬ 
dence  at  present,  and  considering  ourselves  merely  in  our 
temporal  capacity. 

Nor  is  there  any  thing  shocking  in  all  this,  or  which  would 
seem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  administration  in  nature,  if 
we  would  really  keep  in  mind,  that  every  one  should  be 
dealt  equitably  with  ;  instead  of  forgetting  this,  or  explaining 
it  away,  after  it  is  acknowledged  in  words.  All  shadow  of ' 
injustice,  and  indeed  all  harsh  appearances,  in  this  various 
economy  of  Providence,  would  be  lost,  if  we  would  keep  in 
mind,  that  every  merciful  allowance  should  be  made,  and  no 
more  be  required  of  any  one,  than  what  might  have  been 
equitably  expected  of  him,  from  the  circumstances  in  which 
he  was  placed  ;  and  not  what  might  have  been  expected,  had 
he  been  placed  in  other  circumstances :  i.  e.  in  Scripture  lan¬ 
guage,  that  every  man  shall  be  ‘  accepted  according  to* what 
he  had,  not  according  to  what  he  had  not.’"'^^  This,  however, .  , 
doth  not  by  any  means  imply,  that  all  persons’  condition  here^ 
is  equally  advantageous  with  respect  to  futurity.  And 
Providence’s  designing  to  place  some  in  greater  darkness  ' 
with  respect  to  religious  knowledge,  is  no  more  a  reason  why 
they  should  not  endeavour  to  get  out  of  that  darkness,  and 
others  to  bring  them  out  of  it,  than  why  ignorant  and  slow 


( 


I 


*  2  Cor.  viii.  12. 


200 


REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL  :  [PART  II« 


people,  in  matters  of  other  knowledge,  should  not  endeavour 
to  learn,  or  should  not  be  instructed. 

It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  same  wise  and 
good  principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  disposed  the  Author  of 
nature  to  make  different  kinds  and  orders  of  creatures,  dis¬ 
posed  him  also  to  place  creatures  of  like  kinds  in  different 
situations ;  and  that  the  same  principle  which  disposed  him  to 
make  creatures  of  different  moral  capacities,  disposed  him  also 
to  place  creatures  of  like  moral  capacities  in  different  reli¬ 
gious  situations  ;  and  even  the  same  creatures,  in  different  pe¬ 
riods  of  their-  being.  And  the  account  or  reason  of  this,  is  also 
most  probably  the  account  why  the  constitution  of  things  is 
such,  as  that  creatures  of  moral  natures  or  capacities,  for  a 
‘  Cl  ‘  considerable  part  of  that  duration  in  which  they  are  living 
agents,  are  not  at  all  subjects  of  morality  and  religion  ;  but 
grow  up  to  be  so,  and  grow  up  to  be  so  more  and  more,  gra¬ 
dually,  from  childhood  to  mature  age. 

What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  reason  of  these 
things,  we  must  be  greatly  in  the  dark,  were  it  only  that  we 
know  so  very  little  even  of  our  own  case.  Our  present  state 
may  possibly  be  the  consequence  of  somewhat  past,  which 
we  are  wholly  ignorant  of ;  as  it  has  a  reference  to  somewhat 
to  come,  of  which  we  know  scarce  any  more  than  is  neces¬ 
sary  for  practice.  A  system  or  constitution,  in  its  notion, 
implies  variety ;  and  so  complicated  a  one  as  this  world,  very 
great  variety.  So  that  were  revelation  universal,  yet  from 
^  men’s  different  capacities  of  understanding,  from  the  different 
lengths  of  their  lives,  their  different  educations  and  other  ex- 
ternal  circumstances,  and  from  their  difference  of  temper  and 
bodily  constitution,  their  religious  situations  would  be  widely 
different,  and  the  disadvantage  of  some  in  comparison  of 
others,  perhaps,  altogether  as  much  as  at  present.  And  the 
true  account,  whatever  it  be,  why  mankind,  or  such  a  part  of 
mankind,  are  placed  in  this  condition  of  ignorance,  must  be 
supposed  also  the  true  account  of  our  farther  ignorance,  in 
not  knowing  the  reasons'  why,  or  whence  it  is,  that  they  are 
placed  in  this  condition.  But  the  following  practical  reflec¬ 
tions  may  deserve  the  serious  consideration  of  those  persons, 
who  think  the  circumstances  of  mankind,  or  their  own,  in  the 
forementioned  respects,  a  ground  of  complaint. 

First,  The  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  obvious, 
may  constitute  one  particular  part  of  some  men’s  trial  in  the 
religious  sense  ;  as  it  gives  scope  for  a  virtuous  exercise,  or 
vdcious  neglect,  of  their  understanding,  in  examining  or  not 


CHAP.  VI.]  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  201 

examining  into  that  evidence.  There  seems  no  possible  rea¬ 
son  to  be  given,  why  we  may  not  be  in  a  .state  of  moral  pro¬ 
bation,  with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  our  understanding  upon 
the  subject  of  religion,  asyve  are  with  regard  to  our  behaviour 
in  common  affairs.  The  former  is  as  much  a  thing  within 
our  power  and  choice  as  the  latter..  And  1  suppose  it  is  to 
be  laid  down  for  certain,  that  the  same  character,, the  same 
inward  principle,  which,  after  a  n^an  is  convinced  of  the 
truth  of  religion,  renders  him  obedient  to  the  precepts  of  it, 
would,  were  he  not  thus  convinced,  set  him  about  an  exam¬ 
ination  of  it,  upon  its  system  and  evidence  being  offered  to  his 
thoughts  ;  and  that  in  the  latter  state,  his  examination  would 
be  with  an  impartiality,  seriousness,  and  solicitude,  proportion- 
able  to  what  his  obedience  is  in  the  former.  And  as  inattem 
tion,  negligence,  want  of  all  serious  concern,  about  a  matter 
of  such  a  nature  and  such  importance,  when  offered  to  men’s 
consideration,  is,  before  a  distinct  conviction  of  its  truth,  as 
real  immoral  depravity  and  dissoluteness,  as  neglect  of  reli¬ 
gious  practice  after  such  conviction ;  so,  active  solicitude 
about  it,  and  fair  impartial  consideration  of  its  evidence  before 
such  conviction,  is  as  really  an  exercise  of  a  morally  right 
temper,  as  is  religious  practice  after.  Thus,  that  religion  is 
not  intuitively  true,  but  a  matter  of  deduction  and  inference  ; 
that  a  conviction  of  its  truth  is  not  forced  upon  every  one. 
but  left  to  be,  by  some,  collected  with  heedful  attention  to 
premises  ;  this  'as  much  constitutes  religious  probation,  as 
much  affords  sphere,  scope,  opportunity,  for  right  and  wrong 
behaviour,  as  any  thing  whatever  does.  And  their  manner 
of  treating  this  subject,  when  laid  before  thpm,  shows  w^hat 
is  in  their  heart,  and  is  an  exertion  of  it. 

Secondly j  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident,  though  it  is 
not  so  much  attended  to,  that  if,  upon  consideration  of  religion, 
the  evidence  of  it  should  seem  to  any  persons  doubtful  ip 
the  highest  supposable  degree,  even  this  doubtful  evidence 
will,  however,  put  them  into  a  general  stale  of  probation^  in 
the  moral  and  religious  sense.  F or,  suppose  a  man  to  be  really 
in  doubt,  whether  such  a  person  had  not  done  him  the  greats- 
est  favor  ;  or,  whether  his  whole  temporal  interest  did  not  de¬ 
pend  upon  that  person ;  no  one  who  had  any  sense  of  grati¬ 
tude  and  of  prudence,  could  possibly  consider  himself  in  the 
same  situation,  with  r<^gard  to  such  person,  as  if  he  had  no  , 
such  doubt.  In  truth,  it  is  as  just  to  say,  that  certainty  and 
doubt  are  the  same,  as  to  say,  the  situations  now  mentioned 

would  leave  a  man  as  entirely  at  liberty,  in  point  of  gratitude 

*  * 


202  REVELA.TION  NOT  UNIVERSAL:  [PART  11. 

or  prudence,  as  he  would  be,  were  he  certain  he  had  received 
no  favor  from  such  person,  or  that  he  no  way  depended  upon 
him.  Aiid  thus,  though  the  evidence  of  religion  which  is 
afforded  to  some  men,  should  be  little  more  than  that  they  arc 
given  to  see  the  system  of  Christianity,  or  religion  in  general, 
to  be  supposable  and  credible,  this  ought  in  all  reason  to  beget 
a  serious  practical  apprehension  that  it  may  be  true.  And  even 
this  will  afford  matter  of  exercise,  for  religious  suspense  and 
deliberation,  for  moral  resolution  and  self-government ;  because 
the  apprehension  that  religion  may  be  true,  does  as  really 
lay  men  under  obligations,  as  -a  full  conviction  that  it  is 
true.  It  gives  occasion  and  motives  to  consider  farther  the 
important  subject ;  to  preserve  attentively  upon  their  minds 
a  general  implicit  sense  that  they  may  be  under  divine  moral 
government,  an  awful  solicitude  about  religion,  whether  na¬ 
tural  or  revealed.  Such  apprehension  ought  to  turn  men’s 
eyes  to  every  degree  of  new  light  which  may  be  had,  from 
whatever  side  it  comes,  and  induce  them  to  refrain,  in  the 
mean  time,  from  all  immoralities,  and  live  in  the  conscientious 
practice  of  every  common  virtue.  Especially  are  they  bound 
to  keep  at  the  greatest  distance  from  all  dissolute  profaneness 
--for  this  the  very  nature  of  the  case  forbids  ;  and  to  treat 
■w  ith  highest  reverence  a  matter  upon  which  their  own  whole, 
interest  and  being,  apd  the  fate  of  nature  depends.  This  be¬ 
haviour,  and  an  active  endeavour  to  maintain  within  them¬ 
selves  this  temper, .is  the  business,  the  duty  and  the  wisdom 
of  those  persons,  who  complain  of  the  doubtfulness  of  reli¬ 
gion  ;  is  what  they  are  under  the  most  proper  obligations  to ; 
and  such  behaviour  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to 
improve  in  them,  that  character,  which  the  practice  of  all  the 
several  duties  of  religion,  from  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth, 
is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve  in  others ; 
others,  I  say,  to  whom  God  has  afforded  such  conviction-  Nay, 
considering  the  infinite  importance  of  religion,  revealed  as 
well  as  natural,  I  think  it  may  be  said  in  general,  that  who¬ 
ever  will  weigh  the  matter  thoroughly,  may  see  there  is  not 
near  so  much  difference  as  is  commonly  imagined,  between 
what  ought  in  reason  to  be  the  rule  of  life,  to  those  persons  who 
are  fully  convinced  of  its  truth,  and  to  those  who  have  only 
a  serious  doubting  apprehension  that  it  may  be  true.  Their 
hopes,  and  fears,  and  obligations,  will  be  in  various  degrees ; 
but  as  the  subject-matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is  the  same, 
so  the  subject-matter  of  their  obligations,  what  thej^  are  bound 
to  do  and  to  refrain  from,  is  not  so  very  unbke 


CHAP.  VI.J  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  203 

It  is  to  be  observed  farther,  that,  from  a  character  of  under¬ 
standing,  or  a  situation  of  influence  in  the  world,  some  per¬ 
sons  have  it  in  their  power  to  do  infinitely  more  harm  or  good, 
by  setting  an  example  of  profaneness,  and  avowed  disregard 
to  all  religion,  or,  on  the  contrary,  of  a  serious,  though  perhaps 
doubting,  apprehension  of  its  truth,  and  of  a  reverend  regard 
to  it  under  this  doubtfulness,  than  they  can  do  by  acting  well 
or  ill  in  all  the  common  intercourses  amongst  mankind  ;  and 
consequently  they  are  most  highly  accountable  for  a  beha¬ 
viour,  which,  they  may  easily  foresee,  is  of  such  importance, 
and  in  which  there  is  most  plainly  a  right  and  a  wrong  ;  even 
admitting  fhe  evidence  of  religion  to  be  as  doubtful  as  is  pre¬ 
tended. 

The  ground  of  these  observations,  and  that  which  renders 
them  just  and  true,  is,  that  doubting  necessarily  implies  some 
-degree  of  evidence  for  that  of  which  we  doubt.  For  no  per¬ 
son  would  be  in  doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  a  number  of 
facts  so  and  so  circumstanced,  which  should  accidentally  come 
into  his  thoughts,  and  of  which  he  had  no  evidence  at  ail. 
And  though  in  the  case  of  an  even  chance,  and  where  conse¬ 
quently  we  were  in  doubt,  we  should  in  common  language  say, 
that  we  had  no  evidence  at  all  for  either  side  ;  yet  that  situa¬ 
tion  of  things  which  renders  it  an  even  chance  and  no  more 
that  such  an  event  will  happen,  renders  this  case  equivalent 
to  all  others,  where  there  is  such  evidence  on  both  sides  of  a 
question,*  as  leaves  the  mind  in  doubt  concerning  the  truth. 
Indeed,  in  all  these  cases,  there  is  no  more  evidence  on  the 
one  side  than  on  the  other  ;  but  there  is  (what  is  equivalent 
to)  much  more  for  either,  than  for  the  truth  of  a  number  of 
facts  which  come  into  one’s  thoughts  at  random.  And  thus, 
in  all  these  cases,  doubt  as  much  presupposes  evidence,  Ipwer 
degrees  of  evidence,  as  belief  presupposes  higher,  and  cer¬ 
tainty  higher  still.  Any  one,  who  will  a  little  attend  to  the  na¬ 
ture  of  evidence,  will  easily  carry  this  observation  on,  and  see, 
that  between  no  evidence  at  all,  and  that  degree  of  it  which 
affords  ground  of  doubt,  there  are  as  many  intermediate  de¬ 
grees,  as  there  are  between  that  degree  which  is  the  ground 
of  doubt,  and  demonstration.  And,  though  we  have  not  fa¬ 
culties  to  distinguish  these  degrees  of  evidence  with  any  sort 
of  exactness,  yet,  in  proportion  as  they  are  discerned,  the}’ 
ought  to  influence  our  practice.  For  it  is  as  real  an  imperfec¬ 
tion  in  the  moral  character,  not  tobe  influenced  in  practice  by  a 


^  Introduction, 


204 


REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL  I 


[part  II 


lower  degree  of  evidence  when  discerned,  as  it  is  in  the  under- 
standing,  not  to  discern  it.  And  as,  in  all  subjects  which  men 
consider,  they  discern  the  lower  as  w^ell  as  higher  degrees 
of  evidence,  proportionabiy  to  their  capacity  of  understanding  ; 
so  in  practical  subjects,  they  are  influenced  in  practice  by 
the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degrees  of  it,  proportionabiy  to 
their  fairness  and  honesty.  And  as,  in  proportion  to  de¬ 
fects  in  the  understanding,  men  are  unapt  to  see  lower  degrees 
of  evidence,  are  in  danger  of  overlooking  evidence  when  it  is 
not  glaring,  and  are  easily  imposed  upon  in  such  cases  ;  so, 
in  proportion  to  the  corruption  of  the  heart,  they  seem  capa¬ 
ble  of  satisfying  themselves  with  having  no  regard  in  prac¬ 
tice  to  evidence  acknowledged  real,  if  it  be  not  overbearing. 
From  these  things  it  must  follow,  that  doubting  concerning 
religion  implies  such  a  degree  of  evidence  for  it,  as,  joined  with 
the  consideration  of  its  importance,  unquestionably  lays  men 
under  the  obligations  before  mentioned,  to'have  a  dutiful  regard 
to  it  in  all  their  behaviour. 

Tliirdlij,  The  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of  reli¬ 
gion  is  involved,  which  some  complain  of,  is  no  more  a  just 
ground  of  complaint,  than  the  external  circumstances  of  tempt¬ 
ation,  which  others  are  placed  in  ;  or  than  difficulties  in  the 
practice  of  it,  after  a  full  conviction  of  i's  truth.  Temptations 
render  our  state  a  more  improving  state  of  discipline*  than  it 
would  be  otherwise  ;  as  they  give  occasion  for  a  more  atten¬ 
tive  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  which  confirms  and 
strengthens  it  mo.e  than  an  easier  or  less  attentive  exercise  of 
it  could.  Now,  speculative  difficulties  are,  in  this  respect,  of 
the  very  same  nature  with  these  external  temptations.  For 
the  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  obvious,  is,  to  some 
persons,  a  temptation  to  reject  it,  without  any  consideration 
at  all ;  and  therefore  requires  such  an  attentive  exercise  of 
the  virtuous  principle,  seriously  to  consider  that  evidence,  as 
there  would  be  no  occasion  for,  but  for  such  temptation.  And 
the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  its  evidence,  after  it  has  been  in 
sorne  sort  considered,  affords  opportunity  to  an  unfair  mind, 
of  explaining  away,  and  deceitfully  hiding  from  itself,  that 
evidence  which  it  might  see  ;■  and  also  for  men’s  encouraging 
themselves  in  vice,  from  hopes  of  impunity,  though  they  do 
clearly  see  thus  much  at  least,  that  these  hopes  are  uncertain : 
in  like  manner,  as  the  common  temptations  lo  many  instances 
of  folly,  which  end  in  temporal  infamy  and  ruin,  is  the  ground 


^  Part  1.  chap.  5. 


CHIP.  VI.]  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  205 

for  hope  of  not  being  detected,  and  of  escaping  -with  impunity : 
i.  e.  the  doubtfulness  of  the  truth  beforehand,  that  such  foolish 
behaviour  will  thus  end  in  infamy  and  ruin.  On  the  con* 
trary,  supposed  doubtfulness  in  the  evidence  of  religion  calls 
for  a  more  careTul  and  attentive  exercise  of  the  virtuous  prin¬ 
ciple,  in  fairly  yielding  themselves  up  to  the  proper  influence 
of  any  real  evidencCj  though  doubtful ;  and  in  practising  con¬ 
scientiously  all  virtue,  though  under  some  uncertainty 
whether  the  government  in  the  universe  may  not  possibly 
be  such,  as  that  vice  may  escape  with  impunity.  And,  in 
general,  temptation,  meaning  by  this  wordy  the  lesser  allure¬ 
ments  to  wrong,  and  difficulties  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty, 
as  well  as  the  greater  ones ;  temiptation,  I  say'  as  such,  and 
of  every  ’kind  and  degree,  as  it  calls  forth  some  virtuous 
cflbrts,  additional  to  what  would  otherwise  have  been  wanting:, 
cannot  but  be  an  additional  discipline  and  improvement  of 
virtue,  as  well  as  probation  of  it,  in  the  other  senses  of  that 
word.  So  that  the  very  same  account  is  to  be  given,  why 
the  evidence  of  religion  should  be  left  in  such  a  manner,  as  to 
require,  in  some,  an  attentive,  solicitous,  perhaps  painful,  ex¬ 
ercise  of  their  understanding  about  it ;  as  why  others  should 
be  placed  in  such  circumstances  as  that  the  practice  of  its 
common  duties,  after  a  full  conviction  of  the  truth  of  it,  should 
require  attention,  solicitude,  and  pains ;  or,  why  appearing 
doubtfulness  should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  tempta¬ 
tion  to  some ;  as  why  exterhal  difficulties  and  allurements 
should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to  others. 
The  same  account  also  is  to  be  given,  why  some  should  be 
exercised  with  temptations  of  both  these  kinds,  as  why  others 
should  be  exercised  with  the  latter  in  such  very  high  de¬ 
grees,  as  some  have  been,  particularly  as  the  primitive 
Christians  were. 

Nor  doe's  there  appear  any  absurdity  in  supposing,  that  the 
speculative  difficulties  in  Which  the  evidence  of  religion  is 
involved,  may  make  even  the  principal  part  of  some  per¬ 
sons’  trial.  For,  as  the  chief  temptations  of  the  generality 
of  the  world,  are,  the  ordinary  motives  to  injustice  or  unre¬ 
strained  pleasure ;  or  to  live  in  the  neglect  of  religion  from . 
that  frame  of  mind,  which  renders  many  persons  almost  with¬ 
out  feeling  as  to  any  thing  distant,  or  which  is  not  the  object 
of  their  senses ;  so  there  are  other  persons  without  this  shal¬ 
lowness  of  temper,  persons  of  a  deeper  sense  as  to  what  is  in- 


206 


REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL  :  [PART  IT. 

visible  and  future,  who  not  onlj  see,  but  have  a  general  prac¬ 
tical  feeling  that  what  is  to  come  will  be  present,  and  that 
things  are  not  less  real  for  their  not  being  the  object  of  sense  ; 
and  who,  from  their  natural  constitution  of  body  and  of  temper, 
and  from  their  external  condition,  may  have  small  temptations 
to  behave  ill,  small  difficulty  in  behaving  well,  in  the  common 
course  of  life.  Now,  when  these  latter  persons  have  a  distinct, 
full  conviction  of  tlio  truth  of  religion,  without  any  possible 
doubts  or  difficulties,  the  practice  of  it  is  to  them  unavoidable, 
unless  they  will  do  a  constant  violence  to  their  own  minds ; 
and  religion  is  scarce  any  more  a  discipline  to  them,  than  it  is 
to  creatures  in  a  state  of  perfection.  Yet  these  persons  may 
possibly  stand  in  need  of  moral  (hscipline  and  exercise,  in  a 
higher  degree  than  they  would  have  by  such  an  easy  practice 
of  religion.  Or  it  may  be  requisite,  for  reasons  unknown  to 
us,  that  they  should  give  some  further  manliest ation  what  is 
their  moral  character,  to  the  creation  of  God,  than  such  "a 
practice  of  it  would  be.  Thus,  in  the  great  varietj^  of  religious 
situations  in  which  men  are  placedj  what  constitutes,  what 
chiefly  and  peculiarly  constitutes  the  probation,  in  all  senses,- 
of  some  persons,  may  be  the  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence 
of  religion  is  involved  ;  and  their  principal  and  distinguished 
trial  may  be,  how  they  will  behave  under  and  with  respect  to 
these  difficulties.  Circumstances  in  men’s  situation  in  their 
temporal  capacity,  analogous  in  good  _  measure  to  this,  re¬ 
specting  religion,  are  to  be  observed.  We  find,  some  persons 
;  are  placed  in  such  a  situation  in  the  world,  as  that  tiieir  chief 
difficulty,  with  regard  to  conduct,  is  not  the  doirig  what  is 
;  prudent  when  it  is  known  ;  for  this,  in  numberless  cases,  is 
.  as  easy  as  the  contraiy'' :  but  to  some,  the  principal  exercise 
is,  recollection,  and  being  upon  their  guard  against  deceits ; 
the  deceits,  suppose,  of  those  about  them  ;  against  false  ap- 
:  pearances  of  reason  and  prudence.  To  persons  in  some  situa- 
1  tions,  the  principal  exercise,  with  respect  to  conduct,  is  atten- 
\  tion,  in  order  to  inform  themselves  what  is,  proper,  what  is 
^  really  the  reasonable  and  prudent  part  to  act. 

But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  supposition,  that  men’s 
dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  religion,  is  not  owing  to 
1  their  neglects  or  prejudices  ;  it  must  be  added,  on  the  other 
I  hand,  in  all  common  reason,  and  as  what  the  truth  of  the 
case  plainly  requires  should  be  added,  that  such  dissatisfac 


CHAP.  VI.]  SUPPPOSED  HEPICIENGY  m  ITS  PROOF.  207 

tiol'-  possibly  may  be  owing  to  those,  possibly  may  be  men’s 
own  fault.  For, 

If  there  are  any  persons,  who  never  set  themselves  heartily, 
and  in  earnest,  to  be  informed  in  religion  ,  if  there  are  any, 
who  secretly  wish  it  may  not  prove  true,  and  are  less  atten^ 
tive  to  evidence  than  to  difficulties,  and  more  to  objections 
than  to  what  is  said  in  answer  to  them  ;  these  persons  will 
scarce  be  thought  in  a  likely  way  of  seeing  the  evidence  of 
religion,  though  it  were  most  certainly  true,  and  capable  of 
being  ever  so  fully  proved.  If  any  accustom  themselves  to 
consider  this  subject  usually  in  the  way  of  mirth  and  sport  J 
if  they  attend  to*  forms  and  representations,  and  inadequate 
manners  of  expression,  instead  of  the  real  things  intended  by 
them,  (for  signs  often  can  be  no  more  than  inadequately  ex¬ 
pressive  of  the  things  signified  :)  or  if  they  substitute  human 
errors  in  the  room  of  divine  truth  ;  why  may  not  all,  or  any 
of'  these  things,  hinder  some  men  from  seeing  that  evidence 
which  really  is  seen  by  others  ;  as  a  like  turn  of  mind,  with 
respect  to  matters  of  common  speculation,  and  practice,  does, 
we  find  by  experience,  hinder  them  from  attaining  that  know¬ 
ledge  and  right  understanding,  in  matters  of  common  specu¬ 
lation  and  practice,  which  more  fair  and  attentive  minds  at^ 
tain  to  ?  And  the  effect  will  be  the  same,  whether  their  neg¬ 
lect  of  seriously  considering  the  evidence  of  religion,  and  their 
indirect  behaviour  with  regard  to  it,  proceed  from  mere  care¬ 
lessness,  or  from  the  grosser  vices ;  or  whether  it  be  owing 
to  this,  that  forms,  and  figurative  manners  of  expression,  as 
well  as  errors,  administer  occasions  of  ridicule,  when  the 
things  intended,  and  the  truth  itself,  would  not.  Men  may 
indulge  a  ludicrous  turn  so  far,  as  to  lose  all  sense  of  conduct 
and  prudence  in  worldly  affairs,  and  even,  as  it  seems,  to 
impair  their  faculty  of  reason.  And  in  general,  levity,  care¬ 
lessness,  passion,  and  prejudice,  do  hinder  us  from  being 
rightly  informed,  with  respect  to  common  things  ;  and  they 
may,  in  like  manner,  and  perhaps  in  some  farther  providential 
manner,  with  respect  to  moral  and  religious  subjects ;  may 
hinder  e  /idence  from  being  laid  before  us,  and  from  being  seen 
when  it  is.  The  Scripture*  does  declare,  ‘  that  every  one 
shall  not  understand.’  And  it  makes  no  difference  by  what 

*  Dan.  xii.  10.  See  also  Isa.  xxix.  13,  14.  Matt.  vi.  23,  and  xi.  25^ 
and  xxiii.  1 1,  12.  John  iii.  9.  John  v.  44.  1  Cor.  ii.  14,  and  2  Cor.  iv. 

4.  2  Tim.  iii.  13  ;  and  that  affectionate,  as  well  as  authoiitative  admo¬ 

nition,  so  very  many  times  inculcated,  ‘  He  that  hath  ears  to  hear,  let 
him  hear.’  Grotius  saw  so  strongly  the  thing  intended  in  these  and 


208  KEVELAtlOJJ  NOT  UNIVERSAL  :  [PART  II 

providential  conduct  this  comes  to  pass ;  whether  the  evi¬ 
dence  of  Christianity  was,  originally  and  with  design,  put 
and  left  so,  as  that  those  who  are  desirous  of  evading  moral 
obligations,  should  not  see  it,  and  that  honest-minded  persons 
should  ;  or  whether  it  comes  to  pass  by  any  other  means. 

Farther:  The  general  proof  of  natural  religion  and  of  Chris 
tianity,  does,  I  think,  lie  level  to  common  men ;  even  those, 
the  greatest  part  of  whose  time,  from  childhood  to  old  age,  ia 
taken  up  with  providing,  for  themselves  and  their  families,  the 
common  conveniences,  perhaps  necessaries  of  life ;  those  1 
mean,  of  this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all  of  asking  after 
proof,  or  attending  to  it.  Common  men,  were  they  as  much 
in  earnest  about  religion  as  about  their  temporal  affairs,  are 
capable  of  being  convinced  upon  real  evidence,  that  there  is  a 
God  who  governs  the  world ;  and  they  feel  themselves  to 
be  of  a  moral  nature,  and  accountable  creatures.  And  as 
Christianity  entirely  falls  in  with  this  their  natural  sense  of 
things ;  so  they  are  capable,  not  only  of  being  persuaded,  but 
of  being  made  to  see,  that  there  is  evidence  of  miracles 
wrought  in  attestation  of  it,  and  many  appearing  completions 
of  prophecy.  But  though  this  proof  is  real  and  conclusivej 
yet  it  is  liable  to  objections,  and  may  be  run  up  into  difficul¬ 
ties  ;  which,  however,  persons  who  are  capable,  not  only  of 
talking  of,  but  of  really  seeing,  are  capable  also  of  seeing 
through ;  i.  e.  not  of  clearing  up  and  answering  them,  so  as 
to  satisfy  their  cunosity,  for  of  such  knowledge  we  are  not 
capable  with  respect  to  any  one  thing  in  nature  •  bht  capable 
of  seeing  that  the  proof  is  not  lost  in  these  difficulties,  or  de¬ 
stroyed  by  these  objections.  But  then  a  thorough  examina¬ 
tion  into  religion,  with  regard  to  these  objections,  which  can¬ 
not  be  the  business  of  every  man,  is  a  matter  of  pretty  large 
compass,  and  from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  some  knowledge, 
as  well  as  time  and  attention,  to  see  how  the  evidence  comes 
out,  upon  balancing  one  thing  with  another,  and  what,  upon 
the' whole,  is  the  amount  of  it.  Now,  if  persons  who  have 
picked  up  these  objections  from  others,  and  take  for  granted 
they  are  of  weight,  upon  the  word  of  those  from  whom  they 
received  them,  or,  by  often  retailing  of  themj  come  to  see,  or 
fancy  they  see,  them  to  be  of  weight,  will  not  prepare  them¬ 
selves  for  such  an  examination,  with  a  competent  degree  oi 

other  passages  of  Scripture  of  the  like  sense,  as  to  say,  that  the  proof 
given  us  of  Christianity  was  less  than  it  might  have  been,  for  this  very 
purpose  :  Ut  ita  sermo  Evangelii  tanquam  lapis  esset  Lydius  ad  qutm  in- 
genia  tanabih'a  explorai'ehtiir.  De  Ver.  R.  C.  1,  2,  towards  the  end. 


CHAP.  VI.]  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  209 

knowledge ;  or  will  not  give  that  time  and  attention  to  the 
subject,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  is  necessary  for  attaining 
such  information :  in  this  case,  they  must  remain  in  doubtful¬ 
ness,  ignorance,  or  error  ;  in  the  same  way  as  they  must 
with  regard  to  common  sciences,  and  matters  of  common  life, 
if  they  neglect  the  necessary  means  of  being  informed  in 
them. 

But  still,  perhaps,  it  will  be  objected,  that  if  a  prince  or 
common  master  were  to  send  directions  to  a  servant,  he  would 
take  care,  that  they  should  always  bear  the  certain  marks 
who  they  came  from,  and  that  their  sense  should  be  always 
plain ;  so  as  that  there  should  be  no  possible  doubt,  if  he 
could  help  it,  concerning  the  authority  or  meaning  of  them. 
Now,  the  proper  answer  to  all  this  kind  of  objections  is,  that, 
wherever  the  fallacy  lies,  it  is  even  certain  we  cannot  argue 
thus  with  respect  to  Him  who  is  the  governor  of  the  world  ; 
and  particularly,  that  he  does  not  afford  us  such  information, 
with  repect  to  our  temporal  affairs  and  interests,  as  experience 
abundantly  shows.  However,  there  is  a  full  answer  to  this 
objection,  from  the  very  nature  of  religion.  For,  the  reason 
why  a  prince  would  give  his  directions  in  this  plain  manner, 
is,  that  he  absolutely  desires  such  an  external  action  should 
be  done,  without  concerning  himself  with  the  motive  or  prin¬ 
ciple  upon  which  it  is  done  :  i.  e.  he  regards  only  the  external 
event,  or  the  thing’s  being  done,  and  not  at  all,  properly 
speaking,  the  doing  of  it,  or  the  action.  Whereas  the  whole 
of  morality  and  religion  consisting  merely  in  action  itself, 
there  is  no  sort  of  parallel  between  the  causes.  But  if  the 
prince  be  supposed  to  regard  only  the  action ;  i.  e.  only  to 
desire  to  exercise,  or  in  any  sense  prove,  the  understanding 
or  loyalty  of  a  servant,  he  would  not  always  give  his  orders 
in  such  a  plain  manner.  It  may  be  proper  to  add,  that  the 
will  of  God,  respecting  morality  and  religion,  may  be  consid¬ 
ered,  either  as  absolute,  or  as  only  conditional.  If  it  be  abso¬ 
lute,  it  can  only  be  thus,  that  we  should  act  virtuously  in 
such  given  circumstances  ;  not  that  we  should  be  brought 
to  act  so,  by  his  changing  of  our  circumstances.  And  if 
God’s  will  be  thus  absolute,  then  it  is  in  our  power,  in  the 
highest  and  strictest  sense,  to  do  or  to  contradict  his  will ; 
which  is  a  most  weighty  consideration.  Or  his  will  may  be 
considered  only  as  conditional, — that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we 
shall  be  rewarded  ;  if  otherwise,  punished :  of  which  condi¬ 
tional  will  of  the  Author  of  nature,  the  whole  constitution  of 
it  affords  most  certain  instances. 


210  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL*.  [PART  II 

Upon  the  whole :  That  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion  neces* 
sarily  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation ;  and  the 
credibility  of  our  being  at  all  in  such  a  state  being  admitted, 
there  seems  no  peculiar  difficulty  in  supposing  our  probation 
to  be,  just  as  it  is,  in  those  respects  which  are  above  objected 
against.  There  seems  no  pretence  from  the  reason  of  the 
thing  to  say,  that  the  trial  cannot  equitably  be  any  thing, 
but  whether  persons  will  act  suitably  to  certain  infomation, 
or  such  as  admits  no  room  for  doubt;  so  as  that  there  can  be  no 
danger  of  miscaniage,  but  either  from  their  not  attending  to 
what  they  certainly  know,  or  from  overbearing  passion  hurry¬ 
ing  them  on  to  act  contrary  to  it.  For,  since  ignorance  and 
doubt  afford  scope  for  probation  in  all  senses,  as  really  as  in¬ 
tuitive  conviction  or  certainty  ;  and  since  the  two  former  are 
to  be  put  to  the  same  account  as  difficulties  in  practice  ;  men's 
moral  probation  may  also  be,  whether  they  will  take  due  care 
to  inform  themselves  by  impartial  consideration,  and  afterwards 
whether  they  will  act  as  the  case  requires,  upon  the  evidence 
which  they  have,  however  doubtful.  And  this,  we  find  by 
experience,  is  frequently  our  probation,  in  our  temporal  ca¬ 
pacity.  For  the  information  which  we  want,  with  regard  to 
our  worldly  interests,  is  by  no  means  always  given  us  of 
course,  without  any  care  of  our  own.  And  we  are  greatly 
liable  to  self-deceit  from  inward  secret  prejudices,  and  also  to 
the  deceit  of  others.  So  that  to  be  able  to  judge  what  is  the 
prudent  part,  often  requires  much  and  difficult  consideration. 
Then,  after  we  have  judged  the  very  best  we  can,  the  evidence 
upon  which  we  must  act,  if  we  live  and  act  at  all,  is  perpetually 
doubtful  to  a  very  high  degree.  And  the  constitution  and 
course  of  the  world  in  fact  is  such,  as  that  want  of  impartial 
consideration  what  we  have  to  do,  and  venturing  upon  extra¬ 
vagant  courses,  because  it  is  doubtful  what  will  be  the  conse¬ 
quence,  are  often  naturally,  i.  e.  providentially,  altogether  as 
fatal,  as  misconduct  occasioned  by  heedless  inattention  to 
what  we  certainly  know,  or  disregarding  it  from  overbearing 
passion. 

Several  of  the  observations  here  made  may  v/ell  seem 
strange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to  many  good  men.  But  if 
the  persons  for  whose  sake  they  are  made,  think  so ;  persons 
who  object  as  above,  and  throw  off  all  regard  to  religion  un¬ 
der  pretence  of  want  of  evidence ;  I  desire  them  to  consider 
again  whether  their  thinking  so,  be  owing  to  any  thing  unin- 


CHAP.  VI.J  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  211 

telligible  in  these  observations,  or  to  their  own  not  having  such 
a  sense  of  religion  and  serious  solicitude  about  it,  as  even 
their  state  of  scepticism  does  in  all  reason  require  ?  It  ought 
to  be  forced  upon  the  reflection  of  these  persons  that  our  na¬ 
ture  and  condition  necessarily  require  us,  in  the  daily  course 
of  life,  to  act  upon  evidence  much  lower  than  what  is  com¬ 
monly  called  probable ;  to  guari,  not  only  against  what  we 
fully  believe  will,  but  also  against  what  we  think  it  supposa- 
ble  may,  happen  ;  and  to  engage  in  pursuits  when  the  proba¬ 
bility  is  greatly  against  success,  if  it  be  credible  that  possibly 
we  may  succeed  in  them. 


212 


OP  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE 


PART  11. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity. 

The  presumptions  against  revelation,  and  objections  against 
the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  particular  things  re¬ 
lating  to  it,  being  removed,  there  remains  to  be  considered, 
what  positive  evidence  we  have  for  the  truth  of  it ;  chiefly  in 
order  to  see,  what  the  analogy  of  nature  suggests  with  regard 
to  that  evidence,  and  the  objections  against  it ;  or  to  see  what 
is,  and  is  allowed  to  be,  the  plain  natural  rule  of  judgment 
and  of  action,  in  our  temporal  concerns,  in  cases  where  we 
have  the  same  kind  of  evidence,  and  the  same  kind  of  objec¬ 
tions  against  it,  that  we  have  in  the  case  before  us.  Now,  in 
the  evidence  of  Christianity,  there  seems  to  be  several  things 
of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to  the  head,  either  of  miracles,  or 
the  completion  of  prophecy,  in  the  common  acceptation  of  the 
words.  But  these  two  are  its  direct  and  fundamental  proofs  ; 
and  those  other  things,  however  considerable  they  are,  yet 
ought  never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its  direct  proofs,- but  always 
to  be  joined  with  them.  Thus  the  evidence  of  Christianity 
will  be  a  long  series  of  things,  reaching,  as  it  seems,  from  the 
beginning  of  the  world  to  the  present  time,  of  great  variety 
and  compass,  taking  in  both  the  direct,  and  also  the  collateral 
proofs,  and  making  up,  all  of  them  together,  one  argument  j 
the  conviction  arising  from  which  kind  of  proof  may  be  com¬ 
pared  to  what  they  call  the  effect  in  architecture  or  other 
works  of  art ;  a  result  from  a  great  number  of  things  so  and  so 
disposed,  and  taken  into  one  view.  I  shall  therefore,  firsts 
make  some  observations  relating  to  miracles,  and  the  appear¬ 
ing  completions  of  prophecy  ;  and  consider  what  analogy  sug¬ 
gests,  in  answer  to  the  objections  brought  against  this  evi¬ 
dence.  And,  secondly^  I  shall  endeavour  to  give  some  ac¬ 
count  of  the  general  argument  now  mentioned,  consisting 
both  of  the  direct  and  collateral  evidence,  considered  as  making 


CHAP.  VII.] 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


213 


up  one  argument ;  this  being  the  kind  of  proof  upon  which  we 
determine  most  questions  of  difficulty  concerning  common  facts, 
alleged  to  have  happened,  or  seeming  likely  to  happen ;  es¬ 
pecially  questions  relating  to  conduct. 

Fir  si  ^  I  shall  make  some  observations  upon  the  direct  proof 
of  Christianity  from  miracles  and  prophecy,  and  upon  the  ob¬ 
jections  alleged  against  it. 

1.  Now,  the  following  observations,  relating  to  the  histori¬ 
cal  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  Christia¬ 
nity,  appear  to  be  of  great  weight. 

1.  The  Old  Testament  affords  us  the  same  historical  evi¬ 
dence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the  prophets,  as  of  the 
common  civil  history  of  Moses  and  the  kings  of  Israel ;  or,  as 
of  the  affairs  of  the  Jewish  nation.  And  the  Gospels  and  the 
A.cts  afford  us  the  same  historical  evidence  of  the  miracles  of  j 
Christ  and  the  Apostles,  as  of  the  common  matters  related  ini 
them.  This,  indeed,  could  not  have  been  affirmed  by  any  rea-/ 
sonable  man,  if  the  authors  of  these  books,  like  many  other\ 
historians,  had  appeared  to  make  an  entertaining  manner  of! 
writing  their  aim ;  though  they  had  interspersed  miracles  in ! 
their  works,  at  proper  distances,  and  upon  proper  occasions. ) 
These  might  have  animated  a  dull  relation,  amused  the  ' 
reader,  and  engaged  his  attention.  And  the  same  account 
would  naturally  have  been  given  of  them,  as  of  the  speeches  i 
and  descriptions  of  such  authors ;  the  same  account,  in  a  ’ 
manner,  as  is  to  be  given,  why  the  poets  make  use  of  won¬ 
ders  and  prodigies.  But  the  facts,  both  miraculous  and 
natural,  in  Scripture,  are  related  in  plain  unadorned  narra-  j 
tives ;  and  both  of  them  appear,  in  all  respects,  to  stand 
upon  the  same  foot  of  historical  evidence.  Farther :  Some  ■ 
parts  of  Scripture,  containing  an  account  of  miracles  fully 
sufficient  to  prove  the  truth  of  Christianity,  are  quoted  as 
genuine,  from  the  age  in  which  they  are  said  to  be  written,  | 
down  to  the  present :  and  no  other  parts  of  them,  material 
in  the  present  question,  are  omitted  to  be  quoted,  in  such  man¬ 
ner  as  to  afford  any  sort  of  proof  of  their  not  being  genuine. 
And,  as  common  history,  when  called  in  question  in  any  in¬ 
stance,  may  often  be  greatly  confirmed  by  contemporary  or 
subsequent  events  more  known  and  acknowledged  ;  and  as 
the  common  Scripture  history,  like  many  others,  is  tfius  con¬ 
firmed  ;  so  likewise  is  the  miraculous  history  of  it,  not  only 
in  particular  instances,  but  in  general.  For,  the  establish-x 
ment  of  the  Jewfish  and  Christian  religions,  which  were  events  ] 
contemporary  with  the  miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in  at- 


/ 


( 


214 


OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PART  II. 

testation  of  both,  or  subsequent  to  them,  these  events  are  just 
what  we  should  have  expected,  upon  supposition  such  mira¬ 
cles  were  really  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  those  religions. 
These  miracles  are  a  satisfactory  account  of  those  events , 
of  which  no  other  satisfactory  account  can  be  given,  nor  any 
account  at  all,  but  what  is  imaginary  merely  and  invented, 
rit  is  to  be  added,  that  the  most  obvious,  the  most  easy  and 
direct  account  of  this  history,  how  it  came  to  be  written  and 
to  be  received  in  the  world,  as  a  true  history,  is,  that  it  really 
is  so ;  nor  can  any  other  account  of  it  be  easy  and  direct. 
Now,  though  an  account,  not  at  all  obvious,  but  very  far¬ 
fetched  and  indirect,  may  indeefl  be,  and  often  is,  the  true  ac¬ 
count  of  a  matter ;  yet,  it  cannot  be  admitted  on  the  authority 
of  its  being  asserted.  Mere  guess,  supposition,  and  possibility, 
when  opposed  to  historical  evidence  prove  nothing,  but  that 
historical  evidence  is  not  demonstrative. 

Now,  the  just  consequence  from  all  this,  I  think,  is,  that 
the  Scripture  history,  in  general,  is  to  be  admitted  as  an  au¬ 
thentic  genuine  history,  till  somewhat  positive  be  alleged 
sufficient  to  invalidate  it.  But  r>o  man  will  deny  the  conse 
quence  to  be,  that  it  cannot  be  rejected,  or  thrown  by  as  of 
no  authority,  till  it  can  be  proved  to  be  of  none  ;  even  though 
the  evidence  now  mentioned  for  its  authority  were  doubtful. 
This  evidence  may  be  confronted  by  historical  evidence  on 
the  other  side,  if  there  be  any  ;  or  general  incredibility  in  the 
things  related,  or  inconsistence  in  the  general  turn  of  the  his¬ 
tory,  would  prove  it  to  be  of  no  authority.  But  since,  upon 
the  face  of  the  matter,  upon  a  first  and  general  view,  the  ap¬ 
pearance  is,  that  it  is  an  authentic  history,  it  cannot  be  deter¬ 
mined  to  be  fictitious  without  some  proof  that  it  is  so.  And 
the  following  observations,  in  support  of  these  and  coincident 
with  them,  will  greatly  confirm  the  historical  evidence  for  the 
truth  of  Christianity. 

2.  The  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  from  the  nature  of  epistolary 
writing,  and  moreover,  from  several  of  them  being  ^vTitten, 
not  to  particular  persons,  but  to  churches,  carry  in  them  evi¬ 
dences  of  their  being  genuine,  beyond  what  can  be,  in  a  mere 
historical  narrative,  left  to  the  world  at  large.  This  evidence, 
joined  with  that  which  they  have  in  common  with  the  rest  of 
the  New  Testament,  seems  not  to  leave  so  much  as  any  par¬ 
ticular  pretence  for  denying  their  genuineness,  considered  as 
an  ordinary  matter  of  fact,  or  of  criticism  :  I  say,  particular 
pretence  for  denying  it ;  because  any  single  fact,  of  such  a 
kind  and  such  antiquity,  may  have  general  doubts  raised  con- 


CHAP.  VII. J 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY 


215 


ceming  it,  from  the  very  nature  of  human  affairs  and  human 
testimony.  There  is  also  to  be  mentioned,  a  distinct  and  par-’' 
ticular  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  the  epistle  chiefly  re¬ 
ferred  to  here,  the  first  to  the  Corinihians  ;  from  the  manner 
in  which  it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Romanus^  in  an  episue  of 
his  own  to  that  church. Now,  these  epistles  afford  a  proof 
of  Christianity,  detached  from  all  others,  which  is,  I  think,  a 
thing  of  weight ;  and  also  a  proof  of  a  nature  and  kind  pe¬ 
culiar  to  itself.  For, 

In  them  the  author  declares  that  he  received  the  gospel  in 
general,  and  the  institution  of  the  communion  in  particular^ 
not  from  the  rest  of  the  Apostles,  or  jointly  together  with 
them,  but  alone  from  Christ  himself ;  whom  he  declares,  like¬ 
wise  conformably  to  the  history  m-^the  Acts,  thcit  he  saw  after 
his  ascension. I  So  that  the  testimony  of  St  Paul  is  to  be 
considered,  as  detached  from  that  of  the  rest  of  the  Apostles. 

And  he  declares  farther,  that  he  was  endued  with  a  power 
of  working  miracles,  as  what  was  publicly  known  to  those 
very  people  ;  speaks  of  frequent  and  great  variety  of  miracu¬ 
lous  gifts,  as  then  subsisting  in  those  very  churches  to  which 
he  was  writing ;  which  he  was  reproving  for  several  irregu¬ 
larities  ;  and  where  he  had  personal  opposers  :  he  mentions 
these  gifts  incidentally,  in  the  most  easy  manner,  and  without 
effort ;  by  way  of  reproof  to  those  who  had  them,  for  their 
indecent  use  of  them ;  and  by  way  of  depreciating  them,  in 
comparison  of  moral  virtues.  In  short,  he  speaks  to  these 
churches  of  these  miraculous  powers,  in  the  manner  any  one 
would  speak  to  another  of  a  thing,  which  was  as  familiar, 
and  as  much  known  in  common  to  them  both,  as  any  thing 
m  the  world. J  And  this,  as  has  been  observed  by  several 
persons,  is  surely  a  very  considerable  thing. 

3.  It  is  an  acknowledged  historical  fact,  that  ChristianiU^ 
offered  itself  to  the  world  and  demanded  to  be  received,  upon 
the  allegation,  i.  e.  as  unbelievers  would  speak,  upon  the  pre¬ 
tence  of  miracles,  publicly  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  it,  in 
such  an  age ;  and  that  it  was  actually  received  by  great 
numbers  in  that  very  age,  and  upon  the  professed  belief  of  the 
reality  of  these  miracles.  And  Christianity,  including  the  dis¬ 
pensation  of  the  Old  Testament,  seems  distinguished  by  this 
from  all  other  religions.  I  mean,  that  this  does  not  appear 

*  Clem.  Rom.  Ep.  i,  c.  47. 

t  Gal.  i.  1  Cor.  xi.  23,  &c.  1  Cor.  xv.  8. 

f  Rom.  XV.  19.  I  Cor.  xii  8,  9,  10 — 28,  &c.  and  chap.  xiii.  1,  2,  8 
and  tl)e  whole  xivth  chap.  2  Ccr.  xii,  12,  13.  Gal.  iii.  2,  5. 


216  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PART  It 

to  be  the  case  with  regard  to  any  other :  for  surely  it  will  not 
be  supposed  to  lie  upon  any  person,  to  prove,  by  positive  his¬ 
torical  evidence,  that  it  was  not.  It  does  in  no  sort  appear 
that  Mahometanism  was  first  received  in  the  world  upon  the 
foot  of  supposed  miracles,*  i.  e.  public  ones :  for,  as  revelation 
is  itself  miraculous,  all  pretence  to  it  must  necessarily  imply 
some  pretence  of  miracles.  And  it  is  a  known  fact,  that  it 
was  immediately,  at  the  very  first,  propagated  by  other 
means.  And  as  particular  institutions,  whether  in  paganism 
or  popery,  said  to  be  confirmed  by  miracles  after  those  insti¬ 
tutions  had  obtained,  are  not  to  the  purpose ;  so,  were  there 
what  might  be  called  historical  proof,  that  any  of  them  were 
introduced  by  a  supposed  divine  commend,  believed  to  be  at¬ 
tested  by  miracles,  these  would  not  be  in  any  wise  parallel. 
For  single  things  of  this  sort  are  easy  to  be  accounted  for, 
after  parties  are  formed,  and  have  power  in  then  hands  ;  and 
the  leaders  of  them  are  in  veneration  with  the  multitude ; 
and  political  interests  are  blended  with  religious  claims,  and 
religious  distinctions.  But  before  any  thing  of  this  kind,  for 
a  few  persons,  and  those  of  the  lowest  rank,  all  at  once  to 
bring  over  such  great  numbers  to  a  new  religion,  and  get  it 
to  be  received  upon  the  particular  evidence  of  miracles ;  this 
is  quite  another  thing.  And  I  think  it  will  be  allowed  by 
any  fair  adversary,  that  the  fact  now  mentioned,  taking  in 
all  the  chcumstances  of  it,  is  peculiar  to  the  Christian  reli¬ 
gion.  However,  the  fact  itself  is  allowed,  that  Christianity 
obtained,  i.  e.  was  professed  to  be  received  in  the  world,  upon 
the  belief  of  miracles,  immediately  in  the  age  in  which  it  is 
said  those  miracles  were  wrought :  or  that  this  is  what  its 
first  converts  would  have  alleged,  as  the  reason  for  their  em¬ 
bracing  it.  Now,  certainly  it  is  not  to  be  supposed,  that  such 
numbers  of  men,  in  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  world,  should 
forsake  the  religion  of  their  country,  in  which  they  had  been 
educated  ;  separate  themselves  from  their  friends,  particularly 
in  their  festival  shows  and  solemnities,  to  which  the  common 
people  are  so  greatly  addicted,  and  which  were  of  a  nature 
to  engage  them  much  more  than  any  thing  of  that  sort 
amongst  us  ;  and  embrace  a  religion  which  could  not  but  ex¬ 
pose  them  to  many  inconveniences,  and  indeed  must  have 
been  a  giving  up  the  world  in  a  great  degree,  even  from  the 
very  first,  and  before  the  empire  engaged  in  form  against 
them:  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that  such  numbers  should 


*  See  the  Koran,  chap.  xiii.  and  cha 


CHAP.  VII,] 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


217 


make  so  great,  and,  to  say  the  least,  so  inconvenient  a  change 
in  their  whole  institution  of  life,  unless  they  were  really  con¬ 
vinced  of  the  truth  of  those  miracles,  upon  the  knowledge  or 
belief  of  which  they  professed  to  make  it.  And  it  will,  I  sup¬ 
pose,  readily  be  acknowledged,  that  the  generality  of  the 
first  converts  to  Christianity  must  have  believed  them;  that 
as,  by  becoming  Christians,  they  declared  to  the  world  they 
were  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  those  miracles,  so  this  declara¬ 
tion  was  to  be  credited.  And  this  their  testimony  is  the 
same  kind  of  evidence  for  those  miracles,  as  if  they  had  put  it 
in  writing,  and  these  writings  had  come  down  to  us.  And  it 
is  real  evidence,  because  it  is  of  facts,  which  they  had  capa¬ 
city  and  full  opportunity  to  inform  themselves  of.  It  is  also 
distinct  from  the  direct  or  express  historical  evidence,  though 
it  is  of  the  same  kind ;  and  it  would  be  allowed  to  be  distinet 
in  all  cases.  For,  were  a  fact  expressly  related  by  one  or 
more  ancient  historians,  and  disputed  in  after  ages  ;  that  this 
fact  is  acknowledged  to  have  been  believed,  by  great  numbers 
of  the  age  in  which  the  historian  says  it  was  done,  would  be 
allowed  an  additional  proof  of  sueh  fact,  quite  distinct  from 
the  express  testimony  of  the  historian.  The  credulity  of 
mankind  is  acknowledged,  and  the  suspicions  of  mankind 
ought  to  be  acknowledged  too  ;  and  their  backwardness  even 
to  believe,  and  greater  still  to  practise,  what  makes  against 
their  interest.  And  it  must  particularly  be  remembered,  that 
education,  and  prejudice,  and  authority,  were  against  Chris¬ 
tianity,  in  the  age  I  am  speaking  of.  So  that  the  immediate 
conversion  of  such  numbers,  is  a  real  presumption  of  some¬ 
what  more  than  human  in  this  matter :  I  say  presumption, 
for  it  is  alleged  as  a  proof,  alone  and  by  itself  Nor  need  any 
one  of  the  things  mentioned  in  this  chapter  be  considered  as  a 
proof  by  itself ;  and  yet  all  of  them  together  may  be  one  of 
the  strongest. 

Upon  the  whole,  as  there  is  large  historical  evidence,  both 
direct  and  circumstantial,  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of 
Christianity,  collected  by  those  who  have  writ  upon  the  sub¬ 
ject  ;  it  lies  upon  unbelievers  to  show  why  this  evidence  is  not 
to  be  credited.  This  way  of  speaking  is,  I  think,  just,  and 
what  persons  who  write  in  defence  of  religion  naturally  fall 
into.  Yet,  in  a  matter  of  such  unspeakable  importance,  the 
proper  question  is,  not  whom  it  lies  upon,  according  to  the 
rules  of  argument,  to  maintain  or  confute  objections;  but, 
whether  there  really  are  any  against  this  evidence,  sufficient, 

10 


218 


OF  THIi  particular  EVIDENCE  [pART  II. 

in  reason,  to  destroy  the  credit  of  it  ?  Flowever,  unbelievers 
seem  to  take  upon  them  the  part  of  showing  that  there  are. 

They  allege,  that  numberless  enthusiastic  people,  in  diiferent 
ages  and  countries,  expose  themselves  to  the  same  difficulties 
which  the  primitive  Christians  did  ;  and  are  ready  to  give  up 
their  lives,  for  the  most  idle  follies  imaginable.  But  it  is  not 
very  clear,  to  what  i>urpose  this  objection  is  brought;  for 
every  one,  surely,  in  every  case,  must  distinguish  between 
opinions  and  facts.  And  though  testimony  is  no  proof  of  en¬ 
thusiastic  opinions,  or  any  opinions  at  all ;  yet,  it  is  allowed,  in 
all  other  cases  to  be  a  proof  of  facts.  And  a  person’s  laying 
down  his  life  in  attestation  of  facts  or  of  opinions,  is  the 
strongest  proof  of  his  believing  them.  And  if  the  apostles 
and  their  contemporaries  did  believe  the  facts,  in  attestation  of 
which  they  exposed  themselves  to  sufferings  and  death  this 
their  belief,  or  rather  knowledge,  must  be  a  proof  of  those  facts  ; 
for  they  were  such  as  come  under  the  observation  of  their 
senses.  And  though  it  is  not  of  equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of 
weight,  that  the  martyrs  of  the  next  age,  notwithstanding 
they  were  not  eye-witnesses  of  those  facts,  as  were  the 
apostles  and  their  contemporaries,  had,  however,  full  oppor¬ 
tunity  to  inform  themselves,  whether  they  were  true  or  not, 
and  give  equal  proof  of  their  believing  them  to  be  true. 

But  enthusiasm,  it  is  said,  greatly  weakens  the  evidence  of 
testimony  even  for  facts,  in  matters  relating  to  religion  ;  some 
seem  to  think,  it  totally  and  absolutely  destroys  the  evidence  of 
testimony  upon  the  subject.  And,  indeed,  the  powers  of  enthu¬ 
siasm,  and  of  diseases,  too,  which  operate  in  a  like  manner,  are 
very  wonderful,  in  particular  instances.  But  if  great  numbers 
of  men  not  appearing  in  anj''  peculiar  degree  weak,  noi  under 
any  peculiar  suspicion  of  negligence,  affirm  that  they  saw  and 
heard  such  things  plainly  with  their  eyes  and  their  ears,  and 
are  admitted  to  be  in  earnest ;  such  testimony  is  evidence  of 
the  strongest  kind  we  can  have  for  any  matter  of  fact.  Yet, 
possibly  it  may  be  overcome,  strong  as  it  is,  b}’’  incredibility  in 
the  things  thus  attested,  or  by  contrary  testimony.  And  in 
an  instance  where  one  thought  it  was  so  overcome,  it  might 
be  ]ust  to  consider,  how  far  such  evidence  could  be  accounted 
for  by  enthusiasm  ;  for  it  seems  as  if  no  other  imaginable  ac¬ 
count  were  to  be  given  of  it.  But  till  such  incredibility  be 
shown.,  or  contrary  testimony  produced,  it  cannot  surely  bt 
expected,  that  so  far-fetched,  so  indirect  and  wonderful  an  ac¬ 
count  of  such  testimony,  as  that  of  enthusiasm  must  be  ;  an 
account  so  strange,  that  the  generality  of  mankind  can  scarce 


CHAP.  VII.J 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


219 


be  made  tc  understand  wha  t  is  meant  by  it ;  it  cannot,  I  say, 
be  expected,  that  such  account  will  be  admitted  of  such  evi¬ 
dence,  when  there  is  this  direct,  easy,  and  obvious  account 
of  it,  that  people  really  saw  and  heard  a  thing  not  incredible 
which  they  affirm  sincerely,  and  with  full  eissurance,  they  did 
see  and  hear.  Granting,  then.,  that  enthusiasm  is  not  (strictly 
speaking)  an  absurd,  but  a  possible  account  of  such  testi¬ 
mony,  it  is  manifest  that  the  very  mention  of  it  goes  upon  the 
previous  supposition,  that  the  things  so  attested  are  incredi¬ 
ble  :  and  therefore,  need  not  be  considered,  till  they  are  shown 
to  be  so.  Much  less  need  it  be  considered,  after  the  contrary 
has  been  proved.  And  i  think  it  has  been  proved,  to  full 
satisfaction,  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  a  revelation,  in 
general,  or  in  such  a  one  as  the  Christian  in  particular. 
However,  as  religion  is  supposed  peculiarly  liable  to  enthusi¬ 
asm,  it  may  just  be  observed,  that  prejudices  almost  without 
number  and  without  name,  romance,  affiectation,  humour,  a 
desire  to  engage  attention  or  to  surprise,  the  party-spirit,  cus¬ 
tom,  little  competitions,  unaccountable  likings  and  dislikings  • 
these  influence  men  strongly  in  common  matters  And  as 
these  prejudices  are  often  scarce  known  or  reflected  upon  by 
the  persons  themselves  who  are  influenced  by  them,  they  are 
to  be  considered  as  influences  of  a  like  kind  to  enthusiasm. 
Yet  human  testimony  in  common  matters  is  naturally  and 
justly  believed  notwithstanding. 

It  is  intimated  farther,  in  a  more  refined  way  of  observa¬ 
tion,  that  though  it  should  he  proved,  that  the  apostles  and 
fust  Christians  could  not,  in  some  respects,  be  deceived  them¬ 
selves,  and,  in  other  respects,  cannot  be  thought  to  have  in¬ 
tended  to  impose  upon  the  world,  jmt,  it  will  not  follow,  that 
their  general  testimony  is  to  be  believed,  though  truly  handed 
down  to  us  •  because  they  might  still  in  part,  i.  e.  in  other 
respects,  be  deceived  themselves,  and  in  part  also  designedly 
impose  upon  others  ;  which,  it  is  added,  is  a  thing  very  credi¬ 
ble,  from  that  mixture  of  real  enthusiasm,  and  real  knavery, 
to  be  met  with  in  the  same  characters.  And,  I  must  confess, 
I  think  the  matter  of  fact  contained  in  this  observation  upon 
mankind,  is  not  to  be  denied  ;  and  that  somewhat  very  much 
akin  to  it,  is  often  supposed  in  Scripture  as  a  very  common 
case,  and  most  severely  reproved.  But  it  were  to  have  been 
expected,  that  persons  capable  of  applying  this  observation  as 
applied  in  the  objection,  might  also  frequently  have  met  with 
the  like  mixed  character,  in  instances  where  religion  was 
quite  cut  of  the  case.  The  thing  plainly  is,  that  mankffid  are 


‘220  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PART  II. 

naturally  endued  with  reason,  or  a  capacity  of  distinguishing 
between  truth  and  falsehood  ;  and  as  naturally  they  are  en¬ 
dued  with  veracity,  or  a  regard  to  truth  in  what  they  say : 
but  from  many  occasions,  they  are  liable  to  be  prejudiced, 
and  biassed,  and  deceived  themselves,  and  capable  of  intend¬ 
ing  to  deceive  others,  in  ever}'’  ditferent  degree ;  insomuch 
that,  as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  deceived  by  prejudice,  so  like¬ 
wise  it  seems  to  be  not  an  uncommon  thing,  for  persons,  who, 
from  their  regard  to  truth,  would  not  invent  a  lie  entirely 
Avithout  any  foundation  at  all,  to  propagate  it  with  heighten¬ 
ing  circumstances,  after  it  is  once  invented  and  set  agoing. 
And  others,  though  they  would  not  pi'opagate  a  lie,  yet, 
which  is  a  lower  degree  of  falsehood,  will  let  it  pass  without 
contradiction.  But,  notwithstanding  all  this,  human  testi¬ 
mony  remains  still  a  natural  ground  of  assent ;  and  this 
assent,  a  natural  principle  of  action. 

It  is  objected  farther,  that  however  it  has  happened,  the 
fact  is,  that  mankind  have,  in  different  ages,  been  strangely 
deluded  with  pretences  to  miracles  and  wonders.  But  it  is 
by  no  means  to  be  admitted,  that  they  have  been  oftener,  oi 
are  at  all  more  liable  to  be  deceived  by  these  pretences,  than 
by  others. 

It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  very  considerable  degree  of  his¬ 
torical  evidence  for  miracles,  ’v^hich  are  on  all  hands  acknow¬ 
ledged  to  be  fabulous.  But  suppose  there  were  even  the  like 
historical  evidence  for  these,  to  what  there  is  for  those  alleged 
in  proof  of  Christianity,  which  yei  is  in  no  wise  allowed  j  but 
suppose  this  ;  the  consequence  would  not  be,  the  evidence  of 
the  latter  is  not  to  be  admitted.  Nor  is  there  a  man  in  the 
world  who,  in  common  cases,  would  conclude  thus.  For 
what  ■would  such  a  conclusion  really  amount  to  but  this,  that 
evidence,  confuted  by  contrary  evidence,  or  any  way  over¬ 
balanced,  destroA^s  the  credibility  of  other  evidence,  neither 
confuted  nor  overbalanced  1  To  arsrue,  that  because  there  is, 
if  there  were,  like  evidence  from  testimony,  for  miracles  ac¬ 
knowledged  false,  as  for  those  in  attestation  of  Christianity, 
therefore  the  evidence  in  the  latter  case  is  not  to  be  credited ; 
this  is  the  same  as  to  argue,  that  if  tAvo  men  cf  equally  good 
reputation  had  given  evidence  in  different  cases  no  waj  cen- 
nected,  and  one  of  them  had  been  convicted  of  perjury,  thu' 
confuted  the  testimony  of  the  other. 

Upon  the  AA'hole,  then,  the  general  observation  that  human 
creatures  are  so  liable  to  be  deceived,  from  enthusiasm  in  re¬ 
ligion,  and  pntinciples  equiA’-nlent  to  enthusiasm  in  cOmmtfr 


CHAP.  VII.] 


B’OR  CHRISTIANITV. 


221 


matters,  and  in  both  from  negligence  ;  and  that  they  are  so 
capable  of  dishonestly  endeavouring  to  deceive  ethers  ;  this 
does  indeed  weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  all  cases, 
but  does  not  destroy  it  in  any.  And  these  things  will  appear, 
to  different  men,  to  weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony,  in 
different  degrees ;  in  degrees  proportionable  to  the  observa¬ 
tions  they  have  made,  or  the  notions  they  have  any  way- 
taken  up,  concerning  the  weakness,  and  negligence,  and  dis¬ 
honesty  of  mankind ;  or  concerning  the  powders  of  enthusi¬ 
asm,  and  prejudices  equivalent  to  it.  But  it  seems  to  me, 
that  people  do  not  know  what  they  say.  who  affirm  these 
things  to  destroy  the  evidence  from  testimony,  which  we 
have  of  the  truth  of  Christianity.  Nothing  can  destroy  the 
evidence  of  testimon}^  in  any  case,  but  a  proof  or  probaliility, 
that  persons  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  facts  to  \vhich 
they  give  testimony  ;  or  that  they  are  actually  under  some 
indirect  influence  in  giving  it,  in  such  particular  case.  Till 
this  be  miade  out,  the  natural  laws  of  human  actions  require, 
that  testimony  be  admitted.  It  can  never  be  sufficient  to 
overthrow’-  direct  historical  evidence,  indolently  to  say,  that 
there  are  so  many  principles,  from  whence  mien  are  liable  to 
be  deceived  themselves  and  disposed  to  deceive  others,  espe¬ 
cially  in  matters  of  religion,  that  one  knows  not  w’-hat  to  be¬ 
lieve.  And  it  is  surprising  persons  can  help  reflecting,  that 
this  very  manner  of  speaking  supposes,  they  are  not  satisfied 
that  there  is  nothing  in  the  evidence,  of  wdiich  they  speak 
thus  ;  or  that  they  can  avoid  observing,  if  they  do  make  this 
reflection,  that  it  is,  on  such  a  subject,  a  very  material  one.* 

And  over  against  all  these  objections,  is  to  be  set  the  im 
portance  of  Christianity,  as  what  must  have  engaged  the  at¬ 
tention  of  its  first  converts,  so  as  to  have  rendered  them  less 
liable  to  be  deceived  from  carelessness,  than  they  would  in 
common  matters  ;  and  likewise  the  strong  obligations  to  ve¬ 
racity,  which  their  religion  laid  them  under:  so  that  the  first 
and  most  obvious  presumption  is,  that  they  could  not  be  do’ 
ceived  themselves,  nor  would  deceive  others.  And  this  pre¬ 
sumption,  in  this  degree,  is  peculiar  to  the  testimony  we  have 
been  considering. 

Ill  argument,  assertions  are  nothing  in  themselves,  and 
have  an  air  of  positiveness,  which  sometimes  is  not  very 
easy ;  yet  they  are  necessary,  and  necessary  to  be  repeated, 
in  order  to  connect  a  discourse,  and  distinctly  to  lay  before  the 


“  !dec  the  foregping  chapter. 


222 


or  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE 


I  PART  II. 


view  of  the  reader  what  is  proposed  to  be  proved,  and  what  is 
left  as  proved.  Now,  the  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  obser¬ 
vations  is,  I  think,  beyond  all  doubt,  this :  that,  unbelievers 
must  be  forced  to  admit  the  external  evidence  for  Christianity, 
i.  e.  the  proof  of  miracles  wrought  to  attest  it,  to  be  of  real 
weight  and  very  considerable  ;  though  they  cannot  allow  it  to 
be  sufficient  to  convince  them  of  the  reality  of  those  miracles. 
And  as  they  must,  in  all  reason,  admit  this,  so  it  seems  to  me, 
that  upon  consideration  they  would,  in  fact,  admit  it ;  those 
of  them,  I  mean,  who  know  any  thing  at  all  of  the  matter : 
in  like  manner  as  persons,  in  many  cases,  own,  they  see 
strong  evidence  from  testimony,  for  the  truth  of  things,  which 
yet  they  cannot  be  convinced  are  true  ;  cases,  suppose,  where 
there  is  contrary  testimony,  or  things  which  they  think, 
whether  with  or  without  reason,  to  be  incredible.  But  there 
is  no  testimony  contrary  to  that  which  we  have  been  con¬ 
sidering  ;  and  it  has  been  fully  proved,  that  there  is  no  incredi¬ 
bility  in  Christianity  in  general,  or  in  any  part  of  it. 

II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from  prophecy,  I 
shall  only  make  some  few  general  observations,  which  are 
suggested  by  the  analogy  of  nature ;  i.  e.  by  the  acknow¬ 
ledged  natural  rules  of  judging  in  common  matters,  concern 
ing  evidence  of  a  like  kind  to  this  from  prophecy. 

1.  The  obscurity  or  unintelligibleness  of  one  part  of  a 
prophecy,  does  not,  in  any  degree,  invalidate  the  proof  of 
foresight,  arising  from  the  appearing  completion  of  those  other 
parts  which  are  understood.  For  the  case  is  evidently  the 
same,  as  if  those  parts,  which  are  not  understood,  were  lost, 
or  not  written  at  all,  or  written  in  an  unknown  tongue. 
Whether  this  observation  be  commonly  attended  to  or  not, 
it  is  so  evident,  that  one  can  scarce  bring  one’s  self  to  set  down 
an  instance  in  common  matters,  to  exemplify  it.  However, 
suppose  a  writing,  partly  in  cypher,  and  partly  in  plain  words 
at  length,  and  that,  in  the  part  one  understood,  there  appeared 
mention  of  several  known  facts ;  it  would  never  come  into 
any  man’s  thoughts  to  imagine,  that  if  he  understood  the 
whole,  perhaps  he  might  find,  that  those  facts  were  not,  in 
reality,  known  by  the  writer.  Indeed,  both  in  this  example, 
and  the  thing  intended  to  be  exemplified  by  it,  our  not  under¬ 
standing  the  whole,  (the  whole,  suppose,  of  a  sentence  or  a 
paragraph,)  might  sometimes  occasion  a  doubt,  whether  one 
understood  the  literal  meaning  of  such  a  part ;  but  this  comes 
under  another  consideration. 

For  the  same  reason  though  a  man  should  be  incapable. 


CHAP.  VII. J 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


223 


for  want  of  learning,  or  opportunities  of  inquiry,  or  from  not 
having  turned  his  studies  this  way,  even  so  much  as  to  judge 
whether  particular  prophecies  have  been  throughout  com¬ 
pletely  fulfilled  ;  yet  he  may  see,  in  general,  that  they  have 
been  fulfilled,  to  such  a  degree,  as,  upon  very  good  ground, 
to  be  convinced  of  foresight  more  than  human  in  such  pro¬ 
phecies,  and  of  such  events  being  intended  by  them.  For 
the  same  reason  also,  though,  by  means  of  the  deficiencies 
in  eivil  history,  and  the  different  accounts  of  historians,  the 
most  learned  should  not  be  able  to  make  out  to  satisfaction, 
that  such  parts  of  the  prophetic  history  have  been  minutely 
and  throughout  fulfilled  ;  yet  a  very  strong  proof  of  foresight 
may  arise  from  that  general  completion  of  them  which  is 
made  out ;  as  much  proof  of  foresight,  perhaps,  as  the  Giver 
of  prophecy  intended  should  ever  be  a,fForded  b3^  such  parts  of 
prophecju 

2.  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to  such  and 
such  events,  is  itself  a  proof,  that  it  was  intended  of  them ; 
as  the  rules,  by  which  we  naturally  judge  and  determine,  in 
common  cases  parallel  to  this,  will  show.  This  observation  I 
make  in  answer  to  the  common  objection  against  the  applica¬ 
tion  of  the  prophecies,  that,  considering  each  of  them  distinctly 
b}^  itseF,  it  does  not  at  all  appear,  that  they  were  intended  of 
those  particular  events  to  which  they  are  applied  by  Chris¬ 
tians  ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  to  be  supposed,  that,  if  they  meant 
any  thing,  they  were  intended  of  other  events  unknown  to  us, 
and  not  of  these  at  all. 

Now,  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing,  which  bear  a  great 
resemblance  to  prophecy,  wi  a  respect  to  the  matter  before 
us  ;  the  mythological  and  the  satirical,  where  the  satire  is,  to 
a  certain  degree,  concealed.  And  a  man  might  be  assured, 
that  he  understood  what  an  author  intended  by  a  fable  or 
parable,  related  without  any  application  or  moral,  merely 
from  seeing  it  to  be  easily  capable  of  such  application,  and 
that  such  a  moral  might  naturally  be  deduced  from  it.  And 
he  might  be  fully  assured,  that  such  persons  and  events  were 
intended  in  a  satirical  writing,  merely  from  its  being  applica¬ 
ble  to  them.  And,  agreeably  to  the  last  observation,  he 
might  be  in  a  good  measure  satisfied  of  it,  though  he  were 
not  enough  informed  in  affairs,  or  in  the  story  of  such  persons, 
to  understand  half  the  satire.  For,  his  satisfaction,  that  he 
understood  the  rcxeaning,  the  intended  meaning,  of  tliese 
writings,  should  be  greater  or  less,  in  proportion  as  he  saw  the 
genei’al  turn  of  them  to  be  capable  of  such  application  and 


224  or  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [  PART  II 

in  proportion  to  the  number  of  particular  things  capable  of  it 
And  thus,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is  applicable  to  the 
present  state  of  the  church,  and  to  the  political  situations  of 
the  kingdoms  of  the  world,  some  thousand  years  after  these 
prophecies  were  delivered,  and  a  long  series  of  prophecy  de¬ 
livered  before  the  coming  of  Christ  is  applicable  to  him ;  these 
things  are  in  themselves  a  proof,  that  the  prophetic  history 
was  intended  of  him,  and  of  those  events  :  in  proportion  as 
the  general  turn  of  it  is  capable  of  such  application,  and  to 
the  number  and  variety  of  particular  prophecies  capable  of  it. 
And,  though  in  all  just  way  of  consideration,  the  appearing 
completion  of  prophecies  is  to  be  allowed  to  be  thus  explana¬ 
tory  of,  and  to  determine  their  meaning ;  yet  it  is  to  be  re¬ 
membered  farther,  that  the  ancient  Jews  applied  the  prophe¬ 
cies  to  a  Messiah  before  his  coming,  in  much  the  same  man¬ 
ner  as  Christians  tlo  now ;  and  that  the  primitive  Christians 
interpreted  the  prophecies  respecting  the  state  of  the  church 
and  of  the  world  in  the  last  ages,  in  the  sense  which  the 
event  seems  to  confirm  and  verify.  And  from  these  things  it 
may  be  made  appear, 

3,  That  the  showing,  even  to  a  high  probability,  if  that 
could  be,  that  the  prophets  thought  of  some  other  events,  in 
such  and  such  predictions,  and  not  those  at  all  which  Chris¬ 
tians  allege  to  be  completions  of  those  predictions ;  or  that 
such  and  such  prophecies  are  capable  of  being  applied  to 
other  events  than  those  to  which  Christians  apply  them — that 
this  would  not  confute  or  destroy  the  force  of  the  argument 
from  prophecy,  even  with  regard  to  those  very  instances.  For, 
observe  how  this  matter  really  is.  If  one  knew  such  a  per¬ 
son  to  be  the  sole  author  of  such  a  book,  and  w^as  certainly 
assured,  or  satisfied  to  any  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole 
of  what  he  intended  in  it,  one  should  be  assured  or  satisfied  to 
such  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  that  book  ; 
for  the  meaning  of  a  book  is  nothing  but  the  meaning  of  the 
author.  But  if  one  knew  a  person  to  have  compiled  a  book 
out  of  memoirs,  which  he  received  from  another,  of  vastly  su¬ 
perior  knowledge  in  the  subject  of  it,  especially  if  it  were  a 
book  full  of  great  intricacies  and  difficulties,  it  would  m  no 
wise  follow,  that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  the  book, 
from  knowing  the  whole  meaning  of  the  compiler ;  for  the 
original  memoirs,  i.  e.  the  author  of  them,  might  have,  and 
there  would  be  no  degree  of  presumption,  in  many  cases, 
against  supposing  him  to  have,  some  farther  meaning  than 
the  compiler  saw*  To  say,  then,  that  the  Scriptures  and  Chi? 


CHAP.  VII.J 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


225 


things  contained  in  them  can  have  no  other  or  farther  mean¬ 
ing,  than  those  persons  thought  or  had,  who  first  recited  or 
wrote  them,  is  evidently  saying,  that  those  persons  were  the 
original,  proper,  and  sole  authors  of  those  books,  i.  e.  that  they 
are  not  inspired ;  which  is  absurd,  whilst  the  authority  of 
these  books  is  under  examination,  i.  e.  till  you  have  determined 
they  are  of  no  divine  authority  at  all.  Till  this  be  deter¬ 
mined,  it  must  in  all  reason  be  supposed,  not  indeed  that  they 
Iiave,  for  this  is  taking  for  granted  that  the}^  are  inspired,  but 
that  the_y  may  have,  some  farther  meaning  than  what  the 
compilers  saw  or  understood.  And,  upon  this  supposition,  it 
is  supposable  also,  that  this  farther  meaning  may  be  fulfilled. 
Now,  events  corresponding  to  prophecies,  interpreted  in  a  dif¬ 
ferent  meaning  from  that  which  the  prophets  are  supposed  to 
have  understood  them  ;  this  affords,  in  a  manner,  the  same 
proof  that  this  different  sense  was  originally  intended,  as  it 
would  have  afforded,  if  the  prophets  had  not  understood  their 
predictions  in  the  sense  it  is  supposed  they  did  ;  because  there 
is  no  presumption  of  their  sense  of  them  being  the  whole  sense 
of  them. ,  And  ii  has  been  already  shown,  that  the  apparent 
completions  of  prophecy  must  be  allowed  to  be  explanatoiy 
of  its  meaning.  So  that  the  question  is,  whether  a  series  of 
prophecy  has  been  fulfilled,  in  a  natural  or  proper,  i.  e.  in  any 
real  sense  of  the  words  of  it.  For  such  completion  is  equally 
a  proof  of  foresight  more  than  human,  whether  the  prophets 
are,  or  are  not,  supposed  to  have  understood  it  in  a  different 
sense.  I  say,  supposed  ;  for  though  I  think  it  clear,  that  the 
prophets  did  not  understand  the  full  meaning  of  their  predic¬ 
tions,  it  is  another  question,  how  far  they  thought  they  did, 
and  in  what  sense  they  understood  them. 

Hence  may  be  seen,  to  how  little  purpose  those  persons  busy 
themselves,  who  endeavour  to  prove  that  the  prophetic  history 
is  applicable  to  events  of  the  age  in  which  it  was  written,  or 
of  ages  before  it.  Indeed,  to  have  proved  this  before  there 
was  any  appearance  of  a  farther  completion  of  it,  might  have 
answered  some  purpose;  for  it  might  have  prevented  the  ex¬ 
pectation  of  any  such  farther  completion.  Thus,  could  Por¬ 
phyry  have  shown,  that  some  principal  parts  of  the  book  of 
Daniel,  for  instance,  the  seventh  verse  of  the  seventh  chanter, 
which  the  Christians  interpreted  of  the  latter  ages,  was  appli¬ 
cable  to  events  which  happened  before  or  about  the  age  of 
Antiochus  Epiphanes  ;  this  might  have  prevented  them  from 
expecting  any  farther  completion  of  it.  And  unless  there  was 

then,  as  I  think  there  must  have  been,  external  evidence  con- 

10* 


22G 


OF  THE  FARTICULAR  EVIDENCE 


[part  II 


cerning  that  book,  more  than  is  come  down  to  us,  such  a  dis* 
covery  might  have  been  a  stumbling-block  in  the  way  oi 
Christianity  itself ;  considering  the  authority  which  our  Sa¬ 
viour  has  given  to  the  book  of  Daniel,  and  how  much  the  ge¬ 
neral  scheme  of  Christianity  presupposes  the  truth  of  it.  But 
even  this  discovery,  had  there  been  any  such,*  would  be  oi 
very  little  weight  with  reasonable  men  now  ;  if  this  passage, 
tlius  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of  Porphyry,  appears 
to  be  applicable  also  to  events,  which  succeeded  the  dissolution 
of  the  Roman  empire.  I  mention  this,  not  at  all  as  intending 
to  insinuate,  that  the  division  of  this  empire  into  ten  parts,  for  it 
plainly  was  divided  into  about  that  number,  were,  alone  and 
by  itself,  of  any  moment  in  verifying  the  prophetic  history ; 
but  only  as  an  example  of  the  thing  I  am  speaking  of.  And 
thus,  upon  the  whole,  the  matter  of  inquiry  evidently  must  be, 
as  above  put,  Whether  the  prophecies  are  applicable  to  Christ, 
and  to  the  present  state  of  the  world  and  of  the  church ;  appli 
cable  in  such  a  degree,  as  to  imply  foresight :  not  whether 
they  are  capable  of  any  other  application  ;  though  I  know  no 
pretence  for  saying,  the  general  turn  of  them  is  capable  of  an}' 
other. 

These  observations  are,  I  think,  just,  and  the  evidence  re¬ 
ferred  to  in  them,  real ;  though  there  may  be  people  who  will 
not  accept  of  such  imperfect  information  from  Scripture.  Some 
too  have  not  integrity  and  regard  enough  to  truth,  to  attend 
to  evidence,  which  keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  perhaps  perplex¬ 
ity,  and  which  is  much  of  a  different  sort  from  what  they  expec¬ 
ted.  And  it  plainly  requires  a  degree  of  modesty  and  fairness, 
beyond  what  every  one  has,  for  a  man  to  say,  not  to  the  world, 
but  to  himself,  that  there  is  a  real  appearance  of  somewhat  of 
great  weight  in  this  matter,  though  he  is  not  able  thoroughly 
to  satisfy  himself  about  it ;  but  it  shall  have  its  influence  upon 
him,  in  proportion  to  its  appearing  realit}^  and  weight.  It  is 
much  more  easy,  and  more  falls  in  with  the  negligence,  pre¬ 
sumption,  and  wilfulness  of  the  generality,  to  d.,  termine  at 
once,  with  a  decisive  air,  there  is  nothing  in  it.  The  preju¬ 
dices  arising  from  that  absolute  contempt  and  scorn,  with 
which  this  evidence  is  treated  in  the  world,  I  do  not  mention. 

*  It  appears,  that  Porphyry  did  nothing  worth  mentioning  in  this  way. 
For  Jerome  on  the  place  says  :  Duas  posteriores  bestias — in  uno  Macedo- 
nvm  regno  ponit.  And  as  to  the  ten  kings  :  Decern  reges  enumerate  qui 
fnemnt  scevissimi :  ipsosque  reges  non  unius  ponit  regni,  verbi  gratia,  Mace- 
donicz,  Srjnce,  Jlsirz,  etEgypti;  sed  de  'diversis  repiis  unum  efficit  regim 
ordinem.  And  in  this  way  of  interpretation,  any  thing  may  be  made  of 
any  thing. 


CHAP.  VII.] 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


221 


For  what  indeed  can  be  said  to  persons,  who  are  weak  enough 
in  their  understandings  to  think  this  any  presumption  against 
It ;  or,  if  they  do  not,  are  yet  weak  enough  in  their  temper 
to  be  influenced  by  such  prejudices,  upon  such  a  subject  ? 

I  shall  row,  secondly,  endeavour  to  give  some  account  of 
the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of  Christianity,  consisting 
both  of  the  direct  and  circumstantial  evidence,  considered  as 
making  up  one  argument.  Indeed,  to  state  and  examine  this 
argument  fully,  would  be  a  work  much  beyond  the  compass 
of  this  whole  Treatise  ;  nor  is  so  much  as  a  proper  abridg¬ 
ment  of  it  to  be  expected  here.  Yet  the  present  subject  re¬ 
quires  to  have  some  brief  account  of  it  given.  For  it  is  the 
kind  of  evidence  upon  which  most  questions  of  difficulty,  in 
common  practice,  are  determined  ;  evidence  arising  from  va¬ 
rious  coincidences,  which  support  and  confirm  each  other,  and 
in  this  manner  prove,  with  more  or  less  certainty,  the  point 
under  consideration.  And  I  choose  to  do  it  also,  j^rs^.  Be¬ 
cause  it  seems  to  be  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  not  duly 
attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the  proof  of  revelation  is,  not 
some  direct  and  express  things  only,  but  a  great  variety  of 
circumstantial  things  also  ;  and  that  though  each  of  these 
direct  and  circumstantial  things  is  indeed  to  be  considered 
separately,  yet  they  are  afterwards  to  be  joined  together ;  for 
that  the  proper  force  of  the  evidence  consists  in  the  results  of 
those  several  things,  considered  in  their  respects  to  each 
other,  and  united  into  one  view  ;  and,  in  the  next  place,  Be¬ 
cause  it  seems  to  me,  that  the  matters  of  fact  here  set  down, 
which  are  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  must  be  acknow¬ 
ledged  by  them  also  to  contain  together  a  degree  of  evidence 
of  great  weight,  if  they  could  be  brought  to  lay  these  several 
things  before  themselves  distinctly,  and  then  with  attention 
consider  them  together ;  instead  of  that  cursory  thought  of 
them,  to  which  we  are  familiarized.  For  being  familiarized 
to  the  cursory  thought  of  things,  as  really  hinders  the  weight 
of  them  from  being  seen,  as  from  having  its  due  influence 
upon  practice. 

The  thing  asserted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to  be  in¬ 
quired  into,  is  this :  that  over  and  above  our  reason  and  aflfec- 
tions,  which  God  has  given  us  for  the  information  of  our  judg¬ 
ment  and  conduct  of  our  lives,  he  has  also,  by  external  reve¬ 
lation,  given  us  an  account  of  himself  and  his  moral  govern¬ 
ment  over  the  world,  implying  a  future  state  of  rewards  and 
punishments ,  i.  e.  hath  revealed  the  system  of  natural  reli- 


228 


OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PART  II. 


gion ;  for  natural  religion  may  be  externally  revealed  by 
God,  as  the  ignorant  may  be  taught  it  by  mankind,  their  fel¬ 
low  creatures — that  God,  I  say,  has  given  us  the  evidence  of 
revelation,  as  well  as  the  evidence  of  reason,  to  ascertain  this 
moral  system ;  together  with  an  account  of  a  particular  dis¬ 
pensation  of  Providence,  which  reason  could  no  way  have 
discovered,  and  a  particular  institution  of  religion  founded  on 
it,  for  the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of  their  present  wretched 
condition,  and  raising  them,  to  the  perfection  and  final  happi¬ 
ness  of  their  nature. 

This  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may  be  consid¬ 
ered  as  wholly  historical.  For  prophecy  is  nothing  but  the 
history  of  events  before  they  come  to  pass  :  doctrines  also  are 
matters  of  fact ;  and  precepts  come  under  the  same  notion. 
And  the  general  design  of  Scripture,  which  contains  in  it  this 
revelation,  thus  considered  as  historical,  may  be  said  to  be,  to 
give  us  an  account  of  the  world,  in  this  one  single  view,  as 
God’s  world  ;  by  which  it  appears  essentially  distinguished 
from  till  other  books,  so  far  as  I  have  found,  except  such  as 
are  copied  from  it.  It  begins  with  an  account  of  God’s  crea¬ 
tion  of  the  world,  in  order  to  ascertain  and  distinguish  from  all 
others,  who  is  the  object  of  our  worship,  by  what  he  has  done ; 
in  order  to  ascertain  who  he  is,  concerning  whose  providence, 
commands,  promises,  and  threatenings,  this  sacred  book  all 
along  treats  ;  the  Maker  and  Proprietor  of  the  world,  he  whose 
creatures  we  are,  the  God  of  nature :  in  order  likewise  to  dis¬ 
tinguish  him  from  the  idols  of  the  nations,  which  are  either  im¬ 
aginary  beings,  i.  e.  no  beings  at  all ;  or  else  part  of  that  crea¬ 
tion,  the  historical  relation  of  which  is  here  given.  And  St 
John,  not  improbably  with  an  eye  to  this  Mosaic  account  of 
the  creation,  begins  his  gospel  with  an  account  of  our  Sa¬ 
viour’s  pre-existence,  and  that,  ‘  all  things  w^ere  made  by  him, 
and  without  him  was  not  any  thing  made  that  was  made  ;’t 
agreeably  to  the  doctrine  of  St  Paul,  that  ‘  God  created  all 
things  by  Jesus  Christ.’ J  This  being  premised,  the  Scripture, 
taken  together,  seems  to  profess  to  contain  a  kind  of  an  abndg- 
ment  of  the  history  of  the  world,  in  the  view  just  now  men¬ 
tioned  ;  that  is,  a  general  account  of  the  condition  of  religion 
and  its  professors,  during  the  continuance  of  that  apostacy 
from  God,  and  state  of  wickedness,  wdiich  it  every  w'here 
supposes  the  wmrld  to  lie  in.  And  this  account  of  the  state 
of  religion  carries  with  it  some  brief  account  of  the  political 


t  John  i.  3. 


J  Eph.  iiL  9. 


CHAP.  VIL] 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


229 


state  of  things,  as  religion  is  affected  hy  it.  Revelation  in¬ 
deed  considers  the  common  affairs  of  this  world,  and  what  is 
going  on  in  itj  as  a  mere  scene  of  distraction,  and  cannot  be 
supposed  to  concern  itself  with  foretelling  at  what  time  Rome, 
or  Babylon,  or  Greece,  or  any  particular  place,  should  be  the 
most  conspicuous  seat  of  that  tyranny  and  dissoluteness, 
which  all  places  equally  aspire  to  be  ;  cannot,  I  say,  be  sup¬ 
posed  to  give  any  account  of  this  wild  scene  for  its  own  sake. 
But  it  seems  to  contain  some  very  general  account  of  the 
chief  governments  of  the  world,  as  the  general  state  of  reli¬ 
gion  has  been,  is,  or  shall  be,  affected  by  them,  from  the  first 
transgression  and  during  the  whole  interval  of  the  world’s 
continuing  in  its  present  state,  to  a  certciin  future  period, 
spoken  of  both  in  the  Old  and  New  Testament,  very  dis 
tinctly,  and  in  great  variety  of  expression  :  ‘  The  times  of  the 
restitution  of  all  things  when  ‘  the  mystery  of  God  shall 
be  finished,  as  he  hath  declared  to  his  servants  tlie  prophets 
when  ‘  the  God  of  heaven  shall  set  up  a  kingdom,  which 
shall  never  be  destroyed  ;  and  the  kingdom  shall  not  be  left 
to  other  people,’J  as  it  is  represented  to  be  during  this  apos- 
tacy,  but  ‘judgment  shall  be  given  to  the  saints,’§  and  ‘  they 
shall  reign  ;’||  ‘  and  the  kingdom  and  dominion,  and  the  great¬ 
ness  of  the  kingdom  under  the  whole  heaven,  shall  be  given 
to  the  people  of  the  saints  of  the  Most  High. ’ll 

Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture,  I  would  remark 
how  great  a  length  of  time  the  whole  relation  takes  up,  near 
six  thousand  years  of  which  are  past :  and  how  great  a  va¬ 
riety  of  things  it  treats  of ;  the  natural  and  moral  system  or 
history  of  the  world,  including  the  time  when  it  was  formed, 
all  contained  in  the  very  first  book,  and  evidently  written  in  a 
rude  and  unlearned  age  ;  and  in  subsequent  books,  the  vari¬ 
ous  common  and  prophetic  history,  and  the  particular  dispen¬ 
sation  of  Christianity.  Now  all  this  together  gives  the 
largest  scope  for  criticism  ;  and  for  confutation  of  what  is  ca¬ 
pable  of  being  confuted,  either  from  reason,  or  from  common 
history,  or  from  any  inconsistence  in  its  several  parts.  And 
it  is  a  thing  which  deserves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that 
whereas  some  imagine,  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  the  evi¬ 
dence  for  revelation  implies  a  positive  argument  that  it  is  not 
true ;  it  appears,  on  the  contrary,  to  imply  a  positive  argu¬ 
ment  that  it  is  true.  For,  could  any ‘common  relation  of  such 

*  Acts  iii.  2 1 .  t  ffev.  x.  7.  |  Dan.  ii.  §  Dan,  vii,  22. 

U  R«v^  xi.  17.,  13,  ch.  XX,  H  Dan.  vik 


230 


OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [  PART  IL 


antiquity,  extent,  and  variety,  (for  in  these  things  the  stresa 
of  what  I  am  now  observing  lies,)  be  proposed  to  the  examina¬ 
tion  of  the  world  ;  that  it  could  not,  in  an  age  of  knowledge 
and  liberty,  be  confuted,  or  shown  to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the 
satisfaction  of  reasonable  men ;  this  would  be  thought  a 
strong  presumptive  proof  of  its  truth.  And  indeed  it  must  be 
a  proof  of  it  just  in  proportion  to  the  probability,  that  if  it  were 
false,  it  might  be  shown  to  be  so ;  and  this,  I  think,  is  scarce 
pretended  to  be  shown  but  upon  principles  and  in  ways  of 
arguing  which  have  been  clearly  obviated.* .  Nor  does  it  at 
all  appear,  that  any  sect  of  men  who  believe  natural  religion, 
are  of  the  opinion,  that  Christianity  has  been  thus  confuted. 
But  to  proceed : 

Together  with  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  the  Old  Tes¬ 
tament  contains  a  chronological  account  of  the  beginning  of 
it,  and  from  thence,  an  unbroken  genealogy  of  mankind  for 
many  ages  before  common  history  begins ;  and  carried  on  as 
much  farther,  as  to  make  up  a  continued  thread  of  history  of 
the  length  of  between  three  and  four  thousand  years.  It  con¬ 
tains  an  account  of  God’s  making  a  covenant  with  a  particu¬ 
lar  nation,  that  they  should  be  his  people,  and  he  would  be  their 
God,  in  a  peculiar  sense  ;  of  his  often  interposing  miraculously 
in  their  affairs  ;  giving  them  the  promise,  and,  long  after,  the 
possession,  of  a  particular  country ;  assuring  them  of  the 
greatest  national  prosperity  in  it,  if  they  would  worship  him, 
in  opposition  to  the  idols  which  the  rest  of  the  world  worship¬ 
ped,  and  obey  his  commands  ;  and  threatening  them  with  un¬ 
exampled  punishments,  if  they  disobeyed  him,  and  fell  into  the 
general  idolatry  :  insomuch,  that  this  one  nation  should  con¬ 
tinue  to  be  the  observation  and  the  wonder  of  all  the  world. 
It  declares  particularly,  that  “  God  would  scatter  them  among 
all  people,  from  one  end  of  the  earth  unto  the  other but 
“  when  they  should  return  unto  the  Lord  their  God,  he  would 
have  compassion  upon  them,  and  gather  them,  from  all  the 
nations  whither  he  had  scattered  them  that  “Israel  should 
be  saved  in  the  Lord,  with  an  everlasting  salvation,  and  not  be 
ashamed  or  confounded,  world  wuthout  end.”  And  as  some 
of  these  promises  are  conditional,  others  are  as  absolute  as 
any  thing  can  be  expressed,  that  the  time  should  come,  when 
“  the  people  should  be  all  righteous,  and  inherit  the  land  for¬ 
ever  that  “  though  God  would  make  a  full  end  of  all  na¬ 
tions  whither  he  had  scattered  them,  yet  would  he  not  make 


*  Chap.  2, 3,  &c. 


CHAP.  \II.] 


FOPv  CHRISTIANITY. 


231 


a  full  end  of  them that  “  he  would  bring  again  the  captivity 
of  his  people  Israel,  and  plant  them  upon  their  land,  and  they 
should  be  no  more  pulled  up  out  of  their  land  that  “  the 
seed  of  Israel  should  not  cease  from  being  a  nation  forever.”'"*^ 
It  foretells,  that  Gcd  would  raise  them  up  a  particular  person, 
in  whom  ah  his  promises  should  be  fulfilled ;  the  Messiah, 
who  should  be,  in  a  high  and  eminent  sense,  their  anointed 
Prince  and  Saviour.  This  was  foretold  in  such  a  manner,  as 
raised  a  general  expectation  of  such  a  person  in  the  nation,  as 
apjrears  from  the  New  Testament,  and  is  an  acknowledged 
fact ;  an  expectation  of  his  coming  at  such  a  particular  time, 
before  any  one  appeared,  claiming  to  be  that  person,  and 
where  there  was  no  ground  for  such  an  expectation  but  from 
the  prophecies  ;  which  expectation,  therefore,  must  in  all  rea¬ 
son  be  presunied  to  be  explanatory  to  those  prophecies,  if 
there  were  any  doubt  about  their  meaning.  It  seems  more¬ 
over  to  foretell,  that  this  person  should  be  rejected  by  that  na¬ 
tion,  to  whom  he  had  been  so  long  promised,  and  though  he 
was  so  much  desired  by  them.|  And  it  expressly  foretells, 
that  he  should  be  the  Saviour  of  the  Gentiles  ;  and  even  that 
the  completion  of  the  scheme,  contained  in  this  book,  and 
then  begun,  and  in  its  progress,  should  be  somewhat  so  great, 
that,  in  comparison  with  it,  the  restoration  of  the  Jews  alone 
would  be  but  of  small  account.  ‘  It  is  a  light  thing  that  thou 
shouldest  be  my  servant  to  raise  up  the  tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to 
restore  the  preserved  of  Israel :  I  will  also  give  thee  for  a  light 
to  the  Gentiles,  that  thou  mayest  be  for  salvation  unto  the 
end  of  the  earth.’  And,  ‘  In  the  last  days,  the  mountain  of 
the  Lord’s  house  shall  be  established  in  the  top  of  the  moun¬ 
tains,  and  shall  be  exalted  above  the  hills ;  and  all  nations 
shall  flow  into  it — for  out  of  Zion  shall  go  forth  the  law,  and 
the  word  of  the  Lord  from  Jerusalem.  And  he  shall  judge 
among  the  nations — and  the  Lord  alone  shall  be  exalted  in 
that  day,  and  the  idols  he  shall  utterly  abolish. ’J  The  Scrip¬ 
ture  farther  contains  an  account,  that  at  the  time  the  Messiah 
was  expected,  a  person  rose  up,  in  this  nation,  claiming  to  be 
that  Messiah,  to  be  the  person  whom  all  the  prophecies 

*  Deut.  xxxiii.  64.  Ch.  xxx.  2,  3.  Isa.  xlv.  17.  Ch.  lx,  21.  Jer, 
XXX.  1 1.  Ch.  Ixvi.  28.  Amos  ix.  15.  Jer.  xxxi.  36. 

t  Isa.  viii.  14,  15.  Ch.  x.ix.  5.  Ch.  liii.  Mai.  i.  10,  11.  and  Ch.  iii. 

t  Isa.  xlix.  6.  Ch.  ii.  Ch.xi.  Ch.lvi.7.  Mai.  i,  11. — Towhiohmust 
be  added,  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,  several  in  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment,  and  very  many  in  the  Old,  which  desciibe  what  shall  be  the  com* 
pletion  of  the  revealed  plan  of  Providence. 


2C2 


OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PART  II 


referred  to,  and  in  whom  they  should  centre ;  that  he  spent 
some  years  in  a  continued  course  of  miraculous  works,  and 
endued  his  immediate  disciples  and  followers  with  a  power  of 
doing  the  same,  as  a  proof  of  the  truth  of  that  religion  which 
lie  commissioned  them  to  publish;  that,  invested  with  this 
authority  and  power,  thej?^  made  numerous  converts  in  the 
remotest  countries,  and  settled  and  established  his  religion  in 
the  world;  to  the  end  of  which,  the  Scripture  professes  to 
give  a  prophetic  account  of  the  state  of  this  religion  amongst 
mankind. 

Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  utterly  ignorant  of  history,  to 
have  all  this  related  to  him,  out  of  the  Scriptures.  Or,  sup¬ 
pose  such  a  one,  having  the  Scriptures  put  into  his  hands,  to 
remark  these  things  in  it,  not  knowing  but  that  the  whobt, 
even  its  civil  histor}",  as  well  as  the  other  parts  of  it,  might 
be,  from  beginning  to  end,  an  entire  invention  ;  and  to  ask. 
What  truth  was  in  it,  and  wdiether  the  revelation  here  related 
was  real  or  a  fiction  ?  And,  instead  of  a  direct  answer,  sup¬ 
pose  him,  all  at  once,  to  be  told  the  following  confessed  facts  ; 
and  then  to  unite  them  into  one  view. 

Let  him  first  be  told,  in  how  great  a  degree  the  profession 
and  establishment  of  natural  religion,  the  belief  that  there  is 
one  God  to  be  worshipped,  that  virtue  is  his  law,  and  that 
mankind  shall  be  rew^arded  and  punished  hereafter,  as  they 
obey  and  disobey  it  here  ;  in  how  very  great  a  degree,  I  say, 
the  profession  and  establishment  of  this  moral  system  in  the 
world,  is  owing  to  the  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed, 
contained  in  this  book  ;  the  establishment  of  this  moral  sys¬ 
tem,  even  in  those  countries  which  do  not  acknowledge  the 
proper  authority  of  the  Scripture.  Let  him  be  told  also, 
what  number  of  nations  do  acknowledge  its  proper  authority. 
Let  him  then  take  in  consideration,  of  w’hat  importance  reli¬ 
gion  is  to  mankind.  And  upon  these  things,  he  might,  I 
think,  truly  observe,  that  this  supposed  revelation’s  obtaining 
and  being  received  in  the  world,  with  all  the  circumstances 
and  effects  of  it,  considered  together  as  one  event,  is  the  most 
conspicuous  and  important  event  in  the  story  of  mankind : 
that  a  book  of  this  nature,  and  thus  promulged  and  recom¬ 
mended  to  our  consideration,  demands,  as  if  by  a  voice  from 
heaven,  to  have  its  claims  most  seriously  examined  into  ;  and 
that,  before  such  examination,  to  treat  it  with  any  kind  of 
scofRng  and  ridicule,  is  an  offence  against  natural  piety.  But 


CHAP.  VII.] 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


233 


it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  how  much  soever  the  establish 
ment  of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  owing  to  the  Scrip¬ 
ture  revelation,  this  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  religion  from 
reason,  any  more  than  the  proof  of  Euclid’s  Elements  is  de¬ 
stroyed,  by  a  man’s  knowing  or  thinking  that  he  should 
never  have  seen  the  truth  of  the  several  propositions  contained 
in  it,  nor  had  those  propositions  come  into  his  thoughts,  but 
for  that  mathematician. 

Let  such  a  person  as  we  are  speaking  of,  be,  in  the  next 
place,  informed  of  the  acknowledged  antiquity  of  the  first 
parts  of  this  book  ;  and  that  its  chronology,  its  account  of  the 
time  when  the  earth,  and  the  several  parts  of  it,  were  first 
peopled  with  human  creatures,  is  no  way  contradicted,  but  is 
really  confirmed,  by  the  natural  and  civil  history  of  the 
world,  collected  from  common  historians,  from  the  state  of  the 
earth,  and  the  late  invention  of  arts  and  sciences.  And,  as 
the  Scripture  contains  an  unbroken  thread  of  common  and 
civil  history,  from  the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for  between 
three  and  four  thousand  years ;  let  the  person  we  are  speak¬ 
ing  of  be  told,  in  the  next  place,  that  this  general  history,  as 
it  is  not  contradicted,  but  is  confirmed  by  profane  history,  as 
much  as  there  would  be  reason  to  expect,  upon  supposition 
of  its  truth ;  so  there  is  nothing  in  the  whole  history  itself,  to 
give  any  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion,  of  its  not  being,  in 
the  general,  a  faithful  and  literally  true  genealogy  of  men, 
and  series  of  things,  I  speak  here  only  of  the  common 
Scripture  history,  or  of  the  course  of  ordinary  events  related 
in  it,  as  distinguished  from  miracles,  and  from  the  prophetic 
history.  In  all  the  Scripture  narrations  of  this  kind,  following 
events  arise  out  of  foregoing  ones,  as  in  all  other  histories. 
There  appears  nothing  related  as  done  in  any  age,  not  con¬ 
formable  to  the  manners  of  that  age  ;  nothing  in  the  account 
^  of  a  succeeding  age,  which,  one  would  say,  could  not  be  true, 
or  was  improbable,  from  the  account  of  things  in  the  preced¬ 
ing  one.  There  is  nothing  in  the  characters,  which  would 
raise  a  thought  of  their  being  feigned ;  but  all  the  internal 
marks  imaginable  of  their  being  real.  It  is  to  be  adde^i  also, 
that  mere  genealogies,  bare  narratives  of  the  number  of  years 
which  persons  called  by  such  and  such  names  lived,  do  not 
carry  the  face  of  fiction  ;  perhaps  do  carry  some  presumption 
of  veracity ;  and  all  unadorned  narratives,  which  have  nothing 
to  surprise,  may  be  thought  to  carry  somewhat  of  the  like 
presumption  too.  And  the  domestic  and  the  political  history 
&  plainly  credible.  There  may  be  incidents  in  Scripture, 


234  OF  THE'  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PART  II 

which,  taken  alone  in  the  naked  way  tiiey  are  told,  may  ap* 
pear  strange,  especially  to  persons  of  other  manners,  tern-- 
per,  education ;  but  there  are  also  incidents  of  undoubted 
truth,  in  many  or  most  persons’  lives,  which,  in  the  same  cir¬ 
cumstances,  would  appear  to  the  full  as  stange.  There  may 
be  mistakes  of  transcribers,  there  may  be  other  real  or  seeming 
rrdstakes,  not  easy  to  be  particularly  accounted  for  ;  but  there 
are  certainly  no  more  things  of  this  kind  in  the  Scripture, 
than  what  were  to  have  been  expected  in  books  of  such  an¬ 
tiquity  ;  and  nothing,  in  any  wise,  sufficient  to  discredit  the 
general  narrative.  Now,  that  a  history,  claiming  to  com¬ 
mence  from  the  creation,  and  extending  in  one  continued 
series,  through  so  great  a  length  of  time,  and  variety  of  events, 
should  have  such  appearances  of  reality  and  truth  in  its  whole 
contexture,  is  surely  a  very  remarkable  circumstance  in  its 
favor.  And  as  all  this  is  applicable  to  the  common  history 
of  the  New  Testament,  so  there  is  a  farther  credibility,  and 
a  very  high  one,  given  to  it  by  profane  authors  ;  many  of 
these  writing  of  the  same  times,  and  confirming  the  truth  of 
customs  and  events,  which  are  incidentally,  as  well  as  more 
purposely  mentioned  in  it.  And  this  credibility  of  the  com¬ 
mon  Scripture  history,  gives  some  credibility  to  its  miracu¬ 
lous  biistory ;  especially  as  this  is  inierwoven  with  the  com¬ 
mon,  so  as  that  they  imply  each  other,  and  both  together 
make  up  one  relation, 

liOt  it  then  be  more  particularly  observed  to  this  person,  that 
it  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of  fact,  which  is  indeed  implied 
in  the  foregoing  observation,  that  there  was  such  a  nation  as 
the  Jews,  of  the  greatest  antiquity,  whose  government  and 
general  polity  was  founded  on  the  law,  here  related  to  be 
given  them  by  Moses  as  fi'om  Heaven  :  that  natural  religion, 
though  with  rites  additional,  yet  no  way  contrary  to  it,  was 
their  established  religion,  which  cannot  be  said  of  the  Gentile 
world  ;  and  that  their  very  being,  as  a  nation,  depended  upon 
their  acknowledgment  of  one  God,  the  God  of  the  universe. 
For  suppose,  in  their  captivity  in  Babylon,  they  had  gone  over 
to  the  religion  of  their  conquerors,  there  would  have  remained 
no  bond  of  union,  to  keep  them  a  distinct  people.  And  whilst 
they  were  under  their  own  kings,  in  their  own  countr}^  a  to¬ 
tal  apostacy  from  God  would  have  been  the  dissolution  of  their 
whole  government.  They  in  such  a  sense  nationally  acknow¬ 
ledged  and  worshipped  the  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth,  when 
the  rest  of  the  world  were  sunk  in  idolatry,  as  rendered  them, 
in  fact,  the  peculiar  people  of  God.  And  this  so  remarkable 


CHAr.  VII.] 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 


235 


an  establishment  and  preservation  of  natural  religion  amongst 
them,  seems  to  add  some  peculiar  credibility  to  the  historical 
evidence, for  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  the  prophets  ;  because 
these  miracles  are  a  full  satisfactory  account  of  this  event, 
which  plainly  wants  to  be  accounted  for,  and  cannot  other¬ 
wise. 

Let  this  person,  supposed  wholly  ignorant  of  history,  be 
acquainted  farther,  that  one  claiming  to  be  the  Messiah,  of 
Jewish  extraction,  rose  up  at  the  time  when  this  nation,  from 
the  prophecies  above  mentioned,  expected  the  Messiah:  that 
he  was  rejected,  as  it  seemed  to  have  been  foretold  he  should, 
by  the  body  of  the  people  under  the  direction  of  their  rulers  . 
that  in  the  course  of  a  very  few  years  he  was  believed  on, 
and  acknowledged  as  the  promised  Messiah,  by  great  num¬ 
bers  among  the  Gentiles  agreeably  to  the  prophecies  of  Scrip¬ 
ture,  yet  not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles, 
of  which  .miracle.s  we  also  have  strong  historical  evidence; 
(by  which  I  mean  here  no  more  than  must  be  acknowledged 
by  unbelievers  ;  for  let  pious  frauds  and  follies  be  admitted  to 
weaken,  it  is  absurd  to  say  thej'-  destroy,  our  evidence  of 
miracles  wrought  in  proof  of  Christianity  :)  that  this  religion 
approving  itself  to  the  reason  of  mankind,  and  carrying  its  own 
evidence  with  it,  so  far  as  reason  is  a  judge  of  its  system,  and 
being  no  way  contrary  to  reason  in  those  parts  of  it  which  re¬ 
quire  to  be  believed  upon,  the  mere  authority  of  its  Author ; 
that  this  religion,  I  say,  gradually  spread  and  supported  itself, 
for  some  hundred  years,  not  only  without  any  assistance  from 
temporal  power, but  under  constant  discouragements, and  often 
the  bitterest  persecutions  fron.  it,  and  then  became  the  religion 
of  the  world ;  that,  in  the  mean  time,  the  Jewish  nation  and  go¬ 
vernment  were  destroyed  in  a  very  remarkable  manner,  and  the 
people  carried  away  captive  and  dispersed  through  the  most 
distant  countries  ;  in  which  state  of  dispersion  they  have  re¬ 
mained  fifteen  hundred  years  ;  and  that  they  remain  a  nume¬ 
rous  people,  united  among  themselves,  and  distinguished  from 
the  rest  of  the  world,  as  they  were  in  the  days  of  Moses,  by 
the  profession  of  his  law,  and  every  where  looked  upon  in  a 
manner,  which  one  scarce  knows  how  distinctly  to  express, 
b  ut  in  the  words  of  the  prophetic  account  of  it,  given  so  many 
ages  before  it  came  to  pass  ;  ‘Thou  shalt  become  an  astonish¬ 
ment,  a  proverb,  and  a  byword,  among  all  nations  whither  the 
Lord  shall  lead  thee.’J 


t  Deut  xjnriii.  .37 


236  OP  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PART  11 

The  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in  the  Jews  remain¬ 
ing  a  distinct  people  in  their  dispositions,  and  the  confirmation 
which  this  event  appears  to  give  to  the  truth  of  revelation, 
maj  be  thought  to  be  answered,  by  their  religion  forbidding 
them  intermarriages  with  those  of  any  other,  and  prescribing 
them  a  great  many  peculiarities  in  their  food,  by  w'hich  they 
are  debarred  from  the  .means  of  incorporating  with  the  people 
in  whose  countries  they  live.  This  is  not,  I  think,  a  satisfac¬ 
tory  account  of  that  which  it  pretends  to  account  for.  But 
what  does  it  pretend  to  account  for  1  The  correspondence  be¬ 
tween  this  event  and  the  prophecies ;  or  the  coincidence  of 
both  with  a  long  dispensation  of  Providence,  of  a  peculiar  na¬ 
ture,  towards  that  people  formerly  ?  No.  It  is  only  the  event 
itself  which  is  offered  to  be  thus  accounted  for  ;  which  single 
event  taken  alone,  abstracted  from  all  such  correspondence 
and  coincidence,  perhaps  would  not  have  appeared  miracu¬ 
lous  ;  but  that  correspondence  and  coincidence  may  be  so, 
though  the  event  itself  be  supposed  not.  Thus  the  concur¬ 
rence  of  our  Saviour’s  being  born  at  Bethlehem,  with  a  long 
foregoing  series  of  prophecy  and  other  coincidences,  is  doubt¬ 
less  miraculous,  the  series  of  prophecy,  and  other  coinci¬ 
dences,  and  the  event,  being  admitted ;  though  the  event  itself, 
his  birth  at  that  place,  appears  to  have  been  brought  about 
in  a  natural  way ;  of  which,  however,  no  one  can  be  certain 

■And  as  several  of  these  events  seem,  in  some  degree,  ex- 
pressly,  to  have  verified  the  prophetic  history  already ;  so 
likewise  they  may  be  considered  farther,  as  having  a  peculiar 
aspect  towards  the  full  completion  of  it ;  as  affording  some 
presumption  that  the  whole  of  it  shall,  one  time  or  other,  be 
fulfilled.  Thus,  that  the  Jews  have  been  so  wonderfully  pre¬ 
served  in  their  long  and  wide  dispersion  ;  which  is  indeed  the 
direct  fulfilling  of  some  prophecies,  but  is  now  mentioned  only 
as  looking  forward  to  somewhat  yet  to  come :  that  natural 
religion  came  forth  from  Judea,  and  spread  in  the  degree  it 
has  done  over  the  world,  before  lost  in  idolatry ;  which,  to¬ 
gether  with  some  other  things,  have  distinguished  that  very 
place,  in  like  manner  as  the  people  of  it  are  distinguished: 
that  this  great  change  of  religion  over  the  earth,  was  brought 
about  under  the  profession  and  acknowledgment,  that  Jesus 
was  the  promised  Messiah  :  things  of  this  iiind  naturally  turn 
the  thoughts  of  serious  men  towards  the  full  completion  of 
the  prophetic  history,  concerning  the  final  ]’estoration  of  that 
people  ;  concerning  the  establishment  of  the  everlasting  king¬ 
dom  among  them,  the  kingdom  of  the  Messiah;  and  the 


CHA?.  VII.J 


FOR  CHRISTIANITY, 


237 


future  state  of  the  world,  under  this  sacred  government.  Such 
circumstances  and  events  compared  with  these  prophecies, 
though  no  completions  of  them,  jet  would  not,  I  think,  be 
spoken  of  as  nothing  in  the  argument,  by  a  person  upon  his 
first  being  informed  of  them.  They  fall  in  with  the  prophetic 
history  of  things  still  future,  give  it  some  additional  credibility, 
have  the  appearance  of  being  somewhat  in  order  to  the  full 
completion  of  it. 

Indeed  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge,  and  great 
calmness  and  consideration,  to  be  able  to  judge,  thoroughly,  of 
the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianitjq  from  that  part  of 
the  prophetic  history  which  relates  to  the  situation  of  the 
kingdoms  of  the  world,  and  to  the  state  of  the  church,  from 
the  establishment  of  Christianity  to  the  present  time.  But  it 
appears  from  a  general  view  of  it,  to  be  very  material.  And 
those  persons  who  have  thoroughly  examined  it,  and  some  of 
them  were  men  of  the  coolest  tempers,  greatest  capacities, 
and  least  liable  to  imputations  of  prejudice,  insist  upon  it  as 
determinateiy  conclusive. 

Suppose  now  a  person  quite  ignorant  of  history,  first  to  re¬ 
collect  the  passages  above  mentioned  out  of  Scripture,  without 
knowing  but  that  the  whole  was  a  late  fiction,  then  to  be  in¬ 
formed  of  the  correspondent  facts  now  mentioned,  and  to  unite 
them  all  into  one  view :  that  the  profession  and  establishment 
of  natural  religion  in  the  world,  is  greatly  owing,  in  different 
ways,  to  this  book,  and  the  supposed  revelation  which  it  con¬ 
tains  ;  that  it  is  acknowledged  to  be  of  the  earliest  antiquity : 
that  its  chronology  and  comrnon  history  are  entirely  credible  5 
that  this  ancient  nation,  the  Jews,  of  whom  it  chiefly  treats, 
appear  to  have  been,  in  fact,  the  people  of  God,  in  a  distin¬ 
guished  sense ;  that  as  there  was  a  national  expectation 
amongst  them,  raised  from  the  prophecies,  of  a  Mes.siah  to 
appear  at  such  a  time,  so  one  at  this  time  appeared,  claiming 
to  be  that  Messiah  ;  that  he  was  rejected  by  this  nation,  but 
received  by  the  Gentiles,  not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy, 
but  of  miracles ;  that  the  religion  he  taught  supported  itself 
under  the  greatest  difficulties,  gained  ground,  and  at  length 
became  the  religion  of  the  world ;  that  in  the  mean  time  the 
Jewish  polity  was  utterly  destroyed,  and  the  nation  dispersed 
over  the  face  of  the  earth  ;  that  notwithstanding  this,  they 
have  remained  a  distinct  numerous  people  for  so  many  centu¬ 
ries,  even  to  this  day ;  which  not  only  appears  to  be  the  ex¬ 
press  completion  of  several  prophecies  concerning  them ;  but 
also  renders  it,  as  one  may  speak,  a  visible  and  easy  possi- 


238 


OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PART  II 

bility,  that  the  promises  made  to  them  as  a  nation,  may  yet 
be  fulfilled.  And  to  these  acknowledged  truths,  let  the  per¬ 
son  we  have  been  supposing  add,  as  I  think  he  ought 
whether  every  one  will  allow  it  or  no,  the  obvious  appear¬ 
ances  which  there  are,  of  the  state  of  the  world,  in  other  re¬ 
spects  besides  what  relates  to  the  Jews,  and  of  the  Christian 
church,  having  so  long  answered,  and  still  answering  to  the 
prophetic  history.  Suppose,  I  say,  these  facts  set  over 
against  the  things  before  mentioned  out  of  the  Scripture,  and 
seriously  compared  with  them;  the  joint  view  of  both  to¬ 
gether,  must,  I  think,  appear  of  very  great  weight  to  a  con¬ 
siderate  reasonable  person :  of  much  greater,  indeed,  upon 
having  them  first  laid  before  him,  than  is  easy  for  us,  who 
are  so  familiarized  to  them,  to  conceive,  without  some  particu¬ 
lar  attention  for  that  purpose.  ' 

All  these  things,  and  the  several  particulars  contained  un¬ 
der  them,  require  to  be  distinctly  arid  most  thoroughly  ex¬ 
amined  into  ;  that  the  weight  of  each  may  be  judged  of,  upon 
such  examination,  and  such  conclusion  drawn  as  results  from 
iheir  united  force.  But  this  has  not  been  attempted  here.  1 
have  gone  no  farther  than  to  show,  that  the  general  imperfect 
view  of  them  now  given,  the  confessed  historical  evidence  for 

0  3 

miracles,  and  the  many  obvious  appearing  completions'  of 
prophecy,  together  with  the  collateral  things*  here  men¬ 
tioned,  and  there  are  several  others  of  the  like  sort ;  that  all 
this  together,  which,  being  fact,  must  be  acknowledged  by 
unbelievers,  amounts  to  real  evidence  of  somewhat  more  than 
human  in  this  matter:  evidence  much  more  important,  than 
careless  men,  who  have  been  accustomed  only  to  transient 
and  partial  views  of  it,  can  imagine  ;  and  indeed  abundantly 
sufficient  to  act  upon.  And  these  things,  I  apprehend,  must 
be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers.  For  though  they  may  say, 
that  the  historical  evidence  of  miracles,  wrought  in  attesta¬ 
tion  of  Christianity,  is  not  sufficient  to  convince  them  that 
such  miracles  were  really  wrought ;  they  cannot  deny,  that 
there  is  such  historical  evidence,  it  being  a  known  matter  of 
fact  that  there  is.  They  may  say,  the  conformity  between 
the  prophecies  and  events,  is  by  accident ;  but  there  are  many 
instances  in  which  such  conformity  itself  cannot  be  denied. 
They  may  say,  with  regard  to  such  kind  of  collateral  things 
as  those  above  mentioned,  that  any  odd  accidental  events, 

*  All  the  particular  thing-s  mentioned  in  this  chapter,  not  reducible  to 
the  head  of  certain  miracles,  or  determinate  completions  of  prophecy 


CHAP.  VII.] 


for  CHRISTIANITY. 


•:39 

^without  meaning,  will  have  a  meaning  found  in  them  by  fan¬ 
ciful  people  ;  and  that  such  as  are  fanciful  in  any  one  certain 
way,  will  make  out  a  thousand  coincidents,  which  seem  to 
favor  their  peculiar  follies.  Men,  I  say,  may  talk  thus  ;  but 
no  one  who  is  serious,  can  possibly  think  these  things  to  be 
notliing,  if  he  considerb  the  importance  of  collateral  things, 
and  even  of  lesser  circumstances,  in  the  e\'ideiice  of  proba¬ 
bility,  as  distinguished,  in  nature,  from  the  evidence  of  demon¬ 
stration.  In  many  cases,  indeed,  it  seems  to  require  the 
truest  judgment,  to  determine  v.dth  exactness  the  weight  of 
circumstantial  evidence ;  but  it  is  very  often  altogether  as 
convincing,  as  that  which  is  the  most  express  and  direct. 

This  general  view  of  the  endence  for  Christianity,  con¬ 
sidered  as  making  one  argument,  may  also  serve  to  recom¬ 
mend  to  serious  persons,  to  set  down  every  thing  which  they 
think  may  be  of  any  real  weight  at  all  in  proof  of  it,  and  par¬ 
ticularly  the  many  seeming  completions  of  prophecj" ;  and 
thej^  will  find,  that,  judging  by  the  natural  rules,  by  which 
we  judge  of  probable  evidence  in  common  matters,  they 
amount  to  a  much  higher  degree  of  proof,  upon  such  a  joint 
review,  than  could  be  supposed  upon  considering  them  sepa¬ 
rately,  at  dhrorent  times  ;  how  strong  soever  the  proof  might 
before  appear  to  them,  upon  such  separate  views  of  it.  For 
probable  proofs,  by  being  added,  not  onlj^  increase  tiie  evi¬ 
dence,  but  muliiply  it.  Nor  should  I  dissuade  any  one  from 
setting  down  what  he  thought  made  for  the  contrary  side. 
But  then  it  is  to  be  rememberecl,  not  in  order  to  influence  Iris 
judgment,  but  his  practice,  that  a  mistake  on  one  side,  may 
be,  in  its  consequences,  much  more  dangerous  than  a  mistake 
on  the  other.  And  what  course  is  most  safe,  and  what  most 
dangerous,  is  a  consideration  thought  very  material,  when  we 
deliberate,  not  concerning  events,  but  concerning  conduct  in 
our  temporal  affairs.  To  be  influenced  by  this  consideration 
in  our  judgment,  to  believe  or  disbelieve  upon  it,  is  indeed  as 
much  prejudice,  as  any  thing  whatevaer.  And,  like  other 
prejudices,  it  operates  contrary  wa^^s  in  different  men.  For 
some  are  inclined  to  believe  what  they  hope;  and  others, 
what  they  fear  And  it  is  manifest  niireasonableiiess,  to 
apply  to  men’s  passions  in  order  to  gain  their  assent.  But 
ill  deliberations  concerning  conduct,  there  is  nothing  which 
reason  more  requires  to  be  taken  into  the  account,  than  the 
importance  of  it.  For,  suppose  it  doubtful,  what  would  be 
the  consequence  of  acting  in  this,  or  in  a  contrary  manner  j 
still,  that  taking  one  side  could  be  attended  with  fit  tie  or  no 


240  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE,  &C.  [PART  II 

bad  consequence,  and  taking  the  other  might  be  attended 
with  the  greatest,  must  appear,  to  unprejudiced  reason,  of  the 
highest  moment  towards  determining  how  we  are  to  act.  But 
the  truth  of  our  religion,  like  the  truth  of  common  matters,  is 
to  be  judged  of  hy  all  the  evidence  taken  together.  And  unless 
the  whole  series  of  things  which  may  be  alleged  in  this  argu¬ 
ment,  and  every  particular  thing  in  it,  can  reasonably  be  sup¬ 
posed  to  have  been  by  accident,  (for  here  the  stress  of  the  argu¬ 
ment  for  Christianity  lies,)  then  is  the  truth  of  it  proved  :  in  like 
manner  as  if,  in  any  common  case,  numerous  events  acknow¬ 
ledged,  were  to  be  alleged  in  proof  of  any  other  event  dis¬ 
puted  ;  the  proof  of  the  disputed  event  would  be  proved,  not 
only  if  any  one  of  the  acknowledged  ones  did  of  itself  clearly 
imply  it,  but,  though  no  one  of  them  singly  did  so,  if  the 
whole  of  the  acknowledged  events  taken  together,  could  not 
in  reason  be  supposed  to  have  happened,  unless  the  disputed 
one  were  true. 

It  is  obvious,  how  much  advantage  the  nature  ^of  this  evi¬ 
dence  gives  to  those  persons  who  attack  Christianity,  espe¬ 
cially  in  conversation.  For  it  is  easy  to  show,  in  a  short  and 
lively  manner,  that  such  and  such  things  are  liable  to  objec¬ 
tion,  that  this  and  another  thing  is  of  little  weight  in  itself ; 
but  impossible  to  show,  in  like  manner,  the  united  force  of 
the  whole  argument  in  one  view. 

However,  lastly,  as  it  has  been  made  appear,  that  there  is 
no  presumption  against  a  revelation  as  miraculous  ;  that  the 
general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  the  principal  parts  of  it, 
are  conformable  to  the  experienced  constitution  of  things,  and 
the  whole  perfectly  credible  ;  so  the  account  now  given  of  the 
positive  evidence  for  it,  shows,  that  this  evidence  is  such,  as, 
from  the  nature  of  it,  cannot  be  destroyed,  though  it  should 
be  lessened, 


CilA.r.  Vlil.]  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY,  &C.  241 


CHAPTER  Vm. 

Of  the  Objections  which  m  ay  be  made  against  arguing  from 
the  Jlncdogy  of  JVature  to  Religion. 

If  every  one  would  consider,  with  such  attention  as  they 
are  bound,  even  in  point  of  morality,  to  consider,  what  they 
judge  and  give  characters  of,  the  occasion  of  this  chapter 
would  be,  in  some  good  measure  at  least,  superseded.  But 
since  this  is  not  to  expected  ,•  for  some  we  find  do  not  concern 
themselves  to  understand  even  what  they  write  against  : 
since  this  treatise,  in  common  with  most  others,  lies  open  to 
objections,  which  may  appear  very  material  to  thoughtful  men 
at  first  sight  j  and,  besides  that,  seems  peculiarly  liable  to  the 
objections  of  such  as  can  judge  without  thinking,  and  of  such 
as  can  censure  without  judging  ;  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  set 
down  the  chief  of  these  objections  which  occur  to  me,  and  con¬ 
sider  them  to  their  hands.  And  they  are  such  as  these  : — 

“  That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difficulties  in  revelation,  b}’ 
saying,  that  there  are  the  same  in  natural  religion;  when  what 
is  wanting  is  to  clear  both  of  them,  of  these  their  common,  as 
well  as  other  their  respective,  difficulties :  but  that  it  is  a 
strange  way  indeed  of  convincing  men  of  the  obligations  of  re¬ 
ligion,  to  show  them  that  they  have  as  little  reason  for  then 
worldly  pursuits ;  and  a  strange  way  of  vindicating  the  justice 
and  goodness  of  the  Author  of  nature,  and  of  removing  the  ob¬ 
jections  against  both,  to  which  the  system  of  religion  lies  open, 
to  show,  that  the  like  objections  lie  against  natural  providence; 
a  way  of  answering  objections  against  religion,  without  so 
much  as  pretending  to  make  out,  that  the  system  of  it,  or  the 
particular  things  in  it  objected  against,  are  reasonable — espe¬ 
cially,  perhaps,  some  may  be  inattentive  enough  to  add,  must 
this  be  thought  strange,  when  it  is  confessed  that  analogy  is 
no  answer  to  such  objections :  that  when  this  sort  of  reason’ 


242 


OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY  [PART  II. 

ing  is  carried  to  the  utmost  length  it  can  be  imagined  capable 
of,  it  will  yet  leave  the  mind  in  a  very  unsatislied  state;  and 
that  it  must  be  unaccountable  ignorance  of  mankind,  to  ima¬ 
gine  they  will  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their  present  inter¬ 
ests  and  pleasures,  from  regard  to  religion,  upon  doubtful  evi¬ 
dence/’ 

Now,  as  plausible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  appear,  that 
appearance  will  be  found  in  a  great  measure  owing  to  half¬ 
views,  which  show  but  part  of  an  object,  yet  show  that  indis¬ 
tinctly  ;  and  to  undeterminate  language.  By  these  means 
weak  men  are  often  deceived  by  others,  and  ludicrous  men  by 
themselves.  And  even  those  who  are  serious  and  considerate 
cannot  always  readily  disentangle,  and  at  once  clearly  see 
through  the  perplexities  in  which  subjects  themselves  are  in¬ 
volved  ;  and  which  are  heightened  by  the  deficiencies  and  the 
abuse  of  words.  To  this  latter  sort  of  persons,  the  following 
reply  to  each  part  of  this  objection  severally,  may  be  of  som  e 
assistance  ;  as  it  may  also  tend  a  little  to  stop  and  silence 
others. 

Firsts  The  thing  wanted,  i.  e.  what  men  require,  is  to  have 
all  difficulties  cleared.  And  this  is,  or,  at  least  for  any  thing  we 
know  to  the  contrary,  it  may  be,  the  same,  as  requiring  to  com¬ 
prehend  the  divine  nature,  and  the  whole  plan  of  Providence 
from  everlasting.  But  it  hath  always  been  allowed  to  argue, 
from  what  is  acknowledged  to  wdiat  is  disputed.  And  it  is  in 
no  other  sense  a  poor  thing,  to  argue  from  natural  religion  to  re¬ 
vealed,  in  the  manner  found  fault  with,  than  it  is  to  argue  in 
numberless  other  ways  of  probable  deduction  and  inference, 
in  matters  of  conduct,  which  we  are  continually  reduced  to  the 
necessity  of  doing.  Indeed  the  epithet  poor  may  be  applied, 
I  fear,  as  properly  to  great  part,  or  the  whole,  of  human  life,  as 
it  is  to  the  things  mentioned  in  the  objection.  Is  it  not  a  poor 
thing,  for  a  physician  to  have  so  little  knowledge  in  the  cure  of 
diseases,  as  even  the  most  eminent  have  ?  To  act  upon  con¬ 
jecture  and  guess,  where  the  life  of  man  is  conccxned  ?  Un¬ 
doubtedly  it  is :  but  not  in  comparison  of  having  no  skill  at 
all  in  that  useful  art,  and  being  obliged  to  act  wholly  in  the 
dark. 

Further :  Since  it  is  as  unreasonable  as  it  is  common,  to 
urge  objections  against  revelation,  which  are  of  equal  weight 
against  ratural  religion  ;  and  those  who  do  this,  if  they  are  not 
confuted  themselves,  deal  unfairly  with  others,  in  making  it 
seem  that  they  are  arguing  only  against  revelation,  or  particu¬ 
lar  doctrines  of  it,  vvhen  in  reality  they  are  arguing  against 


CHAP.  VIII.] 


OF  NATURE  TO  RELIGION. 


243 


moral  providence ;  it  is  a  thing  of  consequence  to  show,  that 
such  objections  are  as  much  levelled  against  natural  religion, 
as  against  revealed.  And  objections,  which  are  equally  ap 
plicable  tc  both,  are,  properly  speaking,  answered,  by  its 
being  shown  that  they  are  so,  provided  the  former  be  admitted 
to  be  true.  And  without  taking  in  the  consideration  how 
distinctly  this  is  admitted,  it  is  plainly  very  material  to  ob¬ 
serve,  that  as  the  things  objected  against  in  natural  religion, 
are  of  the  same  kind  with  what  is  certain  matter  of  experi¬ 
ence  in  the  course  of  providence,  and  in  the  information  which 
God  alFords  us  concerning  our  temporal  interest  under  his  go¬ 
vernment  ;  so  the  objections  against  the  system  of  Christi¬ 
anity  and  the  evidence  of  it,  are  of  the  very  same  kind  with 
those  which  are  made  against  the  system  and  evidence  of 
natural  religion.  However,  the  reader  upon  review  may  see, 
that  most  of  the  analogies  insisted  upon,  even  in  the  latter 
part  of  this  treatise,  do  not  necessarily  require  to  have  more 
taken  for  granted  than  is  in  the  former ;  that  there  is  an  Au¬ 
thor  of  nature,  or  natural  Governor  of  the  world ;  and  Chris¬ 
tianity  is  vindicated,  not  from  its  analogy  to  natural  religion, 
but  chiefl}'',  from  its  analogy  to  the  experienced  constitution 
of  nature. 

Secondly^  Religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  consists  in  such 
a  determinate  course  of  life ;  as  being  what,  there  is  reason 
to  think,  is  commanded  by  the  Author  of  nature,  and  will, 
upon  the  whole,  be  our  happiness  under  his  government. 
Now  if  men  can  be  convinced  that  they  have  the  like  reason 
to  believe  this,  as  to  believe  that  taking  care  of  their  temporal 
affairs  will  be  to  their  advantage ,  such  conviction  cannot 
but  be  an  argument  to  them  for  the  practice  of  religion.  And 
if  there  be  really  any  reason  for  believing  one  of  these,  and 
endeavouring  to  preserve  life,  and  secure  ourselves  the  neces¬ 
saries  and  conveniences  of  it ;  then  there  is  reason  also  for 
believing  the  other,  and  endeavouring  to  secure  the  interest  it 
proposes  to  us.  And  if  the  interest  which  religion  proposes 
to  us  be  infinitely  greater  than  our  whole  teUiporal  interest, 
tl^en  there  must  be  proportionably  greater  reason  for  endea¬ 
vouring  to  secure  one,  than  the  other :  since  by  the  supposi¬ 
tion,  the  probability  of  our  securing  one,  is  equal  to  the  pro¬ 
bability  of  our  securing  the  other.  This  seems  plainly  unan¬ 
swerable  •  and  has  a  tendency  to  influence  fair  minds,  who 
consider  what  our  condition  really  is,  or  upon  what  evidence 
we  are  naturally  appointed  to  act ;  and  who  are  disposed  to 
acquiesce  in  the  terms  upon  which  we  live,  and  attend  to  and 


244  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY  [PAET  II 

follow  that  practical  instruction,  whatever  it  be,  which  is 
tiflbrded  us. 

But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument  referred  to 
in  the  objection,  lies  in  another  place.  For  it  is  said,  that  the 
proof  of  religion  is  involved  in  such  inextricable  difficulties,  as 
to  render  it  doubtful ;  and  that  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that  if 
it  were  true,  it  would  be  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.  Here, 
then,  over  and  above  the  force  of  each  particular  difficulty  or 
objection,  these  difficulties  and  objections,  taken  together,  an 
turned  into  a  positive  argument  against  the  truth  of  religion , 
which  argument  would  stand  thus.  If  religion  were  true,  if 
would  not  be  left  doubtful,  and  open  to  objections  to  the  de¬ 
gree  in  which  it  is ;  therefore,  that  it  is  thus  left,  not  only  ren¬ 
ders  the  evidence  of  it  weak,  and  lessens  its  force,  in  propor¬ 
tion  to  the  weight  of  such  objections  ;  but  also  shows  it  to  be 
false,  or  is  a  general  presumption  of  its  being  so.  Now  the 
observation,  that  from  the  natural  constitution  and  course  of 
things,  we  must  in  our  temporal  concerns,  almost  continually, 
and  in  matters  of  great  consequence,  act  upon  evidence  of  a 
like  kind  and  degree  to  the  evidence  of  religion,  is  an  answer 
to  this  argument ;  because  it  shows,  that  it  is  according  to 
the  conduct  and  character  of  the  Author  of  nature  to  appoint 
we  should  act  upon  evidence  like  to  that,  which  this  argu¬ 
ment  presumes  he  cannot  be  supposed  to  appoint  we  should 
act  upon :  it  is  an  instance,  a  general  one  made  up  of  nu¬ 
merous  particular  ones,  of  somewhat  in  his  dealing  with  us, 
similar  to  what  is  said  to  be  incredible.  And  as  the  force  of 
this  answer  lies  merely  in  the  parallel  which  th(!re  is  between 
the  evidence  for  religion  and  for  our  temporal  conduct ;  the 
answer  is  equally  just  and  conclusive,  whether  the  parallel  be 
made  out,  by  showing  the  evidence  of  the  former  to  be  higher, 
or  the  evidence  of  the  latter  to  be  lower. 

Thirdly,  The  design  of  this  treatise  is  not  to  vindicate  the 
character  of  God,  but  to  show  the  obligations  of  men;  it  is 
not  to  justify  his  providence,  but  to  show  what  belongs  to  us 
to  do.  These  are  two  subjects,  and  ought  not  to  be  con¬ 
founded.  And  though  they  may  at  length  run  up  into  each 
other,  yet  observations  may  immediately  tend  to  make  out 
the  latter,  which  do  not  appear,  by  any  immediate  connexion, 
to  the  purpose  of  the  former :  which  is  less  our  concern  than 
many  seem  to  think.  For,  1st,  It  is  not  necessary  we  should 
justify  the  dispensations  of  Providence  against  objections,  any 
farther  than  to  show,  that  the  things  objected  against  may 
fbr  aught  we  know,  be  consistent  with  justice  and  goddness 


CHAP.  VIII.] 


OF  NATURE  TO  RELIGION. 


2i5 


Suppose,  then,  that  there  are  things  in  the  system  of  this 
world,  and  plan  of  Providence  relating  to  it,  which  taken  alone 
would  be  unjust ,  yet  it  has  been  shown  unanswerably,  that 
if  we  could  take  in  the  reference  which  these  things  may 
have  to  other  things  present,  past,  and  to  come ;  to  the  whole 
sr.hem.e,  which  the  things  objected  against  are  parts  of ;  these 
very  things  might,  for  aught  we  know,  be  found  to  be,  not 
only  consistent  with  justice,  but  instances  of  it.  Indeed  it  has 
been  shown,  by  the  analogy  of  what  we  see,  not  only  possi¬ 
ble  that  this  may  be  the  case,  but  credible  that  it  is.  And 
thus  objections,  drawn  from  such  things,  are  answered,  and 
Providence  is  vindicated,  as  far  as  religion  makes  its  vindica¬ 
tion  necessary.  Hence  it  appears,  2dly^  That  objections 
against  the  divine  justness  and  goodness  are  not  endeavoured 
to  be  removed,  by  showing  that  the  like  objections,  allowed 
to  be  really  conclusive,  lie  against  natural  providence :  but 
those  objections  being  supposed  and  shown  not  to  be  conclu¬ 
sive,  the  things  objected  against,  considered  as  matters  of 
fact,  are  farther  shown  to  be  credible,  from  their  conformity  to 
the  constitution  of  nature  ;  for  instance,  that  God  will  reward 
and  punish  men  for  their  actions  hereafter,  from  the  observa¬ 
tion  that  he  does  reward  and  punish  them  for  their  actions 
here.  And  this,  I  apprehend,  is  of  weight.  And  I  add,  3d/y, 
It  would  be  of  weight,  even  though  those  objections  were  not 
answered.  For,  there  being  the  proof  of  religion  above  set 
down,  and  religion  impl3hng  several  facts  ;  for  instance,  again, 
the  fact  last  mentioned,  that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men 
for  their  actions  hereafter ;  the  observation  that  his  present 
method  of  government  is  by  rewards  and  punishments,  shows 
that  future  fact  not  to  be  incredible  ;  whatever  objections  men 
may  think  they  have  against  it,  as  unjust  or  unmerciful,  ac¬ 
cording  to  their  notions  of  justice  and  mercy ;  or  as  improba¬ 
ble  from  their  belief  of  necessity.  I  say,  as  improbable  ;  for 
it  is  evident  no  objection  against  it,  as  unjust^  can  be  urged 
fj'om  necessity  ;  since  this  notion  as  much  destroys  injustice, 
as  it  does  justice.  Then,  Though  objections  against 

the  reasonableness  of  the  system  of  religion,  cannot  indeed  be 
answered  without  entering  into  a  consideration  of  its  reasona¬ 
bleness,  yet  objections  against  the  credibility  or  truth  of  it 
may.  Because  the  system  of  it  is  reducible  into  what  is  pro¬ 
perly  matter  of  fact;  and  the  truth,  the  probable  truth,  of  facts, 
may  be  shown  without  consideration  of  their  reasonableness. 
iXor  is  it  necessary,  though,  in  some  cases  and  respects,  it  is 
highly  useful  and  pirop'er,  yet  it  is  not  necess’ary,  to  give  a  proof 


246 


OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY  [PART  IL 

of  the  reasonableness  of  every  precept  enjoined  us,  and  of 
every  particular  dispensation  of  Providence,  which  comes  into 
the  system  of  religion.  Indeed  the  more  thoroughly  a  person 
of  a  right  disposition  is  convinced  of  the  perfection  of  the  divine 
nature  and  conduct,  the  farther  he  will  advance  towards  that 
perfection  of  religion,  which  St  John  speaks  of."^  But  the 
general  obligations  of  religion  are  fully  made  out,  by  proving 
the  reasonableness  of  the  practice  of  it.  And  that  the  prac¬ 
tice  of  religion  is  reasonable,  may  be  shown,  though  no  more 
could  be  proved,  than  that  the  system  of  it  may  be  so,  for 
aught  we  know  to  the  contrary  ;  and  even  without  entering 
into  the  distinct  consideration  of  this.  And  from  hence,  dthly^ 
It  is  easy  to  see,  that  though  the  analogy  of  nature  is  not  an 
immediate  answer  to  objections  against  the  wisdom,  the  jus¬ 
tice,  or  goodness,  of  any  doctrine  or  precept  of  religion ;  yet 
it  may  be,  as  it  is,  an  immediate  and  direct  answer  to  what  is 
really  intended  by  such  objections  ;  which  is,  to  show  that 
the  things  objected  against  are  incredible. 

Fourthly,  It  is  most  readily  acknowledged,  that  the  fore¬ 
going  Treatise  is  by  no  means  satisfactory  ;  very  far  indeed 
from  it :  but  so  would  any  natural  institution  of  life  appear,  if 
reduced  into  a  system,  together  with  its  evidence.  Leav 
ing  religion  out  of  the  case,  men  are  divided  in  their  opinions, 
whether  our  pleasures  over-balance  our  pains ;  and  whether 
it  be,  or  be  not,  eligible  to  live  in  this  world.  And  were  all 
such  controversies  settled,  which,  perhaps,  in  speculation 
would  be  found  involved  in  great  difficulties  ;  and  w^ere  it  de¬ 
termined,  upon  the  evidence  of  reason,  as  nature  has  deter¬ 
mined  it  to  our  hands,  that  life  is  to  be  preserved  ;  yet  still, 
the  rules  which  God  has  been  pleased  to  afford  us,  for  escap¬ 
ing  the  miseries  of  it,  and  obtaining  its  satisfactions,  the  rules, 
for  instance,  of  preserving  health  and  recovering  it  when  lost, 
are  not  only  fallible,  and  precarious,  but  very  far  from  being 
exact.  Nor  are  we  informed  by  nature,  in  future  contin¬ 
gencies  and  accidents,  so  as  to  render  it  at  all  certain,  what  is 
the  best  method  of  managing  our  affairs.  What  will  be  the 
success  of  our  temporal  pursuits,  in  the  common  sense  of  the 
word  success,  is  highly  doubtful.  And  what  will  be  the  suc¬ 
cess  of  them,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word  ;  t.  e.  what  hap¬ 
piness  or  enjoyment  we  shall  obtain  by  them,  is  doubtful  in  a 
much  higher  degree.  Indeed,  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of 
the  evidence,  with  which  we  are  obliged  to  take  up,  in  the 


♦  1  John  iv,  18. 


CHAP.  VIII.] 


OF  NATURE  TO  RELIGION. 


247 


daily  course  of  life,  is  scarce  to  be  expressed.  Yet  men  do 
not  throw  away  life,  or  disregard  the  interests  of  it,  upon  ac* 
count  of  this  doubtfulness.  The  evidence  of  religion  then 
being  admitted  real,  those  who  object  against  it,  as  not  satis¬ 
factory,  i.  e.  as  not  being  what  they  wish  it,  plainly  forget 
the  very  condition  of  our  being  ;  for  satisfaction,  in  this  sense, 
does  not  belong  to  such  a  creature  as  man.  j^nd,  which  is 
more  material,  they  forget  also  the  very  nature  of  religion. 
For,  religion  presupposes,  in  all  those  who  will  embrace  it,  a 
certain  degree  of  integrity  and  honesty ;  which  it  was  in¬ 
tended  to  try  whether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  exercise  in 
such  as  have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement.  Religion  pre¬ 
supposes  this  as  much,  and  in  the  same  sense,  as  speaking  to 
a  man  presupposes  he  understands  the  language  in  which 
you  speak ;  or  as  warning  a  man  of  any  danger,  presupposes 
that  he  has  such  a  regard  to  himself,  as  that  he  will  endeavour 
to  avoid  it.  And  therefore  the  question  is  not  at  all.  Whether 
the  evidence  of  religion  be  satisfactory  ?  but,  Whether  it  be, 
in  reason,  sufficient  to  prove  and  discipline  that  virtue  which 
it  presupposes  ?  Now,  the  evidence  of  it  is  fully  sufficient  for 
all  those  purposes  of  probation ;  how  far  soever  it  is  from 
being  satisfactory,  as  to  the  purposes  of  curiosity,  or  any 
other :  and  indeed  it  answers  the  purposes  of  the  former  in 
several  respects,  which  it  would  not  do,  if  it  were  as  over¬ 
bearing  as  is  required.  One  might  add  farther,  that  whether 
the  motives,  or  the  evidence  for  any  course  of  actions,  be  satis¬ 
factory,  meaning  here  by  that  word,  what  satisfies  a  man, 
that  such  a  course  of  action  will  in  event  be  for  his  good  ; 
this  need  never  be,  and  I  think,  strictly  speaking,  never  is, 
the  ])ractical  question  in  common  matters.  But  the  practical 
question  in  all  cases,  is.  Whether  the  evidence  for  a  course  of 
action  be  such,  as,  taking  in  all  circumstances,  makes  the 
faculty  Vithin  us,  which  is  the  guide  and  judge  of  conduct,* 
determine  that  course  of  action  to  be  prudent  ?  Indeed,  satis¬ 
faction  that  it  will  be  for  our  interest  or  happiness,  abundantly 
determines  an  action  to  be  prudent ;  but  evidence,  almost  in¬ 
finitely  lower  than  this,  determines  actions  to  be  so  too,  even 
in  the  conduct  of  every  day. 

Fifthly^  As  to  the  objection  concerning  the  influence  which 
this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may,  or  may  not,  be  expected 
to  have  upon  men,  I  observe,  as  above,  that  religion  being  in¬ 
tended  for  a  trial  and  exercise  of  the  moiality  of  every  persorfls 


♦  See  Dissertation  2. 


248  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY  [paRT  II. 

character,  who  is  a  subject  of  it ;  and  there  being,  as  I  have 
shown,  such  evidence  for  it,  as  is  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influ¬ 
ence  men  to  embrace  it ;  to  object,  that  it  is  not  to  be  ima¬ 
gined  mankind  will  be  influenced  by  such  evidence,  is  nothing 
to  the  purpose  of  the  foregoing  Treatise.  For  the  purpose  of 
it  is  not  to  inquire.  What  sort  of  creatures  mankind  are ;  but, 
Wliat  the  light  and  knowledge,  which  is  afforded  them,  re¬ 
quires  they  should  be  ?  to  show  how,  in  reason,  they  ought 
to  behave ;  not  how,  in  fact,  they  will  behave.  This  de 
pends  upon  themselves,  and  is  their  own  concern ;  the  per 
sonal  concern  of  each  man  in  particular.  And  how  little  re¬ 
gard  the  generality  have  to  it,  experience,  indeed,  does  too 
fully  show.  But  religion,  considered  as  a  probation,  has  had 
its  end  upon  all  persons,  to  whom  it  has  been  proposed,  with 
evidence  sufficient  in  reason  to'  influence  their  practice ;  for 
by  this  means  they  have  been  put  into  a  state  of  probation  j 
let  them  behave  as  they  will  in  it.  And  thus,  not  only  reve¬ 
lation,  but  reason  also,  teaches  us,  that  by  the  evidence  of  re¬ 
ligion  being  laid  before  men,  the  designs  of  Providence  are 
carf3ring  on,  not  only  with  regard  to  those  who  will,  but  like¬ 
wise  with  regard  to  those  who  will  not,  be  influenced  by  it. 
However,  lastly,  the  objection  here  referred  to,  allows  the 
things  insisted  upon  in  this  Treatise  to  be  of  some  weight ; 
and  if  so,  it  may  be  hoped  it  will  have  some  influence.  And 
if  there  be  a  probability  that  it  will  have  any  at  all,  there  is 
the  same  reason  in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to  lay  it  before 
men,  as  there  would  be,  if  it  were  likely  to  have  a  greate-i  in¬ 
fluence. 

And  farther,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered,  with  respect  to  the 
whole  of  the  foregoing  objections,  that  in  this  Treatise  I  have 
argued  upon  the  principles  of  others,*  not  my  own ;  and  have 
omitted  what  I  think  true,  and  of  the  most  importance,  because 
by  others  thought  unintelligible,  or  not  true.  Thus  I  have 
argued  upon  the  principles  of  the  Fatalists,  which  I  do  not 
believe ;  and  have  omitted  a  thing  of  the  utmost  importance, 
which  I  do  believe,  the  moral  fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions, 

1  prior  to  all  will  whatever ;  which  I  apprehend  as  certainly  to 
I  determine  the  divine  conduct,  as  speculative  truth  and  false- 
j  hood  necessarily  determine  the  divine  judgment.  Indeed 

♦By  arguing  upon  the  principles  of  others,  the  reader  will  observe  is 
meant,  not  provins^  any  thing /rom  those  principles,  but  notwithstanding 
them.  Thus  religion  is  proved,  not  from  the  opinion  of  necessity,  which 
is  absurd,  but  mtwUkstunding  or  even  thxmgh  that  opinion  were  admitted 
to  be  true. 


CHAP.  VIII.] 


OP  NATURE  TO  RELIGION. 


249 


the  principle  of  liberty,  and  that  of  moral  fitness,  so  force 
themselves  upon  the  mind,  that  moralists,  the  ancients  as  well 
as  moderns,  have  formed  their  language  upon  it.  And  probably 
it  may  appear  in  mine,  though  I  have  endeavoured  to  avoid  it : 
and  in  order  to  avoid  it,  have  sometimes  been  obliged  to  ex¬ 
press  myself  in  a  manner  which  will  appear  strange  to  such 
as  do  not  observe  the  reason  for  it ;  but  the  general  argument 
here  pursued  does  not  at  all  suppose,  or  proceed  upon,  these 
principles.  Now,  these  two  abstract  principles  of  liberty  and 
moral  fitness  being  omitted,  religion  can  be  considered  in  no 
other  view  than  merely  as  a  question  of  fact ;  and  in  this  view 
it  is  here  considered.  It  is  obvious,  that  Christianity,  and  the 
proof  of  it,  are  both  historical.  And  even  natural  religion  is, 
properly,  a  matter  of  fact.  For,  that  there  is  a  righteous 
Governor  of  the  world,  is  so ;  arid  this  proposition  contains 
the  general  system  of  natural  religion.  But  then,  several  ab¬ 
stract  truths,  and  in  particular  those  two  principles,  are 
usually  taken  into  consideration  in  the  proof  of  it ;  whereas  it 
is  here  treated  of  only  as  a  matter  of  fact.  To  explain  this  : 
that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  ones, 
is  an  abstract  truth ;  but  that  they  appear  so  to  our  mind,  is 
only  a  matter  of  fact.  And  this  last  must  have  been  ad 
mitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  those  ancient  sceptics,  who  would 
not  have  admitted  the  former ;  but  pretend  to  doubt.  Whether 
there  were  any  such  thing  as  truth  ;  or,  Whether  we  could 
certainly  depend  upon  our  faculties  of  understanding  for  the 
knowledge  of  it  in  any  case.  So  likewise,  that  there  is,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  an  original  standard  of  right  and  wrong 
in  actions,  independent  upon  all  will,  but  which  unalterably 
determines  the  will  of  God,  to  exercise  that  moral  government 
over  the  world  which  religion  teaches,  i.  e.  finally  and  upon 
the  whole  to  reward  and  punish  men  respectively  as  they  act 
right  or  wrong ;  this  assertion  contains  an  abstract  truth,  as 
well  as  matter  of  fact.  But  suppose  in  the  present  state, 
every  man,  without  exception,  was  rewarded  and  punished, 
in  exact  proportion  as  he  followed  or  transgressed  that  sense 
of  right  and  wrong,  which  God  has  implanted  in  the  nature 
of  every  man  ;  this  would  not  be  at  all  an  abstract  truth,  but 
only  a  matter  of  fact.  And  though  this  fact  were  acknow¬ 
ledged  by  every  one,  yet  the  very  same  difficulties  might  be 
raised,  as  are  now,  ooncerning  the  abstract  questions  of  liberty 
and  moral  fitness  :  and  we  should  have  a  proof,  even  the  cer¬ 
tain  one  of  experience,  that  the  government  of  the  world  was 
oerfeotly  moral,  without  taking  in  the  consideration  of  those 


250  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY  [PAKT  II. 

questions :  and  this  proof  would  remain,  in  what  waj  soever 
they  were  determined.  And  thus,  God  having  given  man¬ 
kind  a  moral  faculty,  the  object  of  which  is  actions,  and 
which  naturally  approves  some  actions  as  right  and  of  good 
desert,  and  condemns  others  as  wrong  and  of  ill  desert :  that 
he  will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  reward  the  former  and 
punish  the  latter,  is  not  an  assertion  of  an  abstract  truth,  but 
ot  what  is  as  mere  a  fact  as  his  doing  so  at  present  would  be. 
This  future  fact  I  have  not  indeed  proved  with  the  force  with 
which  it  might  be  proved,  from,  the  principles  of  liberty  and 
moral  fitness  ‘  but  without  them  have  given  a  really  conclu¬ 
sive  practical  proof  of  it,  wdiich  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the 
general  analogy  of  nature ;  a  proof  easily  cavilled  at,  easily 
shown  not  to  be  demonstrative,  for  it  is  not  offered  as  such , 
but  impossible,  I  think,  to  be  evaded  or  answered.  And  thus 
the  obligations  of  religion  are  made  out,  exclusively  of  the 
questions  concerning  liberty  and  moral  fitness  ;  w^hich  have 
been  perplexed  with  difficulties  and  abstruse  reasonings,  as 
every  thing  may. 

Hence,  therefore,  may  be  observed  distinctly,  what  is  the 
force  of  this  Treatise.  It  will  be,  to  such  as  are  convinced 
of  religion,  upon  the  proof  arising  out  of  the  two  last  men¬ 
tioned  principles,  an  additional  proof  and  a  confirmation  of  it , 
to  such  as  do  not  admit  those  principles,  an  original  proof  o( 
it,  and  a  confirmation  of  that  proof.  Those  who  believe, 
will  here  find  the  scheme  of  Christianity  cleared  of  objections 
and  the  evidence  of  it  in  a  peculiar  manner  strengthened . 
those  who  do  not  believe,  will  at  least  be  shown  the  absurdity 
of  all  attempts  to  prove  Christianity  false,  the  plain  undoubted 
credibility  of  it,  and,  I  hope,  a  good  deal  more. 

And  thus,  though  some  perhaps  may  seriously  think,  that 
analogy,  as  here  urged,  has  too  great  stress  laid  upon  it ;  and 
lidicule,  unanswerable  ridicule,  may  be  applied,  to  show  the 
argument  from  it  in  a  disadvantageous  light :  yet  there  can 
be  no  question,  but  that  it  is  a  real  one.  For  religion,  both 
natural  and  revealed,  implying  in  it  numerous  facts  ;  analogy 
being  a  confirmation  of  all  facts  to  wdiich  it  can  be  applied, 
as  it  is  the  only  proof  of  most,  cannot  but  be  admitted  by 
every  one  to  be  a  material  thing,  and  truly  of  weight  on  the 
side  of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed ;  and  it  ought  to 
be  particularly  regarded  by  such  as  profess  to  follow  nature, 
and  to  be  less  satisfied  with  abstract  reasonings. 


PART  II.  1 


CONCLUSION. 


2oJ 


CONCLUSION. 


Whatever  account  may  be  given,  of  the  strange  inatten¬ 
tion  and  disregard,  in  some  ages  and  countries,  to  a  matter  of 
such  importance  as  religion,  it  would,  before  experience,  be 
liicredible,  that  there  should  be  the  like  disregard  in  those, 
who  have  had  the  moral  system  of  the  world  laid  before  them, 
as  it  is  by  Christianity,  and  often  inculcated  upon  them ;  be¬ 
cause  this  moral  system  carries  in  it  a  good  degree  of  evi¬ 
dence  for  its  truth,  upon  its  being  barely  proposed  to  our 
thoughts.  There  is  no  need  of  abstruse  reasonings  and  dis¬ 
tinctions,  to  convince  an  unprejudiced  understanding,  that 
there  is  a  God  who  made  and  governs  the  world,  and  who 
will  judge  it  in  righteousness ;  though  they  may  be  necessary 
to  answer  abstruse  difficulties,  when  once  such  are  raised  ; 
w  hen  the  very  meaning  of  those  words,  which  express  most 
intelligibly  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  is  pretended  to  be 
uncertain,  and  the  clear  truth  of  the  thing  itself  is  obscured 
by  the  intricacies  of  speculation.  But,  to  an  unprejudiced 
mind,  ten  thousand  thousand  instances  of  design,  cannot  but 
prove  a  Designer.  And  it  is  intuitively  manifest,  that  crea¬ 
tures  ought  to  live  under  a  dutiful  sense  of  their  Maker  ;  and 
that  justice  and  charity  must  be  his  laws,  to  creatures  whom 
he  has  made  social,  and  placed  in  society.  Indeed,  the  truth 
of  revealed  religion,  peculiarly  so  called,  is  not  self-evident, 
but  requires  external  proof,  in  order  to  its  being  received. 
Yet  inattention,  among  us,  to  revealed  religion,  will  be  found 
to  imply  the  same  dissolute  immoral  temper  of  mind,  as  inat¬ 
tention  to  natural  religion ;  because,  when  both  are  laid  be¬ 
fore  us,  in  the  manner  they  are  in  Christian  countries  of 
liberty,  our  obligations  to  inquire  into  both,  and  to  embrace 
both  upon  supposition  of  their  truth,  are  obligations  of  the 
same  nature.  For,  revelation  claims  to  be  the  voice  of  God  ; 
and  our  obligation  to  attend  to  his  voice,  is,  surely,  moral  in 
all  cases.  And  as  it  is  insisted,  that  its  evidence  is  conclu¬ 
sive,  upon  thorough  consideration  of  it ;  so  it  offers  itself  to  us 


252 


CONCLUSION. 


[part  II. 

with  manifest  obvious  appearances  of  naving  something  more 
than  human  in  it,  and  therefore  in  all  reason  requires  to  have 
its  claims  most  seriously  examined  into.  It  is  to  be  added, 
that  though  light  and  knowledge,  in  what  manner  soever 
afforded  us,  is  equally  from  God  ;  yet  a  miraculous  revelation 
has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the  first  principles  of  our  nature, 
to  awaken  mankind,  and  inspire  them  with  reverence  and 
awe :  and  this  is  a  peculiar  obligation,  to  attend  to  what 
claims  to  be  so  with  such  appearances  of  truth.  It  is  therefore 
most  certain,  that  our  obligations  to  inquire  seriously  into  the 
evidence  of  Christianity,  and,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  to 
embrace  it,  are  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  moral  in  the 
highest  and  most  proper  sense.  Let  us  then  suppose,  that 
the  evidence  of  religion  in  general,  and  of  Christianity,  has 
been  seriously  inquired  into  by  all  reasonable  men  among  us. 
Yet  we  find  many  professedly  to  reject  both,  upon  specula¬ 
tive  principles  of  infidelity.  And  all  of  them  do  not  content 
themselves  with  a  bare  neglect  of  religion,  and  enjoying 
their  imaginary  freedom  from  its  restraints.  Some  go  much 
beyond  this.  They  deride  God’s  moral  government  over  the 
world :  they  renounce  his  protection,  and  defy  his  justice : 
they  ridicule  and  vilify  Christianity,  and  blaspheme  'the  Au¬ 
thor  of  it ;  and  take  all  occasions  to  manifest  a  scorn  and  con¬ 
tempt  of  revelation.  This  amounts  to  an  active  setting  them¬ 
selves  against  religion  ;  to  what  may  be  considered  as  a  posi¬ 
tive  principle  of  irreligion  ;  which  they  cultivate  within  them¬ 
selves,  and,  whether  they  intend  this  effect  or  not,  render 
habitual,  as  a  good  man  does  the  contrary  principle.  And 
others,  who  are  not  chargeable  with  all  this  profligateness, 
yet  are  in  avowed  opposition  to  religion,  as  if  discovered  to  be 
groundless.  Now  admitting,  which  is  the  supposition  we  go 
upon,  that  these  persons  act  upon  what  they  think  principles 
of  reason,  and  otherwise  they  are  not  to  be  argued  with ;  it 
is  really  inconceivable,  that  they  should  imagine  they  clearly 
see  the  whole  evidence  of  it,  considered  in  itself,  to  be  nothing 
at  all ;  nor  do  they  pretend  this.  They  are  far  indeed  from 
having  a  just  notion  of  its  evidence  ;  but  they  would  not  say 
its  evidence  was  nothing,  if  they  thought  the  system  of  it, 
with  all  its  circumstances,  were  credible,  like  other  matters  of 
science  or  history.  So  that  their  manner  of  treating  it  must 
proceed,  either  from  such  kind  of  objections  against  all  reli¬ 
gion,  as  have  been  answered  or  obviated  in  the  former  part  of 
this  Treatise ;  or  else  from  objections  and  difficulties,  supposed 
more  peculiar  to  Christianity,  Thus,  they  entertain  preju- 


PART  II.J 


CONCLUSION. 


253 


dices  against  the  whole  notion  of  a  revelation  and  miraculous 
interpositions.  They  find  things  in  Scripture,  whether  in  in¬ 
cidental  passages  or  in  the  general  scheme  of  it,  which  ap 
pear  to  them  unreasonable.  They  take  for  granted,  that  ij 
Christianity  were  true,  the  light  of  it  must  have  been  more 
general,  and  the  evidence  of  it  more  satisfactory,  or  rather 
overbearing  ;  that  it  must  and  would  have  been,  in  some  way, 
otherwise  put  and  left,  than  it  is.  Now,  this  is  not  imagining 
they  see  the  evidence  itself  to  be  nothing,  or  inconsiderable ; 
but  quite  another  thing.  It  is  being  fortified  against  the  evi¬ 
dence,  in  some  degree  acknowledged,  by  Tanking  they  see 
the  system  of  Christianity,  or  somewhat  which  appears  to 
them  necessarily  connected  with  it,  to  be  incredible  or  false  ; 
fortified  against  that  evidence,  which  might,  otherwise,  make 
great  impression  upon  them.  Or,  lastly,  if  any  of  these  per¬ 
sons  are,  upon  the  whole,  in  doubt  concerning  the  truth  of 
Christianity,  their  behaviour  seems  owing  to  their  taking  for 
granted,  through  strange  inattention,  that  such  doubting  is,  in 
a  manner,  the  same  thing  as  being  certain  against  it. 

To  these  persons,  and  to  this  state  of  opinion  concerning  re¬ 
ligion,  the  foregoing  Treatise  is  adapted.  For,  all  the  ge¬ 
neral  objections  against  the  moral  system  of  nature  having 
been  obviated,  it  is  shown,  that  there  is  not  any  peculiar  pre¬ 
sumption  at  all  against  Christianity,  either  considered  as  not 
discoverable  by  reason,  or  as  unlike  to  what  is  so  discovered  ; 
nor  any  worth  mentioning,  against  it  as  miraculous,  if  any  at 
all ;  none  certainly,  which  can  render  it  in  the  least  incredible. 
It  is  shown,  that  upon  supposition  of  a  divine  revelation,  the 
analogy  of  nature  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible,  1 
think  probable,  that  man}^  things  in  it  must  appear  liable  to 
great  objections  ;  and  that  we  must  be  incompetent  judges  of 
it,  to  a  great  degree.  This  observation  is,  I  think,  unques¬ 
tionably  true,  and  of  the  very  utmost  importance :  but  it  is 
urged,  as  I  hope  it  will  be  understood,  with  great  caution  of 
not  vilifying  the  faculty  of  reason,  which  is  ‘  the  candle  of  the 
Lord  within  us  though  it  can  afford  no  light,  where  it  does 
not  shine  ;  nor  judge,  where  it  has  no  principles  to  judge 
upon.  The  objections  here  spoken  of,  being  first  ansM^ered 
in  the  view  of  objections  against  Christianity  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  are  in  the  next  place  considered  as  urged  more  immedi¬ 
ately  against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  dispensation.  And  it  is  fully  made  out,  that  they  admit 


♦  Prov.  XX.  27 


254 


COKCLUSIOK. 


[part  Ji 


of  exactly  the  like  answer,  in  every  respect,  to  wnat  the  like 
objections  against  the  constitution  of  nature  admit  of:  that,  as 
partial  views  give  the  appearance  of  wrong  to  things,  which 
upon  farther  consideration  and  knowledge  of  their  relations  to 
other  things,  are  found  just  and  goo«1 ;  so  it  is  perfectly  credi¬ 
ble,  that  the  things  objected  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness 
of  the  Christian  dispensation,  may  be  rendered  instances  of 
wisdom  and  goodness  by  their  reference  to  other  things  be¬ 
yond  our  view  :  because  Christianity  is  a  scheme  as  much 
above  our  comprehension,  as  that  of  nature  ;  and,  like  that,  a 
scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends, 
and  which,  as  is  most  credible,  may  be  carried  on  by  general 
laws.  And  it  ought  to  be  attended  to,  that  this  is  not  an  an¬ 
swer  taken  merely  or  chiefly  from  our  ignorance  ;  but  from 
somewhat  positive,  which  our  observation  shows  us.  For,  to 
like  objections,  the  like  answer  is  experienced  to  be  just,  in 
numberless  parallel  ca^ses.  The  objections  against  the  Chris¬ 
tian  dispensation,  and  the  method  by  which  it  is  carried  on, 
having  been  thus  obviated,  in  general  and  together :  the  chief 
of  them  are  considered  distinctly,  and  the  particular  things 
objected  to  are  shown  credible,  by  their  perfect  analogy,  each 
part,  to  the  constitution  of  nature.  Thus,  if  man  be  fallen 
from  his  primitive  state,  and  to  be  restored,  and  infinite  wis¬ 
dom  and  power  engages  in  accomplishing  our  recovery ;  it 
were  to  have  been  expected,  it  is  said,  that  this  should  have 
been  effected  at  once,  and  not  by  such  a  long  series  of  means, 
and  such  a  various  economy  of  persons  and  things ;  one  dis¬ 
pensation  preparatory  to  another,  this  to  a  farther  one,  and  so 
on  through  an  indefinite  number  of  ages,  before  the  end  of  the 
scheme  proposed  can  be  completely  accomplished  ;  a  scheme 
conducted  by  infinite  wisdom,  and  executed  by  Almdghty 
power.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  our  finding  that  every 
thing  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  is  thus  carried 
on,  shows  such  expectations  concerning  revelation  to  be 
highly  unreasonable ;  and  is  a  satisfactory  answer  to  them, 
when  urged  as  objections  against  the  credibility,  that  the 
great  scheme  of  Providence  in  the  redemption  of  the  world, 
may  be  of  this  kind,  and  to  be  accomplished  in  this  manner. 
As  to  the  particular  method  of  our  r^emption,  the  appoint¬ 
ment  of  a  Mediator  between  God  and  man ;  this  has  been 
shown  to  be  most  obviously  analogous  to  the  general  con¬ 
duct  of  nature,  i.  e.  the  God  of  nature,  in  appointing  others  to 
be  the  instruments  of  his  mercy,  as  we  experience  in  the 
daily  course  of  Pro\ddence.  The  condition  of  this  world 


PiRl  II,] 


CONCLUSION. 


255 


which  the  doctrine  of  our  redemption  bj  Chiist  presupposes, 
BO  much  falls  in  with  natural  appearances,  that  heathen 
moraKsts  inferred  it  from  those  appearances ;  inferred,  that 
human  nature  was  fallen  from  its  original  rectitude,  and,  in 
consequence  of  this,  degraded  from  its  primitive  happiness. 
Or,  however  this  opinion  came  into  the  world,  these  appear¬ 
ances  must  have  kept  up  the  tradition,  and  confirmed  the  be¬ 
lief  of  it.  And  it  was  the  general  opinion,  under  the  light  of 
nature,  that  repentance  and  reformation,  alone  and  by  itself, 
was  not  sufficient  to  do  away  sin,  and  procure  a  full  remission 
of  the  penalties  annexed  to  it ;  and  as  the  reason  of  the  thing 
does  not  at  all  lead  to  any  conclusion  ;  so  eveiy  day’s  expe¬ 
rience  shows  us  that  reformation  is  not,  m  any  sort,  sufficient 
to  prevent  the  present  disadvantages  and  miseries,  which,  in 
the  natural  course  of  things,  God  has  annexed  to  folly  and 
extravagance.  Yet  there  may  be  ground  to  think,  that  the 
punishments,  which  by  the  general  laws  of  divine  govern¬ 
ment,  are  annexed  to  vice,  maj^  be  prevented ;  that  pro¬ 
vision  may  have  been,  even  originally,  made,  that  they  should 
be  prevented  by  some  means  or  other,  though  they  could  not 
by  reformation  alone.  For  we  have  daily  instances  of  such 
mercy,  in  the  general  conduct  of  nature;  compassion  pro¬ 
vided  for  misery,*  medicines  for  diseases,  friends*against  ene¬ 
mies.  There  is  provisions  made,  in  the  original  constitution 
of  the  world,  that  much  of  the  natural  bad  consequences  of 
our  follies,  which  persons  themselves  alone  cannot  prevent, 
may  be  prevented  by  the  assistance  of  others ;  assistance, 
which  nature  enables,  and  disposes,  and  appoints  them  to 
afford.  By  a  method  of  goodness  analogous  to  this,  when 
the  world  lay  in  wickedness,  and  consequently  in  ruin,  ‘  God 
so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son’  to 
save  it ;  and  ‘  he  being  made  perfect  by  suffering,  became 
the  author  of  eternal  salvation  to  all  them  that  obey  him.’p 
Indeed,  neither  reason  nor  analogy  would  lead  us  to  think,  in 
particular,  that  the  interposition  of  Christ,  in  the  manner  in 
which  he  did  interpose,  would  be  of  that  efficacy  for  recovery 
of  the  world,  which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  it  was ;  but 
neither  would  reason  nor  analogy  lead  us  to  think,  that  other 
particular  means  would  be  of  the  efficacy,  which  experience 
shows  they  are,  in  numberless  instances.  \nd  therefore,  as 
the  case  before  us  does  not  admit  of  experience,  so  that  neither 
reason  nor  analogy  can  show  how,  or  in  what  particular  way, 


♦  Sermon  6th,  at  the  Rolls. 


f  John  iii.  16,  Heb.  v.  9. 


256 


CONCLUSION. 


[part  II 


the  interposition  of  Christ,  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  is  of  that 
efficacy  which  it  is  there  represented  to  be ;  this  is  no  kind 
nor  degree  of  presumption  against  its  being  really  of  that  effi- 
cac}".  Farther :  the  objections  against  Christianitj^,  from  the 
light  of  it  not  being  universal,  nor  its  evidence  so  strong  as 
might  possibly  be  given  us,  have  been  answered  by  the  ge¬ 
neral  analogy  of  nature.  That  God  has  made  such  variety 
of  creatures,  is  indeed  an  answer  to  the  former :  but  that  he 
dispenses  his  gifts  in  such  variety,  both  of  degrees  and  kinds, 
amongst  creatures  of  the  same  species,  and  even  to  the  same 
individuals  at  different  times,  is  a  more  obvious  and  full  an¬ 
swer  to  it.  And  it  is  so  far  from  being  the  method  of  Provi¬ 
dence,  in  other  cases,  to  afford  us  such  overbearing  evidence 
as  some  require  in  proof  of  Christianity,  that,  on  the  contrarjq 
the  evidence  upon  which  we  are  naturally  appointed  to  act  in 
common  matters,  throughout  a  very  great  part  of  life,  is 
doubtful  in  a  high  degree.  And,  admitting  the  fact,  that 
God  has  afforded  to  some  no  more  than  doubtful  evidence  oi 
religion,  the  same  account  may  be  given  of  it,  as  of  difficul¬ 
ties  and  temptations  with  regard  to  practice.  But  as  it  is  not 
impossible,  surely,  that  this  alleged  doubtfulness  may  he 
men’s  own  fault,  it  deserves  their  most  serious  consideration, 
whether  it  be  not  so.  However,  it  is  certain  that  doubting 
implies  a  degree  of  evidence  for  that  of  which  we  doubt,  and 
that  this  degree  of  evidence  as  really  lays  us  under  obliga¬ 
tions,  as  demonstrative  evidence. 

The  whole  then  of  religion  is  throughout  credible  ;  nor  is 
there,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  the  revealed  dispensation 
of  things  more  different  from  the  experienced  constitution  and 
course  of  nature,  than  some  parts  of  the  constitution  of  nature 
are  from  other  parts  of  it.  And  if  so,  the  only  question  which 
remains  is.  What  positive  evidence  can  be  alleged  for  the  truth 
of  Christianity  ?  This  too,  in  general,  has  been  considered, 
and  the  objections  against  it  estimated.  Deduct  therefore  what 
is  to  be  deducted  from  that  evidence,  upon  account  of  any 
weight  v/hich  may  be  thought  to  remain  in  these  objections, 
after  what  the  analogy  of  nature  has  suggested  in  answer  to 
them ;  and  then  consider  what  are  the  practical  consequences 
from  all  this,  upon  the  most  sceptical  principles  one  can  argue 
upon,  (for  I  am  writing  to  persons  who  entertain  these  princi¬ 
ples  :)  and,  upon  such  consideration,  it  will  be  obvious,  that  im¬ 
morality,  as  little  excuse  as  it  admits  of  in  itself,  is  greatly 


PART  II. 


CONCLUSION. 


25V 


aggra.vated,  in  persons  who  have  been  made  acquainted  with 
Christianity,  whether  they  believe  it  or  not ;  because  the  moral 
system  of  nature,  or  natural  religion,  which  Christianity  lays 
before  us,  approves  itself,  almost  intuitively,  to  a  reasonable 
mind,  upon  seeing  it  proposed.  In  the  next  place,  with  regard 
to  Christianity  it  will  be  observed,  that  there  is  a  middle,  be¬ 
tween  a  full  satisfaction  of  the  truth  of  it,  and  the  satisfaction 
of  the  contrary^  The  middle  state  of  mind  between  these 
two  consists  in  a  serious  apprehension  that  it  may  be  true, 
joined  with  doubt,  whether  it  be  so.  And  thisj  upon  the  best 
judgment  I  am  able  to  make,  is  as  far  towards  speculative  in¬ 
fidelity,  as  any  sceptic  can  at  all  be  supposed  to  go,  who  has 
had  true  Christianity,  with  the  proper  evidence  of  it,  laid  be¬ 
fore  him,  and  has  in  any  tolerable  measure  considered  them. 
For  I  would  not  be  mistaken  to  comprehend  all  who  have 
ever  heard  of  it;  because  it  seems  evident,  that,  in  many 
countries  called  Christian,  neither  Christianity, ,  nor  its  evi¬ 
dence,  are  fairly  laid  before  men.  And  in  places  where  both 
are,  there  appear  to  be  some  who  have  very  little  attended  to 
either,  and  who  reject  Christianity  with  a  scorn  proportionate 
to  their  inattention ;  and  yet  are  by  no  means  without  under¬ 
standing  in  other  matters.  Now  it  has  been  shown,  that  a  se¬ 
rious  apprehension  that  Christianity  may  be  true,  lays  per¬ 
sons  under  the  strictest  obligations  of  a  serious  regard  to  it, 
throughout  the  whole  of  their  life ;  a  regard  not  the  same 
exactly,  but  in  many  respects  nearly  the  same  with  what  a 
full  conviction  of  its  truth  would  lay  them  under.  Lastly,  it 
will  appear,  that  blasphemy  and  profaneness,  I  mean  with 
regard  to  Christianity,  are  absolutely  without  excuse.  For 
there  is  no  temptation  to  it,  but  from  the  wantonness  of  vanity 
or  mirth ;  and  these,  considering  the  infinite  importance  of 
the  subject,  are  no  such  temptations  as  to  afford  any  excuse 
for  it.  If  this  be  a  just  account  of  things,  and  yet  men  can 
go  on  to  vilify  or  disregard  Christianity,  which  is  to  talk  and 
act  as  if  they  had  a  demonstration  of  its  falsehood ;  there  is 
no  reason  to  think  they  would  ^alter  their  behaviour  to  any 
purpose,  though  there  were  a  demonstration  of  its  truth. 


258 


OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 


DISE  1 


DISSERTATION  I. 


OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 


Whether  we  are  to  live  in  a  future  state,  as  it  is  the  most 
important  question  which  can  possibly  be  asked,  so  it  is  the 
most  intelligible  one  which  can  be  expressed  in  language. 
Yet  strange  perplexities  have  been  raised  about  the  meaning 
of  that  identity,  or  sameness  of  person,  which  is  implied  in  the 
notion  of  our  living  now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  suc¬ 
cessive  moments.  And  the  solution  of  these  difficulties  hath 
been  stranger  than  the  difficulties  themselves.  For,  personal 
identity  has  been  explained  so  by  some,  as  to  render  the  in¬ 
quiry  concerning  a  future  life  of  no  consequence  at  all  to  us, 
the  persons  who  are  making  it.  And  though  few  men  can 
be  misled  by  such  subtleties,  yet  it  may  be  proper  a  little  to 
consider  them. 

Now,  when  it  is  asked  wherein  personal  identity  consists, 
the  answer  should  be  the  same  as  if  it  were  asked,  wherein 
consists  similitude  or  equality ;  that  all  attempts  to  define, 
would  but  perplex  it.  Y et  there  is  no  difficulty  at  all  in  as¬ 
certaining  the  idea.  For  as,  upon  two  triangles  being  com¬ 
pared  or  viewed  together,  there  arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of 
similitude ;  or  upon  twice  two  and  four,  the  idea  of  equality ; 
so  likewise,  upon  comparing  the  consciousness  of  one’s  self, 
or  one’s  own  existence  in  any  two  moments,  there  as  immedi¬ 
ately  arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  personal  identity.  And 
as  the  two  former  comparisons  not  only  give  the  idea  of  simili¬ 
tude  and  equalit}’-,  but  also  shows  us,  that  two  triangles  are 
like,  and  twice  two  and  four  are  equal ;  so  the  latter  compa¬ 
rison  not  only  gives  us  the  idea  of  personal  identity,  but  also 
shows  us  the  identity  of  ourselves  in  those  two  moments ; 
the  present,  suppose,  and  that  immediately  past ;  or  the 
present,  and  that  a  month,  a  year,  or  twenty  years  past.  Or, 
m  other  words,  by  reflecting  upon  that  which  is  myself  now, 


DISS.  I.]  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  259 

and  that  which  was  myself  twenty  years  ago,  1  discern  they 
are  not  two,  but  one  and  the  same  self. 

But  though  consciousness  of  what  is  past  does  thus  ascer¬ 
tain  our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet,  to  say  that  it 
makes  personal  identity,  or  is  necessary  to  our  being  the 
same  persons,  is  to  say,  that  a  person  has  not  existed  a  single 
moment,  nor  done  one  action,  but  what  he  can  remember; 
indeed  none  but  what  he  reflects  upon.  And  one  should 
really  think  it  self-e\fldent,  that  consciousness  of  personal 
identity  presupposes,  and  therefore  cannot  constitute,  per¬ 
sonal  identity,  any  more  than  knowledge,  in  any  other  case, 
can  constitute  truth,  which  it  presupposes. 

This  wonderful  mistake  may  possibly  have  arisen  from 
hence,  that  to  be  endued  with  consciousness,  is  inseparable 
from  the  idea  of  a  person,  or  intelligent  being.  For,  this 
might  be  expressed  inaccurately  thus, — that  consciousness 
makes  personality ;  and  from  hence  it  might  be  concluded  to 
make  personal  identity.  But  though  present  consciousness 
of  what  we  at  present  do  and  feel,  is  necessary  to  our  being 
the  persons  we  now  are ;  yet  present  consciousness  of  past 
actions,  or  feelings,  is  not  necessary  to  our  being  the  same 
persons  who  performed  those  actions,  or  had  those  feelings. 

The  inquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  same  in  the  com¬ 
mon  acceptation  Of  the  word,  does  not  appear  to  have  any  re 
lation  to  this  Of  personal  identity ;  because  the  word  same, 
when  applied  to  them  and  to  persons,  is  not  only  applied  to 
different  subjects,  but  it  is  also  used  in  different  senses.  For 
when  a  man  swears  to  the  same  tree,  as  having  stood  fifty 
years  in  the  same  place,  he  means  only  the  same  as  to  all  the 
purposes  of  property  and  uses  of  common  life,  and  not  that 
the  tree  has  been  all  that  time  the  same  in  the  strict  philoso¬ 
phical  sense  of  the  word.  For  he  does  not  know  whether 
any  one  particle  of  the  present  tree  be  the  same  with  any  one 
particle  of  the  tree  which  stood  in  the  same  place  fifty  years 
ago.  And  if  they  have  not  one  common  particle  of  matter, 
they  cannot  be  the  same  tree,  in  the  proper  philosophic  sense 
of  the  word  same  ;  it  being  evidently  a  contradiction  in  terms, 
to  say  they  are,  when  no  part  of  their  substance,  and  no  one 
of  their  properties,  is  the  same  ;  no  part  of  their  substance,  by 
the  supposition ;  no  one  of  their  properties,  because  it  is  al¬ 
lowed  that  the  same  property  cannot  be  transferred  from  one 
substance  to  another.  And  therefore,  when  we  say  the  ideri- 
tity  or  sameness  of  a  plant  consists  in  a  continuation  of  the 
same  life  communicated  under  the  same  organization,  to  a 


200  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  [dISS.  I. 

number  of  particles  of  matter,  whether  the  same  or  not,  the 
word  same,  when  applied  to  life  and  to  organization,  cannot  pos¬ 
sibly  be  understood  to  signify,  what  it  signifies  in  this  very  sen¬ 
tence,  when  applied  to  matter.  In  a  loose  and  popular  sense, 
then,  the  life,  and  the  organization,  and  the  plant,  are  justly 
said  to  be  the  same,  notwithstanding  the  perpetual  change  of 
the  pai  ts.  But  in  a  strict  and  philosophical  manner  of  speech, 
no  man,  no  being,  no  mode  of  being,  nor  any  thing,  can  be 
the  same  with  that,  with  which  it  hath  indeed  nothing  the. 
same.  Now,  sameness  is  used  in  this  latter  sense  when  ap¬ 
plied  to  persons.  The  identity  of  these,  therefore,  cannot  sub¬ 
sist  with  diversity  of  substance. 

The  thing  here  considered,  and  demonstratively,  as  I  think, 
determined,  is  proposed  by  Mr,  Locke  in  these  words.  Whether 
it,  i,  e,  the  same  self  or  person,  be  the  same  identical  sub¬ 
stance  1  And  he  has  suggested  what  is  a  much  better  an¬ 
swer  to  the  question  than  that  which  he  gives  it  in  form. 
For  he  defines  person,  a  thinking  intelligent  being,  &c.  and 
personal  identity  the  sameness  of  a  rational  being*  The 
question  then  is,  whether  the  same  rational  being  is  the  same 
substance  ;  which  needs  no  answer,  because  being  and  sub¬ 
stance,  in  this  place,  stand  for  the  same  idea.  The  ground 
of  the  doubt,  whether  the  same  person  be  the  same  substance 
is  said  to  be  this  ;  that  the  consciousness  of  our  own  existence 
in  youth  and  m  old  age,  or  in  any  two  joint  successive  mo¬ 
ments,  is  not  the  same  individual  action, "f  i.  e,  not  the  same 
consciousness,  but  different  successive  consciousnesses.  Now 
it  is  strange  that  this  should  have  occasioned  such  perplexi¬ 
ties.  For  it  is  surely  conceivable,  that  a  person  may  have 
a  capacity  of  knowing  some  object  or  other  to  be  the  same 
now,  which  it  was  when  he  contemplated  it  formerly ;  yet, 
in  this  case,  where,  by  the  supposition,  the  object  is  percfcived 
to  be  the  same,  the  perception  of  it  in  any  two  moments  can¬ 
not  be  one  and  the  same  perception.  And  thus,  though  the 
successive  consciousnesses  which  we  have  of  our  own  exist¬ 
ence  are  not  the  same,  yet  are  they  consciousnesses  of  one 
and  the  same  thing  or  object ;  of  the  same  person,  self,  or 
living  agent.  The  person,  of  whose  existence  the  conscious¬ 
ness  's  felt  now,  and  was  felt  an  hour  or  a  year  ago,  is  dis¬ 
cerned  to  be,  not  two  persons,  but  one  and  the  same  person  j 
and  therefore  is  one  and  the  same. 

Mr.  Locke’s  observations  upon  this  subject  appear  hasty  j 


*  Locke’s  Works,  vol.  i.  p,  146. 


t  Locke,  p.  146,  147. 


D1S8.  I.] 


OP  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 


261 


and  he  seems  to  profess  himself  dissatisfied  with  suppositions, 
which  he  has  made  relating  to  it  *  But  some,  of  those  hasty 
observations  have  been  carried  to  a  strange  length  by  others ; 
whose  notion,  when  traced  and  examined  to  the  bottom, 
amounts,  I  think,  to  this  if  ‘  That  personality  is  not  a  perma 
nent,  but  a  transient  thing :  that  it  lives  and  dies,  begins  an. I 
ends,  continually :  that  no  one  can  any  more  remain  one  and 
the  same  person  two  moments  together,  than  two  successive 
moments  can  be  one  and  the  same  moment :  that  our  sub¬ 
stance  is  indeed  continually  changing ;  but  whether  this  be 
so  or  not,  is,  it  seems,  nothing  to  the  purpose  ;  since  it  is  not 
substance,  but  consciousness  alone,  which  constitutes  person¬ 
ality  ;  which  consciousness,  being  successive,  cannot  be  the 
same  in  any  two  moments,  nor  consequently  the  personality 
constituted  by  it.’  And  from  hence  it  must  follow,  that  it  is 
a  fallacy  upon  ourselves,  to  charge  our  present  selves  with 
any  thing  we  did,  or  to  imagine  our  present  selves  interested 
in  any  thing  which  befell  us  yesterday,  or  that  our  present 
self  will  be  interested  in  what  will  befall  us  to-morrow ;  since 
our  present  self  is  not,  in  reality,  the  same  with  the  self  of 
yesterday,  but  another  like  self  or  person  coming  in  its  room, 
and  mistaken  for  it ;  to  which  another  self  will  succeed  to¬ 
morrow.  This,  I  say,  must  follow :  for  if  the  self  or  person 
of  to-day,  and  that  of  to-morrow,  are  not  the  same,  but  only 
like  persons,  the  person  of  to-day  is  really  no  more  interested 
in  what  will  befall  the  person  of  to-morrow,  than  in  what  will 
befall  any  other  person.  It  may  be  thought,  perhaps,  that 
this  is  not  a  just  representation  of  the  opinion  we  are  speaking 
of ;  because  those  who  maintain  it  allow,  that  a  person  is  the 
same  as  far  back  as  his  remembrance  reaches.  And,  indeed, 
they  do  use  the  words,  identity  and  same  person.  Nor  will 
language  permit  these  words  to  be  laid  aside :  since  if  they 
were,  there  must  be,  I  know  not  what,  ridiculous  periphrasis 
substituted  in  the  room  of  them.  But  they  cannot,  consist¬ 
ently  with  themselves,  mean,  that  the  person  is  really  the 
game.  For  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  personality  cannot  be 
really  the  same,  if,  as  they  expressly  assert,  that  in  which  it 
consists  is  not  the  same.  And  as,  consistently  with  them¬ 
selves,  they  cannot,  so,  I  think,  it  appears  they  do  not,  mean, 
that  the  person  is  really  the  same,  but  only  that  he  is  so  in  a 
fictitious  sense  ;  in  such  a  sense  only  as  they  assert ;  for  this 

♦  Locke,  p.  152. 

t  See  an  answer  to  Dr.  Clarke’s  third  defence  of  his  letter  to  Mr. 
Dodwell,  2d  edit,  p,  44,  56,  &c. 


262 


OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 


[diss.  li 


they  do  assert,  that  any  number  of  persons  whatever  may  be 
the  same  person.  The  bare  unfolding  this  notion,  and  laying 
it  thus  naked  and  open,  seems  the  best  confutation  of  it. 
However,  since  great  stress  is  said  4o  be  put  upon  it,  I  add 
the  following  things : 

Firsts  This  notion  is  absolutely  contradictory  to  that  cer¬ 
tain  conviction,  which  necessarily,  and  every  moment,  rises 
within  us,  when  we  turn  our  thoughts  upon  ourselves ;  when 
we  reflect  upon  what  is  past,  and  look  forward  upon  what  is 
to  come.  All  imagination  of  a  daily  change  of  that  living 
agent  which  each  man  calls  himself,  for  another,  or  of  any 
such  change  throughout  our  whole  present  life,  is  entirely 
borne  down  by  our  natural  sense  of  things.  Nor  is  it  possible 
for  a  person  in  his  wits  to  alter  his  conduct,  with  regard  to 
his  health  or  affairs,  from  a  suspicion,  that  though  he  should 
live  to-morrow,  he  should  not,  however,  be  the  same  person 
he  is  to-day.  And  yet,  if  it  be  reasonable  to  act,  with  respect 
to  a  future  life,  upon  this  notion,  that  personality  is  transient  • 
it  is  reasonable  to  act  upon  it,  with  respect  to  the  present. 
Here  then  is  a  notion  equally  applicable  to  religion  and  to 
our  temporal  concerns  ;  and  every  one  sees  and  feels  the  in¬ 
expressible  absurdity  of  it  in  the  latter  case.  If,  therefore, 
any  can  take  up  with  it  in  the  former,  this  cannot  proceed 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but  must  be  owing  to  an  inward 
unfairness,  and  secret  corruption  of  heart. 

Secondly^  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abstract  notion,  or  quality^ 
but  a  being  only  which  is  capable  of  life  and  action,  of  happi¬ 
ness  and  misery.  Now  all  beings  confessedly  continue  the 
same,  during  the  whole  time  of  their  existence.  Consider 
then  a  living  being  now  existing,  and  which  has  existed  for 
any  time  alive :  this  living  being  must  have  done  and  suf¬ 
fered  and  enjoyed,  what  it  has  done  and  suffered  and  enjoyed 
formerly,  (this  living  being,  I  say,  and  not  another,)  as  really 
as  it  does  and  suflers  and  enjoys,  what  it  does  and  suffers  and 
enjoys  this  instant.  All  these  successive  actions,  enjoyments, 
and  sufferings,  are  actions,  enjoyments,  and  sufferings,  of  the 
same  living  being.  And  they  are  so,  prior  to  all  considera' 
tion  of  its  remembering  or  forgetting ;  since  remembering  or 
forgetting  can  make  no  alteration  in  the  truth  of  past  matter 
of  fact.  And  suppose  this  being  endued  with  limited  powers 
of  knowledge  and  memory,  there  is  no  more  difficulty  in  com 
ceiving  it  to  have  a  power  of  knowing  itself  to  be  the  same 
living  being  which  it  was  some  time  ago,  of  remembering 
some  of  its  actions,  sufferings,  and  enjoyments,  and  forgetting 


DISS.  I.] 


OP  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 


263 


others,  than  in  conceiving  it  to  know,  or  remember,  or  forget 
any  thing  else. 

Thirdly^  Every  person  is  conscious,  that  he  is  now  the 
same  person  or  seif  he  was,  as  far  back  as  his  remembrance 
reaches ;  since,  when  any  one  reflects  upon  a  past  action  of 
his  own,  he  is  just  as  certain  of  the  person  who  did  that  action, 
namely  himself,  the  person  who  now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is 
certain  that  the  action  was  at  all  done.  Nay,  very  often  a  per¬ 
son’s  assurance  of  an  action  having  been  done,  of  which  he  is 
absolutely  assured,  arises  wholly  from  the  consciousness  that 
he  himself  did  it.  And  this  he,  person,  or  self,  must  either  be  a 
substance,  or  the  property  of  some  substance.  If  he,  if  person, 
be  a  substance  ;  then  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same  per¬ 
son,  is  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same  substance.  If  the 
person,  or  he,  be  the  property  of  a  substance  ;  still  conscious¬ 
ness  that  he  is  the  same  property,  is  as  certain  a  proof  that 
his  substance  remains  the  same,  as  consciousness  that  he  re 
mains  the  same  substance  would  be;  since  the  same  property 
cannot  be  transferred  from  one  substance  to  another. 

But  though  we  are  thus  certain  that  we  are  the  same 
agents,  living  beings,  or  substances,  now,  which  we  were  as 
far  back  as  our  remembrance  reaches ;  yet  it  is  asked,  whether 
we  may  not  possibly  be  deceived  in  it  ?  And  this  question 
may  be  asked  at  the  end  of  any  demonstration  whatever ;  be¬ 
cause  it  is  a  question  concerning  the  truth  of  perception  by 
memory.  And  he  who  can  doubt,  whether  perception  by 
memory  can  in  this  case  be  depended  upon,  may  doubt  also, 
whether  perception  by  deduction  and  reasoning,  which  also 
include  memory,  or,  indeed,  whether  intuitive  perception  can. 
Here  then  we  ,can  go  no  farther.  For  it  is  ridiculous  to  at¬ 
tempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  those  perceptions,  whose  truth  we 
can  no  otherwise  prove,  than  by  other  perceptions  of  exactly 
the  same  kind  with  them,  and  which  there  is  just  the  same 
ground  to  suspect ;  or  to  atterflpt  to  prove  the  truth  of  our  fa¬ 
culties,  which  can  no  otherwise  be  proved,  than  by  the  use  or 
means  of  those  very  suspected  faculties  themselves. 


2G4 


OP  THE  NATURE  OP  VIRTUE.  [dISS,  II. 


DISSERTATION  II. 

OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


That  which  renders  beings  capable  of  moral  government^ 
is  their  having  a  moral  nature,  and  moral  faculties  of  percep¬ 
tion  and  of  action.  Brute  creatures  are  impressed  and  actu¬ 
ated  by  various  instincts  and  propensions :  so  also  are  we. 
But,  additional  to  this,  we  have  a  capacity  of  reflecting  upon 
actions  and  characters,  and  making  them  an  object  to  our 
thoughts  ;  and  on  doing  this,  we  naturally  and  unavoidably 
approve  some  actions,  under  the  peculiar  view  of  their  being 
virtuous  and  of  good  desert ;  and  disapprove  others,  as  vicious 
and  of  ill  desert.  That  we  Jbave  this  moral  approving  and 
disapproving*  faculty,  is  certain  from  our  experiencing  it  in 
ourselves,  and  recognismg  it  in  each  other.  It  appears  from 
our  exercising  it  unavoidably,  in  the  approbation  and  disap¬ 
probation  even  of  feigned  ‘  characters :  from  the  words,  right 
and  wrong,  odious  and  arniable,  base  and  worthy,  with  many 
others  of  like  signification  in  all  languages,  applied  to  actions 
and  characters ;  from  the  many  written  systems  of  morals 
which  suppose  it ;  since  it  cannot  be  imagined,  that  all  these 
authors,  throughout  all  these  treatises,  had  absolutely  no 
meaning  at  all  to  their  words,  or  a  meaning  merely  chimeri- 

+  This  way  of  speaking  is  taken  from  Epictetus,!  is  made  use  of 
as  seeming  the  most  full,  and  least  liable  to  cavil.  And  the  moral  fa¬ 
culty  may  be  understood  to  have  these  two  epithets,  loxifiatrTiKT}  and 
airoSoKifjiaaTiKxi,  upon  a  double  account ;  because,  upon  a  survey  of  ac¬ 
tions,  whether  before  or  after  they  are  done,  it  determines  them  to  be 
good  or  evil ;  and  also  because  it  determines  itself  to  be  the  guide  of  ac¬ 
tion  and  of  life,  in  contradistinction  from  all  other  faculties,  or  natural  prin¬ 
ciples  of  action  :  in  the  very  same  manner,  as  speculative  reason  directly 
and  naturally  judges  of  speculative  truth  and  falsehood  ;  and,  at  the 
same  time,  is  attended  with  a  consciousness  upon  reflection,  that  the 
natural  right  to  judge  of  them  belongs  to  it. 

t  Arr.  Epict.  lib.  i.  cap.  1. 


OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


265 


DISS.  11.] 


cal :  from  our  natural  sense  of  gratitude,  whic-h  implies  a  dis¬ 
tinction  between  merely  being  the  instrument  of  good,  and 
intending  it :  from  the  like  distinction,  every  one  makes,  be¬ 
tween  injury  and  mere  harm,  which  Hobbes  says,  is  peculiar 
to  mankind ;  and  between  injury  and  just  punishment,  a  dis¬ 
tinction  plainly  natural,  prior  to  the  consideration  of  human 
laws.  It  is  manifest,  great  part  of  common  language,  and  of 
common  behaviour  over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  supposition 
of  such  a  moral  faculty ;  whether  called  conscience,  moral 
reason,  moral  sense,  or  divine  reason ;  whether  considered  as 
a  sentiment  of  the  understanding,  or  as  a  perception  of  the 
heart,  or,  which  seems  the  truth,  as  including  both.  Nor  is 
it  at  all  doubtful  in  the  general,  what  course  of  action  this 
faculty,  or  practical  discerning  power  within  us,  approves, 
and  what  it  disapproves.  For,  as  much  as  it  has  been  dis¬ 
puted  wherein  virtue  consists,  or  whatever  ground  for  doubt 
there  may  be  about  particulars,  yet,  in  general,  there  is  in 
reality  a  universally  acknowledged  standard  of  it.  It  is  that, 
which  all  ages  and  all  countries  have  made  profession  of  in 
public ;  it  is  that,  which  every  man  you  meet,  puts  on  the 
show  of ;  it  is  that,  which  the  primary  and  fundamental  laws 
of  all  civil  constitutions,  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  make  it 
their  business  and  endeavour  to  enforce  the  practice  of  upon 
mankind  ;  namely,  justice,  veracity,  and  regard  to  common 
good.  It  being  manifest  then,  in  general,  that  we  have  such 
a  faculty  or  discernment  as  this,  it  may  be  of  use  to  remark 
some  things,  more  distinctly  concerning  it. 

Firstj  It  ought  to  be  observed,  that  the  object  of  this  fa 
culty  is  actions,*  comprehending  under  that  name,  active  or 
practical  principles  ;  those  principles  from  which  men  would 
act,  if  occasions  and  circumstances  gave  them  power ;  and 
which,  when  fixed  and  habitual  in  any  person,  we  call,  his 
character.  It  does  not  appear,  that  brutes  have  the  least 
reflex  sense  of  actions,  as  distinguished  from  events  ;  or  that 
will  and  design,  which  constitute  the  very  nature  of  actions 
as  such,  are  at  all  an  object  to  their  perception.  But  to  ours 
they  are ;  and  they  are  the  object,  and  the  only  one,  of  the 
approving  and  disapproving  faculty.  Acting,  conduct,  be¬ 
haviour,  abstracted  from  all  resrard  to  what  is,  in  fact  and 
event,  the  consequence  of  it,  is  itself  the  natural  object  of  the 
moral  discernment,  as  speculative  truth  and  falsehood  is  of 


*  ovSe  ^  aprjTt]  Kai  KUKia — zv  vcktzi,  aWa  zvzpyzia.  M.  Anton.  1.  9,  16. 
Vlrtutis  laus  omnis  in  actione  consislit.  Cic.  Off.  I.  1.  c.  6. 

12 


266 


or  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


DISS.  II. 


speculative  reason.  Intention  of  such  and  such  consequences, 
indeed,  is  always  included  ;  for  it  is  part  of  the  action  itself : 
but  though  the  intended  good  or  bad  consequences  do  not 
follow,  we  have  exactly  the  same  sense  of  the  action  as  if 
they  did.  In  like  manner,  we  think  well  or  ill  of  characters, 
abst  racted  from  all  consideration  of  the  good  or  the  evil,  which 
persons  of  such  characters  have  it  actually  in  their  power  to 
do.  We  never,  in  the  moral  way,  applaud  or  blame  either 
ourselves  or  others,  for  what  we  enjoy  or  what  we  suffer,  or 
for  having  impressions  made  upon  us  which  we  consider  as 
altogether  out  of  our  power ;  but  only  for  what  we  do,  or 
would  have  done,  had  it  been  in  our  power ;  or  for  what  we 
leave  undone  which  we  might  have  done,  or  would  have  left 
undone  though  we  could  have  done  it. 

Secondly,  Our  sense  or  discernment  of  actions,  as  morally 
good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  discernment  of  them  as  of 
good  or  ill  desert.  It  may  be  difficult  to  explain  this' percep¬ 
tion,  so  as  to  answer  all  the  questions  which  may  be  asked 
concerning  it ;  but  every  one  speaks  of  such  and  such  actions 
as  deserving  punishment ;  and  it  is  not,  I  suppose,  pretended, 
that  they  have  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to  the  expres¬ 
sion.  Now,  the  meaning  plainly  is,  not  that  we  conceive  it 
for  the  good  of  society,  that  the  doer  of  such  actions,  should 
be  made  to  suffer.  For  if  unhappily  it  were  resolved,  that  a 
man  who,  by  some  innocent  action  was  infected  with  the 
plague,  should  be  left  to  perish,  lest,  by  other  people  coming 
near  him,  the  infection  should  spread ;  no  one  would  say,  he 
deserved  this  treatment.  Innocence  and  ill  desert  are  incon¬ 
sistent  ideas.  Ill  desert  always  supposes  guilt ;  and  if  one 
be  not  part  of  the  other,  yet  they  are  evidently  and  naturally 
connected  in  our  mind.  The  sight  of  a  man  in  misery  raises 
our  compassion  towards  him  ;  and,  if  this  misery  be  inflicted 
on  him  by  another,  our  indignation  against  the  author  of  it. 
But  when  we  are  informed,  that  the  sufferer  is  a  villain,  and 
is  punished  only  for  his  treachery  or  cruelty  ;  our  compassion 
exceedingly  lessens,  and,  in  many  instances,  our  indignation 
wholly  subsides.  Now,  what  produces  this  effect,  is  the  con¬ 
ception  of  that  in  the  sufferer,  wffiich  we  call  ill  desert.  Upon 
considering  then,  or  viewing  together,  our  notion  of  vice  and 
ffiat  of  misery,  there  results  a  third,  that  of  ill  desert.  And 
thus  there  is  in  human  creatures  an  association  of  the  two 
ideas,  natural  and  moral  evil,  wickedness  and  punishment. 
If  this  association  were  merely  artificial  or  accidental,  it  were 
nothing;  but  being  most  unquestionably  natural,  it  greatlv 


DiSS.  II.] 


tfF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


28V 


concerns  us  to  attend  to  it,  instead  of  endeavoiing  to  explain 
it  away. 

It  may  be  observed  farther,  concerning  our  perception  of 
good  and  of  ill  desert,  that  the  former  is  very  weak  with 
respect  to  common  instances  of  virtue.  One  reason  of  which 
may  be,  that  it  does  not  appear  to  a  spectator,  how  far  such 
instances  of  virtue  proceed  from  a  virtuous  principle,  or  in 
what  degree  this  principle  is  prevalent ;  since  a  very  we^k 
regard  to  virtue  may  be  sufficient  to  make  men  act  well  in 
many  common  instances.  And  on  the  other  hand,  our  per¬ 
ception  of  ill  desert  in  vicious  actions  lessens,  in  proportion  to 
the  temptations  men  are  thoughtr  to  have  had  to  such  vices. 
For,  vice  in  human  creatures  consisting  chiefly  in  the  absence 
or  want  of  the  virtuous  principle,  though  a  man  be  overcome, 
suppose,  by  tortures,  it  does  not  from  thence  appear,  to  what 
degree  the  virtuous  principle  was  wanting.  All  that  appears, 
is  that  he  had  it  not  in  such  a  degree,  as  to  prevail  over  the 
temptation  ;  but  possibly  he  had  it  in  a  degree,  which  would 
have  rendered  him  proof  against  common  temptations. 

Thu'dly,  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill  deserts  arises  from, 
and  is  the  result  of,  a  comparison  of  actions  with  the  nature 
and  capacities  of  the  agent.  For,  the  mere  neglect  of  doing 
what  we  ought  to  do,  would,  in  many  cases,  be  determined  by 
all  men  to  be  in  the  highest  degree  vicious.  And  this  deter¬ 
mination  must  arise  from  such  comparison,  and  be  the  result 
of  it ;  because  such  neglect  would  not  be  vicious  in  creatures 
of  other  natures  and  capacities,  as  brutes.  And  it  is  the  same 
also  with  respect  to  positive  vices,  or  such  as  consist  in  doing 
what  we  ought  not.  For,  every  one  has  a  different  sense  of 
harm  done  by  an  idiot,  madman,  or  child,  and  by  one  of  mature 
and  common  understanding  ;  though  the  action  of  both, 
including  the  intention,  which  is  part  of  the  action,  be  the 
same  :  as  it  may  be,  since  idiots  and  madmen,  as  well  as 
children,  are  capable,  not  only  of  doing  mischief,  but  also  of 
intending  it.  Now,  this  difference  must  arise  from  somewhat 
discerned  in  the  nature  or  capacities  of  one,  which  renders  the 
action  vicious  ;  and  the  want  of  which  in  the  other,  renders 
the  same  action  innocent,  or  less  vicious  :  and  this  plainly 
supposes  a  comparison,  whether  reflected  upon  or  not,  between 
the  action  and  capacities  of  the  agent,  previous  to  our  deter¬ 
mining  an  action  to  be  vicious.  And  hence  arises  a  proper 
application  of  the  epithets,  incongruous,  unsuitable,  dispro- 
porl innate,  unfit,  to  actions  which  our  moral  faculty  determines 
to  be  vicious. 


268 


OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


[diss.  II* 


Fourthly,  It  deserves  to  be  considered,  whether  men  are 
more  at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make  themselves  misera¬ 
ble  without  reason,  than  to  make  other  people  so ;  or  disso¬ 
lutely  to  neglect  their  own  greater  good,  for  the  sake  of  a 
present  lesser  gratification,  than  they  are  to  neglect  the  good 
of  others,  whom  nature  has  committed  to  their  care.  It 
should  seem,  that  a  due  concern  about  our  own  interest  or 
happiness,  and  a  reasonable  endeavor  to  secure  and  promote 
it,  which  is,  I  think,  very  much  the  meaning  of  the  word 
prudence  in  our  language  ;  it  should  seem,  that  this  is  virtue, 
and  the  contrary  behaviour  faulty  and  blameable :  since,  in 
the  calmest  way  of  reflection,  we  approve  of  the  first,  and 
condemn  the  other  conduct,  both  in  ourselves  and  others. 
This  approbation  and  disapprobation  are  altogether  different 
from  mere  desire  of  our  own,  or  of  their  happiness,  and  from 
sorrow  upon  missing  it.  For  the  object  or  occasion  of  this 
last  kind  of  perception,  is  satisfaction  or  uneasiness  ;•  whereas 
the  object  of  the  first  is  active  behaviour.  In  one  case,  what 
our  thoughts  fix  upon  is  our  condition  ;  in  the  other,  our  con¬ 
duct.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  nature  has  not  given  us  so  sen¬ 
sible  a  disapprobation  of  imprudence  and  folly,  either  in  our¬ 
selves  or  others,  as  of  falsehood,  injustice,  and  cruelty ;  I 
suppose,  because  that  constant  habitual  sense  of  private  inte¬ 
rest  and  good,  which  we  always  carry  about  with  us,  renders 
such  sensible  disapprobation  less  necessary,  less  wanting,  to 
keep  us  from  imprudently  neglecting  our  own  happiness,  and 
foolishly  injuring  ourselves,  than  it  is  necessary  and  wanting 
to  keep  us  from  injuring  others,  to  whose  good  we  cannot  have 
so  strong  and  constant  a  regard;  and  also,  because  impru¬ 
dence  and  folly,  appearing  to  bring  its  own  punishment,  more 
immediately  and  constantly  than  injurious  behaviour,  it  less 
needs  the  additional  punishment  which  would  be  inflicted  upon 
it  by  others,  had  they  the  same  sensible  indignation  against  it. 
as  against  injustice,  and  fraud,  and  cruelty.  Besides,  unhap¬ 
piness  being  in  itself  the  natural  object  of  compassion,  the 
unhappiness  which  people  bring  upon  themselves,  though  it 
be  wilfully,  excites  in  us  some  pity  for  them  ;  and  this,  of 
ourse,  lessens  our  displeasure  against  them.  But  still  it  is 
matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  formed  so  as  to  reflect  very 
severely  upon  the  greater  instances  of  imprudent'  neglect  and 
foolish  rashness,  both  in  ourselves  and  others.  In  instances 
of  this  kind,  men  often  say  of  themselves  with  remorse,  and 
of  others  with  some  indignation,  that  they  deserve  to  suffer 
such  calamities,  because  they  brought  them  upon  themselves 


DISS.  II.] 


OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


269 


a.nd  would  not  take  warning'.  Particularly  when  persons 
come  to  poverty  and  distress  by  a  long  course  oi‘  extrava¬ 
gance,  and  after  frequent  admonitions,  though  without  false¬ 
hood  or  injustice ;  we  plainly  do  not  regard  such  people  as 
like  objects  of  compassion,  with  those  who  are  brought  into 
the  same  condition  by  unavoidable  accidents.  From  these 
things  it  appears,  that  prudence  is  a  species  of  virtue,  and 
folly  of  vice  :  meaning  hy  folly,  somewhat  quite  different  from 
mere  incapacity ;  a  thoughtless  want  of  that  regard  and 
attention  to  our  own  happiness,  which  we  had  capacity  for. 
And  this  the  word  properly  includes,  and,  as  it  seems,  in  its 
usual  acceptation  ;  for  we  scarce  apply  it  to  brute  creatures. 

However,  if  any  person  be  disposed  to  dispute  the  matter, 
I  shall  very  willingly  give  him  up  the  words  virtue  and  vice, 
as  not  applicable  to  prudence  and  folly ;  but  must  beg  leave 
to  insist,  that  the  faculty  within  us,  which  is  the  judge  of  ac¬ 
tions,  approves  of  prudent  actions  and  disapproves  imprudent 
ones  ;  I  say,  prudent  and  imprudent  actions  as  such,  and  con¬ 
sidered  distinctly  from  the  happiness  or  misery  which  they 
occasion.  And  by  the  way,  this  observation  may  help  to 
determine,  what  justness  there  is  in  that  objection  against  re¬ 
ligion,  that  it  teaches  us  to  be  interested  and  selfish. 

Fifthly,  Without  inquiring  how  far,  and  in  what  sense, 
virtue  is  resolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice  into  the  want 
of  it ;  it  may  be  proper  to  observe,  that  benevolence,  and  the 
want  of  it,  singly  considered,  are  in  no  sort  the  whole  of  virtue 
and  vice.  Fgi  if  this  were  the  case,  in  the  review  of  one’s 
own  character,  or  that  of  others,  our  moral  understanding 
and  moral  sense  would  be  indifferent  to  every  thing,  but  the 
degrees  in  which  benevolence  prevailed,  and  the  degrees  in 
which  it  was  wanting.  _  That  is,  we  should  never  approve  of 
benevolence  to  some  persons  rather  than  to  others,  nor  disap¬ 
prove  injustice  and  falsehood  upon  any  other  account,  than 
merely  as  an  overbalance  of  happiness  was  foreseen  likely  to 
be  produced  by  the  first,  and  of  misery  by  the  second.  But 
now,  on  the  contrary,  suppose  two  men  competitors  for  any 
thing  whatever,  which  would  be  of  equal  advantage  to  each 
of  them  ;  though  nothing  indeed  would  be  more  impertinent, 
than  for  a  stranger  to  busy  himself  to  get  one  of  them  prefer¬ 
red  to  the  other  ;  yet  such  endeavor  would  be  'cirtne,  in  behalf 
of  a  friend  or  benefactor,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of 
distant  consequences :  as  that  example  of  gratitude,  and  the 
cultivation  of  friendship,  would  be  of  general  good  to  the 
world.  Again,  suppose  one  man  should,  by  fraud  or  violence 


270  OF  THE  NATURE  OP  VIRTUE.  [dI8S.  H. 

take  from  another  the  fruit  of  his  labor  with  intent  to  give  it  to 
a  third,  who,  he  thought,  would  have  as  much  pleasure  from 
it  as  would  balance  the  pleasure  which  the  first  possessor 
would  have  had  in  the  enjoyment,  and  his  vexation  in  the  loss 
of  it :  suppose  also,  that  no  bad  consequences  would  follow  ; 
yet  such  an  action  would  surely  be  vicious.  Nay,  farther, 
were  treachery,  violence,  and  injustice,  no  otherwise  vicious, 
than  as  foreseen  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  misery  to 
society  ;  then,  if  in  any  case  a  man  could  procure  to  himself 
as  great  advantage  by  an  act  of  injustice,  as  the  whole  fore¬ 
seen  inconvenience,  likely  to  be  brought  upon  others  by  it, 
would  amount  to,  such  a  piece  of  injustice  would  not  be  faulty 
or  vicious  at  all ;  because  it  would  be  no  more  than,  in  any 
other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own  satisfaction  to  another’s 
in  equal  degrees.  The  fact  then  appears  to  be,  that  we  are 
constituted  so  as  to  condemn  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence, 
injustice,  and  to  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  preferably  to 
others,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  which  conduct  is 
likeliest  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness  or  misery. 
And  therefore,  were  the  author  of  nature  to  propose  nothing 
to  himself  a,s  an  end  but  the  production  of  happiness,  were 
his  moral  character  merely  that  of  benevolence ;  yet  ours  is 
not  so.  Upon  that  supposition,  indeed,  the  only  reason  of  his 
giving  us  the  above-mentioned  approbation  of  benevolence  to 
some  persons  rather  than  to  others,  and  disapprobation  of 
falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  and  injustice,  must  be,  that  he 
foresaw  this  constitution  of  our  nature  would  produce  more 
happiness,  than  forming  us  "with  a  temper  of  mere  general 
benevolence.  But  still,  since  this  is  our  constitution,  false¬ 
hood,  violence,  injustice,  must  be  vice  in  us,  and  benevolence 
to  some  preferably  to  others,  virtue,  abstracted  from  all  consi¬ 
deration  of  the  overbalance  of  evil  or  good  which  they  may 
appear  likely  to  produce. 

Now,  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a  moral 
nature  as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a  moral  facultjq 
the  natural  object  of  which  is  actions  ;  moral  government 
must  consist  in  rendering  them  happy  and  unhappy,  in 
rewarding  and  punishing  them,  as  they  follow,  neglect,  or 
depart  from,  the  moral  rule  of  action  interwoven  in  their 
nature,  or  suggested  and  enforced  by  this  moral  faculty  in 
rewarding  and  punishing  them  upon  account  of  their  so  doing. 

I  am  not  sensible  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  observation,  con^ 
tradicted  what  any  author  designed  to  assert.  But  some  of 

*  Part  ii.  Chap.  6. 


DISS.  II.]  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

great  and  distinguished  merit  have,  I  think,  expressed  them¬ 
selves  in  a  manner,  which  maj  occasion  some  danger  to  care¬ 
less  readers,  of  imagining  the  whole  of  virtue  to  consist  in 
singly  aiming,  according  to  the  best  of  their  judgment,  at 
promoting  the  happiness  of  mankind  in  the  present  state  ; 
and  the  whole  of  vice,  in  doing  what  they  foresee,  or  might 
foresee,-  is  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  unhappiness  ip 
It ;  than  which  mistakes,  none  can  be  conceived  more  terrible. 
For  it  is  certain,  that  some  of  the  most  shocking  instances  ol 
.njustice,  adultery,  murder,  perjury,  and  even  of  persecution, 
may,  in  many  supposable  cases,  not  have  the  appearance  of 
being  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  misery  in  the  pre¬ 
sent  state  ;  perhaps  sometimes  may  have  the  contrary  appear¬ 
ance.  For  this  reflection  might  easily  be  carried  on  ;  but  1 
forbear.—: — The  happiness  of  the  world  is  the  concern  of 
Him,  who  is  the  Lord  and  the  proprietor  of  it ;  nor  do  we 
know  what  we  are  about,  when  we  endeavor  to  promote  the 
good  of  mankind  ip  any  ways  but  those  which  he  has  direct¬ 
ed  ;  that  is,  indeed,  in  all  ways  not  contrary  to  veracity  and 
justice.  I  speak  thus  upon  supposition  of  persons  really 
endeavoring,  in  some  sort,  to  do  good  without  regard  to  these. 
But  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  such  supposed  endeavors  pro¬ 
ceed,  almost  always,  from  ambition,  the  spirit  of  party,  or 
some  indirect  principle,  concealed  perhaps  in  great  measure 
from  persons  themselves.  And  though  it  is  our  business  and 
our  duty  to  endeavor,  within  the  bounds  of  veracity  and  jus¬ 
tice,  to  contribute  to  the  ease,  convenience,  and  even  cheerful- 
noss  and  diversion  of  our  fellow-creatures ;  j^et,  from  our  short 
views,  it  is  greatly  uncertain  whether  this  endeavor  will,  in 
particular  instances,  produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness 
upon  the  whole  ;  since  so  many  and  distant  things  must  come 
into  the  account.  And  that  which  makes  it  our  duty,  is,  that 
there  is  some  appearance  that  it  will,  and  no  positive  appear¬ 
ance  sufficient  to  balance  this,  on  the  contrary  side  ;  and  also, 
that  such  benevolent  endeavor  is  a  cultivation  of  that  most 
excellent  of  all  virtuous  principles,  the  active  principle  of  be¬ 
nevolence. 

However,  though  veracity,  as  -well  as  justice,  is  to  be  our 
rule  of  life,  it  must  be  added,  otherwise  a  snare  will  be  laid  in 
•he  way  of  some  plain  men,  that  the  use  of  common  forms  of 
speech  generally  understood,  cannot  be  falsehood ;  and,  in 
general,  that  there  can  be  no  designed  falsehood  without  de¬ 
signing  to  deceive.  It  must  likewise  be  observed,  that,  in 
numberless  cases,  a  man  may  be  under  the  strictest  obligations 


272 


OV  THC  NATURE  OP  VIRTUE. 


[OISS.  II. 


to  what  he  foresees  will  deceive,  without  his  intending  it.  For 
It  IS  impossible  not  to  foresee,  that  the  words  and  actions  of 
men  in  different  ranks  and  employments,  and  of  different  edu¬ 
cations,  will  perpetually  be  mistaken  by  each  other ;  and  it 
cannot  but  be  so,  whilst  they  will  judge  vuth  the  utmost  care¬ 
lessness,  as  they  daily  do,  of  what  they  are  not,  perhaps, 
enough  informed  to  be  competent  judges  ofj  even  though  they 
considered  it  with  great  attention. 


r 


< 


QUESTIONS 

>  "  FOR  THE_ 

EXAMINATION  OP  STUDENTS  ON  BUTLER’S  ANALOGY  OP 
NATURAL  AND  REVEALED  RELIGION. 


\ 

INTRODUCTION. 

1.  Distinction  between  'probable  and  demonstrative  evidence. 

2.  Why  cannot  we  say,  upon  one  slight  presumption,  that  a 

thing  is  probably  true  ? 

3.  Still,  how  is  it  shown,  that  the  slightest  possible  presump¬ 

tion  partakes  of  the  nature  of  probability  ? 

4.  How  is  that  which  constitutes  probability  expressed?  and 

why  ? 

5.  What  is  the  use  of  probability  in  the  discussion  of  (piestions 

where  more  satisfactory  evidence  cannot  be  had  ? 

6.  Do  men,  generally  speaking,  consider  the  analogical  method 

of  reasoning  just,  natural,  and  conclusive  ?  For  example; 

7.  To  what  conclusion,  from  analogy,  did  Origen  come,  as  to  the 

objections  urged  against  the  Scriptures  ?  and  what  does 
the  author  say  ir}  addition  ? 

8.  How  does  the  author  propose  to  apply  the  principles  of  anal¬ 

ogy  to  the  doctrines  of  natural  and  revealed  religion  ? 

9.  Why  does  he  select  this  mode  of  reasoning  ? 

10.  What  is  the  legitimate  tendency  of  dreamy  speculations  as  to 

how  the  world  might  possibly  have  beeij  framed  otherwise 
than  it  is  ? 

11.  What  do  such  extravagant  and  foolish  trains  of  conclusions 

show,  as  to  such  speculations? 

12.  How  do  they  show  this? 

13.  Instead,  thereftre,  of  this  idle  and  not  very  innocent  way  of 

forming  imaginary  models  oDa  world,  how  ought  we  to 
study  the  natural  and  moral  constitution  of  the  world  ? 

14.  What  is  said  of  the  analogy  here  to  be  considei’ed  ? 

15.  State  what  the  Divine  government  of  the  world,  as  implied 

in  the  notion  of  religion  in  general,  and  of  Christianity,  com¬ 
prehends  ? 

16.  Now,  what  is  the  design  of  the  following  treatise  ? 

12* 


274 


QUESTIONS. 


PART  I. 

■> 

CHAPTER  I. 

1.  Difficulties  concerning  personal  identity. 

Personal  identity  a  complex  term.  Its  constituents. 

2.  What  is  the  object  of  this  chapter? 

3.  What  general  law  in  our  species  obtains,  and  which  affords 

a  high  presumption  in  favor  of  a  future  life  ? 

4.  Does  this  law  hold  good  in  other  races  of  animated  life  ? 

5.  What  is  the  conclusion  from  this  law  of  nature  ? 

6.  What  is  a  law  of  nature  ?  What  is  consciousness  ? 

7.  Of  what  is  the  fact,  that  we  have  capacities  of  pleasure  or 

pain  before  death,  a  presumption  ?  and  why  ? 

8.  What  is  meant  by  faith  in  the  order  of  nature  ? 

9.  Why  do  we  believe  the  course  of  the  world  will  be  as  it 

always  has  been  ? 

10.  Suppose  men  knew  that  death  was  not  the  destruction  of  the 

faculties  of  action  and  perception'  would  they  fear  any  other 
power  or  event  would  be  ?  Why  not  ? 

11.  Now  then,  from  what  two  causes  only  can  we  have  appre¬ 

hensions  that  death  is  the  destruction  of  our  living^powers  ? 

12.  There  can  be  no  apprehension  J'rom  the  reason  of  the  thing: 

Why  not  ? 

13.  Do  we  know  on  what  the  play  of  the  living  powers  depends  ? 

14.  How  do  you  show  these  powers  may  exist  when  they  are 

not  exercised  ? 

15.  Hence,  since  we  do  not  know  on  what  the  play  of  the  living 

powers  depends,  and  since  we  do  know  these  powers  may 
be  suspended  ;  may  exist  when  there  is  no  present  capa¬ 
city  for  exercising  them,  what  is  our  conclusion  as  to  this 
apprehension  from  the  reason  of  the  thing  1 

16.  Can  there  be  any  apprehension  from  the  analogy  of  nature 

that  death  is  the  destruction  of  living  powers  ?  Prove  this. 

17.  In  fact,  of  what  is  our  knowing  that  animals  had  these  pow¬ 

ers  up  to  the  very  period  of  the  event  we  call  death,  a  pre¬ 
sumption  ? 

]  8.  By  what  facts  from  analogy  is  this  confirmed  ? 

19.  AWiat  is  the  hypothesis,  on  which  all  presumption  that  death 

is  the  destruction  of  living  beings,  founded? 

20.  What  is  the  argument,  from  consciousness,  for  the  oneness 

and  indivisibility  of  the,  living  agent-^the  I,  that  which 
thinks,  wills,  acts  ? 

21.  State  the  hypothesis  offered  to  prove  the  unity  of  the  living 

agent.  • 

^2.  What  is  the  deduction  from  this  ? 


quESTioNS-  27s 

23.  Now  then,  if  the  living  being  each  calls  I,  is  a  single  being, 

and  indivisible,  what  follows  as  to  our  organized  bodies? 

24.  It  is  replied  ;  It  is  inconceivable  how  matter  which  is  no 

part  of  us,  may  be  appropriated  to  us  as  our  present  bodies 
are,  How  do  you  meet  this  objection  ? 

25.  Now,  what  is  the  conclusion  from  all  this  ? 

26.  State  some  of  the  facts  which  prove  the  absolute  oneness 

of  the  living  agent. 

27.  Now,  what  do  these  facts  teach? 

28.  The  atomic  elements  of  matter  incapable  of  being  dissolved 

by  any  natural  power, 

29.  Now,  what  follows  from  the  fact  that  we  are  sometimes  closely 

related  to,  and  interested  in,  certain  systems  of  matter,  as 
the  flesh  and  bones,  and  then  cease  to  be  at  all  related  to 
them,  the  living  agents,  ourselves,  being  all  the  while  the 
same — undestroyed  and  entire  ? 

30.  But  it  may  be  said  the  cases  are  not  parallel ;  for  the  aliena¬ 

tion  in' the  one  ease  is  gradual,  and  in  the  other  more  at 
once  :  how  do  you  answer  the  objection  ? 

31.  After  all,  what  does  the  relation  which  a  person  bears  to  those 

parts  of  his  body  to  which  he  is  most  nearly  related,  appa¬ 
rently  amount  ? 

32.  How  may  the  same  be  shown  from  a  consideration  of  the 

body,  as  consisting  of  organs  of  motion  and  perception  ? 

83.  Of  wflat  are  all  instruments  for  assisting  the  reach  and  strength 
of  vision  and  hearing,  illustrations,  when  taken  in  connec¬ 
tion  with  this  discussion  ? 

34.  How  then  may  both  the  eye  and  the  optical  instrument  be 

regarded  ?  and  what  is  the  conclusion  from  this  ? 

35.  Is  it  meant  that  the  whole  apparatus  of  vision  or  of  perception 

can  be  traced  up  to  the  living  power  of  seeing  and  perceiv¬ 
ing  ?  What  then  ? 

36.  By  what  other  way  is  it  shown  that  the  organs  of  sense  are 

not  percipients  ? 

37.  How  may  the  same  be  shown  by  our  power  of  moving,  or 

directing  motion  by  the  will  and  choice  ? 

38.  Does  the  power,  then,  of  moving  or  directing  themselves  re^* 

side  in  the  limbs  ? 

39.  How  may  the  same,  vi^.,  the  mind’s  independency  of  the 

body,  be  shown  by  the  determinations  of  the  will  ? 

40.  Now,  what  is  the  conclusion  from  the  foregoing? 

41.  It  is  objected,  that  these  observations  are  equally  applicable  to 

brutes,  making  them  immortal,  and  capable  of  everlasting 
happiness  :  how  do  you  answer  the  objection  ? 

42.  Does  the  natural  immortality  of  brutes  imply  that  they  are 

endowed  with  any  latent  capacities  of  a  rational  or  moral 
nature  ? 

43.  In  what  are  the  difficulties  as  to  how  brutes  shall  be  disposed 

of  founded  ?  and  to  what  does  this  objection  amount  ? 

44.  What  follows  from  the  fact  that  our  present  powers  of  reason, 


276 


QU^STI0^'3. 


imagination,  and  memor}'-,  do  not  depend  on  our  material 
body,  as  perception  does  on  our  organs  of  sense  ? 

45.  What  are  the  two  states  of  life  and  perception  in  which  hu¬ 

man  creatures  at  present  exist  ? 

46.  Now,  how  do  you  show  that  nothing  dissolvable  by  death  is 

necessary  to  the  living  being  after  ideas  are  gained  ? 

47.  What  other  facts  show  that  the  relation  of'  this  gross  body  to 

the  reflecting  being  is  apparently  no  way  necessary  to 
thinking  ;  nor  to  our  intellectual  enjoyments  and  sufferings  : 
and  that  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  to  conclude  that  its 
dissolution  or  alienation  by  death  will  be  the  destruction 
of  the  rational  and  perceptive  powers  ? 

48.  How  is  it  shown  that  death,  instead  of  being  the  discontinu¬ 

ance  of  these  powers,  may  be  but  another  birth,  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  another  life,  and  which  is  but  the  continuation  of 
the  present,  as  the  present  is  so  of  that  antecedent  to  birth  ? 

49.  What  are  the  grounds  for  believing  that  death  may  but  serve 

to  introduce  us  to  a  higher  and  more  enlarged  state  of  life  ? 

50.  Were  we  certain  that  death  would  suspend  all  our  active  and 

perceptive  powers,  would  that  prove Jt  destroys  them  ? 

51.  But  may  it  not  be  argued  that  the  decay  of  vegetables  and 

living  beings  is  analogous,  and  hence  a  presumption  that 
death  is  their  destruction  ? 

52.  What  then  is  the  conclusion  at  which  we  arrive  on  this  ques^ 

lion,  when  we  confine  ourselves  to  facts ;  to  the  analogies 
of  things  which  we  know,  and  understand  ? 

5.3.  What  is  the  presumption  as  to  the  character  of  the  new  state 
after  the  event  we  call  death,  and  how  may  its  advantages 
be  bestowed  ? 

64.  What  is  the  meaning  of  tl^e  term  natural?  What  follows 

from  this  ? 

65.  Recapitulate  the  arguments  to  show  that  death  is  not  the 

destruction  of  living  agents  : — That  it  is  not  the  destruction 
of  their  present  powers  of  reflection ;  and  that  suspension 
of  these  powers  is  not  their  destruction  ? 


CHAPTER  II. 

1.  What  is  the  subiect  of  the  second  chapter  qf  Butler’s  Anal- 

2.  Wliy  is  the  cjuestion  about  a  future  life  so  impressive  and 

solemn  ? 

3.  What  is  it  that  makes  it  parti cularl}’’  so? 

4.  Apart  from  this  consideration,  would  the  subject  be  one  of 

much  interest  ? 

5.  Now,  if  there  be,  from  analogy,  ground  to  suppose  our  future 

interests  connected  with  our  present  behavior,  is  there  not 


QUESTIONS.  2  7  7 

Reason  for  tho  most  active  and  earnest  solicitude  to  secure 
those  interests  ?  * 

6.  What  is  the  fact  as  to  our  happiness  or  suffering  in  the  pres¬ 

ent  state  1  "  ^  . 

7.  How  do  you  show  this? 

8.  Are  all  our  sufferings^  hoWeVef,  owing  to  our  own  follies  ? 

9.  Answer  the  question,  why  the  Author  of  nature  does  not  make 
j  his  creatures  happy  without  the  instrumentality  of  their 

own  actions,  and  so  prevent  their  bringing  suffering  on 
themselves? 

10.  What  is  the  language  of  universal  experience  on  this  sub¬ 

ject  ? 

11.  What  is  meant  when  it  is  said,  all  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to 

the  course  of  nature  ? 

12.  What  is^meant  by  the  assertion  that  good  and  bad  consS* 

quences  are  the  appointments  of  the  Author  of  nature  ? 

13.  What  general  fact  shows  that  we  are  under  a  government  of 

rewards  and  punishments  ? 

14.  What  is  the  proper  formal  notion  of  siich  a  govern¬ 

ment  ? 

15.  Is  it  material  to  the  argument,  in  any  Way,  whether  the  plea¬ 

sure  or  pain,  which  thus  follows  upon  our  behavior,  be 
owing  to  the  inimediaie  action  of  the  Creator,  or  part  (if  tile 
great  plan  of  things  ?  Why  hot  ? 

16.  How  is  it  shown  from  the  doctrine  of  final  causes  we  are  un¬ 

der  such  a  govemment  ? 

17.  What  is  the  true  conception  of  the  government  which  the 

Author  of  nature  exercises  over  us  ? 

18.  What  is  oUr'cencltlsion  then  from  the  analogy  of  nature  as  to 

this  government'? 

MEN  CIIIEFLr  object  TO  DIVINE  TUNfSHMENT. 

19.  What  circumstances  are  there  in  the  natural  course  of  purt-* 

ishments  now^  analogous  to  what  religion  teaches  Concern¬ 
ing  a  future  state  of  punishment? 

20.  What  facts  connected  with. these  punishments  particularly  de¬ 

serve  attention  ?  '  '  " 

21.  For  example? 

22.  Example  from  habits  contracted  in  early  life?^ 

23i  HoW  is  it  shown  that  the  natural  course  of  things  aff  Uds  op¬ 
portunities  for  procuring  advantages  we  cannot  procure 
when  We  please^  nor  even  recall  bjiportunities  we  have  neg- 
hcted  7 

24.  How  may  the  same  principle  be  illustrated  by  what  obtains 

in  courses  of  folly  and  extravagance  ? 

25.  And  furthermore,  do  not  neglects  from  iiiconsiderateness — 

want  of  attention,  not  looking  about  us,  to  see  what  we 
have  to  do,  often  bring  dreadful  consequences,  as  much  so 
as  active  misbehavior  ? 


278 


QUESTIONS. 


26.  What  is  the  fact  as  to  civil  governments,  are  their  punish¬ 

ments  also  nathral  i 

27.  Now  show  how  these  civil  pUnishments  are  analogous  to 

what  religion  teaches  concerning  the  future  punishment 
of  the  wicked  ? 

28.  Quote  the  Scripture  passages  in  proof  of  this,  and  draw  the 

conclusion  ? 

29.  In  fact,  on  a  sober  review  of  the  proofs  of  a  future  state  of 

rewards  and  punishments,  what  circumstances  do  give  to 
the  mind  its  most  impressive  apj)rehensions  of  punish- 
^  ment  i 

30.  Does  Butler  mean  to  say,  that  men  are  punished  uniformly 

here,  according  to  their  misbehavior? 

31.  What  are  the  closing  reflections  of  the  chapter? 

32.  Recapitulate  the  argument  showing  that  we  are  under  tliC 

government  of  God  by  rewards  and  punishments  ? 


.  '  'chapter  iil 

1.  Of  what  does  the  third  chapter  of  Butler’s  Analogy  treat? 

2.  What  do  the  manifold  appearances  of  design  and  of  final 

causes  in  the  constitution  of  the  world  prove  ? 

8.  What  do  the  particular  final  causes  of  the  distribution  of 
pleasure  and  pain  among  human  beings  pro^■e  ? 

4.  Does  this  alone  prove  that  the  government  of  the  world  is  a 

moral  govemment  ? 

5.  What  is  the  right  idea  of  a  moral  government  ? 

6.  In  what  does  the  perfection  of  moral  government  consist  ? 

7.  What  is  the  opinion  some  entertain  of  the  moral  character  of 

the  Author  of  nature? 

8.  What  is  meant  by  simple,  absolute  benevolence  ? 

9.  And  what  Would  the  attributes  of  Veracity  and  jtistice  be  on 

this  supposition  ?  What  does  Biitler  say  of  this  opinion  ? 

10.  May  there  not  be  beings  in  the  universe  to  whom  the  Author 

of  nature  does  manifest  himself  as  infinite  absolute  benev¬ 
olence  ?  ’  . 

11.  Is  that  the  question  here? 

12.  Is  the  government  of  the  present  state,  taken,  alone,  the  per¬ 

fection  of  moral  government  ?  Is  there  nothing  in  it  then, 
truly  moral  ? 

13.  What  is  the  object  of  this  third  chapter? 

14.  For  example:  what  might  be  mentioned  as  an  impressive  in¬ 

stance  of  moral  government  established  in  nature? 

15.  Is  this,  however,  a  fact?  Are  there  no  exceptions  to  the  hap¬ 

piness  of  virtue  :  Is  virtue,  on  the  whole,  happier  than 
vice  in  the  present  world  ? 

16.  Is  there  any  difficulty  as  to  the  question  whether  God  governs 


QUESTIONf<* 


219 


the  wofld  by  rewards  and  punishments  according  to  set¬ 
tled  rules  of  distribution'? 

17.  What  is  the  difficulty  then  ? 

18.  Now  then,  this  is  the  teaching  of  religion;  does  it,  however, 

harmonize  with  the  analogy  of  things? 

19.  What  facts  show  that  the  world  is  governed  by  fixed  general 

laws — that  happiness  and  misery  result  from,  or  are  in¬ 
stances  of  a  right  constitution  of  nature  ? 

20.  What  facts  more  plainly  prove  the  same,  viz.,  that  we  arc 

under  some  sort  of  moral  gON^ernment  ? 

21.  What  is  the  voice  of  nature  as  to  vicious  actions  ? 

22.  Why  should  the  vices  of  falsehood,  injustice,  and  cruelty  be 

punished  ? 

23.  Now  what  follows  from  the  fact  that  society  punishes'  such 

vices," and  sometimes  rewards  virtues'? 

24.  Hchv  do  you  answer  the  objection  that  good  actions  are  often 

punished  as  in  the  case  of  persecution,  and  ill  actions  are 
often  rewarded '? 

25.  What  is  the  legitimate  conclusion  from  this  ? 

26.  Of  what  then  is  the  fact  that  virtue,  as  such,  is  rewarded,  and 

vice,  as  such,  is  punished  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  a 
proof '? 

27.  What  distinction  is  necessary  to  be  made,  so  as  to  see  this 

clearly  1 

28.  Why  is  this  distinction  necessary  ? 

29.  How  do  you  illustrate  this  distinction  between  the  action  and 

the  morality  of  the  action  ? 

30.  Now  what  proves  that  virtue,  as  such,  procures  advantages^ 

and  that  vice,  as  such,  occasions  great  inconveniences  ? 

31.  How  is  this  argument  strengthened  by  the  behavior  of  all 

honest  and  good  men,  towards  honest  and  good  men,  as  sach^ 

32.  Does  this  obtain  in  the  affairs  of  life  generally :  do  even  men 

who  have  little  love  of  virtue  themselves  reverence  it  in 
others  ? 

33.  For  example:  What  similar  illustration  maybe  given  from 

the  great  revolutions  that  figure  in  history  ? 

34.  In  fact,  on  what  are  all  correct  ideas  of  retaliation  and  re¬ 

sentment,  or  of  gratitude,  and  a  disposition  to  return  good 
offices  founded  ? 

35.  What  instances  have  we  in  domestic  government  illustrative 

of  the  same  fact  ? 

36.  How  do  you  show  that,  though  civil  governments  punish 

actions  only,  because  they  are  prejudicial  to  society,  and 
without  regard  to  their  immorality,  yet  the  sense  of  the 
immorality  of  such  actions  is,  in  some  degree,  felt  by  all  ? 

37.  On  the  whole  then,  what  does  the  sense  of  well-doing;  pre¬ 

sages  of  conscience,  love  of  good  characters  and  dislike  of 
bad  characters ;  honor,  shame,  &c.,  in  themselves,  con¬ 
sidered,  and  in  their  effects  show  ? 


280 


Qt'r:sTio>:s. 

38.  Indeed,  of  wliat  may  the  fact,  that  we  are  endowed  with  a 

moral  nature,  be  regarded  as  a  proof? 

39.  Taken  together,  what  do  these  two  facts  prove? 

40.  But  let  Us  ask  more  minutely,  why  virtue  as  siich,  and  vice  US 

such,  are  rewarded  and  punished  invariably  ? 

41.  What  two  facts  prove  this  satisfactorily  ? 

42.  Is  there  any  such  thing  as  vice  being  approbated  as  such  ? 

43.  What  is  the  conclusion  from  this  ? 

44.  Is  this  a  fact :  is  it  a  truth  of  daily  experience  ? 

45.  In  what  other  way  may  personal  merit  and  demerit,  happi¬ 

ness  and  misery j  be  distributed  in  the  natural  course  ol 
things  ? 

46.  If  the  world  be  governed  by  general  laws,  must  not  the  right¬ 

eous  sometimes  suffer,  and  The  vicious  sometimes  be  re¬ 
warded  ? 

47.  Does  this,  however,  shake  our  faith,  that  God  is  on  the  side 

of  virtue  and  opposed  to  vice  ? 

48.  Why  not  ? 

49.  Can  it  be  said,  that  since  virtuous  actions  are  sometimes  pun¬ 

ished,  and  vicious  actions  sometimes  rewarded,  that  nature 
intended  it  to  be  so  ? 

50.  Why  not  ? 

51.  To  what  then  does  this  declaration,  that  nature  is  on  the  side 

of  virtue  and  opposed  to  vice,  amount  ? 

52.  Now,  how  far  may  every  man  be  said  to  be  on  the  side  of  the 

Divine  administration,  and  what  is  the  result  on  the  man’s 
moral  hopes  ? 

55.  By  what  is  this  sehse  of  security  and  hope  of  something  further 
still,  b}^  the  doer  of  the  right,  confirmed  ? 

54.  How  do  you  show  these  tendencies  are  such,  that  good  men 

ought  to  be  rewarded,  and  bad  men  punished  more  as  such^ 
than  they  are  ? 

55.  It  is  acknowledged  these  tendencies  are  obvious  as  to  individ¬ 

uals:  but  is  -it  equally  obvious,  that  power  in  a  society 
controlled  by  vii’tue,  naturally  increases  and  necessarily 
tends  to  prevail  oVer  power  not  Under  the  direction  of 
virtue  ? 

56.  What  is  the  supposition  to  illustrate  the  principle,  that  length 

of  time,  and  proper  scope  for  reason  to  exert  itself;  may  be 
absolutely  necessary  for  Tower  though  joined  with  reason, 
to  prevail  over  opposite  power  thoUgh  merely  brutal  ? 

57.  Further  still,  are  there  not  instances,  in  which  brutes,  owing 

to  their  incapability  of  foreseeing  the  dangers  of  certain  at¬ 
tempts,  have  succeeded  in  these  attempts,  and  instances  of 
reason  and  real  prudence  preventing  men’s -undertaking 
what  they  might  have  succeeded  in  by  a  lucky  rashness  ? 

68.  Nay,  may  there  not  be  some  globes  where  possibly  the  irra¬ 

tional  have  the  superiority  over  the  rational  animals  ? 

69.  Now  suppose  the  rational  animals  of  such  globes  wholly  B.P 

variance,  envious,  treacherous,  unjust,  utterly  disunited. 


QUESTIONS. 


281 


while  the  irrational  were  firmly  united  by  interest,  what 
would  be  the  opinion  one  would  likely  form  of  the  origin 
of  this  state  of  things  ? 

60.  What  is  the  analogy  then  as  to  the  power  of  virtue  in  a  so¬ 

ciety  ? 

61.  How  does  this  tendency  of  the  power  of  virtue  in  a  society 

manifest  itself? 

62.  Now  suppose  the  invisible  world  and  its  dispensations  anal¬ 

ogous  to  the  present,  or  that  both  are  parts  of  one  great 
plan,  what  is  the  deduction  as  to  this  tendency  of  reason, 
under  the  direction  of  virtue,  to  prevail  ? 

63.  But  are  there  no  requisites  for  this  ;  what  may  be  necessary 

that  yirtue  may  actually  produce  what  it  has  a  tendency 
to  produce  ? 

64.  What  is  the  Author’s  opinion  as  to  the  proportion  between 

the  good  and  the  bad,  even  here  on  earth,  and  the  relative 
natural  power  of  the  good  ? 

65.  What  are  the  hinderances  which  prevent  the  union  of  good 

men  over  the  earth,  in  opposition  to  force  not  under  the 
control  of  virtue  ? 

66.  How  may  the  condition  of  virtue  here,  very  properly  be  rep¬ 

resented,  and  particularly  so  as  to  its  ultimate  triumph? 

67.  If  then  the  soul  be  naturally  immortal :  if  this  state  be  but  a 

stage  in  our  progress  onward,  whatsis  the  presumption  as 
to  this  union  of  all  good  men,  as  well  as  other  orders  of  vir¬ 
tuous  beings,  on  the  side  of  right  and  goodness  in  that  fu¬ 
ture  state  ? 

68.  Now  suppose  this  tendency  fully  carried  out  in  one  or  more 

orders  of  beings  in  any  distant  scenes  and  periods,  what  ef¬ 
fect  might  it  have  on  the  orders  of  the  vicious  if  seen  by 
them,  even  throughout  the  universal  kingdom  of  God? 

69.  For  what  purposes  are  these  suppositions  mentioned,  since 

they  are  not  offered  as  a  literal  exhibition  of  what  is  in 
fact  the  particular  scheme  of  the  universe  ? 

70.  Of  what  may  all  the  advantageous  tendencies  of  virtue  be 

considered  ?  ' 

71.  Repeat  the  hypothesis  as  to  the  effects  and  influence  of  a 

kingdom  or  society  of  men,  perfectly  virtuous  for  a  suc¬ 
cession  of  many  ages,  on  itself  and  on  other  nations  ? 

72.  Does  this  harmonize  with  the  general  system  of  religion  ? 

73.  It  may  be  objected,  that  notwithstanding  all  these  tendencies 

of  virtue,  things  may  be  going  on  throughout  the  universe, 
and  may  go  on  hereafter  in  the  same  mixed  way  as  on  the 
earth  at  present :  What  is  your  answer  ? 

74.  What  four  reasons  has  Butler  given  in  addition  to  the  fore¬ 

going,  to  show  the  ultimate  triumph  of  virtue  ? 

75.  Upon  the  whole  then,  what  is  the  conclusion  as  to  the  notion 

of  a  scheme  of  moral  government,  and  of  its  ultimate  pro¬ 
gress  towards  absolute  perfection  ? 


282 


QUESTIONS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

1.  What  is  the  subject  of  this  chapter  1 

2.  What  is  meant  by  our  present  life  being  a  state  of  probation 

for  a  future  life  ? 

3.  Is  not  this  equivalent  to  saying  we  are  under  the  moral  gov¬ 

ernment  of  God,  and  are  to  give  to  Him  an  account  of  our 
actions  ? 

4.  State  the  difference  between  the  terms  probation  ^and  moral 

government  ? 

5.  What  does  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  religion 

teaches  us,  imply  ?  What  does  his  natural  government 
imply  ? 

6.  In  what  does  the  natural  government  here  meant  consist,  and 

what  does  it  imply  ? 

7.  What  facts  show,  that  in  our  natural  or  temporal  capacity, 

we  are  in  a  state  of  trial :  that  is,  of  difficulty  and  danger, 
analogous  to  our  moral  and  religious  trial  ? 

8.  What  is  it  that  constitutes  this  our  trial  in  our  natural  and 

moral  capacities  ? 

9.  How  is  this  illustrated  ? 

10.  What  is  the  deducible  therefore,  as  to  particular  habits  and 

passions  in  connection  with  moral  behavior  ? 

11.  Further,  how  is  it  shown  we  are  in  a  like  state  of  trial,  as  to 

both  our  present  and  future  good,  by  the  very  same  pas¬ 
sions  excited  by  the  very  same  means  ? 

12.  What  is  the  conclusion  ? 

13.  As  a  general  thing,  how  does  the  consideration  of  this  state 

of  trial,  in  their  temporal  and  religious  capacity,  affect  the 
behavior  of  mankind  ? 

14.  What  is  the  parallel  instituted  as  to  the  difficulties  and  dan¬ 

gers  of  miscarrying,  failing  in  our  religious  and  temporal 
interests  from  the  ill  behavior  of  others  ? 

15.  What  are  some  of  those  dangers  of  failure  arising  out  of 

personal  misconduct,  wrong  behavior  putting  us  in  a 
more  disadvantageous  state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  ca¬ 
pacity  ? 

1 6.  Does  it  seem  as  if  mankind  were  in  the  most  advantageous 

state  naturally,  or  morally,  for  securing  their  present  and  fu¬ 
ture  interests  ? 

17.  Does,  after  all,  this  low,  careful  and  uncertain  condition,  afford 

just  ground  of  complaint  ? 

18.  What  renders  the  state  of  trial,  religion  teaches  us  we  are  in, 

credible  ? 

19.  What  are  the  circumstances  supposed,  which  if  true,  might 

form  a  presumption  against  the  representation  religion 
makes  of  our  future  and  more  general  interests,  depending 
on  behavior  and  self-government  ? 

20.  If  this  then  were  our  natural  condition,  what  would  be  the 


QUESTIONS. 


283 


course  of  our  reasonings  as  to  the  state  of  our  luture 
being  ? 

21.  But,  what  is  the  fact  as  to  our  happiness  and  security  in  the 

present  state  ? 

22.  How  do  you  answer  the  specious' objection,  It  is  impossible 

the  Infinite  Being  should  put  upon  us  hazard  and  danger, 
which  he  foreknew  must,  from  our  very  nature,  end  in 
error  and  misery. 

23.  To  what  are  these  observations  an  answer,  and  what  do  they 

show  ? 

24.  Give  a  summary  of  the  chapter? 


CHAPTER  V. 

1.  What  question  naturally  arises  from  the  consideration  of  our 

being  in  a  state  of  probation — one  of  so  much  difficulty 
and  hazard  ?  ’ 

2.  What  are  some  of  the  insuperable  difficulties  in  which  such  a 

general  inquiry  as  this  is  involved  ? 

3.  What  partial  answer  may  be  given  to  the  question  ? 

4.  There  is  another  inquiry,  however,  lying  side  by  side  with  this, 

of  far  higher  and  more  pressing  importance  :  What  is  it  ? 

5.  How  is  this  question  answered  ;  What  is  the  known  end  of 

this  state  of  hazard,  affliction,  and  difficulty  in  which  we 
are  placed  ? 

6.  Now,  what  is  there  analogous,  in  the  beginning  of  life,  con¬ 

sidered  as  an  education  for  mature  age  in  the  present 
world,  to  this  our  trial  for  a  future  one  ? 

7.  How  is  it  shown  there  must  be  some  necessary  character  and 

qualifications,  without  which  persons  cannot  but  be  utterly 
incapable  of  happiness  here  or  hereafter  ? 

8.  What  is  the  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  indeed  of 

all  creatures  we  are  acquainted  with,  as  to  capacities  for 
states  of  life,  for  enlargement,  for  acquirements  of  experi¬ 
ence  and  habits  ? 

9.  How  is  this  illustrated  by  our  own  moral  and  intellectual 

capacities. 

10.  How  is  this  still  further  illustrated  by  the  law  of  habit  ? 

11.  What  is  habit  ?  What  are  some  of  its  laws  ? 

12.  Now,  on  what  must  all  mental  habits  be  fonned? 

13.  Resolutions  to  do  well  are  virtuous  acts :  endeavoring  to  en¬ 

force  on  our  own,  or  on  the  minds  of  others,  a  practical 
sense  of  virtue,  are  virtuous  acts :  how  are  they  to  be  con¬ 
verted  into  habits  of  active  goodness? 

14.  Will  mere  going  over  the  theory  of  virtue  in  one’s  thoughts : . 

talking  well  of  it,  and  drawing  fine  pictures  of  it,  necessa¬ 
rily,  or  certainly,  form  virtuous  habits  ? 

15.  According  to  what  law  of  habit  does  this  take  place  1 


284 


QUESTIO^■S. 


16.  Now,  what  follows  from  the  fact,  that  practical  habits  are 

formed  by  repeated  acts,  and  that  passive  impressions  grow 
weaker  by  repetition? 

17.  Does  experience  confirm  this  ?  Repeat  the  three  instances 

of  this. 

16.  It  is  then  an  appointment  of  nature  that  active  habits  are  to 
be  formed  by  exercise  :  that  our  nature  is  formed  to  yield 
in  some  such  manner,  to  use  and  exercise ;  so  that  we  may 
form  a  new  character,  and  many  habitudes  of  life,  not  given 
by  nature,  but  which  nature  directs  us  to  acquire.  Illus¬ 
trate  this. 

19.  Indeed,  what  does  the  fact,  that  we  have  these  capacities  of 

improving  by  experience,  acquired  knowledge,  and  habits, 
prove  ? 

20.  How  is  this  further  shown  ? 

21.  What  is  the  supposition  illustrative  of  this  ? 

22.  What  is  the  state  of  man,  then,  in  these  respects,  as  to  that 

mature  state  of  life  which  is  the  end  of  his  creation,  con¬ 
sidering  him  only  as  related  to  this  world  ? 

23.  How  are  we  to  regard  childhood  and  youth  in  reference  to 

mature  age  ? 

24.  How  is  this  still  further  illustrated  1 

25.  Now,  if  these  things  be  so,  how  are  we  to  regard  the  present 

stages  of  life,  in  reference  to  a  maturer  condition  of  being 
hereafter  ? 

26.  Suppose  we  are  unable  to  discern  how  the  present  life  could 

be  our  preparation  for  another,  ought  that  to  be  an  objec¬ 
tion  to  the  credibility  it  is  so  ? 

27.  What  is  the  conclusion  from  this  ?  ^ 

28.  Suppose  we  include  the  idea  of  moral  government,  and  conse¬ 

quently  that  virtue  and  piety  are  necessary  qualifications 
for  the  future  state,  how  will  the  question  then  stand  ? 

29.  Judging  from  the  analogies  of  nature,  is  the  Hereafter  a  soli¬ 

tary,  inactive  state  ? 

30.  Is  ignorance  of  its  employments:  ignorance  how  justice,  ve¬ 

racity,  charity,  can  be  exercised  among  its  members,  to  be 
taken  as  proof  there  will  be  no  such  sphere  of  exercise  for 
those  virtues  ? 

31.  Inasmuch  as  the  government  established  in  the  universe  is 

moral,  what  is  almost  certainty  as  to  fitment  for  happiness  ? 

32.  We  have  seen  we  are,  from  our  natural  power  of  habits, 

capable  of  moral  improvement  by  discipline :  show  that 
we  need  it.  <■ 

33.  Show  that  mankind,  and  indeed  all  finite  creatures,  from  their 

very  constitution,  arc,  before  habits  of  virtue,  deficient  and 
in  danger  of  deviations  from  right,  and,  therefore,  need 
virtuous  habits  for  a  security. 

34.  Now,  what  is  the  general  security  against  this  danger  of 

actually  deviating  from  right,  which  finite  creatures  are  in 
from  propension  or  particular  affections  ? 


QUESTIONS. 


285 


35.  How  is  this  illustrated  ? 

Might  not  a  sense  of  interest  effectually  restrain  creatures 
from  doing  wrong  ? 

36.  Show  how  it  comes  to  pass  that  creatures  made  upright  fall : 

and  that  those  who  preserve  their  uprightness,  by  so  doing, 
raise  themselves  to  a  more  secure  state  in  virtue.  .  , 

37.  What  is  here  meant  by  the  phrases,  creatures  made  upright ; 

or  finitely  perfect  ? 

38.  Now,  how  do  these  propensions  and  affections  endanger  the 

uprightness  of  such  creatures? 

39.  How  is  such  a  case  illustrated  / 

40.  It  is  indeed  impossible  to  say  how  much  the  first  full  overt 

act  of  irregularity  might  disorder  the  inward  constitution  ; 
but  is  it  as  hard  to  say  what  would  be  the  effect  of  re¬ 
peated  irregularities  ? 

41.  And  conversely,  how  may  it  be  shown  that  by  following  the 

moral  principle,  upright  creatures  may  improve ;  may 
raise  themselves  to  a  higher  and  securer  state  ofyirtue? 

42.  Now  then,  what  is  the  conclusion  as  to  habits  of  vicious  in¬ 

dulgence,  and  habits  of  virtuous  self-government  in  them¬ 
selves,  and  on  the  inward  constitution  and  character? 

43.  May  not  the  more  complete  security  of  virtuous  beings  in  this 

higher  perfection  continue  to  consist  in  habits  of  virtue 
formed  in  a  state  of  discipline :  and  if  so,  will  it  serve  to 
explain  how  creatures  made  upright,  may  be  in  danger  of 
going  wrong  ? 

44.  If  virtuous  habits  are  needed  for  the  full  security  of  vir- 

?tuous  beings,  aforliorU  what  will  be  the  need  oi  such  with 
respect  to  beings  who  have  corrupted  their  nature  ? 

45.  Now,  how  is  it  shown  that  this  present  world  is  'peculiarly Jit 

to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  moral  amendment  and  im¬ 
provement  ? 

46.  Once  more,  how  do  allurements  to  wrong-doing:  difficulties 

in  the  discharge  of  duty  ;  the  snares  and  temptations  of 
vice  under  the  present  world,  y)eculiarly  fit  it  to  be  a  state 
of  discipline  to  such  as  will  maintain  their  integrity  ? 

47.  For  example. 

48.  Is  self-denial  essential  to  virtue  and  piety  ? 

49.  What  is  the  sense  in  which  this  world  is  to  be  considered 

peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  our  improve¬ 
ment  in  virtue  and  piety  ? 

50.  Do  we  know  the  whole  end  and  occasion,  why  mankind  is 

placed  in  the  present,  which  to  many  is  a  discipline  of  vice 
rather  than  of  virtue  ? 

51.  What  appears  to  be  a  fact  as  to  this  ? 

52.  But  may  it  not  be  objected,  that  since  the  generality  do  not 

improve  or  grow  better  in  the  present  world,  that  this 
world  was  not  intended  for  moral  discipline  ?  Answer  the 
objection. 


286 


QUESTIONS. 


53.  What  does  Butler  say  of  the  appearance  of  such  an  amazing 

waste  in  nature,  of  vegetable  and  animal  life,  unperfected  ? 

54.  How  do  you  answer  the  objection,  that  behavior,  though  vir¬ 

tuous,  yet  proceeding  from  hope  and  fear,  is  only  a  disci¬ 
pline  of  self-love  ? 

55.  Are  hope  and  fear  then,  proper  means  for  the  discipline  of  vir¬ 

tuous  character  ? 

56.  Besides  active  virtue,  what  other  essential  part  of  a  right 

character  is  there,  and  which  is  very  much  in  our  power 
to  form  ourselves  to  ? 

57.  How  do  you  answer  the  question,  What  need  for  resigna¬ 

tion  in  a  state  of  perfect  happiness  ?  Can  nothing  but  af¬ 
flictions  require  this  virtue  ? 

58.  Now,  why  may  there  be  need  for  that  temper  of  the  mind, 

which  is  formed  by  patience  and  contentedness  with  the  de¬ 
gree  of  happiness  allotted  us,  founded  on  habits  of  resig¬ 
nation  ? 

59.  What  is  the  proper  discipline  for  resignation  ?  Why  is  it  ? 

60.  Is  this  the  mere  inuring  of  the  mind  to  submit  to  power  and 

force  ?  What  is  the  conclusion  from  this  ? 

61.  How  do  you  answer  the  objection,  that  all  this  discipline  of 

life  might  have  been  saved  us,  by  our  being  made  at  once 
the  creatures  and  characters  we  were  to  be  ? 

62.  In  what  case  is  this  law  of  our  nature,  namely,  that  what  we 

are  to  be,  is  to  be  the  effect  of  what  we  do,  definite  and 
plain  ? 

63.  Besides  the  ideas  of  danger  and  difficulties,  discipline  and 

improvement,  what  is  the  third  idea  implied,  in  the  present 
world  being  in  a  state  of  probation  ?  ^ 

64.  Of  what  may  it  be  the  means  with  reference  to  the  ultimate 

disposal  of  moral  beings  ? 


CHAPTER  VI. 

1.  What  is  the  subject  of  this  chapter  ? 

2.  To  what  has  the  condition  of  mankind,  as  inhabitants  of  this 

world,  and  under  moral  government,  been  shown  to  be 
analogous  ? 

3.  But,  might  not  a  fatalist  object,  that  the  opinion  of  universal 

necessity  will  account  for  the  origin  and  preservation  of  all 
things ;  and  hence  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  our  being 
in  a  state  of  religion  ;  how  do  you  meet  this  objection? 

4.  In  an  argument  between  a  fatalist,  and  one  who  believed  him¬ 

self  a  free  agent,  as  to  the  origin  of  a  house,  would  their 
difference  of  belief  as  to  necessity  and  freedom  affect  their 
agreement  that  it  is  the  work  of  some  architect  ?  In  what 
might  they  disagree  ? 

5.  Suppose,  then,  they  proceeded  to  inquire  concerning  the  con- 


QUESTIONS.  28Y 

stitution  of  nature,  how  must  they  use  the  terms,  necessity 
and  freedom  ? 

6.  Why  do  we  ascribe  to  God  a  necessary  existence,  uncaused 

by  any  agent  ? 

7.  Why  cannot  we  ascribe  this  kind  of  necessity,  a  necessity 

antecedent  in  nature  to  design,  to  everything  that  exists? 

8.  Now,  what  does  the  fatalist  mean,  when  he  says  everything 

is  b}'^  necessity  ? 

9.  Suppose  the  system  of  fatalism,  as  thus  explained;  What 

then  ? 

JO.  Now,  since  the  scheme  of  fatalism  pre-supposes  a  builder, 
what  do  the  appearances  of  design  and  final  causes  in  the 
constitution  of  nature  jirove  this  Builder  to  be  ? 

11.  Does  the  opinion,  then,  of  necessity  destroy  the  proof  that 

there  is  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  the  natural 
world  ? 

12.  Supposing,  then,  the  opinion  of  necessity  consistent  with  the 

constitution  of  the  world,  and  the  natural  government  we 
expeiience,  would  it  destroy  all  reasonable  ground  of  belief 
that  we  are  in  a  probationary  state  ? 

13.  What  is  the  illustration  to  show  that  it  does  not,  even  on 

the  fatalist’s  own  principles  of  conduct  ? 

14.  What  is  the  illustration  to  show  that  the  scheme  of  fatalism 

is  equally  fallacious  in  a  practical  sense  ? 

15.  Even  though  it  were  admitted  that  the  opinion  of  necessity  is 

speculativel3^  true,  is  it  not  fjractically  false  ? 

16.  If,  therefore,  the  opinion  of  nccessit}'^,  be  it  ever  so  true  spec¬ 

ulatively,  misleads  us  as  to  our  real  interests  in  the  prac¬ 
tical  affairs  of  life,  is  it  safe  to  trust  to,  in  interests  that  are 
future,  and  more  solemn  still  ? 

17.  How  does  it  follow,  then,  that  if  the  evidence  of  religion  on 

the  supposition  of  freedom  be  conclusive,  it  is  equally  so 
on  the  supposition  of  necessit^^  ? 

18.  How  is  it  shown,  that  fate,  necessity,  is,  on  the  fatalist’s  prin¬ 

ciples,  reconcilable  with  the  idea  of  a  Moral  Governor  and 
Designer  ? 

19.  Now,  the  benevolence,  veracity,  justice  of  the  Creator,  attri¬ 

butes  which  are  the  foundation  of  religion,  are  also  recon¬ 
cilable  on  the  principle  of  necessity  :  How  do  you  show 
this  ? 

20.  Well  then,  if  universal  necessity  be  reconcilable  with  the 

character  of  the  Author  of  nature,  does  it  not  plainly  de¬ 
stroy  this  moral  character,  and  with  it  the  proof  of  religion  ? 

21.  Show  the  proof  from  ffnal  causes,  that  the  idea  of  an  intelli¬ 

gent  Moral  Governor  is  not  affected  by  the  supposition  that 
necessity  is  reconcilable  with  the  constitution  of  things. 

22.  Prove  that  the  dictates  of  the  moral  faculty  are  laws  in  a 

sense  including  sanctions. 

23.  What  gives  explicitness  to  the  sanction:  makes  it,  as  one 

may  say,  exj)ressed  ? 


288 


QUESTIONS. 


24.  And  why  does  it  so? 

25.  What  then  is  there  the  most  evident  reason  to  conclude  as  to 
-  the  government  of  God  ?  and  what  is  the  deduction  from 

it  as  to  the  obligations  of  religious  worship  ? 

26.  Now,  why  can  no  valid  objection  be  brought  against  this 

general  proof  of  religion,  nor  against  the  proposition  that 
we  have  such  a  moral  faculty,  nor  against  the  conclusion 
that  God  will  reward  the  righteous  and  punish  the  wicked, 
finally  ?  t 

27.  By  what  else  is  this  reasoning  from  fact  confirmed,  and  what 

indeed  makes  the  general  proof  of  religion  unanswerably 
real,  even  on  the  wild  supposition  of  universal  necessity? 

28.  Besides  this,  has  natural  religion  any  external  evidence  which 

‘  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  if  true,  would  not  afiect  ?  What 
are  the  proofs  that  it  has? 

29.  Now  what  is  the  particular  value  of  these  three  proofs  that 

natural  religion  has  an  external  evidence,  unafiected  by 
the  supposition  of  necessity  ? 

30.  Does  the  fact,  that  our  moral  understandings  may  be  im¬ 

paired  and  perverted,  and  their  dictates  not  impartially 
attended  to,  weaken  the  belief  they  were  designed  by 
nature  to  inform  us  in  the  theory  of  things,  and  instruct  us 
how  to  behave,  and  what  to  exjiect  from  such  behavior  ? 

31.  Of  what  should  this  liableness  we  are  in  to  prejudice  and 

perversion,  most  seriously  .tv  arn  us  ?  ^ 

32.  Finally,  suppose  the  fatalist  tells  you  :  The  method  of  re¬ 

wards  and  punishments,  you  say,  must  go  on  the  suppo¬ 
sition  we  are  free,  and  not  necessary  agents :  But  the 
Author  of  nature  knows  we  are  not,  and  hence  it  is  absurd 
to  suppose  He  will  reward  or  punish  us  hereafter :  How 
would  you  answer  the  objection  ? 

33.  What  then  is  the  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  consider¬ 

ations  ? 

34.  In  what  sense  are  we  to  understand  that  general  assertion, 

that  the  opinion  of  necessity  is  destructive  essentially  of  all 
religion  ? 

35.  Recapitulate  the  leading  arguments  of  the  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

1.  What  is  the  subject  of  the  seventh  chapter? 

2.  Admitting  that  the  analogy  of  nature  strengthens  the  credi¬ 

bility  of  the  general  doctrines  of  religion,  as  facts ;  and  that 
the  notion  of  necessity  does  not  destroy  this  credibility,  yet 
may  there  not  be  objections  against  the  wisdom,  goodness, 
and  equity  of  the  Divine  administration  implied  in  the  idea 
of  religion,  and  for  which  analogy  can  furnish  no  answer? 
How  do  you  meet  this  objection  ? 


QUESTIONS. 


289 


3.  Why  cannot  analogy  furnish  a  direct  answer  to  such  an 

objection  ? 

4.  But  still,  on  the  supposition  of  a  moral  constitution,  and  a 

moral  goveniment  over  it,  analogy  has  its  use  :  What  is  itT 

5.  Now,  what  are  the  teachings  of  analogy  that  show  this  ? 

6.  Show'  that  the  natural  government  of  the  world  is  a  scheme 

infinite  and  incomprehensible,  and  that,  analogically,  the 
moral  government  must  be  so  ? 

7.  In  truth,  do  the  natural  and  moral  constitution  of  the  world 

form  two  distinct  schemes  ? 

8.  What  is  the  conclusion  from  this  ? 

9.  Thus,  for  example. 

10.  Suppose  it  asserted  that  the  origin  and  continuance  of  evil 

might  have  been  prevented  by  interpositions  so  guarded  as 
to  preclude  all  mischief  arising  from  them  :  or  suppose  it  is 
asserted  that  a  scheme  of  government  is  in  itself  an  imper¬ 
fection,  since  more  good  might  have  been  produced  by 
single  insulated  acts  of  distinctive  goodness  and  justice  than 
by  any  such  scheme  or  constitution  :  How  would  you  an¬ 
swer  the  objection  ? 

11.  What,  in  truth,  is  the  common  but  really  satisfactory  answer 

to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  God  ? 
For  example. 

12.  How'  may  this  be  further  shown,  namely,  that  all  objections 

against  the  goodness  and  justice  of  God  in  the  constitution 
of  things  are  forceless  ? 

13.  Now,  upon  the  supposition  that  the  moral  is  analogous  to  the 

natural  world,  and  in  which  natural  ends  are  reached  by 
means  both  apparently  undesirable  and  unlikely,  what  is 
our  conclusion  ? 

14.  But  is  there  not  a  presumption  against  this,  in  the  fact,  that 

we  do  not  always  see  those  means  have  this  tendency,  but 
rather  the  contrary  ? 

15.  By  what  analogy  is  it  sho%vn,  that  though  the  commission  of 

wickedness  may  be  beneficial  to  the  world,  yet  that  it 
would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  to  refrain  from  it  ? 

16.  When  it  is  said  that  the  actual  permission  of  evil  is  beneficial 

to  the  world,  what  is  meant  ? 

17.  What  are  some  of  the  reasons  for  supposing  that  Tlie  natural 

go\ eminent  of  the  w'orld  is  earned  on  by  general  laws? 

18.  Now,  though  every  single  case  may  be  provided  for  by  these 

general  laws,  yet  might  not  interpositions  to  prevent  irreg¬ 
ularities,  which  general  laws  could  neither  prevent  nor 
remedy,  be  manifestly  attended  with  some  bad  effects  ? 

19.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  what  is  the  conclusion  as  to  interpo¬ 

sitions  ? 

20.  Two  objections  may  here  be  raised  :  First,  that  we  must 

judge  of  religion  as  we  do  of  other  things,  by  what  we  do 
know,  and  reject  all  su]>posed  relations  and  impossibilities 
which  to  us  are  unknown ;  and  secondly,  that  these  un- 

13 


290 


QUESTION^ 


known  impossibilities  and  relations  militate  as  much  against 
as  for  religion  :  How  do  you  answer  them  ?  Answer  the 
first. 

21.  How  do  you  answer  the  second  ? 

22.  Even  though  the  future  consequences  of  virtue  and  vice  were 

doubtful,  would  it  not'  be,  after  all,  the  highest  prudence  to 
abstain  from  all  wickedness,  and  to  practise  the  right  ? 

23.  But  again,  these  objections  against  religion  cannot  be  made  use 

of  to  invalidate  its  proofs :  How  do  the  analogies  of  nature 
show  this  ? 

24.  Finally,  what  does  analogy  show  us  definitely  as  to  our  ca¬ 

pability  of  judging  of  the  possibilities  of  things,  and  the 
various  relations  in  nature  ? 

Recapitulate  the  leading  argurnents  of  the  chapter. 


CONCLUSION. 

1.  How  do  the  observations  of  the  last  chapter  lead  us  to  con¬ 

sider  the  present  life  ? 

2.  What  then  is  the  character  of  the. scheme  in  which  we  find 

ourselves  placed  ?  ' 

3.  What  is  the  only  intelligent  way  of  accounting  for  the  origin 

and  continuance  of  the  world  ? 

4.  Now,  as  many  things  render  it  palpably  absurd,  tliat  we  shall 

cease  to  he,  at  death,  what  reflections  must,  at  times,  sug¬ 
gest  themselves  to  earnest  thinking  men  ? 

5.  On  what  is  the  probability  that  we  shall  be  living  creatures 

after  death  grounded  ? 

6.  What  is  the  argument  for  this  from  experience  ? 

7.  Now,  what  is  the  character  of  the  prospect  which  immortality 

opens  to  us  ? 

8.  How  has  it  been  shown  that  to  good  actions,  as  such,  happi¬ 

ness  has  been  annexed,  and  to  bad  actions,  as  such,  misery: 
in  other  words,  that  the  good  will  be  rewarded  and  the  bad 
punished  ? 

9.  Does  this  establish  the  opinion  of  a  moral  government?  and 

what  are  the  apprehensions  it  suggests  ? 

10.  How  is  it  shown  from  the  analogies  of  things  that  there  is 

nothing  incredible  in  supposing  a  future  condition,  depen¬ 
dent  on  our  behavior  noic? 

11.  What  is  the  teaching  of  religion  on  this*  subject? 

12.  By  what  else  is  this  intention  of  nature,  namely,  that  the 

present  is  probationary,  rendered  credible  ? 

13.  What  are  the  answers  to  the  objections  to  religion  from  the 

doctrine  of  necessity  ? 

14.  As  these  things  are  matters  of  fact,  what  should  their  legiti¬ 

mate  influence  be  on  our  lives  and  conduct  ? 


I 


qUESTIONS. 


291 


15.  Can  mere  passion  in  sncli  a  state  be  pleaded  as  an  excuse  for 

a  vicious  life  ? 

16,  Finally,  are  the  proper  motives  to  religion  and  the  proofs  of  it 

the  same :  and  what  are  they  ? 


PART  IL 

OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 

CHAPTER  I. 

1.  What  is  the  object  of  this  chapter  ? 

2.  On  what  grounds  do  some  reject  all  revelation  as  in  its  very 

nature  incredible  and  fictitious '? 

3.  VTiat  consideration  shows  that  natural  religion  is  not  enough 

for  all  our  moral  and  spiritual  wants  1 

4.  In  fact,  is  there  any  likeliness  that  any  one  could  have  reasoned 

out  a  system  of  natural  religion,  full,  simple,  and  unmarred 
by  superstition  ? 

5.  Admitting  the  generality  of  mankind  might  have  reasoned  out 

such  a  system,  might  not  revealed  religion  have  still  been 
•  needed  ? 

6.  What  is  the  argument  used  by  some,  who  do  not  deny  the 

p^Tssibility  of  revelation,  but  rather  overlook  its  claims,  as 
of  little  importance  if  natural  religion  be  followed  ? 

7.  How  do  you  answer  an  argument  of  this  kind  ? 

8.  What  two  fundamental  considerations  to  be  attended  to  in 

discussing  the  importance  of  Christianity  1 

9.  How  is  it  shown  that  Christianity’  is  a  republication  of  natu¬ 

ral  religion  ? 

_  <i_* 

10.  VTiat  were  the  miracles  and  prophesies  of  Scripture  intended 

to  prove  ? 

11.  How  also,  do  these  prove  the  general  providence  of  God  over 

the  world  as  our  Moral  Governor  and  Judge  ? 

1*2.  It  is  true,  it  may  be  disputed  how  far  miracles  can  prove  nat¬ 
ural  religion,  and  objections  may  specially  be  urged  against 
it,  but  practically  there  are  none :  prove  this. 

13.  How  then  are  we  to  regard  the  Law  of  Moses  and  the  Gos¬ 

pel  of  Christ? 

14.  By  what  supposition  is  this  enforced  ? 

15.  What  great  truths  are  taught  in  revelation,  and  which  natural 

religion  teaches  most  imperfectly  1 

16.  Furthermore,  the  miraculous  pubhcation  of  Christianity  not 

only  proved  the  truths  of  religion,  when  it  was  first  pub¬ 
lished,  but  has  given  permanency  and  diffusiveness  to  these 


292 


QUESTIONS, 


trnths  by  tbe  establishment  of  a  visible  charch.  Show 
this. 

17.  What  farther  tendency  has  a  visible  church  to  promote  nat¬ 

ural  religion  ? 

18.  What  are  positive  institutions? 

19.  Why  are  all  the  objections  against  Christianity,  drawn  from 

its  perversions,  and  from  the  supposition  of  its  having  had 
but  little  good  influence,  atheistic  in  their  tendency  ? 

20.  Show  that  the  arguments  against  Christianity,  drawn  from 

its  abuses  and  corruptions,  cannot  be  consistently  urged, 
upon  principles  of  theism. 

21.  Christianity  then,  is  a  republication  of  natural  religion, 

authoritatively,  and  with  additions  adapted  to  the  wants 
of  mankind  :  show  that  it  is  obligatory  on  every  man,  who 
professes  to  believe  it,  to  strengthen  its  progress  and  hold 
over  the  world. 

22.  Is  Christianity,  however,  simply  an  external  institution  of 

natural  religion,  and  a  new  promulgation  of  God’s  general 
providence,  as  the  Righteous  Judge  and  Governor  of  the 
world  ? 

23.  What  positive  duties  does  a  profession  of  Christianity  enjoin, 

and  which  natural  religion  does  not  recognize  ? 

24.  From  what  do  the  obligations  we  are  under  of  religious  hom¬ 

age  to  the  Son  and  Spirit  arise  ? 

25.  What  are  the  relations  on  which  these  obligations  of  duty 

rest  ? 

26.  In  what  does  the  essence  of  natural  religion,  as  an  inward 

principle,  consist  ? 

27.  In  what  does  the  essence  of  revealed  religion,  as  an  inward 

principle,  consist? 

28.  Does  it  make  any  difference  as  to  the  obligations  we  are  un¬ 

der  of  paying  religious  regard  to  each  of  these  Divine 
Persons,  whether  these  relations  are  made  known  to  us  by 
reason  or  revelation,  and  why  ? 

29.  What  are  the  inward  religious  regards,  growing  out  of  these 

relations  to  us  of  the  Son  and  Spirit,  as  revealed  in  the 
plan  of  the  Gospel  ? 

30.  How  far  are  the  exercises  of  internal  worship  a  matter  of 

pure  revealed  command  ? 

31.  What  facts  are  overlooked  by  those  who  treat  Christianity 

as  of  little  importance,  provided  natural  religion  be  re¬ 
spected  ? 

32.  If  revelation  be  true,  if  Christ  be  the  mediator  between  God 

and  man,  may  not  the  obstinate  or  careless  disregard  to 
his  offices  be  attended  with  judicial  punishments  ? 

33.  How  is  it  farther  shown  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  that  it 

may  be  no  slight  matter  for  a  man  to  reject  or  treat  with 
levity,  the  character  and  offices  of  the  Sj/irit  ? 

34.  What  is  the  conclusion  from  this,  on  the  supposition  that 


QUESTIONS. 


293 


Christianity  is  even  true  or  credible,  as  to  our  treatment 
of  it  ? 

35.  Distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts?  Between 
moral  and  positive  duties  ? 

■36. 'On  what  are  positive  duties  founded?  '  ’  i 

37.  State  again  the  distinction  between  positive  and  moral  duties. 
33.  How  far  is  the  observance  of  positive  duties  an  object  of  re¬ 
ligious  obedience  or  value  ? 

39.  Suppose  we  are  so  situated  that  a  moral  and  positive  duty 

seems  each  obligatory,  and  we  can  obey  but  one :  Which 
of  the  two  should  we  obey  ? 

40.  Does  the  general  tenor  of  Scripture  favor  this  view :  that  is, 

that  no  positive  duty  can  supersede  a  moral  duty  ? 

41.  What  is  the  teaching  of  our  Lord  himself  as  to  the  compara¬ 

tive  obligation  of  a  moral  and  a  positive  precept  ? 

42.  Recapitulate  the  reasons,  why  a  moral  precept  is  of  higher 

obligation  than  a  positive  precept  ? 

43.  Give  a  brief  summary  of  the  chief  topics  discussed  in  the 

chapter. 

,  '  •  -  \ 


CHAPTER  II. 

1.  What  is  the  subject  of  this  chapter? 

2.  Is  there  any  presumption  from  analogy  against  the  general 
'  scheme  of  Christianity  :  namely,  that  God  created  and 

governs  the  world  by  Jesus  Christ,  and  by  Him  will  here¬ 
after  judge  the  worlt!  :  and  that  all  men  are  under  the 
secret  influence  of  the  Spirit  ? 

3.  If  there  be  such  a  presumption,  it  must  be  from  one  of  two 

grounds  :  What  are  they  ? 

4.  Show  there  is  from  the  analogy  of  nature  no  proof  that  the 

scheme  of  Christianity  was  discoverable  by  reason. 

5.  Show  that  there  is  no  presumption  against  Christianity  on 

the  ground  that  a  revelation  is  unlike  the  whole  course  of 
nature. 

6.  What  are  miracles?  Distinction  between  visible  and  invis¬ 

ible  miracles  ? 

7.  The  object  of  the  preceding  remarks  ? 

8.  Why  is  there  no  presumption  from  analogy  against  a  revela¬ 

tion  at  the  beginning  of  the  world  as  miraculous  ? 

9.  State  the  three  aspects  under  which  this,  as  a  question  of  fact, 

is  viewed. 

10.  What  is  the  voice  of  history  and  tradition  on  this  subject : 

namely,  that  religion  was,  at  firsts  reasoned  out? 

11.  What  follows  from  this? 

12.  Wi  lat  further'  objection  may  be  urged  from  analogy  against 

miracles,  particularly  after  the  settlement,  and  during  a 
continuance  of  a  course  of  nature  ? 


294 


QUESTIONS. 


■•3.  Supposing  we  could,  in  the  history  of  some  other  world, 
placed  in  like  circumstances  with  our  own,  come  at  pre¬ 
sumptive  proof  for  or  against  such  a  revelation,  why  would 
the  proof  be  infinitely  precarious  ? 

14.  What,  then,  is  the  only  material  question  as  to  miracles  and 

common  facts  ? 

15.  What  consideration  affords  distinct  particular  reasons  for 

miracles  ? 

16.  Why  must  not  miracles  be  compared  to  common  natural 

events  ? 

17.  What  are  the  deductions  from  this  discussion  ? 

18.  Recapitulate  the  chief  arguments  of  this  chapter. 


CHAPTER  III. 

1.  What  is  the  object  of  this  chapter? 

2.  From  what  sources,  are  objections  against  Christianity  de¬ 

rived,  besides  those  already  mentioned  ? 

3.  How  are  these  objections  met  1 

4.  What  is  the  character  of  objections  against  Christianity,  as 

distinguished  from  the  objections  against  its  evidence  ? 

5.  Do  the  analogies  of  things  plainly  teach  that  we  are  compe¬ 

tent  judges  as  to  the  revealed  scheme  of  Providence  ? 

6.  Illustrations  to  show  this  ? 

7.  Show  that  these  observations  are  applicable  to  inspiration  in 

particular  ? 

8.  Of  what  are  we  beforehand  ignorant  as  to  natural  knowledge  ? 

9.  Analogies  with  this  as  to  revealed  religion :  that  is,  of  what 

are  we  beforehand  ignorant  as  to  a  revelation  ? 

10.  It  is  objected  that  a  revelation  by  verbal  tradition,  would  have 

answered  all  purposes,  and  secured  against  corruptions : 
How  do  you  answer  it  ? 

11.  What  is  the  palpable  conclusion  from  this;  and  why? 

12.  What  is  the  great  question  concerning  Christianity  ? 

13.  Why  can  no  disputes  about  inaccuracy  or  obscurity  of  style, 

or  various  readings,  or  disputes  about  authors  of  certain 
books,  nor  any  such,  overthrow  the  authority  of  the  Scrip¬ 
tures  ? 

14.  In  discussing  the  authenticity  of  revelation,  we  cannot  apply 

the  same  argument  particularly  to  the  prophetic  books  that 
we  do  to  common  books,  namely,  that  such  and  such,  should 
be  the  sense  of  the  passage,  or  would  have  been  expressed 
more  plainly  :  Why  not  ? 

15.  It  is  objected  that  internal  improbabilities  of  all  kinds  weaken 

external  probable  proofs :  How  do  you  answer  this  ? 

16.  It  has  been  shown,  that  we  are  not  competent  judges  what 

supernatural  instruction  in  any  sort  or  degree,  was  to  be 
expected :  and  it  is  self-evident,  the  objections  of  an  incom- 


1 


QUESTIONS. 


295 


20. 


21. 


petent  judgment  must  be  frivolous  :  now  go  one  step  farther, 
and  show  from  the  analog}’’  of  things,  that  it  is  beforehand, 
highly  probable,  men  will  have  objections  against  a  reve¬ 
lation,  howeveY  unexceptionable  it  may  be. 

17.  For  example. 

18.  What  is  the  legitimate  conclusion  from  these  examples? 

19.  Now,  apply  these  general  observations  to  a  particular  ob¬ 

jection,  namely,  that  in  the  apostolic  ages  certain  gifts  and 
powers  called  miraculous,  were  exercised  in  a  strangely  ir¬ 
regular  and  disorderly  manner,  and  hence  it  is  denied  that 
they  were  really  miraculous :  How  do  you  answer  the  ob¬ 
jection  ? 

Now,  point  out  the  analogies  of  the  case  ;  namely,  that  nat¬ 
ural  and  supernatural  knowledge,  are  liable  to  similar  hin- 
'  drances  and  improvements. 

But  if  it  be  objected,  that  it  is  incredible  so  many  ages  should 
have  passed  before  Christianity  was  announced  as  the 
great  remedy  for  the  moral  evils  of  the  world,  and  then 
too,  delivered  in  an  obscure,  doubtful,  difficult  way,  and 
liable  to  perversions  :  how  will  you  meet  this  objection  ? 

22.  And  now,  what  is  the  proper  deduction  from  the  foregoing,  as 

to  the  decisions  of  human  reason  respecting  the  facts  of 
revealed  religion  ?  "  ( 

23.  In  judging  of  the  morality  of  the  Scriptures,  what  is  the 

rightful  province  of  reason  ? 

24.  Show  that  there  are  precepts  given  in  the  Scriptures  to  par¬ 

ticular  persons,  requiring  particular,  actions,  and  which, 
without  such  precepts,  would  be  vicious  and  immoral? 
Do  Scripture  precepts  then,  require  vicious  actions  ? 

25.  To  what  do  these  observations  and  facts  narrow  down  the 

question  ? 

26.  What  are  the  three  chief  principles  discussed  in  this  chapter  ? 


CHAPTER  IV. 


1. 

2. 


3. 

4. 


5. 


6. 

7. 

8. 


What  is  the  subject  of  the  fourth  chapter  ? 

What  was  shown  in  the  last  chapter,  from  the  analogy  of 
things  to  be  highly  credible  beforehand,  supposing  a  reve¬ 
lation  to  be  made  ? 

What  is  the  objection  to  this  argument  ? 

How  may  these,  and  all  such  objections  be  triumphantly  an¬ 
swered  ? 

Is  Christianity,  as  a  scheme,  within  the  grasp  of  human  com¬ 
prehension  ? 

How  is  the  moral  government  of  God  exercised  ? 

How  is  Christianity  defined  ? 

What  are  some  of  the  parts  of  this  wonderful  economy  for 
the  moral  renovation  of  the  human  race? 


296 


QUESTIONS. 


9.  Quote  the  Scripture  proofs? 

10.  Is  this  system  or  scheme  of  things,  however,  perfectly  com 

prehended  by  the  human  mind  ? 

11.  What  does  the  Apostle  Paul  himself  say  on  this  subject  ? 

12.  Now,  reasoning  from  the  analogy  of  things,  what  may  be  re¬ 

garded  a  sufficient  answer  to  all  objections  against  this 
scheme  for  the  moral  recovery  of  man  ? 

13.  In  the  Christian  dispensation,  as  well  as  in  the  natural 

scheme  of  things,  means  are  used  to  accomplish  ends :  What 
follows  from  this  as  to  objections  against  the  perfection  of 
Christianity  ? 

14.  How  is  the  whole  common  course  of  nature  carried  on? 

15.  Are  all  these  general  foreordained  laws  known  to  us  ?  For 

example. 

16.  How  do  we  reach  the  conclusion  then,  that  the  whole  course 

of  nature  is  governed  by  general  laws  ? 

17.  Now,  if  from  seeing  that  a  part  of  the  course  of  nature  is 

carried  on  by  general  laws,  we  conclude  that  the  whole 
economy  of  nature  is,  what  may  we  justly  suppose  cred¬ 
ible  as  to  what  we  call  supernatural  interferences  ? 

18.  For  example. 

19.  What  is  the  conclusion  from  these  examples? 

20.  Upon  the  whole  then,  to  what  is  the  appearance  of  the  de¬ 

ficiencies  and  irregularities  in  nature  owdng,  and  what  is 
the  conclusion  from  this  ? 

21.  Design  of  the  closing  part  of  this  chapter. 

22.  It  is  objected,  that  the  scheme  of  the  Christian  dispensation 

represents  the  Infinite  Mind,  as  reduced  to  the  necessity  of 
resorting  to  intricate  means  to  accomplish  the  salvation  of 
the  world,  just  as  men  are  forced  to  resort  to  roundabout 
ways,  and  perplexed  contrivances,  to  accomplish  ends. 
Answer  the  objection? 

23.  What  are  the  illustrations  to  show  that  the  natural  world  and 

the  government  of  it,  is  not  a  fixed  scheme,  but  progres¬ 
sive  ? 

24.  Point  out  the  analogies  then,  between  the  operations  going 

on  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  providence,  and  in  the 
supernatural  dispensation  of  Christianity  ? 

25.  What  is  our  conclusion  from  all  this  ? 

26.  Give  an  analysis  of  the  chapter  ? 


CHAPTER  V. 

1.  What  is  the  subject  of  the  fifth  chapter? 

2.  How  has  this,  as  a  distinctive  fact  of  Christianity,  been 

treated  ? 

3.  Is  it,  on  a  strict  and  earnest  examination,  so  objectionable? 

4.  Prove  that  the  general  idea  of  a  Mediator  is  founded  in  the 

O 


QUESTIONS. 


297 


analogy  of  things :  that  the  visible  government  of  God  is 
actually  administered  in  this  way  ? 

5.  Now,  if  the  visible  government,  which  God  exercises  over 

the  world,  be  through  the  instrumentality  of  others,  what 
is  the  presumption  from  analogy'  as  to  his  invisible  gov¬ 
ernment  ? 

6.  Now,  as  we  mxLst  suppose  the  world  is  under  moral  govern¬ 

ment,  is  in  a  state  of  religion,  let  us  ask  what  moral  gov¬ 
ernment  implies,  before  we  discuss  the  doctrine  of  Re¬ 
demption.  WTiat  does  religion  teach  us  that  moral  gov¬ 
ernment  implies  1 

7.  Is  it  to  be  supposed  we  are  made  acquainted  with  all  the  ends 

and  reasons  of  future  punishment,  or  why  such  and  such 
consequent  misery  should  follow  vice  ? 

8.  How  may  we  suppose,  however,  such  punishments  will  fol¬ 

low  sin  ? 

9.  When  it  is  said  that  future  punishment  may  follow  wicked¬ 

ness  by  natural  consequence,  what  is  meant  ? 

10.  It  is  objected  by  .some  good  men,  that  this  is  giving  the  ex¬ 

ecution  of  justice  to  nature,  and  derogatory  to  the  author¬ 
ity  of  the  Moral  Governor  of  the  world  :  How  do  you  Ein- 
swer  this  ? 

11.  Is  there  in  the  constitution  of  nature  provision  made,  that 

all  the  bad  natural  consequences  of  men’s  actions  should 
not  always  actually  fc^ow,  even  on  the  foregoing  suppo- 
sirion  ? 

12.  How  is  this  illustrated. 

13.  What  is  the  instance  illustrative  of  severity  and  indulgence 

in  the  constitution  of  things,  noticed  by  the  author  ? 

14.  Now  then,  it  appears  from  the  course  of  nature,  that  though 

all  the  evils  broTight  on  us  by  our  own  misconduct  cannot 
be  prevented  :  still,  for  some,  reliefe,  and  in  many  cases, 
perfect  remedies,  have  been  applied :  WTiat  may  this  pro- 
’^'ision  be  called  in  the  original  constitution  of  the  world,  as 
distinguished  from  goodness  in  general  ? 
lo.  Now,  since  the  whole  known  constitution  smd  course  of  things 
adbrds  us  instances  of  such  compassion,  what  hope,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  analogy  of  nature,  might  we  cherish  as  to  the 
ruinous  natural  consequences  of  moral  evil  ? 

16-  It  is  true  that  the  generality  of  mankind  are  feebly,  if  at  all, 
sensible  of  the  awful  evils  of  vice ;  but  are  not  the  e^^l 
consequences  of  rashness,  wilfolness.  neglects,  things  we 
scarcely  call  e\'ils,  fearfully  impressive  ? 

17.  If  such  be  the  consequences  of  such  actions,  can  any  one  say 

how  fatal  the  unprevented  consequences  of  profligacy,  vice, 
and  the  stubborn  contempt  of  moral  order  and  right,  may 
be.  according  to  the  general  rule  of  Divine  government  ? 

18.  Could  any  one  say,  with  anything  like  intuitive  certainty,  how 

far  these  evil  consequences  could  possibly  be  prevented, 
conristentlv  with  the  eternal  rule  of  right  ? 

13* 


298 


QUESTIONS. 


19.  And  yet  from  the  course  of  natural  government  what  hope 

might  be  entertained  ? 

20.  Now  as  we  are  utterly  ignorant  of  what  the  natural  conse¬ 

quences  of  vice  are,  or  how  they  are  to  follow  if  not  pre¬ 
vented,  or  whether  anything  we  could  do  would  alone,  and 
of  itself,  prevent  the  infliction,  what  are  the  teachings  of 
the  analogy  of  nature  or  Providence  on  the  subject? 

21.  What  other  analogies  prove  the  same,  namely,  that  mere 

amendment  and  repentance  are  of  themselves  wholly  in¬ 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  future  consequences  of  vice  ? 

£2.  Now  what  light  does  revelation  cast  over  the  darkness  and 
doubt  of  the  human  mind  on  this  momentous  question  ? 

23.  What  does  revelation  teach  as  to  the  character  of  the  un¬ 

known  laws  of  God’s  more  general  government  ?  Is  this 
in  harmony  with  the  analogy  of  things  ? 

24.  What  facts  show  that  mankind  are  in  a  state  of  degradation, 

different  from  that  in  which  they  were  originally  created  ? 

25.  Is  there  anything  contrary  to  analogy  in  the  statement  that 

mankind  have  been  brought  into  this  state  by  the  crime  of 
our  first  parents  ? 

26.  What  is  the  fundamental  fact  which  underlays  the  entire 

scheme  of  Redemption  ? 

27.  In  what  three  relations  has  Christ  been  revealed  to  us  as  in¬ 

terposing  for  the  redemption  of  the  world  ? 

28.  Give  the  Scripture  quotations  on  w'hich  our  knowledge  of  his 

mediatorial  character  is  based. 

29.  What  particularly  constitutes  the  prophetical  office  of  the 

Messiah  ? 

30.  What  particularly  constitutes  the  kingship  of  the  Messiah  ? 

31.  What  constitutes  the  relation  of  Christ  to  us  as  a  priest? 

32.  Is  the  idea  of  vicarious  suffering  confined  to  the  Jewish  and 

Christian  Scriptures  ? 

33.  Is  it  an  idea  in  harmony  with  the  analogy  of  things  ? 

34.  Do  we  understand  how  the  death  of  Christ  made  atonement 

for  the  sins  of  the  world  ? 

35.  State  some  of  the  different  views  of  theologians  on  this 

subject. 

36.  What  is  rightfully  and  properly  our  duty  in  reference  to  ail 

such  views  ? 

37.  Now,  why  is  it  our  duty  to  accept  this  offered  salvation,  re¬ 

verently  and  gratefully,  by  doing  the  conditions  on  which 
it  is  offered,  though  we  cannot  understand  how  it  is  avail¬ 
able,  or  why  it  has  been  made^  rather  than  any  other? 

38.  Upon  the  supposition  of  the  necessity  of  a  Mediator,  are  we, 

antecedently  to  revelation,  judges  of  the  whole  nature  of 
his  office,  any  more  than  we  are,  antecedently  to  revelation, 
judges  whether  a  Mediator  was  or  was  not  necessary  ? 

39.  What  follows  from  this  as  to  all  arguments  against  the  expe¬ 

diency  of  particular  things  revealed  to  have  been  done  or 
suffered  by  a  Mediator  ? 


QUESTIONS. 


299 


40.  It  is  objected,  and  stubbornly  too,  that  the  doctrine  of  the 

Atonement  represents  God  as  indifferent  whether  he  pun¬ 
ished  the  innocent  or  the  guilty. 

41.  Now,  if  there  were  any  force  at  all  in  the  objection,  would  it 

not  be  stronger  in  one  respect  against  natural  providence 
than  against  Christianity  ? 

42.  That  in  the  end  men  will  receive  according  to  their  personal 

deserts,  is  implied  in  the  idea  of  a  moral  government  as  well 
as  revealed  in  the  Scriptures ;  but  may  not,  during  the  pro¬ 
gress  and  for  the  completion  of  this  moral  scheme,  vicarious 
punishments  be  fit  and  absolutely  necessary  ? 

43.  Now,  from  one  of  what  two  sources  must  all  objections  against 

the  propitiatory  sacrifice  of  Christ  originate  ? 

44.  In  fact,  what  argument  in  support  of  this  doctrine  has  never 

yet  been  satisfactorily  answered,  and  is  regarded  as  un¬ 
answerable  ? 

45.  What  then,  from  the  foregoing,  comes  of  the  objections  against 

the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Atonement  ? 

46.  What  is  said  of  the  folly  and  presumption  of  all  such  ob¬ 

jections  ? 

47.  Lastly,  does  not  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  teach  us  we  are 

not  to  expect  the  like  information  concerning  the  Divine 
conduct,  as  concerning  our  own  duty  ? 

48.  Is  it  a  fact,  however,  that  the  reasons  for  all  the  Christian 

precepts  are  evident  ? 

49.  Give  a  brief  analysis  of  the  principal  topics  of  the  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

1.  What  is  the  object  of  this  chapter  ? 

2.  On  what  weak  and  absurd  suppositions  are  these  objections 

founded  ? 

3.  What  is  the  best  way  of  meeting  the  argument  founded  on 

the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  the  evidence  of  religion  ? 

4.  Now,  is  the  evidence  on  which  we  act  in  the  ordinary  affairs 

of  life,  as  to  our  temporal  interests,  and  the  best  means  of 
securing  them,  plain  and  certain  in  all  cases  ? 

5.  Furthermore,  does  not  the  Author  of  nature  bestow  on  some 

gifts,  which  he  does  not  upon  others,  though,  as  far  as  we 
know,  all  equally  need  them  ? 

6.  Well  now,  what  is  the  conclusion  from  these  and  similar  welF 

known  facts  in  the  constitution  of  nature,  as  to  the  objec¬ 
tion  brought  against  the  uncertainty  and  partialness  of  the 
evidence  of  revelation  ? 

7.  Apply  this  to  the  question  at  issue.  Show  that  the  different 

degrees  of  religious  light,  given  at  intervals,  and  with  dif¬ 
ferent  intensities,  and  to  different  nations,  are  perfectly 


300 


QUESTIONS. 


uniform,  and  in  harmony  with  the  conduct  of  Providence 
in  the  distribution  of  his  other  blessings. 

8,  What  great  truth,  if  kept  before  the  mind  steadily  in  this  dis¬ 

cussion,  would  dispel  every  shadow  of  injustice  or  harsh¬ 
ness  cast  over  the  moral  providence  of  God  by  this  appa¬ 
rently  partial  revelation  of  religious  light  ? 

9.  Does  this  imply,  that  every  person’s  condition  here,  is  equally 

advantageous  with  respect  to  futurity  ? 

10.  Does  it  imply  that  men  should  be  any  less  earnest  to  get  out 

of  that  disadvantageous  condition,  or  that  others  should  be 
any  less  earnest  to  help  them  out  of  it  ? 

11.  In  what  other  Avay  may  we  account  for  this  apparently  un¬ 

equal  distribution  of  religious  advantages  and  informa¬ 
tion  ? 

12.  And  of  what  else  is  this  also,  most  probably  the  solution  ? 

13.  Suppose  that  Revelation  was  universal :  what  circumstances 

would  make  the  religious  situation  of  some,  and  the  dis¬ 
advantages  of  some,  as  widely  different  as  at  the  present? 

14.  Three  practical  reflections  are  offered,  to  show  that  there  is 

no  just  ground  of  complaint  against  the  want  of  univer¬ 
sality  of  Revelation,  or  the  deficiency  of  its  proofs — state 
them. 

15.  What  is  the  illustration  of  the  first,  viz. :  That  the  doubtful¬ 

ness  and  uncertainty  of  the  evidence  of  religion  may  con¬ 
stitute  one  particular  part  of  some  men’s  moral  discipline  ? 

16.  What  is  the  illustration  of  the  second  practical  reflection, 

viz. :  That  if  the  evidence  of  religion  should  seem  to  any 
doubtful,  even  in  the  highest  supposable  degree ;  this 
doubtful  evidence  will  put  them  into  a  general  state  of 
probation,  in  the  moral  and  religious  sense  ? 

17.  What  is  the  ground  of  these  observations — that  which  ren¬ 

ders  them  just  and  true  ? 

18.  Even  admitting  the  evidence  of  religion  to  be  as  doubtful  as 

it  is  pretended,  are  there  not  conditions  in  which  men  are 
highly  accountable  for  a  behavior,  in  which  they  plainly 
see  there  is  a  right  and  a  wrong  ? 

19.  What  degree  of  evidence  for  religion  does  doubting,  concern¬ 

ing  religion  imply  ? 

20.  What  is  the  illustration  of  the  third  practical  reflection,  viz. : 

That  the  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of  religion  is 
involved,  is  no  more  a  just  ground  of  complaint,  than  the 
external  circumstances  of  temptation  we  are  placed  in,  or 
the  difficulties  in  the  practice  of  religion  after  a  full  con¬ 
viction  of  its  truth  ? 

21.  Show  that  there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing,  that  the  spec¬ 

ulative  difficulties,  in  which  the  evidence  of  religion  is  in¬ 
volved,  may  make  even  the  principal  part  of  some  men’s 
trials  ? 

22.  What  is  there  analogous  to  this,  with  respect  to  the  situation 

in  which  some  persons  are  placed  in  the  world  ? 


QUESTIONS. 


301 


23.  It  is  possible  men’s  dissatisfaction  with  the  evidences  of  re¬ 

ligion,  may  be  their  own  fault :  For  example. 

24.  State  some  of  the  causes  that  may  hinder  some  men  from 

seeing  religious  truth,  which  is  readily  seen  by  others. 

25.  Is  this  in  accordance  with  the  analogy  of  things  ? 

26.  What  is  the  voice  of  the  Scriptures  on  this  subject? 

27.  Further,  is  it  not  a  fact,  that  the  general  proof  of  natural 

religion  and  Christianity,  is  level  to  the  comprehension  of 
the  least  educated  classes,  if  they  but  attend  to  it  ? 

28.  This  proof  is  indeed  real,  but  it  is  objected  that  a  thorough 

examination  of  the  evidence  of  religion  requires  knowl¬ 
edge,  time,  and  attention,  and  that  such  classes  cannot  af¬ 
ford  the  time ;  have  not  the  means  of  making  such  an  ex¬ 
amination  :  How  do  you  answer  this  objection  ? 

29.  Again,  it  may  be  objected,  if  a  prince  were  to  send  directions 

to  a  servant,  he  would  take  care,  that  they  carried  unmis- 
takeable  marks  of  their  authority  and  meaning,  so  that 
there  would  be  no  possibility  ol'  doubt  as  to  who  they 
came  from.  What  is  the  proper  answer  to  this  kind  of  ob¬ 
jection  ? 

30.  What  is  the  answer  to  this  from  the  very  nature  of  religion  ? 

31.  The  will  of  God,  respecting  morality  and  religion,  may  be 

considered  absolute  or  conditional  :  What  is  meant  by 
this? 

32.  Upon  the  whole  then,  what  does  a  state  of  religion  imply  ? 

33.  Give  a  summary  of  the  principles  taught  in  this  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

1.  What  is  the  subject  of  this  chapter;  and  with  what  view  is 

it  to  be  discussed  ? 

2.  What  are  the  two  direct  fundamental  proofs  of  Christianity  ? 

3.  Besides  these,  what  collateral  proofs  are  there  reducible  to 

neither  of  these,  yet  making  up  one  argument,  when  taken 
together  with  the  direct  proofs  ? 

4.  How  does  the  author  propose  treating  the  subject  ? 

5.  Proofs  of  Christianity  from  miracles  and  prophecy.  Charac¬ 

ter  of  the  historic  evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses,  the 
prophets,  and  of  Christ  and  the  apostles? 

6.  Argument  drawn  from  the  style  of  the  Scripture  narrative  of 

miracles  ? 

7.  The  argument  derived  from  the  fact,  that  the  Scripture  ac¬ 

count  of  miracles  has  been  quoted  from  age  to  age  as  gen¬ 
uine,  from  the  time  they  are  said  to  have  been  written  till 
the  present  ? 

8.  What  contemporary  events  confirm  the  miraculous  history  of 

the  Jewish  and  Christian  miracles?  Besides  this,  what 
may  be  added  as  a  proof  of  the  same  ? 


302 


QUESTIONS. 


9.  The  genuineness  and  authority  of  Scripture  history  may  be 
rejected,  whenl 

10.  What  are  the  evidences  of  the  genuineness  of  St.  Paul’s 

epistles. 

11.  What  distinct  and  ])articular  evidence  is  there  of  the  genuine¬ 

ness  of  the  first  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians  ? 

12.  Why  do  these  epistles  of  Paul  form  of  themselves  a  very 

peculiar  kind  of  proof  of  the  genuineness  of  Christianity  ? 

13.  What  is  the  third  remark,  on  the  direct  proof  of  Christianity 

from  miracles  ? 

14.  Does  this  appear  to  have  been  the  case  with  any  other  rcdi- 

gion  :  the  Mahomedan,  for  example  ? 

15.  On  what  grounds  do  you  show  that  Christianity  was  received 

into  the  world,  upon  the  belief  of  miracles,  in  that  very  age 
in  which  it  is  said  they  were  wrought :  and  that  it  was  on 
their  faith  in  these  miracles  that  the  multitudes  of  the  first 
converts  embraced  it  ? 

16.  Is  this  to  be  regarded  as  real  evidence  ? 

17.  Why  is  this  considered  as  proof  distinct  from  the  direct  his¬ 

torical  evidence  ? 

18.  Is  the  immediate  conversion  of  such  numbers  in  the  first  ages 

of  Christianity,  to  be  considered  a  presumption  of  some¬ 
thing  superhuman  in  Christianity  ? 

19.  It  is  objected  that  numberless  enthusiasts  have,  in  different 

ages  and  countries,  exposed  themselves  to  the  same  diffi¬ 
culties  which  the  primitive  Christians  did  :  How  do  you 
answer  the  objection  ? 

20.  Again,  it  is  said  enthusiasm  greatly  weakens  the  evidence  of 

testimony,  even  for  facts  in  matters  of  religion.  What  is 
the  answer  ? 

21.  Supposing  that  enthusiasm  be  admitted  as  an  argument  against 

religion,  might  not  the  same  charge  equally  be  brought 
against  all  human  testimony  in  common  matters  ? 

22.  Again,  it  is  hinted,  that  though  the  apostles  and  first  Chris¬ 

tians  were  not  deceivers,  nor  altogether  deceived  them¬ 
selves,  yet  their  general  testimony  is  not  to  be  relied  on, 
because  they  might  still  in  part  be  deceived  themselves, 
and  in  part  designedly  deceive  others :  a  thing  credible 
from  the  mixture  of  real  enthusiasm  and  knavery  to  be 
met  with  in  the  founders  of  all  religious  systems.  An¬ 
swer  it. 

23.  It  is  still  farther  objected,  that  it  is  a  fact,  mankind  have  in 

different  ages  been  strangely  deluded  with  pretences  to 
miracles  and  wonders,  and  that  there  is  considerable  his¬ 
toric  evidence  for  miracles  acknowledged  on  all  hands 
fabulous.  Answer  these  objections. 

24.  To  what  is  this  mode  of  argument  compared  ? 

25.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  what  is  the  conclusion  a§  to  the  liabil¬ 

ity  of  men  to  be  deceived  from  enthusiasm  in  religion,  and 


QUESTIONS. 


303 


the  capability  of  men  dishonestly  endeavoring  to  deceive 
others  ? 

26.  In  fact,  what  only  can  destroy  the  evidence  from  testimony 

of  the  truth  of  Christianity  ? 

27.  Now  show  how  unlikely  this  would  be :  that  Christ  and  the 

apostles  were  deceived. 

28.  Now,  from  the  foregoing  observations,  what  is  the  conclusion 

to  which  sceptics  must  come  ? 

EVIDENCE  FROM  PROPHECY. 

29.  The  obscurity  or  unintelligibleness  of  parts  of  prophecy  has 

been  urged  against  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from  that 
source  :  Answer  the  objection. 

30.  How  is  this  illustrated  1 

31.  It  is  objected  that  the  prophecies,  considering  each  of  them 

distinctly  by  itself,  do  not  at  all  appear  they  were  in¬ 
tended  for  those  particular  events  to  which  Christians 
apply  them.  Answer  the  objection. 

32.  What  is  the  analogy  in  proof  of  this,  drawn  from  mythologi¬ 

cal  and  satirical  writings,  where  the  satire  is  to  a  certain 
degree  concealed  ? 

33.  Now  apply  this  to  the  question  under  discussion. 

34.  If  the  apparent  fulfilment  of  prophecy  be  considered  explan¬ 

atory  of  its  meaning,  it  will  bring  the  question  to  this  * 
Has  a  series  of  prophecies  been  in  any  real  sense  of  the 
word  fulfilled  ?  Why  will  it  so  reduce  the  question  ? 

35.  How  is  it  shown  that  it  is  useless  on  the  part  of  objectors  to 

endeavor  to  prove  that  the  prophetic  history  is  applicable 
to  events  of  the  age  in  which  it  was  written,  or  of  ages  be¬ 
fore  it  ? 

36.  Granting  Porphyry  could  have  shown  that  the  seventh  verse 

of  the  seventh  chapter  of  Daniel  was  applicable  to  events 
which  happened  before  or  about  the  age  of  Antiochus  Epi- 
phanes,  would  it  at  the  present  day  have  much  weight 
with  reasonable  men  ? 

37.  On  the  whole  then,  what  is  the  legitimate  matter  of  inquiry 

concerning  the  sacred  prophecies  ? 

38.  What  are  the  remarks  which  the  Author  makes  on  different 

classes  of  inquirers  ? 

39.  General  argument  for  the  truth  of  Christianity :  Of  what 

does  it  consist  ? 

40.  What  is  the  first  reason  the  Author  offers  for  this  mode  of  ar¬ 

gument  ? 

41.  What  is  the  second  reason  assigned  ? 

42.  Now  state  the  argument  to  be  examined. 

43.  Why  may  this  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  be 

treated  as  wholly  historical  ? 

44.  Show  that  the  general  design  of  Scripture  is  essentially  dis¬ 

tinctive  from  that  of  all  other  books. 


304 


QUESTIONS. 


45.  What  is  the  view  which  Revelation  takes  of  the  common  af¬ 

fairs  of  the  world  and  what  is  going  on  in  it  ? 

46.  Does  it  seem  to  contain  anything  like  a  general  history  of  the 

chief  governments  of  the  world,  as  having  ailected,  and 
likely  yet  to  affect,  the  general  state  of  religion?  For  ex¬ 
ample. 

47.  What  are  the  materials  then  of  Scripture  history,  taken  as  a 

whole,  which  afford  ample  room  for  criticism  and  refuta¬ 
tion,  or  inconsistence  in  its  several  parts  ? 

48.  Again  :  Why  does  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  the  evidence 

of  Revelation  imply  a  positive  argument  that  Revelation  is 
true  ? 

49.  Give  an  outline  of  the  Scripture  facts  foretold  in  the  Old  and 

New  Testament? 

50.  Suppose  these  facts  are,  for  the  first  time,  explained  to  a  per¬ 

son,  and  in  connection  with  them,  the  fact  that  the  profes¬ 
sion  and  establishment  of  the  moral  system  of  worship 
in  the  world  is  owing  to  this  Book  :  and  sup})ose  him  also 
to  be  informed  of  the  number  of  nations  that  acknowledge 
the  authority  of  this  Book,  and  of  the  importance  of  the 
religion  it  teaches  to  mankind,  what  opinion  would  he 
form  of  it  as  a  whole  ? 

51.  Suppose  further,  that  he  is  informed  of  the  acknowledged  an¬ 

tiquity  of  the  Book — that  profane  history  confirms  its  nar¬ 
ratives — that  its  characters  are  real  and  natural — that 
there  are  no  errors  to  be  found  in  it  affecting  its  general 
credibility:  Further,  suppose  him  informed  that  there 

was  such  a  nation  as  the  Jews,  whose  government  and 
polity  was  founded  on  the  law  here  said  to  be  given  them 
by  Moses,  as  from  Heaven — that  their  existence  as  a  na¬ 
tion  depended  on  their  acknowledgment  of  one  God — the 
God  of  the  universe:  Further,  suppose  this  person,  in¬ 
formed  that  One,  claiming  to  be  the  Messiah  and  of  Jew¬ 
ish  extraction,  appeared  at  the  very  time  prophecy  fore¬ 
told — that  he  was  rejected  by  the  body  of  the  nation  as 
foretold — that  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  he  was  acknowl¬ 
edged  and  believed  on  as  The  Promised,  by  great  num¬ 
bers  of  Gentiles  on  the  evidence  of  miracles,  and  of  which 
there  is  still  a  strong  historic  evidence — that  this  religion 
spread  and  became  the  religion  of  the  world,  despite  the 
bitterest  persecutions  and  opposition — that  in  the  mean¬ 
time  the  Jewish  nation  and  government  were  destroyed — 
the  people  driven  into  captivity  and  dispersed  over  the 
globe,  and  are  so  to  this  very  day — peculiar  as  in  the 
days  of  Moses,  and  everywhere  regarded,  in  the  lan¬ 
guage  of  Scripture,  “  an  astonishment,'''  and  that  all  these 
facts  had  been  foretold  hundreds  of  years  before :  Now, 
what  would  be  the  effect  of  such  a  narrative  on  this  man’s 
mind,  supposing  him  a  frank  and  sincere  seeker  of  truth  ? 

£2.  Would  then,  the  circumstances  and  collateral  events  con- 


QUESTIONS. 


305 


nected  with  prophecy,  such  as  the  present  aspect  of  the 
Jewish  people — of  Judea — of  the  change  which  the  re¬ 
ligion  of  the  Messiah  has  effected  over  the  earth — be  re¬ 
garded  by  such  an  inquirer  as  inconsiderable  or  valueless 
evidences  of  the  truth  of  the  Sacred  Scriptures  ? 

53.  Again,  suppose  these  collateral  circumstances  and  events 

compared  with  the  Scripture  passages  to  which  they 
seemed  to  correspond :  would  not  their  coincidence  have 
with  a  person  who  heard  them  for  the  first  time,  very 
great  weight — greater  than  is  easy  for  us,  from  our  famil¬ 
iarity  with  them,  to  estimate  ? 

54.  Suppose  it  be  objected  that  these  coincidences  betvmen  events 

and  prophecy  are  accidental :  How  will  you  answer  this  ? 

55.  What  advantage  will  it  be  to  serious-minded  persons  to  set 

down  all  of  real  weight  in  the  proof  of  religion,  and  par¬ 
ticularly  the  many  seeming  completions  of  prophecy,  in 
taking  a  general  view  of  the  evidences  of  Christianity  ? 

56.  What  fact  is  carefully  and  solemnly  to  be  remembered  in 

making  out  a  series  of  probable  proofs  on  the  opposite  side, 
and  why  ? 

57.  Now,  as  the  truth  of  religion,  like  the  truth  of  all  common 

matters,  is  to  be  judged  of  by  all  the  evidence  taken  to¬ 
gether,  in  what  does  the  strength  of  the  argument  for 
Christianity  lie  ? 

58.  What  has  been  proved  in  this  and  the  preceding  chapter,  as 

to  the  truths  of  Revelation  ?  And  what  has  particularly 
been  attempted  in  this  chapter  ? 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

1.  What  is  the  subject  of  this  chapter? 

2.  State  the  five  objections  against  employing  the  argument 

from  the  analogy  of  nature,  to  the  proof  of  revealed  re¬ 
ligion. 

3.  How  do  you  answer  the  first  of  these  objections,  viz.:  That 

religion  is  not  to  be  proved  by  saying,  there  are  the  same 
difficulties  in  natural  as  in  revealed  religion  :  men  require 
to  have  the  difficulties  in  both  cleared  away. 

4.  Answer  the  second  objection :  That  it  is  a  strange  way  to  con¬ 

vince  men  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  by  showing  them 
that  they  have  as  little  reason  for  their  worldly,  as  they 
have  for  their  religious  pursuits. 

5.  In  what  does  the  force  of  this  objection  lie  ? 

6.  Answer  the  third  objection,  viz. :  It  is  a  strange  way  of  vin¬ 

dicating  Moral  Providence,  by  showing  that  the  same  ob¬ 
jections  against  it,  are  equally  so  against  a  natural  prov¬ 
idence. 

f.  What  afe  tloBfivo  Teasons  assigned,  to  show  that  it  is  mora 


QUESTIONS, 


W' 

important  to  convince  men  of  the  obligation®  they  are  tin¬ 
der  as  subjects  of  a  Moral  Providence,  than  it  is  to  justify 
the  wisdom,  goodness,  and  justice  of  the  Creator,  as  man-^- 
ifested  in  natural  providence  ?. 

8.  Answer  the  fourth  objection,  viz..;:  That  analogy  is  no  answer 

to  such  objections,  for  analogical  reasoning,  carried  to  its- 
utmost  capability,  will  still  leave  the  mind  unsatisfied  ? 

9.  What  is  the  true  practical  question  in.  debating  this  objec¬ 

tion  1 

10.  Answer  the  fifth  objection,  viz;.r  That  it  is  not  to  be  imagined 

mankind  will  be  influenced  by  evidence  that  is  doubtful, 
so  as  to  forego,  from  a  regard  to  religioUj  present  interests^ 
and  present  pleasures. 

11.  What  is  the  practical  question,  in  the  discussion  of  this  ob¬ 

jection  ? 

12.  How  has  religion:  all  along,  in  the  foregoing  Treatise,  been 

considered  ? 

13.  Show  the  difference  between  abstract,  and  matter-of-fact,. 

questions. 

14.  What  is  the  conclusion  drawn  from  this  distinction? 

15.  Now  what  does  the  Author  say  of  the  force  and  value  of  this> 

entire  work  ? 


CONCLUSION. 

1.  Why  are  inattention  and  disregard  on  the  part  of  those  who 

have  had  the  moral  system  of  the  world  explained  by 
Christianity,  and  its  claims  often  inculcated  upon  them,  in¬ 
excusable  ? 

2.  What  does  inattention  to  revealed  religion  imply  ?  Why  does 

it  imply  this  ? 

3.  How  do  you  show  we  are  under  the  most  serious  obligations- 

to  inquire  into  the  evidence  of  Christianity,  and  embrace 
it,  on  the  supposition  of  its  truth  ? 

4.  To  what  lengths  do  the  rejectors  of  natural  and  revealed  re¬ 

ligion  carry  their  opposition,  on  speculative  grounds  of  dis¬ 
belief  ? 

6.  Do  such  objectors  deny  that  revealed  religion  has  no  solid' 
grounds  of  evidence  ? 

6.  On  what  do  such  persons  ground  their  objections  ? 

7.  Show  how  this  Treatise  is  adapted  to  meet  such  objections. 

Do  this,  by  giving  a  brief  synopsis  of  the  chapters  on  re¬ 
vealed  religion. 


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